and proposed to be expended on the defensive works extending from Rouse's Point to the Sault of St. Marie, would have been, and will be more beneficially applied to the improvement of the lake harbors and dependent rivers, thus promoting the interests of commerce in time of peace, and affording naval depots for our naval forces in time of war.

defences. Other temporary expedients, such as rafts, hulks sunk in channels, and ridges of stone thrown across the same, could be relied upon, in most instances, only as auxiliary defence to land batteries. 4th. In considering how far the increase of population on the northern frontier, and of the mercantile marine on the northern lakes, obviates the necessity of continuing the system of fortifications on By demonstrating that such an application those lakes, it will be necessary to bring of the public money would directly promote into view some of the elements of the national defence, not only on the lakes, strength, moral, physical, and political, in substitution of fortifications, but on the possessed by the United States, and which seaboard, in aiding the defence by fortificahave already been alluded to in this report. tions, much of the opposition entertained, The chief moral and political element on constitutional grounds, towards internal is the aversion to war with the United improvements, would be removed. States, felt by Great Britain, whose Under these views, it is the opinion of present superiority in naval means of the undersigned, that the whole system of attack make her, of all nations, alone fortifications for the defence of the northformidable to us. This aversion arises ern and lake frontiers should at once be from the intimate and entangling relations abandoned, and that no more money be in commerce with this country, and applied even for the repairs or completion from the dependence of England upon the of the existing works. United States for the chief supply of cotton to the leading branch of her manufactures. And this aversion to the slightest approach of international hostility is not abated by the consideration, that the untoward event of war with the United States would prompt Russia and France to carry out their long-cherished designs of aggrandizement in Turkey, Syria, and India.

The undersigned, in conclusion, would express his opinion in repetition, that a board of artillery and engineer officers and civilians should be formed, to take into consideration the whole subject of the national defences, as called for by the resolutions of the House of Representatives, passed in the session of 3d March, 1851, and as particularly and searchingly alluded to by the Secretary of War, in his The principal physical elements are: order of 17th April, 1851, with a view to first, the facility with which, by means the changes necessary to be made in the of existing railways, we could approach "third system of defence," commenced Montreal with a large force, and drive thirty-five years ago, and of the adaptation thence the British forces to seek shelter of the same, inversely, to the increased under the walls of Quebec, and finally from all Canada; by which simple and rapid movement the two provinces would fall without a struggle into our possession, with one-half of its population, at least, inclined to a change of sovereignty; and second, the superiority of our mercantile marine, affording convertible means for a naval force, giving us the mastery of the lakes, and enabling us to crush any partisan attempts coming from the Canada shore;-and third, the superiority of our advantages on the score of a military population lying along the whole northern and lake frontier.

These great moral, physical, and political advantages being undeniable, the continuation of the system of fortifications, on the northern and lake frontier, would involve a useless waste of public money.

The large sums of money expended,

power, political, physical, and moral, of the United States; the composition of such a board being well calculated to have the whole subject opened fairly and discussed freely, by which errors of opinions, particularly those arising from professional prejudices and interests, would be exposed and corrected, the truth in the premises made manifest, and the good of the common-wealth secured.

Civilians versed in national and international policy, and oflicers known to be opposed to the system of defence on its present scale, as well as those who have declared in its favor, would cause the pour and contre to be fairly stated, and all sophistry and false principles to be detected and discarded.

In the event of such a board bein formed, it is suggested that the ayes noes on all important questions shor ordered to be taken and recorded.

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ART. VIII-CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES.

