Proposed Treaty-Consequences of a War with Foreign Powers. 419

outlet for a portion of its surplus popu- ple of the United States are not provoked lation, but also enlarges its commerce into a war with Spain, they will not atand extends its trade. But when, in the tempt to get Cuba except by purchase; course of time, it is ascertained that even if they do that, of which we have these objects will be better accomplish- many doubts; but if a war should take ed by recognizing the independence of place between Spain and the United the colonies, and permitting them to States, those in this country who now establish a government of their own, believe it would be unwise to acquire then any wise government will pursue Cuba in any manner, could not prevent this course. After the colonies become its acquisition, even if they did not independent nations, they will naturally, themselves become convinced that, with

on account of their sympathies with the all its evils, acquisition was our only mother country, be more apt to trade alternative. If then Spain wished to with her than with any other nation; prevent the annexation of Cuba to the if she has pursued a wise, liberal, and United States, she would do well not to just course towards them. This is owing bring on a war with the United States; to the fact, that, though they be different for we are satisfied that our government governments, they are similar to each will not engage in a war with Spain, other in tastes, feelings, laws, institutions, unless the war is provoked by her. and race, and, although two nations, they This government is not so lost to all will be in many respects one people. high and honorable feelings as to engage We, therefore, believe that many of the in a war with Spain merely to gratify European governments will eventually those who, under the pretext of giving give up most, if not all, of their colonial liberty to the oppressed, wish to make a possessions, finding the expenses of conquest of Cuba; but Spain may, by maintaining them greater than the profits her own rash and imprudent course, derived from them as colonies. Such, force this government to take up arms we think, is even now the position of in defence of her honor, and the rights Spain in reference to Cuba. The ex- of her citizens. pense of the large naval and military establishments, which Spain finds it necessary to keep in Cuba, together with the other expenses incident to the government of the island, are now, perhaps, almost as great as the revenues derived from the island. Were Cuba independent, all this heavy expenditure would be dispensed with, and her commerce with Spain, as well as with other nations, would be greatly increased. The people of Cuba, being of Spanish origin, would naturally prefer trading with Spain, rather than with any other nation, if she would pursue a liberal course towards them, and would permit them to become independent. Spain seems to feel that her hold upon Cuba is very precarious, and that is, perhaps, the reason of the harsh and stringent measures adopted by her in reference to that island. But the measures which she adopts are the very ones most likely to produce the result which she seems so much to dread. She may, by her own imprudent course, provoke a war with the United States; and if she does, the inevitable result of that war will be not only the loss of Cuba without any compensation, but the annexation of that island to the United States. If the peo

In that event we consider the annexation of Cuba to the United States as a sure result. But this is not the only way in which the same effect may be produced. Should Great Britain, or France, attempt to intercept any citizens of the United States, who might be supposed to be engaged in an expedition against Cuba, the result would be war. For our government cannot and will not permit Great Britain and France to take upon themselves the protection of the Spanish authorities in Cuba against expeditions from this country. Those who engage in such expeditions, become liable to their own government, and the government of Spain. If they fail, they will have to pay the penalty of their own misconduct; but they are in no sense responsible to the governments of Great Britain and France. These governments have no right to interfere with them in any way, and if they do so, it would be a just cause of offence to our government. By some such interference as this, war may be produced between the United States and Great Britain, or France; and the result of that war would, we think, be the conquest of Cuba, by the United States, and its incorporation into our Union. The at-all

hazards advocates of Cuban annexation in this country, are aware that such results would follow a war between the United States and any of the great maritime powers; and, therefore, they are not at all unwilling to see such a war commenced.

What the consequences of such a war would be to the island of Cuba, we do not think it very difficult to foresee. Its commerce would be seriously injured, and its value, as a producing country, would be greatly diminished. If we should then gain Cuba, as we believe would be the case, we would have to take it stript of its wealth, and deprived of much of its present value.

such would not be the result, she would, we believe, be willing before long to see Cuba independent.

