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that so great a region of country was to be re- | be made with great caution and a careful congarded as reserved from alienation for so small sideration of the necessary import of the terms a cause-an ordinary eleven-league grant. It of such laws. An illustration of the absurdiis contended that the case of Newhall v. San-ty which may be involved in extending the ger, 92 U. S. 761 [23: 769], has concluded this supposed reservation from sale and alienation question by an answer in the affirmative. This to this kind of grants is shown in the large excase will be examined hereafter. Meantime let us look at the nature of the supposed case. A grant of eleven square leagues is made out of a country seventy or eighty miles in length, and from six to ten in width, containing over eighty square leagues; and this whole eighty leagues is supposed to be retired from the disposable public domain for a period of years, no one knows how long. Does this look reason

able?

tent of country which has been covered by some of them known to the records of this court. In 1822 a grant of twenty leagues square, or four hundred square leagues of land, was made by the Supreme Government of Mexico to President Yturbide, to be located in Texas. In 1835 the Mexican Congress au thorized his heirs to locate the land in New Mexico or in Upper or Lower California. In 1841 it was decreed that it should be located in Upper California-that is, the present State of California. This claim was actually presented to the board of land commissioners, and appealed to the district court and thence to this court. Now, according to the contention of the complainant in the present case, all California was interdicted territory during the pendency of that claim before the board and in the courts. The case is reported in 63 U. S. 22 How. 290 [16: 342], Yturbide v. U. S. This case arose under the same law as that upon which the case of Newhall v. Sanger, supra, was based

the Act of March 3, 1851. If a reservation of an entire territory is to be implied from a floating grant of quantity within it, then, logically, every float, or land warrant issued by the Government, should, until actually located, operate as a reservation of the entire body of public lands.

One or two observations may be made calculated to show the precise question in a still stronger light. First. It is in the option of the Government, not of the grantee, to locate the -quantity granted; and, of course, a grant by the Government of any part of the territory contained within the outside limits of the grant only reduces by so much the area within which the original grantee's proper quantity may be located. If the Government has the right to say where it shall be located, it certainly has the right to say where it shall not be located; and if it sells land to a third person at a place within the general territory of the original grant, it is equivalent to saying that the quantity due to the original grantee is not to be located there. In other words, if the territory comprehended in the outside limits and bounds of a Mexican grant contains eighty leagues, and the quantity granted is only ten leagues, the We can well understand that Indian reservaGovernment may dispose of seventy leagues tions and reservations for military and other without doing any wrong to the original grant- public purposes of the Government should be ee. This was the Mexican law, and of course considered as absolutely reserved and withit is our law. U. S. v. Armijo, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. drawn from that portion of the public lands 444, 449 [18: 492, 493]. In practice, it is true, which are disposable to purchasers and settlers, our authorities, in administering the public-for, in those cases, the use to which they are lands, have generally allowed the original devoted, and for which they are deemed to be grantee to make his own selection of the point reserved, extends to every foot of the reservawhere he will have his quantity located, pro- tion. The same reason applies to Mexican vided he has it all located together in one tract. grants of specific tracts, such as a grant for all But this is a matter of favor, and not a matter the land within certain definite boundaries of right. If this were not so the right of way named, or all the land comprised in a certain granted for the railroads by Congress would be rancho or estate. But this reason does not apsubject to question and litigation. There can- ply to grants of a certain quantity of land, not be any doubt, however, of the validity of within a territory named or described, containthese grants. The cases which show the law ing a much larger area than the amount granton this subject are numerous; it is only neces-ed, and where, as in the present case, the right sary to refer to a few of them. The following may be consulted: Fremont v. U. S. 58 U. S. 17 How. 542, 558, 565 [15: 241, 246, 249]; U. S. v. Armijo, supra, Hornsby v. U. S. 77 Ü. S. 10 Wall. 224, 234-5 [19: 900, 902]; Henshaw v. Bissell, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 255, 266-7 [21: 835, 839]; Miller v. Dale, 92 U. S. 473, 476-7 [23: 735-737]; Van Reynegan v. Bolton, 95 U. S. 33, 36 [24: 351, 352].