THE POLICY OF ANNEXATION DISCUSSED. *

THE present and prospective condition her coming under the control of Great of Cuba is one of deep interest. Ap- Britain or France. The geographical pearances indicate that Spain cannot position of Cuba is such that she must long continue to hold possession of that either belong to Spain, become an indeisland, unless she changes, and that pendent government, or be annexed to greatly, her policy in reference to it. our republic. In no event could our Should the Spanish Government extend government permit her to be acquired to the people of Cuba the privileges they by any European power, and any such so much desire; allow them an equal attempt would necessarily involve the participation in the offices of honor and nation making it in a war with the Uniprofit, instead of bestowing them exclu- ted States. Spain, doubtless, relies greatsively upon natives of Old Spain; re- ly upon the assistance which she exmove the burdens placed upon com- pects to receive from England and merce, and otherwise modify the harsh France, in the event of any serious atfeatures of their present policy, Spain tempt being made to free Cuba from her might for years retain possession of dominion. the island of Cuba. Nor would she sus- It is said that she has assurances to tain any loss in thus changing her policy, that effect, from one or both of these because the increased trade and com- governments. Taking the view of the merce of Cuba, resulting from a more liberal policy, would more than compensate the Spanish Government for the concessions it might make. But we are apprehensive that Spain will obstinately refuse to ameliorate the condition of that people until a successful resistance shall have been made to the Spanish authorities, and Spain shall have lost her dominion over the island of Cuba. We say we are apprehensive that such will be the result, for we think that if Spain would give to the people of Cuba a wise, liberal and good government, the situation of Cuba would then be better than any which she can occupy under existing circumstances. There are many evils which, we think, would attend a war in Cuba for her freedom and independence, even if she should eventually achieve them, and should ultimately be annexed to our republic. There are many satisfactory reasons why Cuba should not be annexed to the United States, unless it becomes a matter of necessity to annex her in order to prevent

The editor of the Review deems it scarcely necessary to say, that he does not hold himself respon

sible for the opinions of his contributors. Upon the subject of Cuba, which is now so "uppermost" in every one's thoughts, he is willing it should be fairly and impartially handled. It is certainly one of deep truths in the article which follows, but some things again which are not so obvious. So far as the Review is concerned, it is not prepared to take a posi

Southern interest, at least. There are many sober

tion now, but will do so soon, in an article of some elaboration.

subject which we do, we are constrained to say, that what she considers her greatest security, we regard as her greatest danger. In our opinion, any attempt on the part of England and France to render "permanent the union of Cuba with the crown of Spain," by interfering to prevent hostile enterprises against that island, and by giving assistance to the Spanish authorities in any struggle which may take place between them and the people of Cuba, would only serve to hasten the event which Spain, England and France, all seem so much to dread; that is, the annexation of Cuba to the United States. Although we do not approve of hostile enterprises, undertaken by our citizens against the island of Cuba, either for the purpose of exciting the Cubans to insurrection, or of aiding them in throwing off the Spanish government, and believe that it is the duty of our government to use all proper and necessary means to prevent such expeditions, yet we cannot recognize any right in the English and French governments to establish a "police of the seas," and to interfere for the purpose of having our laws executed. We are capable of managing our own affairs, without any supervision on their part, and we consider any such interference, implying, as it does, a distrust of the good faith of our government, as officious intermeddling with that which does not especially concern them.

The orders given by the English and French governments to their naval officers in the West Indies, to prevent hostile expeditions against Cuba, were well calculated to be highly offensive to the United States, and any attempt to carry them into execution would necessarily lead to a collision. Whilst we think that the United States should not interfere in a struggle between Spain and the people of Cuba, even to assist those struggling for freedom, yet we could not and would not permit any European nation to interfere in behalf of Spain. All our sympa thies would be with those contending for freedom; and although we could not give them any direct assistance, without violating our most sacred and wisest maxims of policy, and without departing from the examples set us by our ablest, most distinguished, and best statesmen, yet if any other government should interpose for the purpose of crushing the rising spirit of liberty on this continent, we would be in duty bound to put a stop to such interference at the hazard of war, if that were necessary. This is and long has been the American doctrine, and it is well that the governments of England and France should distinctly understand the position we occupy on this subject.