This is, in our opinion, the best position that she could occupy and were she now an independent government, we do not believe there would be as much danger of her annexation to the United States, as there is under existing circumstances. Many of the arguments in favor of annexation would then be removed. She would then be in no danger of being transferred by Spain to any of the great maritime powers, to prevent which, many of our people wish our government to acquire her immediately. There would then be no danger of a war between the United States and any European power, growing out of an attempt to free Cuba from the dominion of Spain. The institution of slavery would then be under the control of the Cubans themselves, without the danger of foreign interference, and thus one great cause of apprehension to the people of the southern states would be removed. The slave trade would be effectually abolished, and many of the harsh and forbidding features which now characterize slavery there would cease, and it would assume more of the humane and domestic features of that institution, as it exists in the southern states of this Union. The commanding military position of the island would not then endanger any of the nations engaged in the commerce of the Gulf of Mexico. This gateway of the Gulf would be open to all nations, and thus the rivalries and jealousies of the great maritime nations on account of Cuba would be at an end.

Cuba, as she now is, contributes much to the commerce of the United States. Our imports into Cuba amount to more than $8,000,000 per annum, and our exports from that country amount to between thirteen and seventeen millions. These would be greatly increased if the Spanish government would reduce its rates of duties, and would give to the people of Cuba a milder and a more just government, but would be in a great degree destroyed in the event of a war for the acquisition of that island. If Spain would give to Cuba a good government, or if Cuba were independent, the United States then would enjoy most, if not all, the commercial advantages that could be obtained by its annexation to this country. Not only would the United States be benefited by a change in the policy of Spain towards Cuba, but so would also Great Britain and France. We, therefore, think that those nations, instead of endeavoring to form a treaty with the United States, for the purpose If Cuba can remain safely in the of securing to the crown of Spain the hands of Spain without endangering the island of Cuba, would be better engaged peace of the world, she can much more in using their efforts to induce the Span- safely be independent, enjoying the ish government to change its policy to- friendship of all nations, opening her wards Cuba, or to permit it to become ports alike to all, and enabling them to independent. They would thus be more reap the rich rewards of an extensive wisely and properly employed than in commerce with her. Were Cuba indeissuing orders to their naval officers to pendent, there would then be no pretext protect Cuba from hostile expeditions or in for hostile expeditions against that proposing tripartite conventions in refer- island, under the disguise of wishing to ence to Cuba. Spain would doubtless be give liberty to the oppressed, and consemuch more willing to see Cuba indepen- quently the peace of the world would dent, than to see her annexed to the not then, as it is now, be endangered by United States; and one great objection such expeditions, and thus many of the she has to the acknowledgment of her delicate questions which are likely to independence is the fear that she would arise between the great maritime in that event enter into the American Union. If she could be assured that be settled.

powers, in reference to Cuba, would

Arguments in favor of Annexation considered.

421

Mr. Calhoun, whose words of wisdom part of our own country. If our object should never be forgotten, said "We have is to acquire territory, to furnish homes now most of the commercial advantages for our growing population, we had much without the expense of administering better acquire a portion of Mexico than the government." If this is the case Cuba. The objection to the acquisition of with Cuba, as at present governed, how Cuba, growing out of the fact that it is much better would it be if she were in- settled by a population differing from us dependent. We would then have all the in race, institutions, laws, religion, mancommercial advantages without the ners, habits and feelings, is insuperable. danger and expense of administering the It may be, and has been said, that if we government. We cannot see any possi- owned the island it would soon be Ameble advantage that we would have from ricanized. We ask, is this reasonable? the annexation of Cuba, that we would If there were only a few there of the not have from its being independent.- Spanish race, this might be the case; The reasons urged in favor of annexa- but we think it idle to talk of Americantion are far from being satisfactory. We izing an island having a population of are told that we must get possession of 600,000 Spaniards, or descendants of that island, to keep the gateway of the Spaniards, upon an area less than that gulf from being closed, and our com- of either Tennessee, Alabama, or any of merce seriously injured. However this the southern states. The fact is, that may have been formerly, that danger is but few of our people comparatively now removed. Great Britain and France would go to Cuba to live, even if it were both disclaim any intention to acquire a part of this confederacy; since so Cuba; and they both well know, that many of our states and territories furnish any attempt of the kind would lead to so many more inducements and advana war with this country. tages to those desirous to emigrate, than Cuba would. That island would remain, as now, Spanish in its population and Spanish in its character.