According to this rule of law, though the Moquelamos grant had been unquestionably genuine and valid, the Government would have had a right to dispose of the whole territory east of range 6 without infringing in the slightest degree the rights of Pico, who would still have had his eleven leagues at the western extremity of the territory. Any construction of the laws which would tend to trammel and obstruct this right of the Government, and render its Acts in making alienations void, should

of location within the larger territory is in the Government, and not in the grantee. In such case the use does not attach to the whole territory, but only to a part of it, and to such part as the Government chooses to designate, provided the requisite quantity be appropriated.

The case of the Leavenworth, L. & G. R. R. Co. v. United States, 92 U. S. 733 [23:634], preceded the case of Newhall v. Sanger, and was relied on in the latter case. But the Leavenworth Case related to an Indian reservation, and the legislative grant upon which it depended (12 Stat. at L. 772), entitled, “An Act for a Grant of Lands to the State of Kansas, in Alternate Sections, to Aid in the Construction of Certain Railroads and Telegraphs in Said State," had an express proviso, "that any and all lands heretofore reserved to the United States, by any Act of Congress, or in any other manner by

competent authority, for the purpose of aiding | 1864), or on the actual day of rendering the in any object of internal improvement, or for judgment (February 13, 1865); one date being any other purpose whatsoever, be, and the before and the other after the withdrawal of same are hereby, reserved to the United States the lands from sale for the benefit of the railfrom the operation of this Act, except so far as road company; and such withdrawal being it may be found necessary to locate the routes assumed to be the act by virtue of which the of said road and branches through such re- railroad title accrued. There was nothing in served lands, in which case the right of way the bill to show that the boundaries named in only shall be granted.' The land grant in that the grant contained any more than eleven squarecase was construed as taking effect imme- leagues of land, the quantity granted. diately, and as vesting a present title in the State of Kansas, though a survey of the lands and a location of the road were held to be necessary to give precision to it, and attach it to any particular tract. The Treaty with the Great and Little Osage Tribe of Indians, made June 2, 1825, which contained a cession to the United States of certain land, contained this clause, to wit: "Within the limits of the country above ceded and relinquished there shall be reserved to and for the Great and Little Osage Tribe or nation aforesaid, so long as they shall choose to occupy the same, the following described tract of land." The described tract embraced the land in question in the cause, and the court held that it was no part of the public lands of the United States, and that no part of it passed to the State of Kansas under the grant, though the railroad passed through it. In our judgment that case differed materially from the one now before us. The whole reservation was appropriated to the use of the Osage nation as long as they chose to occupy it.

The case of Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S. 761 [23:769], on which the complainant confidently relies, was argued and decided shortly after the Leavenworth Case. It arose upon a bill to quiet title to a quarter section of land situated in township 3 Ñ., range 7 E., and therefore west of the Jack Tone road, and within the then admitted limits of the Moquelamos grant now under discussion. We have taken the pains to examine the original record. The bill is comprised in a page and a half, and the whole record in six pages. Sanger, the complainant below, claimed title through the Western Pacific Railroad Company, to whom a patent had been issued in April, 1870, in professed compliance with the requirements of the Acts of Congress of 1862 and 1864. The bill alleges that Newhall claimed title to the same land under a subsequent patent, which recited that the first patent had issued by mistake to the Western Pacific Railroad Company, because the land was within the exterior limits of a Mexican grant called Moquelamos. The bill alleged that this grant was rejected by the final decision of this court in December Term, 1864, before the reservation of lands for the railroad was made; but that the President, in making the second grant, pretended that the Moquelamos grant was not rejected until the 13th day of February, 1865, after the reservation for railroad purposes, claiming the right to look into the minutes of this court to ascertain the precise day when the claim was rejected, and thereby disregarding the mandate; whereas the complainant contended that the rejection took effect from the first day of the term.

This was the substance of the bill. The only issue it raised was as to the time when the rejection of the grant legally took effect, whether at the beginning of the term (December 5,

