use the term "small matter" not because I consider it a small matter but because the big thinkers and planners down there at the Department of State figure $345 million is a mere drop in the bucket against the backdrop of $7 billion annually in foreign air porkbarrel. Bear in mind, in assessing the magnitude of this figure, that we are talking about a country of only some 1.5 million people. I daresay there are few Congressional districts in the United States which would not return to office many times over a member who could produce that kind of money in development loans. So Panama has got some pretty powerful friends here in Washington when 1.5 million people can get their hand in the till for $345 million in development aid.

But, Mr. Chairman, the really annoying part about this $345 million is not so much the fact that it is an exorbitant sum but that, in blandly promising this $345 million, the Department of State has ignored entirely the Congress and, with the exception of certain appropriated monies in the military portion of the $345 million, the Department of State plans to get this money for Panama out of existing authority without any action by the Congress and without any action by the Senate in consenting to these loans as part of the proposed treaties. Again, the prerogatives of the Congress are being ignored by appointed bureaucrats answerable apparently to no one.

DEFENSE OF THE CANAL

I suppose that the United States could absorb this financial rip-off. Certainly, we have paid needlessly vast sums in the past down a variety of ratholes and yet continued as a great and strong nation. But other aspects of these proposed treaties are far more dangerous in the long term to our national well-being than are the massive proposed cash payments to Panama. Chief among these considerations is the dangerous and obviously adverse strategic effect of abandoning-after a decent interval-the Canal and the Canal Zone to a pro-Marxist dictator who receives direction from Cuba and the Soviet Union. What folly. But in order to understand completely the immediate dangers of the defense provisions of the proposed treaties, to appreciate fully the sophistry of the media arguments on defense rights, and to understand the true extent of our proposed surrender, care must be taken to examine in detail the Executive Agreement in Implementation of Article IV of the Canal treaty, the article which deals with defense. Moreover, further study must be given to the annexes to the executive agreement, to the annexes to the annexes, and to the various notes, minutes and protocols-all of which form the fabric of the so-called joint military defense we would undertake with Panama.

I am particularly concerned, Mr. Chairman, that the drafters of the Canal treaty saw fit to set forth the major substantive defense provisions not in the Canal treaty in its Article IV, which is entitled "Protection and Defense", but instead in this executive Agreement in Implementation of Article IV-an agreement which is several times as large as the entire Canal treaty itself. Article IV of the Canal treaty does not cover a complete printed page, yet the Agreement in Implementation of Article IV is some 53 pages long, excluding annexes and excluding an additional 22 pages of agreed minutes, the minutes themselves having their own annexes. So, Mr. Chairman, we have critical defense provisions not in the text of the treaty but rather in this lengthy executive agreement and in other extrinsic documents which could be modified from time to time by the executive branch with no requirement whatsoever to obtain the assent of the Senate.

Moreover, Mr. Chairman, the defense provisions already set forth in this first executive agreement are, on their face, unworkable and portend a complete withdrawal of the U.S. forces from the Canal Zone well in advance of the projected date of 2000 AD. The Administration proposes in this first executive agreement to surrender 10 out of 14 bases. Thus, we are asked at the outset to permit the surrender of 10 out of 14 military bases and to permit our forces defending the Canal to be hemmed in from day one in four relatively small enclaves. These bases would indeed be enclaves because our freedom of action outside of the four bases would be severely limited by the treaty requirement for approval of operations by a joint military board in which the United States and Panama will have equal authority. Apparently, the doctrine of unity of command is imperfectly understood at the Department of State, but the Panamanians no doubt recognize fully that this provision of the executive agreement would give a de facto veto of United States operations outside of the four retained bases.

So our forces would be restricted to four relatively small enclaves and only 'the naive would doubt that we would very soon see pressure on our forces to withdrawal from the four sites retained. That process of withdrawal would be facilitated by the fact that the executive department could close down any one or all of the remaining bases by amendment of the executive agreement with the stroke of a pen without the consent of the Senate or the consent of the Congress. Now, Mr. Chairman, the members of the distinguished Committee may not think that this process of accelerated withdrawal is contemplated, but I would call attention to the provision of the executive agreement implementing Article IV which provides explicitly that the agreement will be renegotiated every two years or upon the request of either government and thus tacitly acknowledges what is coming.