Again, we are told that our revenues would be increased by annexation.This may be true, but still it furnishes no argument in favor of that measure. Our revenues are already sufficiently large, and there is more danger of our having too much money in the treasury, than there is of having too little. A surplus revenue is a much greater injury than benefit. This is upon the supposition that we are to get Cuba without any internal or external difficulties; and even then, we do not see that we are to be so much benefited; but if we are to get it at the end of a war, then there would be no danger of a surplus re

venue.

It is sometimes said the South will be strengthened by the acquisition of Cuba. This is a fatal mistake. That island has now a population consisting of 600,000 whites, 400,000 slaves, and over 200,000 free blacks, upon an area much smaller than many of our southern states. There is more land in cultivation in Cuba, in proportion to the whole extent of its territory, than there is in the southern states of this Republie. The natural inerease of the present population of Cuba will be sufficient for all purposes in that island. Those of our citizens who wish cheap lands would greatly prefer going to our western states and territories, than going to Cuba, even if it were a

In

The situation of Cuba is not similar to that of Louisiana when we purchased it. There were but few French or Spanish inhabitants in that territory when it was purchased, and the area of Louisiana was much greater than that of Cuba. 1810, several years after the purchase, there were less than 100,000 inhabitants in Louisiana, and there are more than 1,000,000 in Cuba. Even at this time Louisiana has only about half the population of Cuba upon a much larger extent of territory. The cases, therefore, are not similar. The annexation of Cuba would not restore the numerical strength of the South in the Union, because even after its acquisition the North would have a large majority in Congress; and when we reflect that the annexation of Cuba would be made a pretext, on the part of the North, for annexing Canada and other free territories, ought not the South to take care not to furnish the excuse? With what grace can those in the South, who advocate the annexation of Cuba, oppose the proposition which will certainly be made to annex Canada? The same or similar arguments will be made in favor of annexing Canada that are now made in regard to Cuba. We will find it as easy to get Canada, whether by

purchase, conquest, or any other means, ing the island at present, all of which has as to get Cuba. Great Britain would be to be borne by the Cubans. There is then as willing to surrender Canada as Spain no reason why Cuba may not maintain will Cuba, and a war for Cuba will lead to an independent existence unless it arise a war for Canada. Great Britain would, from the character of her population. If in all probability, as soon see Canadá no other than a despotic government is annexed to this country as to see Cuba, suitable to that people, then they ought and would be as apt to resist by force to remain under the dominion of Spain; the one as the other. Canada will be- but if this is not the case, then they come independent as soon as Cuba, and may maintain a separate existence. In will be as apt to apply for admission neither case is there any necessity for into our Union. We believe the time is annexing her to the United States. We coming when, if no violent means are trust that the people will be found caparesorted to, Great Britain and Spain will ble of self-government, for we think the acknowledge the independence of both time is coming when they will have to Canada and Cuba, and in any event the make the experiment. We hope Cuba acquisition of Cuba would lead most cer- will either remain a colony of Spain or tainly to that of Canada. Let the South, become independent. We are not one then, unless it desires the annexation of of those who think that national proCanada, oppose also the acquisition of gress consists alone in accessions of Cuba. We do not say but that a state territory. The proper improvement of of things might arise when it would be necessary for us to take both, but such is not now the case; that "overruling necessity" is not now upon us. What then is to become of Cuba? Let her remain in the hands of Spain or become independent. We are aware the opinion has been expressed, that Cuba cannot exist as an independent government. Why not? Cuba has all the elements necessary for a separate and independent existence. Her wealth and population are sufficient; her population amounts to more than 1,200,000, her exports amount to about thirty-two millions of dollars, and her imports to something more. Why then can she not maintain an independent existence? Are her people incapable of self-government? Surely those who are such warm advocates for Cuban emancipation do not think so, else they would not be so anxious to free them from oppression. They certainly would not wish to incorporate into our Union a people incapable of self-government. If they are capable of self-government, they can maintain a separate existence as a nation, for it will be the interest and policy of all the great maritime powers to maintain her independence. Her expenses will not be by any means so great as the expense of govern