The bill was demurred to, the cause was submitted without argument, and the demurrer was overruled. The defendant adhering to his demurrer, a decree was entered for the complainant. An appeal was then taken to this. court, the cause was submitted on printed briefs, and the decree of the circuit court was reversed. The opinion took no notice of the fact (which did not appear in the record) that the grant was one of that class in which the quantity granted was but a small part of the territory embraced within the boundaries named. It proceeded throughout as it would have done on the supposition that the grantcovered and filled up the whole territory described. It simply dealt with and affirmed the general proposition that a Mexican grant whileunder judicial investigation was not public land open for disposal and sale, but was reserved territory within the meaning of the law,-a proposition not seriously disputed. On the question of time when the rejection of the grant took effect, it held with the defendant. that the records of this court could be consulted to ascertain the precise day of rendering judgment. After deciding this point, there was no difficulty, under the admissions of the bill, in reversing the decree of the circuit court. The opinion, however, examined somewhat at large the grounds on which it should be held that Mexican grants (whether valid or invalid), while under judicial consideration, should be treated as reserved lands. The principal reason was that they were not "public lands" in the sense of congressional legislation; those terms being habitually used to describe such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws. The Pacific Railroad Acts of 1862 and 1864 only granted, in aid of the railroads to be constructed under them, "every alternate section of public land *** not sold, reserved, or otherwise disposed of by the United States, and to which a preemption or homestead claim may not have attached at the time the line of said road is definitely fixed." The lands comprised in a Mexican grant, it was held, must be regarded not as "public lands" but as "reserved" lands, because by the treaty with Mexico, all private property was to be respected. And when the Act of March 3, 1851, created a board of commissioners to examine all claims to Mexican grants, the 13th section declared "that all lands the claims to which have been finally rejected by the commissioners in the manner herein provided, or which shall be finally decided to be invalid by the district or supreme court, and all lands the claims to which shall not have been presented to the commissioners within two years after the date of this Act, shall be deemed, held and considered as part of the public domain of the United States (9 Stat. at L. 633);" implying that until then they were not part of the public domain. The

and the ranges that lie easterly thereof; and this option leaves the tract west of range 7 (subject to its right of way) open to disposal in the ordinary manner of other public lands.

same conclusion was thought to be inferred | made its election to take its lands in range 7 from the Act of March 3, 1853, which introduced the land system into California; the sixth section of which, amongst other things, exempted from preemption and sale "lands claimed under any foreign grant or title." And this reservation, the court argued, would apply equally to grants that were fraudulent and void, as to those that were valid; for, until investigated, it could not be known which were valid and which were void.

There is really nothing in the decision of Newhall v. Sanger in conflict with the views here expressed; because the court did not have before it the case of a floating grant.

In a number of cases decided since the decision in Newhall v. Sanger*, that case has been referred to with approbation; and in some of them expressions have been used as if the question of floating grants to be located in larger territories had been decided therein. But we have seen that this is not correct, and we are not aware of any case in which this class of grants has been actually involved and has formed the subject of decision.

EVERETT DEWITT et al. v. KATE D. McLAUGHLIN, Exrx., &c. [No. 11]. Argued with above Dec. 8, 1887. Decided May 14, 1888.

This reasoning of the court in Newhall v. Sanger is entirely conclusive as to all definite grants which identified the land granted, such as the case before it then appeared to be; but is it fairly applicable to floats? that is to say, grants of a larger quantity to be located within a certain tract or territory, whether of limited extent, marked by certain bounds, or anywhere in the State, as in the case of Yturbide? Many The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed in small grants, of only a few leagues, were sus- this and the other cases argued with it. In conceptible of location in large territories. The sequence of the death of Kate D. McLaughlin, Alvarado grant, claimed by Fremont-Fremont the decree will be entered as of the first day of v. U. S. 58 U. S. 17 How. 542 [15:241],- -was the term, nunc pro tunc. only for ten square leagues within a region containing upwards of a hundred square leagues. The description in the grant was "the tract of land known as Mariposas, to the extent of ten square leagues, within the limits of the Sierra Nevada and the rivers known by the names of the Chanchilles, of the Merced, and of the San Joaquin." Did all this vast region cease to be the public domain of the United States for the sake of the ten leagues which constituted the actual grant? Would not such a conclusion have been unreasonable, prejudicial to the public interest, and entirely unnecessary for the protection of the grantee? It may be that the land office might properly suspend ordinary operations in the disposal of lands within the territory indicated, and in that sense they might not be considered as public lands; but why should they not be regarded as public lands disposable by Congress itself, care being taken to preserve a sufficient quantity to satisfy the grant?

In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California.