England or France, on account of Cuba, but our rights as an American nation we will maintain. We will not permit any interference on the part of any European government between those struggling for freedom on this continent and their oppressors. We cannot believe that either the government of England or France desires a war with the United States on account of Cuba, for we cannot see how the true interests of any of the parties would be advanced by such a war. Cuba as an independent government, or under the dominion of Spain, with a milder and more liberal policy than she now has, would be of greater benefit to all the great commercial nations of the earth than if she remained in her present condition, or belonged to any of the great maritime powers. If it should become necessary to annex Cuba to the United States in order to prevent its coming under the control of England or France, then we say, let it be done, but in no other point of view do we see that it would be good policy for us to annex it. The most desirable position which, we think, Cuba could occupy, would be that of an independent republic, rich in her tropical productions, having free and unrestricted commerce with all In the event of a revolution in Cuba, nations, enjoying their friendship and our citizens would have the undoubted sharing largely in their trade. In this right, if they saw fit to exercise it, of way she would be as beneficial to the emigrating to that island and taking part United States as if she were annexed, in the struggle, but in so doing they without any of the evils resulting from would forfeit the privileges of American annexation. We have never been able citizens, and would voluntarily place to see any good reason why Cuba should themselves beyond the protection of our be annexed to the United States, even government. They would have to share with the consent of Spain, and without the fate of war, and to take their chances the hazard of war. Cuba is unlike Texas of success. They would, if unsuccessful, in almost every respect. Texas was in a be at the mercy of the Spanish govern- great degree uninhabited. Cuba is ment, but they would not have incurred densely populated. Texas furnished an the guilt of piracy, nor would they have outlet for overgrowing population. Cuba subjected themselves to the penalties of is already full, and would afford no such a crime. They would in no point homes for the enterprising emigrants of view be responsible to any other from the United States. The present government than their own and the slave population, with its annual ingovernment of Spain, and neither Eng- crease under the humane system of land nor France would have any right to slavery which would follow its annexaintercept them, or in any other way tion, would be amply sufficient for all interfere with them. If, however, it is its wants. It would not, then, give us the desire of England and France to an outlet for our rapidly increasing slave involve themselves in a war with this population. The people of Texas had country for the sake of preserving "the laws, institutions, manners and feelings union of Cuba with the crown of Spain," similar to our own. In fact, Texas was they can do so, and upon them will rest colonized from this country. Such is not the fearful responsibility of so disastrous a war as that would be. Our country does not desire a war with either Spain,

This is owing to the peculiarly harsh character of slavery there now.

At present there is an annual decrease of slaves.

Cuba and the United States.

65

the case with Cuba. They are different acquire unsettled territory, where our from us in nearly every respect, and would population can expand. We want land not easily coalesce with us. Though under without people on it, and not land and the same government, they would remain people together. It is true, we acquired a distinct people. We can easily see how Louisiana, Florida, Texas, California, the owners of land and other property in and New Mexico, but all of these were Cuba would be benefited by its peacea- in a great degree uninhabited, and many ble annexation to this country, but how reasons existed in favor of their annexathe sugar-growers of our southern states tion that do not apply to Cuba. would be benefited by having the productions of Cuba brought into competition with their own, is what we cannot so easily perceive.

By our present laws, an emigrant from a foreign country is required to remain in this country five years before he can become a citizen of the Republic. The If Cuba can now, with all the burdens object of this law is to enable him to bewhich are placed upon her industry, af- come acquainted with our Constitution ford to pay the duties upon articles im- and laws, and to imbibe something of ported into this country, and still compete the spirit of our institutions. But the syswith our Louisiana planters, how will it tem of annexing thickly populated counbe when she is relieved of her burdens tries, and granting to the inhabitants imand has no duties to pay, as will be the mediately the rights of citizens, is not case after annexation? Would it not only wild and dangerous, but a new and bring ruin upon the sugar-growers of untried experiment. Are we prepared Louisiana, Texas, and Florida? The to naturalize a whole nation at once, lands which are now employed in the without any previous training, and incultivation of sugar, would then have to corporate them into our Union. This be used in raising cotton-and as a mat- would indeed be progress, but it would be ter of course the quantity of cotton would progress towards our own destruction. be increased, and the price diminished. If then there are so many objections to This evil would be increased as we con- annexing Cuba, even if it could be tinued to acquire other West India peaceably done, what are we to think of islands; and we think the acquisition of those who desire to obtain it at all Cuba will lead to the acquisition of other hazards, with or without war. There islands in the West Indies. We can see are men who are ready to engage in war no reason, except its military position, with Spain, France and England for the why Cuba should be annexed to this purpose of acquiring Cuba. It cannot be country any more than the other West expected that either England or France India islands, and doubtless those who would quietly see so great a maritime advocate the annexation of Cuba will, nation as the United States acquire Cuba, after that is accomplished, go in for all which is said to be the "key of the Gulf the rest also. of Mexico." The same reasons which would cause us to oppose the acquisition of Cuba by England or France, would cause them to oppose its acquisition by us. Its military position, they may think, is almost as important to them as it is to us, for they also have valuable possessions in the immediate neighborhood of Cuba, and they are extensively engaged in the commerce of the Gulf. They may think that the acquisition of Cuba will be but the first step towards acquiring the whole of the West India islands, and obtaining exclusive control of the Gulf. Such, if we mistake not, is the policy of one of the most active advocates of wholesale annexation. We say then that there is every reason to believe that the acquisition of Cuba would lead to a long, bloody, and disastrous war, ruinous to all the nations engaged in it, and calculated to lead to no beneficial result. Do we de

