her Constitution was republican or not, it hav-| The final question was then taken on the ing a provision in it excluding free colored resolution, and decided in the affirmative, as people from the State. The Senate voted to follows:admit her, with this provision in her Constitution, and the House refused. A Committee of Conference was raised as before, on motion of Mr. Clay.

The following gentlemen were elected a Com-Gray, Guyon, Hackley, Hall of North Carolina, Hardin, mittee on the part of the House:

On the 26th February, 1821, Mr. CLAY, from the joint committee, reported a joint resolution for the admission of the State of Missouri, upon condition that the restrictive clause in her constitution should never be so construed as to authorize the passage of any law by which After an unsuccessful attempt by Mr. Macon, any citizen of any other State shall be excluded to strike out the condition and proviso, which from the enjoyment of any of the privileges was negatived by a large majority, and a few and immunities to which such citizen is entitled remarks by Mr. Barbour, in support of the exunder the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. CLAY briefly explained the views of the committee and the considerations which induced them to report the resolution as being the same in effect as that which had been previously reported by the former committee of thirteen members; and stated that the committee on the part of the Senate was unanimous, and that on the part of the House nearly so, in favor of this resolution.

After further debate, the previous question was ordered, and the main question put, viz. "Shall the resolution be engrossed and read a third time ?" It was decided as follows: For the third reading Against it

The resolution was then ordered to be read a third time that day, but not without considerable opposition.

The resolution was accordingly read a third time, and put on its passage.

Mr. RANDOLPH, in a speech of some twenty minutes, delivered the reasons why he should not vote for the resolution.

Alabama, Lowrie, Morril, Parrott, Pinckney, Pleasants,
Roberts, Southard, Stokes, Talbot, Taylor, Thomas, Van
Dyke, Walker of Alabama, Walker of Georgia, Williams of
Mississippi, and Williams of Tennessee.-28.
NAYS-Messrs. Dana, Dickerson, King of New York,
Knight, Lanman, Macon, Mills, Noble, Ruggles, Sanford,
Smith, Tichenor, and Trimble.-14.

So the joint resolution was concurred in by both Houses and became a law, in the following words :

shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any of the
privileges and immunities to which such citizen is
entitled under the Constitution of the United States :
Provided, That the Legislature of the said State, by
solemn public act, shall declare the assent of the said
State to the said fundamental condition, and transmit
to the President of the United States, on or before
the fourth Monday in November next, an authentic
Copy of the said Act; upon the receipt whereof the
President, by proclamation, shall announce the fact;
whereupon, and without any further proceeding on
the part of Congress, the admission of the said State
into this Union shall be considered as complete.
JOHN W. TAYLOR,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.
JOHN GAILLARD,

President of the Senate, pro tempore.
JAMES MONROE.

Approved, March 2, 1821.

RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR THE ADMISSION OF MISSOURI INTO THE UNION ON A CERTAIN CONDITION. Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That Missouri shall be admitted into this Union on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever, upon the fundamental condition that the fourth clause of the twenty-sixth section of Missouri having accepted the condition imthe third article of the Constitution, submitted on the posed by the above resolution, the President of part of the said State to Congress, shall never be construed to authorize the passage of any law, and that the United States, on the 10th August, 1821, no law shall be passed in conformity thereto, by issued his proclamation declaring the admission which any citizen of either of the States in this Union of Missouri complete according to law.

DANIEL WEBSTER ON THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE.

AMONG the productions of Mr. Webster's pen which do not appear in his collected works, is a pamphlet published by Sewall Phelps, at No. 5 Court street, Boston, in 1819. It is entitled "A Memorial to the Congress of the United States on the subject of restraining the increase of Slavery in new States to be admitted into the Union; prepared in pursuance of a vote of the inhabitants of Boston and its vicinity, assembled at the State House on the 3d of December, A. D. 1819." The memorial is signed by Daniel Webster, George Blake, Josiah Quincy, James T. Austin, and John Gallison.

"MEMORIAL

"To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, in Congress assembled:

ritory, it may exercise over it the most ample jurisdiction in every respect. It possesses in this view all the authority which any State Legislature possesses over its own territory; and if any State Legislature may, in its discretion, abolish or prohibit Slavery within its own limits, in virtue of its general legislative authority, for the same reason Congress also may exercise the like authority over its own Territories. And that a State Legislature, unless restrained by some constitutional provision, may so do, is unquestionable, and has been established by general practice.