Mr. W. J. Johnston and Mr. M. D. Brainard for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. A. L. Rhodes and Mr. Henry Beard for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed with costs, on the authority of the decision and opinion in case No. 1027. U. S. v. McLaughlin et al., ante, 213. Judgment to be entered nunc pro tunc as of October 10, 1887

GEORGE FRIEND et al. v. JOHN H. WISE, Admr. &c. [No. 12]. Argued with above Dec. 8 1887 Decided May 14, 1888.

In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California.

Mr W. J. Johnston and Mr. M. D. Brainard for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. A. L. Rhodes and Mr. Henry Beard for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed with costs, on the authority of the decision and opinion in case No. 1027, U S. v. McLaughlin et al., ante, 213. Judg ment to be entered nunc pro tune as of October 10, 1887.

As we have already seen, there can be no doubt that a grant made by Congress within the limits of a territory subject to a Mexican float, would take precedence of the float if sufficient land remained to satisfy it. The only question is, whether the surplus land so at the disposal of Congress may be regarded as public land within the meaning of the railroad aid grants. We are disposed to think that it may be; and that as to grants of this character, floating grants as they may be called, the railroad aid grants are not deprived of effect, provided a sufficient quantity_lying together be left to satisfy the grant. In this case no difficulty A. A. WILSON, Marshal of the DISTRICT OF

could occur in carrying out this view. The territory described has sufficient extent west of range 7 to satisfy the grant of eleven leagues, and there seems to be no valid reason why it should not be satisfied from this part. Of course, the satisfaction of the grant is a fiction; for it never had any validity But the part referred to would be sufficient to satisfy it, if it had been a valid grant. And as the Government had the right of location, and has made a grant of its title to the railroad company, the company may exercise the same right subject to the like conditions. The company has

JAMES C. CALLAN, Appt.,

v.

COLUMBIA.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 540-557).

Right of trial by jury in District of Columbia -police court-right at first trial-right in appellate court.

1. The Constitution of the United States requires

*The case of Newhall v. Sanger is referred to-on

the question of the time when lands claimed under Mexican grants are to be considered public lands— in Huff v. Doyle, 93 U. S. 564 (23:977): Ryan v. Cent. Pac. R. Co. 99 U. S. 387, 389 (25:305,306); Quinn v. Chapman, 111 U. S. 446 (28:476); Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Dunmeyer, 113 U. S. 642 (28:1126). Ed.

540-557

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

that the right of trial by jury shall be secured to the people of the District of Columbia.

2. A person charged with having committed the crime of conspiracy in the District of Columbia is entitled to a jury, when put upon his trial.

113 U. S. 321 (28: 990); People v. O'Neil, 48
Cal. 257; Bell v. State, 44 Ala. 393; Jackson
State, 6 Blackf. 461; Cancemi v. People, 18 N.
Y. 128; Carpenter v. State, 4 How. (Miss). 163;
Bowles v. State, 5 Sneed, 360; Norval v. Rice,

Mr. Wm. A. Maury, Asst. Atty-Gen., for appellee:

3. The jurisdiction of the Police Court of that Dis-
trict, as defined by existing statutes, does not extend
to the trial of infamous crimes or offenses punish-2 Wis. 22: Doebler v. Commonwealth, 3 Serg. &
R. 237; Re Staff, 63 Wis. 292; Bank of Colum-
able by imprisonment in the penitentiary.
4. Except in those petty offenses which, accord-bia v. Okely, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 235 (4: 559).
ing to the common law, may be proceeded against
summarily, the guarantee of an impartial jury to
the accused in a criminal prosecution, conducted
either in the name or under the authority of the
United States, secures to him the right to a jury
trial the first time, and in whatever court, he is
put on trial. In such cases a judgment of convic-
tion not based upon a verdict of guilty by a jury
is void.
5. To accord to the accused a right to be tried by

a jury in an appellate court, after he has been once fully tried, otherwise than by a jury, in the court of original jurisdiction, and sentenced to pay a fine or be imprisoned, does not satisfy the requirements [No. 1318.]

of the Constitution.

Argued Jan. 16, 1888. Decided May 14, 1888.

The conspiracy laid in the information is not
an infamous crime within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.

Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417 (29: 89);
Constitutional guaranty of trial by jury has
Mackin v. U. S. 117 U. S. 348 (29: 909).
not been denied.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329; Commonwealth

Court of the District of Columbia refusing, upon writ of habeas corpus, to discharge appellant, who was convicted in the Police Court of the District of Columbia of the crime of conspiracy, found guilty by the court and sentenced to pay a fine or be imprisoned, and upon which sentence he was imprisoned. Reversed.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion. Messrs. J. H. Ralston and Chas S. Moore, for appellant and petitioner:

The crime of conspiracy is an infamous crime, only cognizable upon indictment or presentation by a grand jury.