One of the principal objections to the acquisition of Cuba is that it will renew in all its fierceness the slavery agitation, which came so near destroying this confederacy. If Cuba is annexed, it being a slaveholding state, the North will insist upon the annexation of Canada. Thus we see the advocates of Cuba annexation at the North are even now in favor of annexing Canada. Are we of the South willing to take Canada for the sake of getting Cuba? This is the true question. So far as the balance of power is concerned, the South will not make much by agreeing to take Canada and Cuba together, whilst in every other respect she will be much injured. Cuba is now, and will perhaps always be, in the hands of the Spanish race, which can never be assimilated to our own. In our acquisitions of territory, our object should be to

we take the fearful leap. Let the fate of other republics be a warning to us of the dangers of unlimited extension, and of wars of conquest.

sire Cuba at the cost of such a war? We shall not at this time undertake to speculate upon the results of a war between Great Britain and the United States. Suffice it to say it would be disastrous to We have now indicated what course both nations. We might get possession we think our government ought to pursue of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Bruns- in regard to Cuba. This is soon perhaps wick on the north, and all the West to become one of the great questions of Indies and Mexico on the south; for the day, and it becomes us to examine Mexico would hecome involved in the it in all its consequences thoroughly. war by some means or other. But we What is to become of Cuba is a question cannot see that we would be benefited, of deep interest. We sincerely trust if, as the result of that war, we should wise measures will be adopted in refercome into possession of all the continent ence to it by our own and by all other of North America. Our very acquisitions governments connected with it. We fear would become the fruitful source of fear- the conduct of Spain is precipitating ful contentions at home, and bitter would events, and bringing upon the civilized be the fruits which we would reap from world a fearful crisis. May wise counour unwise policy. Let us pause and sels yet prevail, and the dangers which consider well the consequences before surround this question be avoided!

ART. IX.-INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES, STATISTICS, ETC., OF STATES AND CITIES.

FLORIDA-ALABAMA-TEXAS-COLORED POPULATION OF THE NORTH-RICHEST MAN IN VIRGINIA, ETC.

EAST FLORIDA. The letter of the Hon. E. C. Cabell to T. E. Andrews, Esq., U. S. Consul at St. Johns, N. B., in reference to Florida, which has been lately published, has attracted much attention to that long neglected state. Mr. Cabell in that document gives the reasons and general causes why she has not progressed in population and wealth like other states of the Confederacy.

well repaying the planter for his labor, although the price of land there is high, compared with other counties in the vi cinity, and upon the Gulf, where thousands of acres of equally good lands can be obtained at very much less. But the best lands in Florida are yet to be brought out; I mean the cane-brake marshes, on the banks of the St.John's River, for miles. The lands, if properly dammed and planted, For the last four or five years, East would produce sugar, rice, cotton or corn, Florida has been increasing in population, beyond any land known, and the expenses and the condition of her inhabitants in to prepare it would not exceed those every respect is far better now than it incurred in clearing up a dense homhas been since the exchange of flags in mock. 1821. The valuable natural resources of the state are becoming appreciated and developed, and capital to a large amount is now invested profitably in various enterprises. Upon the St. John's River there are now fourteen steam saw mills, turning out over two millions and a half of sawed lumber monthly; besides this, there are many cargoes of ranging and cedar timber, and live oak, making an annual aggregate of about three hundred and fifty cargoes. The extent of timber is incalculable, and this branch of trade is becoming upon the Atlantic altogether confined to Georgia and Florida.

The county of Marion has become the most populous one in East Florida, and is

The outlet for the produce of East Florida, upon the Atlantic side, is chiefly the St. John's River, and the value of the produce, cotton, sugar and tobacco, shipped from it this year, will nearly or quite reach the figure of half a million of dollars. It is but lately that the importance of the trade of East Florida has been known, and at present there is considerable rivalry between Charleston and Savannah to secure it. Until the establishment of the Charleston line last winter, Savannah reaped the chief harvest; but now the trade is tending to Charleston, because it is generally known that for sugar and clean long cotton, Charleston is the best market. The merchants, too, prefer