We believe compelling the performance of pecuniary obligations to be a part of that protection to the rights of property which society should afford to its individual members. So in a certain sense, we presume, do the anti-collection-law "reformers"; but the substitutes which they propose to make for the imposition of law (i. e., the convenience and benefits of doing right, and the coercive influence of public sentiment) would, it seems to us, be just as effectual as substitutes for any or for all laws. For were public sentiment unerringly acute in detecting, and prompt to reprobate all wrong doing, there would be little need of legislation. And were every individual far-sighted enough to discern his true interest in dealing honestly and justly by his fellow men, the penalties of law or the restraints of public opinion would never be called into exercise. But, as the world goes, a common sense of necessity has shown mankind need enough of law for the protection of individual rights. To talk more pertinently to the matter in hand, were all laws compelling the fulfillment of pecuniary obligations abrogated, there would be found those whose integrity would show no necessity of law to make them honest (such feel no "intolerable burden" from the present system)-but others, also, who would obtain confidence only to abuse and betray it, and between these extremes would be seen those practicing every degree of delay, evasion, excuse, and fraud. It is vain to say that the value of a reputation for honesty, or the advantage of a character for promptness, or the power of a sensitive public opinion (all of which it is claimed will result from the abolition of all legal coercion) would afford a sufficient basis for confidence or an effective correction for abuses of credit. It is an easy matter even for a knave to practice honesty for a time, if the reputation thus obtained will afford him the very facilities requisite to accomplish a grand and gainful scheme of fraud. And in the absence of all law to compel him to perform the promises by which he gets hold of the property of his creditors, when once resolved to exchange his character for the profits of fraud, the operator

upon public credulity has nothing to do but brave public opinion, and he may rattle his ill-gotten gains in his pocket and talk as "boldly" as a Mississippi repudiator of "what he will do and what he will not do." There would then be no remedy in society but mob redress, and that is surely more fearful than the most stringent of collection laws. Even this, moreover, he has small reason to fear, for observation teaches that the possessor of money, little matter how obtained, can find countenance and support. There are sycophants enough who can be brought to call dishonesty by a softer name, and to invent excuses and even feel admiration for successful fraud, as easily as party sympathies make our neighbor an apologist and an admirer of the bold dishonesty of a state that borrows money and then refuses to pay.

It may be our error, as the Telegraph man insinuates, that we have "too mean an opinion of mankind"; but, as it is a habit of ours to deduce our opinions from facts, we naturally place more confidence in them than in the crude notions of those with whom fancy appears to answer all the uses of judgment. That the mere reputation of honesty is not sufficient to make men honest, we have convincing example in the instances of those who were exempted from all legal liability for their debts, by the operation of the late general bankrupt law. No one will deny but that, in the case of thousands, the moral or the honorable duty to pay as fast as he could obtain the means was as binding upon the debtor as before he was released from the legal obligation. Yet how few are the instances in which such obligations have weighed a feather. Here and there we hear of an example, like that of Mr. Read of Boston, where native integrity prompted the payment of the creditors to the uttermost farthing of their just dues; but, while that man is presented with a service of a plate as a token of admiration for his remarkable virtue and his praise is sounded through the length and breadth of the land, how few are found ambitious of his

reputation at the expense of even less sacrifices than it cost him to win it.

But, insist our opponents, character will become so valuable, when we have it so that a man is trusted only on his honor and his reputation for punctuality, [that] that alone will make all men honorable and punctual. Hold a moment! Such men as are honest and punctual only because it is profitable to be so will surely turn dishonest the very moment the latter course promises an immediate advantage greater than the more remote gains of upright dealing.

In fine, we believe that the abolition of collection laws would operate hardly against the laborer and all men of limited means to whom credit is often an almost necessary assistance (for the misfortunes or disappointments of such are generally pronounced upon with harshness by those who hold the keys of credit), but would render all classes of society more completely the prey of that class of wholesale swindlers technically termed "financiers.” In other words, we believe that the era of no-collection laws would witness all the curses of credit without any of its benefits.

The measure of exempting a certain quantity of land or the home and tools of the mechanic from attachment or sale on execution for debts, which is countenanced by many of the opponents of collection laws as an advance toward their darling reform, we regard as promising quite different results. With our present light on this subject, we are inclined to favor such an exemption, with suitable restrictions; but then we want stringent laws for compelling the payment of debts to the extent of all means beyond the property protected. Of this subject, however, at another time.

THE QUESTION OF STATE GOVERNMENT

[April 4, 1846]

Will be decided on Tuesday next. All who believe that the people of this territory are equal to the duties, cost, and responsibilities of governing themselves-all who believe that more is to be hoped from the present action of the people, than from any plan of masterly inactivity in procuring a safe, judicious, and practical constitution—all who rightly appreciate the pecuniary profits of "admission,' the blessings of independence, and the political advantages of state sovereignty and equal representation in the national councils, will rally at the polls and vote

"FOR"

a convention, and a state constitution.

All who believe that the people of Wisconsin are too poor to support the expenses of a state government, and deem the yearly diminishing pittance which Congress doles out for our territorial expenses, of greater value than the liberal patrimony which we are to inherit on assuming our majority-all who would rather wait for the whole race of demagogues to die out, and for errors to ripen and decay, than appeal to the common sense of the people to disown the former, and to correct the latter-all who believe colonial vassalage preferable to state independence, and would rather have a delegate to beg, than a representative and senators to demand attention and justice from the national legislature, will either stay at home, or go to the polls and vote

"AGAINST"

a state government but for a continuance of territorial dependence and political imbecility.

THE JUDICIARY

[June 27, 1846]

Unjust laws, so that they are understood, can be avoided in their penalties by circumspection and prudent foresight; but from the weakness or corruption of the judiciary, the citizen is daily at peril in his every interest, without the possibility of foreseeing or avoiding the danger. Hence we regard the adoption of the best system of judiciary, and the mode of selecting judges the least liable to abuse or corruption, as of the first importance in forming our state constitution. In the lengthy arguments which have appeared in several of our territorial exchanges in favor of having judges elected by the people, we have not been able to detect any well-founded objection to the mode of appointment by the executive with confirmation by the senate, or of election by the legislature on joint ballot, one or the other of which methods has been almost uniformly adopted by the other states of the Union.

With the disposition which seems, fortunately, prevalent, to restrict the appointing power of the executive to a very limited number of officers, the first method can scarcely become a part in a system of favoritism, and in the absence of such objection, we humbly conceive that we shall thus be most likely to obtain ability, learning, and integrity upon the bench.

Qualification for the intelligent discharge of the duties of a judge is only attainable at the price of years of patient study and rigid thought. These must beget habits which preclude that familiar acquaintance and general intercourse with the people which might enable them to judge of the fitness of the candidate, or which would acquire for him popularity. With an elective judiciary, then, the duty of selecting candidates for judicial station must devolve more peculiarly than for any other offices upon irresponsible conven