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which he assisted to establish, when their operation could be calculated only by the widest and most clear sighted circumspection. We rejoice in it, for it is, we doubt not, the most gratifying and appropriate reward, that could be offered to a spirit like his. In the beautiful phrase which Tacitus has applied to Germanicus, fruitur fama; for he must be aware, that the ocean which rolls between us and Europe, operates like the grave on all feelings of passion and party, and that the voice of gratitude and admiration, which now rises to greet him, from every city, every village, and every heart, of this wide land, is as pure and sincere as the voice of posterity.

ART. VII.-Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. By OCTAVIUS PICKERING, Counsellor at Law. Vol. 1; Containing the Cases from September Term, 1822, in Berkshire, to October Term, 1823, in Middlesex. Boston, Wells & Lilly. pp. 580.

It is not our province to keep our readers thoroughly instructed in the laws, and make our review a substitute for a law journal. In this country the law is the only sovereign whose supremacy is acknowledged; and as in monarchies and empires reports of the health of the king or emperor are often made to the public, as being a matter in which all his subjects are interested, so we owe it to the public to give occasional notices of any material circumstances affecting the state and condition of this sovereign of ours. Some of our readers may possibly be of opinion, that we perform this part of our duty with an over scrupulous fidelity, and, in this legal dispensation, impose upon ourselves, and upon them, some supererogatory labors. If it be so, and we lose sight of our proper objects by turning too often in pursuit of the law, it will be conceded to us, as some excuse, that we err on the safer side, for of all subjects that can occupy the community, none is more important, and of a more deep and lasting interest, than the character and state of our laws; since no cause so intimately affects the dignity, prosperity, morals, and hap

piness of the community, as the spirit and administration of those rules upon which the enjoyment of life, liberty, rights, and property, depend. But we do not now propose to occupy our readers with the subject of codification, nor to go into any elaborate disquisition, but merely to give a very brief notice of the volume of which the title is prefixed to this article; to which we are induced, in a great measure, by the circumstance, that it is the first published by the present reporter of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.

Before speaking of our particular subject, we will, however, by way of further apology, premise a word respecting a complaint repeated very frequently of late in regard to law books. As long ago as the time of Solomon, it seems that 'there was no end of making many books;' and, some two thousand years since, the Greeks found much study to be a weariness,' as appears by their maxim that a great book is a great evil, to the reader, they meant, no doubt,—and to one who must both purchase and read, the evil is doubled; and of this sort of evils, a law book is certainly not among the least. The men of the law seem to have suffered under more than their just share of this general and ancient calamity, if we may believe their lamentations over the ratio of their number of books, to that of their clients. On this ground we hear loud calls from many quarters for codes and abridgments. Men in the profession wish that books may, at some age or other, become obsolete; or at least that some device may be hit upon to bring this overgrown science within reasonable compass; and men out of the profession, though not at all surprised that every one is not, and cannot be, an adept in theology, physic, natural philosophy, botany, &c. yet seem to be surprised that the law cannot be so abridged, simplified, and elucidated, that every boy leaving the public schools should be a good practising attorney; and that a learned, deep read counsellor at law, should not become a rare and useless curiosity.

We will not, however, enlarge upon these interesting subjects in this place, but remark merely that all which has been said upon them, by way of complaints and projects, shows no ground of objection to the publishing of reports. These exhibit an accurate and authentic history of the administration of the laws, of which it is of vital importance to the

well being of the community, that the public should have ample means to inform themselves. A barrister, who through the medium of the reports, addresses his arguments to the whole profession, both of the present and future times, feels a much stronger motive to make himself completely master of his subject, than if the knowledge of the case which he argues were limited to the court before which it is pending, and the auditors present. A judge, who knows that his decisions, with their reasons, will be recorded and made public, and compared with each other, and tested by those of other judges and courts of former and after times, and yet is ready to throw out hasty conceptions and first impressions, in crude and loose propositions, must be indifferent to his own reputation, and public opinion, as well as regardless of right and wrong, and of his obligations to parties and the public. The practice of reporting decisions, with their grounds and reasons, is indeed an insuperable barrier to the corruption of judges; and what is of greater importance, (for in this country we are at an immeasurable distance from any fear of direct corruption,) it is the strongest possible guard against negligent and inconsiderate decrees. The motives, on the part of the court, to give able opinions, well fortified by reasons and authorities, are so much strengthened and enforced by the practice of reporting, that we may safely say that the judge, who, notwithstanding these motives, ventures to dispose of important and difficult questions, in a summary and superficial manner, must do so under the conviction that he is totally incompetent to an elaborate investigation, or from some constitutional or habitual disqualification for his place, which amounts to a moral necessity of deciding without weighing.