"THE undersigned, inhabitants of Boston and its | ry, it would seem to be as much within its power of vicinity, beg leave most respectfully and humbly to rep- legislation as any other act of local policy. Its sovresent: That the question of the introduction of Slave-ereignty being complete and universal as to the Terfy into the new States to be formed on the west side of the Mississippi river, appears to them to be a question of the last importance to the future welfare of the United States. If the progress of this great evil is ever to be arrested, it seems to the undersigned that this is the time to arrest it. A false step taken now cannot be retraced; and it appears to us that the happiness of unborn millions rests on the measure which Congress on this occasion may adopt. Considering this as no local question, nor a question to be decided by a temporary expediency, but as involving great interests of the whole United States, and affecting deeply and essentially those objects of common defence, general welfare, and the perpetuation of the blessings of liberty, for which the Constitution itself was formed, we have presumed, in this way, to offer our sentiments and express our wishes to the National Legislature. And as various reasons have been suggested against prohibiting Slavery in the new States, it may perhaps be permitted to us to state our reasons for both believing that Congress possesses the constitutional power to make such prohibition a condition, on the admission of a new State into the Union, and that it is just and proper that they should exercise that

power.

And, in the first place, as to the constitutional authority of Congress. The Constitution of the United States has declared that 'Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice the claims of the United States or of any particular State.' It is very well known that the saving in this clause of the claims of any particular State was designed to apply to claims by the then-existing States of territory which was also claimed by the United States as their own property. It has, therefore, no bearing on the present question. The power, then, of Congress over its own Territories is, by the very terms of the Constitution, unlimited. It may make all 'needful rules and regulations,' which of course include all such regulations as its own views of policy or expediency shall from time to time dictate. If, therefore, in its judgment it be needful for the benefit of a Territory to enact a prohibition of Slave

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"The creation of a new State is, in effect, a compact between Congress and the inhabitants of the proposed State. Congress would not probably claim the power of compelling the inhabitants of Missouri to form a Constitution of their own, and come into the Union as a State. It is as plain that the inhabitants of that Territory have no right of admission into the Union as a State without the consent of Congress. Neither party is bound to form this connection. It can be formed only by the consent of both. What, then, prevents Congress, as one of the stipulating parties, to propose its terms? And if the other party assents to these terms, why do they not effectually bind both parties? Or if the inhabitants of the Territory do not choose to accept the proposed terms, but prefer to remain under a Territorial Government, has Congress deprived them of any right, or subjected them to any restraint, which, in its discretion, it had not authority to do? If the admission of new States be not the discretionary exercise of a constitutional power, but in all cases an imperative duty, how is it to be performed? If the Constitution means that Congress shall admit new States, does it mean that Congress shall do this on every application and under all circumstances? Or if this construction cannot be admitted, and if it must be conceded that Congress must in some respects exercise its discretion on the admission of new States, how is it to be shown that that discretion may not be exercised in regard to this subject as well as in regard to others?

"The Constitution declares, 'that the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing, shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year

1808!" It is most manifest that the Constitution | first clause provides for the admission of the ceded does contemplate, in the very terms of this clause, that Congress possesses the authority to prohibit the migration or importation of slaves; for it limits the exercise of this authority for a specific period of time, leaving it to its full operation ever afterward. And power seems necessarily included in the authority which belongs to Congress, to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.' No person has ever doubted that the prohibition of the foreign slave trade was completely within the authority of Congress since the year 1808. And why? Certainly only because it is embraced in the regulation of foreign commerce; and if so, it may for the like reason be prohibited since that period between the States. Commerce in slaves, since the year 1808, being as much subject to the regulation of Congress as any other commerce, if it should see fit to enact that no slave should ever be sold from one State to another, it is not perceived how its constitutional right to make such provision could be questioned. It would seem to be too plain to be questioned, that Congress did possess the power, befere the year 1808, to prohibit the migration or importation of slaves into the territories, (and in point of fact it exercised that power) as well as into any new States; and that its authority, after that year, might be as fully exercised to prevent the migration or importation of slaves into any of the old States. And if it may prohibit new States from importing slaves, it may surely, as we humbly submit, make it a condition of the admission of such States into the Union, that they shall never import them. In relation, too, to its own Territories, Congress possesses a more extensive authority, and may, in various other ways, effect the object. It might, for example, make it an express condition of its grants of the soil, that its owners shall never hold slaves; and thus prevent the possession of slaves from ever being connected with the ownership of the soil. "As corroborative of the views which have been already suggested, the memorialists would respectfully call the attention of Congress to the history of the national legislation, under the Confederation as well as under the present Constitution on this interfering subject. Unless the memorialists greatly mistake, it will demonstrate the sense of the nation at every period of its legislation to have been, that the prohibition of Slavery was no infringement of any just rights belonging to free States, and was not incompatible with the enjoyments of all the rights and immunities which an admission into the Union was supposed to confer.