that which we now possess is of more importance than unlimited extension. Commerce and not conquest is our true policy. In this article we have not alluded to the proposition made by our government in 1848 for the purchase of Cuba. Reasons then existed, or were thought to exist, making it our duty to acquire it to prevent its falling into the hands of the British government. That is not now the case. That danger has passed. The reasons that then existed do not exist at this time; circumstances have materially changed; and what might have been a wise and prudent proposition at that time might be unwise now. It is idle to think of purchasing Cuba from Spain. She will not sell it to the United States, and we believe that she would rather permit it to become independent than sell it to us for a hundred millions, because she would retain her trade with that island as an independent nation, which she would lose in the event of its annexation to this country. We therefore think it would be the true policy of our government, as well as of the governments of Great Britain and France, to use their efforts to prevail on Spain either to modify her policy towards Cuba or to establish its independence.

Examination of the Lake Country-Falls of St. Marie. 423

ART. 11-INLAND COMMERCE OF THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY AND THE ST. LAWRENCE BASIN.*

The inland commerce of our country no great deficit is suffered on either side. has attained such immensity of import- We merely mention these natural pheance, as to occupy much of the attention nomena, as typical of other features of of the shrewd, sagacious, and far-seeing this most interesting section of country. capitalists, statesmen, and merchants of It is well known that the two great the day. And yet, this commerce is ge- combinations of water here alluded to nerally but very badly appreciated, very drain the whole extended country beimperfectly understood, and its import- tween the Alleghany Mountains on the ance greatly underrated by the vast ma- east, and the Rocky range on the west; jority of those who would wish to be that portion of it drained by the Missisclassed with one or the other of those sippi and its tributaries being familiarly coteries just mentioned. It may be well known as the Mississippi Valley; and understood that the great chain of Ame- that bordering the lakes and the St. rican lakes have their natural outlet Lawrence, as the great St. Lawrence through the river and gulf of the St. basin. And it is also a fact, with which Lawrence into the Atlantic. And it is geographers are quite familiar, that so no less a fact of general appreciation, continuous and uninterrupted is the Althat the Ohio, Illinois, Tennessee, Cum- leghany chain, that these channels are berland, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, the only navigable outlets for the proRock Island, Fever and Des Moines rivers, with many others, are tributaries to the great Mississippi, through whose channel these waters find their way to the Gulf of Mexico-more than four thousand miles distant from the outlet of the waters of the lakes at the Gulf of St. Lawrence. But it may not be a matter of such general knowledge, that the sources of these respective drains between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, in the States of New-York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, are to be found in the most intimate association, with their branches interlocking each other. Indeed the dividing line of the watersheds in these states is so slightly marked by nature in the physical construction of the face of the country, that it is not unfrequently the case, when the spring opens amid frequent rains, melting snows, and disembodied springs of the earth, ejecting their contents at the bidding of the departing frost, causing temporary freshets, to see their waters unite in harmony and flow to the lakes sometimes, and at others to the rivers, as the attraction may, for the time being, prove strongest. By this operation the southern gulf is robbed, at times, of a portion of the waters apparently designed for it; and again, the northern one is made to suffer a similar depredation. But in the end probably

ducts of the valley and basin to the seaboard. But we have already said that no very perceptible elevation of the earth marked the dividing line between the sources of the rivers and those of the lakes; and it seems not improbable that this fact, and its consequent, the interchanging of the waters of the two, were designed to lead to that artificial union of these waters for commercial purposes which has already taken place at various points. Hence, as we have seen the waters taking the opposite of their natural course, in obedience to some freak of nature, so in consequence of slight changes in the markets, or the prices of freights, we observe the products of the earth seek a northern or southern outlet to the seaboard. The result is a blending by one common channel of the two great arteries of commerce which drain the basin and valley of their rich and varied products, and through which they are in turn supplied with those necessaries and luxuries which are received in exchange.

This continuous channel forms a vast road-way, open to the common use of all, from the Atlantic to the Gulf of Mexico; and this stupendous highway, with its numerous branches, outlets and tributaries, is the theatre of the great bulk of our internal commerce. It is no part of our present purpose to enter into a history of this inland commerce, or to detail its value. We have daily evidence before our eyes, to convince us of the rapidity of the one, and the im