This treaty is for a proposed term of 22 years. Yes, we are going to need tough-minded negotiators if we plan to hang on to these four defense sites for a term of 22 years with the Panamanians hounding us daily for complete withdrawal and with our own government already proposing to negotiate the matter on a biennial basis or upon request. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, these four defense sites would rest on a foundation of sand if, by Senate ratification of the Canal treaty, the Department of State were to be given the right to agree -and they seem pretty agreeable with this dictator down there in Panama -if the Department of State were to be given the right to agree with Panama more or less at any time that the time was propitious to shut down another base.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would ask the Committee to consider carefully the feasibility of successful joint military operations with Panamanian forces. Over the long term, we can expect problems. How can we expect full cooperation from an army whose recruits are taught to chant in unison at their recruit training base at Fort Cimmaron, "Down with the Yankees, death to the Yankees, to the wall with the Yankees". No, Mr. Chairman, over the long term we would be naive in the extreme to expect full cooperation from Panama in any joint defense of the Canal.

CANAL NEUTRALITY

Closely related to the issue of defense is the failure of the executive branch to negotiate for the United States a right to defend the neutrality of the Canal after 2000 AD. Much has been said in the media to the effect that the United States could unilaterally preserve Canal neutrality after a full withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Isthmus of Panama, but, Mr. Chairman, a careful reading of the neutrality treaty makes it evident that, in fact, the United States would have no such right whatsoever.

The neutrality treaty simply declares that the Canal Zone is neutral and sets forth an agreement by the United States and Panama that both parties recognize the Canal's neutrality. Nowhere is the United States granted permission to determine that the neutrality of the Canal is endangered or has been violated and nowhere is the United States granted the right to intervene to insure that the Canal is not made available to an enemy nation while being denied to our Navy and merchant ships.

Additionally, Mr. Chairman, the so-called right of expeditious transit given to United States warships is totally meaningless. The failure of our negotiators to insist on privileged passage for United States war vessels could permit Panama in an emergency to delay the movement of United States warships by simply requiring those vessels to transit the Isthmus on the same "expeditious" basis as merchant ships of all nations.

As Dr. Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, chief negotiator for Panama, put the matter, "If the gringos with their warships say, 'I want to go through first,' then that is their problem with the other ships there." Regrettably, Mr. Chairman, Dr. Escobar's analysis of the practical meaning of our right to expeditious passage, although stated undiplomatically, is nevertheless that the United States is given the right to send troops to preserve Canal neutrality also accords accurately with the language in the text. In fact, the truth is, Mr. Chairman, that Dr. Escobar's construction of the neutrality treaty, unlike the construction placed on it by our own executive department, is a construction based on the language of the treaty itself rather than on wishful thinking or on the assertions of the mass media.

But, although much has been said of late about correcting by amendment the problems of priority transit and right of intervention, no amount of band-aid

amendments can correct the basis faults embodied in any plan which gives control of the Canal to Panama at any time. No amount of words in no amount of amendments can ever provide to us the same needed guaranties as are provided by actual possession. Regardless of what these treaties might eventually say on keeping the Canal open or on maintaining a regime of neutrality-whatever that might mean-if we give up physical control, this country will still, sooner or later, find itself at the mercy of some petty dictator who decides, probably with the backing of the Soviet Union, to cause difficulties for the United States in using this vital strategic waterway. Our actions in Panama are sadly reminiscent of the mistaken British policies in surrendering the Suez Canal. Ironically, only two months ago, a British nuclear submarine was diverted from the Suez Canal on some pretense or other regarding safety regulations and was diverted around Africa on a journey of months which would otherwise have been only of days. How long will it be before the Panama Canal is closed to our ships in a time of emergency, if these treaties are ratified? When that occurs-and it surely will under these treaties-we will have no option but to attack Panama and recover possession, or to eat crow and begin the long voyage around South America. Some choice.

The unsigned Memorandum between the President and Dictator Torrijos has no legal standing, and, if it did, it would do little to clarify our rights under the treaties.