The publication of reports, again, affords the only means of informing the community of the laws by which their conduct is to be governed, and their rights to be determined, since the combined wisdom, talents, and experience of the country, if they could be brought to act in concert, and with the greatest advantages, upon the subject, could not frame a body of laws, which would anticipate and provide for all cases, and would not give rise to innumerable questions of interpretation; and the multitude of contracts, which men are continually making, and which a good system of legislation takes care to leave them free to make, is incessantly giving rise to questions of

construction; and the interpretations and constructions adopted by the courts are quite as important as the laws and contracts that give rise to them; they are in fact a part of the law, and it is as requisite that they should be fixed and made known, as that laws should be made and published. A people that has not the means of being informed of the decisions of its courts, and the reasons and principles of those decisions, may in truth be said not to have the means of knowing the laws by which they are governed. And the practice of publishing reports of adjudged cases is the only way of establishing these constructions, and interpretations, upon a secure foundation in the reasons and principles on which they are grounded, and in precedents, or in other words, recorded and recognised

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There are the same reasons for publishing reports of adjudged cases, as for publishing laws, and no expense incurred by a government is better bestowed, or goes more directly and effectually to promote the great and fundamental purposes of civil institutions, than the encouragement given for the publication of such reports. We were accordingly surprised at the difficulty recently made in the legislature of Vermont, in voting a sum of money for this purpose, and at the very small amount, (one hundred and fifty dollars if we recollect rightly,) that was deemed sufficient. It is still more remarkable, that some of the states give no encouragement at all to the publication and distribution of reports of judicial decisions, and in fact have no such reports. Others depend upon the voluntary labors of such lawyers, as may be disposed to undertake reporting, from hopes of reputation, and, in some instances perhaps, of a little profit, in respect to which the most modest expectation is in great danger of disappointment; or, if it be not disappointed, the profits afforded in our market by a publication of this description are in general so trifling, that if the reporter obtains for his time and labor, a recompense equivalent to the wages of a common daylaborer, he owes the public a debt of gratitude for their liberal patronage. But this is a very precarious way of supplying the community with the means of knowing by what laws and rules of conduct they are governed; and to depend upon it, is like a man's neglecting to provide for his household, trusting that a neighbor, induced by charity or some other

motive, will supply his neglect. Such a family has the prospect of being ill supplied, with the chance of being starved.

The office of a reporter is highly responsible and intensely laborious, and deserves a liberal compensation. It is the practice in the Massachusetts, as it is in the United States, and in many, and we believe most of the State courts, for the judges to give written opinions on the most important and difficult questions brought before them. The practice appears to be otherwise in most of the English courts, which gives the judges sometimes opportunity, and sometimes no doubt, occasion, to say, that the reporter must have mistaken the language of the court. The only objection to the practice of giving written opinions is the additional labor it costs the judges; but the manual labor of writing out an opinion is very trifling in comparison with that of making it up, and choosing and arranging the authorities and reasons on which it is founded; as every lawyer experiences as often he has occasion to give a written opinion. This inconvenience does not, therefore, outweigh the reasons in favor of this practice, inasmuch as it secures a more thorough and laborious consideration of questions on the part of the court, is an additional guard against crude and hasty opinions, and it checks the expression of broad and general propositions, under which indolence and inability are always ready to shelter themselves. Lord Ellenborough somewhere recommends the perusal of the earlier decisions upon a question then before the court, for the purpose of 'purifying the mind from the generalities' that had crept into the subsequent cases. These 'generalities' make it very easy to decide the pending question, as they afford a great space within which to bring it, or, to use a logical term, they furnish a very comprehensive major, which being once assumed, may be easily shown to include the minor, or particular question before the court; and the premises being conceded as a лov or, the conclusion is irresistible. But very soon another case will be offered to the court, which comes literally within this 'generality,' and yet too plainly requires a different decision. Accordingly this case is decided upon its particular circumstances,' or is considered to be an exception, and then another exception follows, until at length you have nothing but exceptions, and the rule disappears. The greatest talents,

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