"The memorialists, after this general survey, would respectfully ask the attention of Congress to the state of the question of the right of Congress to prohibit Slavery in that part of the former Territory of Louisiana, which now forms the Missouri Territory. Louisiana was purchased of France by the Treaty of the 30th April, 1803. The third article of that Treaty is as follows: 'The inhabitants of the ceded Territory shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States; and in the meantime they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess.'

"Although the language of this article is not very precise or accurate, the memorialists conceive that its real import and intent cannot be mistaken. The

territory into the Union, and the succeeding clause
shows this must be according to the principles of the
Federal Constitution; and this very qualification
necessarily excludes the idea that Congress were not
to be at liberty to impose any conditions upon such
admission which were consistent with the principles of
that Constitution, and which had been or might justly
be applied to other new States. The language is not
by any means so pointed as that of the Resolve of
1780; and yet it has been seen that that Resolve
was never supposed to inhibit the authority of Con-
gress, as to the introduction of slavery. And it is
clear, upon the plainest rule of construction, that in
the absence of all restrictive language, a clause,
merely providing for the admission of a territory into
the Union, must be construed to authorize an admis
sion in the manner, and upon the terms which the
Constitution itself would justify. This construction
derives additional support from the next clause.
The inhabitants' shall be admitted as soon as possi-
ble, according to the principles of the Federal
Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights,
advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United
States.' The rights, advantages, and immunities
here spoken of, must, from the very force of the
terms of the clause, be such as are recognized
or communicated by the Constitution of the United
States; such as are common to all citizens, and are
uniform throughout the United States. The clause
cannot be referred to rights, advantages, and im-
munities derived exclusively from the State Gov-
ernment, for these do not depend upon the Federal
Constitution. Besides, it would be impossible that
all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens
of the different States could be at the same time
enjoyed by the same persons.
These rights are
different in different States; a right exists in one
State which is denied in others, or is repugnant to
other rights enjoyed in others. In some of the
States, a freeholder alone is entitled to vote in elec-
tions; in some a qualification of personal property is
sufficient; and in others age and freedom are the
sole qualifications of electors. In some States, no
citizen is permitted to hold slaves: in others he
possesses that power absolutely; in others it is
limited. The obvious meaning, therefore, of the
clause is, that the rights derived under the Federal
Constitution shall be enjoyed by the inhabitants of
Louisiana in the same manner as by the citizens of
other States. The United States, by the Constitu-
tion, are bound to guarantee to every State in the
Union a republican form of government; and the
inhabitants of Louisiana are entitled, when a State,
to this guarantee. Each State has a right to two
Senators, and to Representatives according to a cer-
tain enumeration of population, pointed out in the
Constitution. The inhabitants of Louisiana, upon
their admission into the Union, are also entitled to
these privileges. The Constitution further declares,
'that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States. It would seem as if the meaning of
this clause could not well be misinterpreted. It
obviously applies to the case of the removal of a citi-
zen of one State to another State; and in such a case
it secures to the migrating citizen all the privileges
and immunities of citizens in the State to which he
removes. It cannot surely be contended, upon any
rational interpretation, that it gives to the citizens
of each State all the privileges and immunities of
the citizens of every other State, at the same time,
and under all circumstances. Such a construction