No, band-aid amendments based on this unsigned memorandum will not do either. Attempts at clarification are not enough. These treaties must be amended to retain physical control of the Canal or they must be rejected entirely.

A NEW CANAL

From the language of the Canal Treaty, rather than from press reports describing perripheral issues, we have also learned a final fatal defect. According to the terms of the Canal Treaty-and unlike other provisions, the treaty is quite unambiguous on this point-the United States agrees not to negotiate without express Panamanian consent with any country except Panama for the right to construct an interoceanic canal on any other route in the Western hemisphere.

Mr. Chairman, knowing you as I do, I feel certain that you share my astonishment that the negotiators for the United States saw fit to preclude any possibility of construction of a new interoceanic canal, perhaps at sea level, without our country first obtaining the express consent of a pro-Marxist and highly unstable military dictatorship. Why was this concession necessary? What did the United States gain from the concession?

I notice with some amusement, Mr. Chairman, that the Republic of Panama purports to grant to the United States of America the right to add a third lane of locks to the existing canal. Inasmuch as the United States already has the right to add a third lane of locks to the existing canal, surely our negotiators did not think that a meaningless concession of that variety was sufficient consideration for giving the Panamanians a veto over any other project we may wish to undertake to connect the two oceans. Certainly, the negotiators for the United States could not have felt that the Panamanian agreement to commit Panama "to study jointly the feasibility of a sea level canal" warranted a countervailing commitment from the United States not to do anything whatsoever without Panamanian permission-but perhaps so. The bizarre behavior of our negotiators has produced other results equally as startling.

In any event, Mr. Chairman, one thing is sure and that is that the Panamanians know they got the best of this bargain. Discussing the sea level canal issue, chief Panamanian negotiator, Romulo Escabar Bethancourt, on August 19, 1977, with pride explained to the Panamanian National Assembly the unilateral benefits of the so-called sea level canal options. Dr. Escobar's remarks on the subject, like his remarks on neutrality, are illuminating and are worth studying in full. As Dr. Escobar explains, instead of the United States obtaining an option to build a sea level canal, the United States negotiators gave to the Panamanians the option to veto construction of any type of interoceanic canal, sea level or locks, proposed to be built by the United States anywhere in the Western hemisphere.

Now, Mr. Chairman, committing the United States to deal only with Panama about building another canal is a serious mistake. As the distinguished Chairman knows, the best route for a new canal is in Nicaragua, that being the route

that Senator John Tyler Morgan favored during consideration of Isthmian routes in the early part of this century. Senator Morgan of Alabama, who was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals, felt strongly that Nicaragua provided a more favorable political and geographical solution to the immense problems involved in constructing a canal between the two oceans. Retrospectively, he may well have been correct, yet our present treaty negotiators propose to foreclose entirely the option Senator Morgan and many others favored, an option which should at least be kept open. Certainly, with the great volume of Alaskan oil which is only now beginning to come on stream and which must move to Gulf and East Coast refineries, any relinquishment of the right to negotiate for a route in Nicaragua is a very grave mistake indeed.

RESERVATION, AMENDMENT, AND FILIBUSTER

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Senate and the House of Representatives should play a significant role in the formulation and revision of these proposed treaties-and I might say in the rejection of these proposed treaties so that the terms of any new arrangement with Panama can be made fully acceptable to the American public and so that the commercial and national security interests of the United States can be fully protected.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure you know of the early practice of including Senators In delegations sent to foreign countries for the purpose of negotiating treaties. That practice has unhappily in large measure ceased, and the Senate has been more and more asked for consent rather than advice. These treaties provide an excellent opportunity for the Senate to reaffirm its Constitutional prerogative and, indeed, duty to advise the executive-to advise the President-in matters of foreign policy, particularly with respect to treaty negotiation. The Senate can give its advice through the amending process. These treaties should be amended to cure their obvious defects, and since any substantive amendment -as opposed to these band-aid amendments we are hearing about-and since any substantive amendment will require a renegotiation of the amended treaty, the Administration will be advised by these Senate amendments of what is acceptable to the Senate and to the people of the United States and what might later receive Senate consent and the authorization of Congress.

