Opinion by DAVIES, Ch. J. The Judge at Special Term held that the money bequeathed to the use of the Plaintiff was a legacy, and was not payable until the expiration of one year from the granting of letters testamentary, and that the Plaintiff was not entitled to interest therein prior to December 20, 1867. Judgment was entered dismissing the complaint, and an appeal to the General Term reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial. From this order the Defendants have appealed to this Court, and stipulated that if the order appealed from is affirmed, that judgment absolute shall be rendered against them. There does not appear to be much difficulty in adjusting the rights of the parties, and the Defendants would have been held blameless if they had acquiesced in the judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court, that the Plaintiff was entitled to the income of the same, set apart by the testator for her support and maintenance, from the time of the death of the testator. The amount in controversy hardly justified them in subjecting the Plaintiff, or the estate they represent, to the delay and expense of an appeal to this Court A bare reading of the will shows that the testator had two classes of beneficiaries in his mind: one to whom he intended to give absolute legacies, and the other those for whose support and maintenance he intended to provide a fund, for which purpose the interest and income thereof were to be applied. In the former class was the bequest of the sum of $6,000 to his wife, the sum of $2,000 each to the two children of his son William, the sum of $3,000 each to his two grandchildren Anna L. Baker and Micajah R. Pinckney. In the latter class is the bequest of the sum of $4,000, the interest and income of which was to be paid to his wife during her natural life; the sum of $5,000, the interest and income of which was to be paid to his daughter married, during her natural life; the sum of $5,000, the interest and income of which was to be applied to the use of his grandson Joseph Cook during his natural life; the sum of $3,000, the interest and income of which was to be applied to the use of his granddaughter Anna Cook during her natural life; and the sum of $3,000, the interest Opinion by DAVIES, Ch. J. and income of which was to be applied to the use of his granddaughter Sarah Cook, the Plaintiff, during her natural life. By the provision of the Revised Statutes, no legacies are to be paid until after the expiration of one year from the time of granting letters testamentary, unless the same are directed by the wil to be sooner paid (2 R. S. p. 90, § 43). This is an affirmance of the doctrine of the common law, and has not changed the rule as to the time when interest on legacies begins to run (3 Brad. Rep. 364). At common law, the general rule is that interest upon a legacy is payable only at the expiration of a year from the testator's death (Toller on Ex. 324; Bradner v. Faulkner, 12 N. Y. R. 472). If, however, an annuity be given, or if by implication from the terms of the instrument the legacy be given for maintenance and support, it shall commence immediately from the death of the testator, and consequently the first payment shall be made at the expiration of the year next after that event (Toller on Ex. 324; Bradner v. Faulkner, ubi supra; 6 Vesey, 539; 6 Paige, 300). A learned author on the duties of executors (2 Williams on Ex. 1288) says: This rule as to the payment of interest is subject to an exception, in case where the testator being a parent, or stands in loco parentis to the legatee: citing Acherly v. Vernon (1 P. Wms. 783); Hill v. Hill (3 V. & B. 183); Miles v. Robarts (1 Russ. & M. 555); Leslie v. Leslie (Cas. temp. Sugd. 4). Rogers v. Soutten (2 Keen, 508); Wilson v. Maddison (2 Y. & C. Ch. C. 372); Russell v. Dickson (Dr. & W. 133). For then, whether the legacy be vested or contingent, if the legatee be not an adult, interest on the legacy shall be assumed as a maintenance from the time of the death of the testator, if there is no other provision for that purpose (Harvey v. Harvey, 2 P. Wms. 21; Incledon v. Northcote, 3 Atk. 438; Chambers v. Godwin, 11 Ves. 2; Brown v. Temperley, 3 Russ. Ch. Cases, 263); and even though the will should contain an express direction that the interest should accumulate (Mole v. Mole, 1 Dick. 310; M'Dermott v. Kealey, 3 Russ. Ch. Cases, 264, note; Wynch v. Wynch, 1 Cox, 433; Donovan v. Needham, 9 Beavan, 164; Rudge v. Winnall, 12 Beavan, 357; In re Rouse's estate, 9 Hare, 649). In Opinion by DAVIES, Ch. J. Miles v. Robarts (supra) the testator gave legacies to be paid to two minor children provided they attained the age of twentyone years, and the question was whether they were entitled to interest on their legacies of $10,000 each for their maintenance and education during their minorities; and he also gave a legacy to one George Francis Stuart, a minor, for his sole use and disposal provided he attains the age of twenty-one. The Master of the Rolls said the testator appoints two gentlemen to be trustees and guardians of these children, and requests them to attend to their education; and the case of Branstrom v. Wilkinson is an authority directly in point, that they are entitled to the interest of the sums given to them until they attain the age of twenty-one, or die under that age. The same principles apply to the legacy to George Francis Stuart. This is a strong case, showing the extent to which the Court of Chancery in England has carried the doctrine of applying the income or interest of a legacy payable at a future period, given to a minor for his maintenance and education, even before the