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would lead to the most extraordinary consequences. | nience and the danger of this description of populaIt would at once destroy all the fundamental limita- tion had become apparent in all parts of this country, tions of the State constitutions upon the rights of and in all parts of the civilized world. It might have their own citizens; and leave all those rights to the been hoped that the new States themselves would mercy of the citizens of any other State, which have had such a view of their own permanent intershould adopt different limitations. According to ests and prosperity as would have led them to prothis construction, if all the State constitutions, save hibit its extension and increase. The wonderful one, prohibited slavery, it would be in the power of increase and prosperity of the States north of the that single State, by the admission of the right of its Ohio is unquestionably to be ascribed, in a great citizens to hold slaves, to communicate the same measure, to the consequences of the ordinance of right to the citizens of all the other States within 1787; and few indeed are the occasions, in the histheir own exclusive limits, in defiance of their own tory of nations, in which so much can be done, by a constitutional prohibitions; and to render the absurd- single act, for the benefit of future generations, as ity still more apparent, the same construction would was done by that ordinance, and as may now be done communicate the most opposite and irreconcilable by the Congress of the United States. We appeal 'rights to the citizens of different States at the same to the justice and to the wisdom of the National time. It seems therefore, to be undeniable, upon Councils to prevent the further progress of a great any rational interpretation, that this clause of the and serious evil. We appeal to those who look forConstitution communicated no rights in any State ward to the remote consequences of their measures, which its own citizens do not enjoy; and that the and who cannot balance a temporary or trifling concitizens of Louisiana, upon their admission into the venience, if there were such, against a permanent, Union, in receiving the benefit of this clause, would growing, and desolating evil. We cannot forbear not enjoy higher or more extensive rights than the to remind the two Houses of Congress that the early citizens of Ohio. It would communicate to the and decisive measures adopted by the American Govformer no right of holding slaves except in States ernment for the abolition of the slave-trade are among where the citizens already possessed the same right the proudest memorials of our nation's glory. That under their own State Constitutions and laws. Slavery was ever tolerated in the Republic is, as yet, "Upon the whole, the memorialists would most to be attributed to the policy of another Government. respectfully submit, that the terms of the Constitu- No imputation, thus far, rests on any portion of the tion, as well as the practice of the Governments American Confederacy. The Missouri Territory is under it, must, as they humbly conceive, entirely a new country. If its extensive and fertile field justify the conclusion that Congress may prohibit shall be opened as a market for slaves, the Governthe further introduction of Slavery into its own terri- ment will seem to become a party to a traffic which, tories, and also make such prohibition a condition in so many acts, through so many years, it has deof the admission of any new State into the Union. nounced as impolitic, unchristian, inhuman. Το "If the constitutional power of Congress to make enact laws to punish the traffic, and at the same time the proposed prohibition be satisfactorily shown, the to tempt cupidity and avarice by the allurements of justice and policy of such prohibition seem to the an insatiable market, is inconsistent and irreconcilaundersigned to be supported by plain and strong rea-ble. Government by such a course would only desons. The permission of Slavery in a new State necessarily draws after it an extension of that inequality of representation, which already exists in regard to the original States. It cannot be expected that those of the original States which do not hold slaves can look on such an extension as being politically just. As between the original States, the rep-nounced heavy penalties against the traffic in slaves, resentation rests on compact and plighted faith; and your memorialists have no wish that that compact should he disturbed, or that plighted faith in the slightest degree violated. But the subject assumes an entirely different character, when a new State proposes to be admitted. With her there is no compact, and no faith plighted; and where is the reason that she should come into the Union with more than an equal share of political importance and political power? Already the ratio of representation, established by the Constitution, has given to the States holding slaves twenty members of the House of Representatives more than they would have been entitled to, except under the particular provision of the Constitution. In all probability this number will be doubled in thirty years. Under these circumstances, we deem it not an unreasonable expectation that the inhabitants of Missouri should propose to come into the Union, renouncing the right in question, and establishing a constitution prohibiting it for ever. Without dwelling on this topic, we have still thought it our duty to present it to the consideration of Congress. We present it with a deep and earnest feeling of its importance, and we respectfully solicit for it the full consideration of the National Legislature. Your memorialists were not without the hope that the time had at length arrived, when the inconve

feat its own purposes, and render nugatory its own measures. Nor can the laws derive support from the manners of the people, if the power of moral sentiment be weakened by enjoying, under the permission of Government, great facilities to commit offences. The laws of the United States have de

because such traffic is deemed unjust and inhuman. We appeal to the spirit of these laws: We appeal to this justice and humanity: We ask whether they ought not to operate on the present occasion with all their force? We have a strong feeling of the injustice of any toleration of Slavery. Circumstances have entailed it on a portion of our community, which cannot be immediately relieved from it, with out consequences more injurious than the suffering of the evil. But to permit it in a new country, where yet no habits are formed which render it indispensable, what is it but to encourage that rapacity, and fraud, and violence, against which we have so long pointed the denunciations of our penal code? What is it but to tarnish the proud fame of the country? What is it but to throw suspicion on its good faith, and to render questionable all its professions of regard for the right of humanity and the liberties of mankind?

"As inhabitants of a free country-as citizens of a great and rising Republic-as members of a Christian community-as living in a liberal and enlightened age, and as feeling ourselves called upon by the dictates of religion and humanity, we have presumed to offer our sentiments to Congress on this question, with a solicitude for the event far beyond what a common occasion could inspire."