Reservations to these treaties alone would be of little or no value. Any reservations must be coupled with substantive amendments explaining to the President what is acceptable to the Senate and to the people of the United States. Reservations can only affect the obligations of the United States and, even with Panamanian assent, they can do little to bind Panama to a course of action consistent with the best interests of our country. Reservations can be used, as I pointed out earlier, to forbid the President to take any action to exchange instruments of ratification until certain pre-conditions are met. I believe very strongly that a reservation should be adopted forbidding ratification except if the Congress should see fit to authorize these transfers of United States territory and property. I hope that even proponents of these treaties would vote for that reservation since, above all, the Senate has an obligation to prevent a usurpation of the prerogatives and powers of the whole Congress.

Reservations, however, cannot be offered, under Senate procedure, until the treaty has been considered in detail, first, in the Senate sitting as the Committee of the Whole and, second, in the Senate itself. In other words, the rules of the Senate provide for a double-barreled approach in consideration of treaties. These rules are designed to insure that treaties receive the utmost scrutiny and are considered with all appropriate deliberation. There will be, therefore, ample opportunity for amendment of these treaties in the Committee of the Whole and later on the floor of the Senate. Substantive amendments must be adopted to guide the President in renewed negotiation with Panama. Then, in my judgment, these particular treaties, being incredibly defective, should be defeated outright so that there is no question but that the Senate and the Congress intend to insist on the will of the people being put into effect by the executive branch.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would comment that I do not foresee a filibuster of these proposed treaties. I do foresee a full discussion, legitimate debate, and consideration of substantive and serious amendments. These proposed band-aid amendments can be dispensed with in short order, and I have no doubt they will be promptly adopted. The real deliberations will occur over the amend

ments of substance which are not cosmetic and which would provide some true safeguards to our vital interests.

But a filibuster would be pointless, both because a filibuster could be stopped by 60 Senators whereas the treaties could be stopped by 34 Senators, and because both treaties present questions which should be disposed of without undue delay so that the country can turn its attention to other dangerous developments which threaten our security-I refer chiefly to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks which portend disaster for our country and which have in large measure been eclipsed by the Panama debate. But inasmuch as the concerns of the citizens of the United States regarding Panama are now abundantly evident, the Senate should with deliberation, but nevertheless promptly, discharge its duty in considering ratification. No good purpose can be served by having these proposed treaties more or less hang around for years. They should be put to the test of ratification without further delay and without further media posturing in Panama or elsewhere. My own sincere hope is that the wisdom and clear desires of the people of the United States will be respected for a change and that, accordingly, these treaties will be resoundly defeated. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this distinguished Committee and before its distinguished Chairman.

Senator ALLEN. Although the defects in both documents are legion, in my judgment there are five major flaws, each of which on its own ground would warrant complete rejection of the arrangements negotiated.

The five major defects, at least as I see it, are: (1) the failure of the canal treaties to require congressional authorization for the proposed cession to Panama of U.S. territory and property; (2) the decision embodied in the canal treaties and related loan agreements to pay to Panama some $2,262 million by means of various devices designed to circumvent the role of the House of Representatives or the Congress in appropriating funds from the Treasury of the United States, the very two points made by the distinguished chairman in his statement; (3) the failure of the canal treaty to provide for an adequate defense of the canal during its proposed 22-year term; (4) the failure of the neutrality treaty to provide for an adequate defense of the canal thereafter, and finally (5) the astonishing provision of the canal treaties which forbids the United States even to negotiate with another nation for the construction of any interoceanic canal in the Western Hemisphere without the express consent of the Panamanian dictatorship.

Mr. Chairman, as we found in the hearings before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, even though our hearing was designed to discuss the constitutional issues involved, there did spill over into the testimony other reasons than the constitutional ground, the failure to follow the Constitution in the hearing, and for that reason I would discuss peripherally other points than the two constitutional questions that the chairman alluded to.

The first major defect in the treaties is perhaps the most significant since it represents a direct assault by the executive branch on the prerogatives of the House of Representatives and since it would set a new precedent extending the authority of the executive branch far beyond the bounds contemplated by the authors of the Constitution of the United States.

As this distinguished committee well knows, article IV, section 3 of the Constitution provides quite clearly that Congress-that is, the Senate and the House of Representatives acting together-"shall