time arrives when the legacy is payable. The weight of authority, undoubtedly, now is in favor of allowing the payment of annuities or incomes to commence at the testator's death. The Chancellor assumes this in Craig v. Craig (3 Barb. Ch. 76), referring to Gibson v. Bolt (7 Ves. 96); Fearnes v. Young (9 Ib. 553); Rebecca Owing's Case (1 Bland. Ch. Rep. 296). The case of Angerstein v. Martin (Turn. & Russ. Rep. 232) came before Lord Eldon in 1823. The testator in that case devised his freehold estates to J. Angerstein for life, with remainder to his children in strict settlements; and as to his residuary personal estate he bequeathed the same to trustees, to be invested in the purchase of lands, to be settled in the same manner, with authority to invest the funds in stocks, &c., until the estates could be purchased, the interest or income to go to the same person or persons to whom the rents of the estate would go if the purchase had been made. The tenant for life filed his bill within the year after the testator's death, for the purpose of having the question decided whether he was entitled to the annual interest of the clear residue Opinion by DAVIES, Ch. J. of the personal estate from the testator's death, or whether the amount of such interest for the first year was to form a part of the capital of the general residue, and which was to be added to the same, and invested; and, upon a review of all the previous cases, it was decided that the interest from the death of the testator belonged to the tenants for life, and was not to be added to the residue for the benefit of those who were entitled to the estates in remainder in the property to be purchased. And in the case of Hewitt v. Morris, which came before Lord Eldon a few months afterwards (Turn. & Russ. Rep. 241), the testator directed his executors to invest the residue of his estate, after payment of debts and legacies, in the funds or upon securities, the interest to be paid to A. for life, and after his death the principal to be held upon trust for his children. The tenant for life was held to be entitled to interest accruing within the year next after the testator's death, upon funds in which the testator's property stood invested at the time of his death, and which were not required for the payment of debts and legacies. And it is to be observed that, in each of these cases, the interest and income were decreed to commence before the exact amount of principal fund was ascertained. See also Beckford v. Tobin (1 Ves. 308); Hill v. Hill (3 Vesey and Beames, 183). Chancellor Walworth in Williamson v. Williamson (6 Paige, 304), after a citation and review of the authenticity, observes that "the result of the English cases appears to be, and I have not been able to find any in this country establishing a different principle, that in the bequest of a life estate in a residuary fund, and where no time is prescribed in the will for the commencement of the interest or the enjoyment of the use or income of such residue, the legatee is entitled to the interest or income of the clear residue, as afterwards ascertained, to be computed from the time of the death of the testator. All the cases which appear to conflict with this rule, except the two decided by Sir John Leach, which are no longer to be considered as authority, will be found to be cases in which the testator had directed one species Opinion by DAVIES, Ch. J. of property to be converted into another, or the residue of any fund to be invested in a particular manner, and had then given a life estate in the funds as thus converted or invested. In such cases it appears to be consistent with the will of the testator to consider the life interest as commencing when the conversion takes place, or the investment is made, either within the year or at the expiration of that time. But as a year is considered a reasonable time for the executor to comply with the testator's directions as to the conversion or investment, the legatee for life cannot be kept out of the interest or income beyond that period. In the case made considerative, there is no direction for the investment thereof in any particular manner before the right of the widow to the use thereof for life was to commence; and as it appeared that a great portion of the personal estate was in bonds and mortgages and other securities, which were drawing interest at the death of the testator, there is no good reason for depriving the widow of the use of the residuary estate for an entire year. These remarks apply with peculiar force to the case now made considerative. There then is no direction for a conversion, but a direction in effect to transfer the bonds and mortgages of the testators, to the amount of the several bequests, in satisfaction of them. These securities were all bearing interest, and it is manifest that it was the intent of the testator that these several beneficiaries should have the interest and income of the amount separate for them, for their maintenance and education. amount of the funds was not a year from the death of the testator, furnishes no reason why the interest therein should not be paid to the beneficiary before that time. In re Williams (12 Legal Observer, 179) the Surrogate of Kings County allowed interest to an adopted daughter of the testator, on a sum of $5,000 directed to be invested, and the interests to be paid to her during life on the proportionate share of her legacy from the death of the testator, but he refused to allow interest from the same period to the widow of the testator, upon a legacy to be invested and the interest thereof And the fact that the precise ascertained until the expiration of |