U. S. v. Buell, 1 MacArth. 502. The Police Court of the District of Columbia, so far as crimes against the United States are concerned, is a United States Court, and its judge should therefore be appointed during good behavior, as directed by the Constitution, instead of for a term of six years.

Rev. Stat. D. C. § 1049; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U. S. 19 How. 436 (15: 713); American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U. S. 1 Pet. 546 (7.256); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U. S. 3 How. 223 (11: 570); U. S. v. More, 7 U. S. 3 Cranch, 159 (2: 397); Re Hennick, 5 Mackey, 503; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 122 (18: 296); State v. Young, 3 Kan. 445; Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331; Priddle's Case, Leach, Cr. Cas. 442. The constitutional provisions as to jury trial were violated when the police judge refused a jury to petitioner.

Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U. S. 14 Pet. 571 (10: 594); Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 244 (4: 561); Edwards v. State, 45 N. J. L. 419; Rev. Stat. D. C. § 1049; 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 367; Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kan. 622; v Whitney, 108 Mass. 5; Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. p. 410, note 5, p. 507; Dillingham v. State, 5 Ohio. St. 280; Sedgw. Stat. & Const. L. 491, and notes; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 74 (24: 612); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 633 (24: 366); Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 775 (27: 471); Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. 89; McGear v. Woodruff, 33 N. J. L. 213.

Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a judgment refusing, upon writ of habeas corpus, to discharge the appellant from the custody of the appellee as It apMarshal of the District of Columbia. pears that by an information filed by the United States in the Police Court of the District, the petitioner, with others, was charged with the crime of conspiracy, and having been found guilty by the court was sentenced to pay a fine of $25, and upon default in its payment to suffer imprisonment in jail for the period of thirty days. He perfected an appeal to the Supreme Court of the District, but having subsequently withdrawn it, and having refused to pay the fine imposed upon him, he was committed to the custody of the Marshal, to the end that the sentence might be carried into effect.

The contention of the petitioner is that he is restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution. The various grounds of this contention will be considered, so far as it is necessary to do so, after we shall have ascertained the precise nature of the offense of which the pe

Const. art. III, § 2; Fifth Amend; Cooley, Const. Lim. 4th ed. 513, note; U. S. v. Buell, 1 MacArth. 502; Re Fry, 3 Mackey, 137; Reck-titioner was found guilty. ner v Warner, 22 Ohio St. 275; State v. Brennan's Liquors, 25 Conn. 278; Beers v Beers, 4 Conn. 535; Steuart v Baltimore, 7 Md. 500; Biddle v. Commonwealth, 13 Serg. & R. 405; Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kan. 622; McGear v. Woodruff, 33 N. J. L. 213; Dill. Mun. Corp. 3d ed. § 411; State v Young, 3 Kan. 445; Shafer v Mumma, 17 Md. 331; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (28: 232); Emerick v Harris, 1 Binn. 416; Murphy v. People, 2 Cow. 815; Jones v Robbins, 8 Gray, 342; Sullivan v. Adams 3 Gray, 477; Hodges v Easton, 106 U. S. 412 (27:171); Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 206; Baylis v. Travelers Ins. Co. 224 See 2/ Sup. Ch. 815-16 extending Cous. to D.C.

The information shows that one Franz Krause, Louis Naecker, August Naecker, Charles Arndt, Louis Naecker, Jr., Herman Feige, Gustave A. Bruder, Fritz Boetcher, Herman Arndt, Julius Schultz, Louis Brandt, Casper Windus, Ernest Arndt, and Christian Feige were, during the months of July and August, 1887, residents of this District, each pursuing the calling of a musician;

for

That, during those months, there was in the District an association or organization of musicians, by the name of "The Washington Musical Assembly, No. 4308, K. of L.," containing one hundred and fifty members, and a

stet. of

127 U. S.

1871 (16 Stab, 419, 426, 884)

branch of a larger association known as "The | you are hereby notified that the following Knights of Labor of America," extending throughout the United States, and having a membership of five hundred thousand persons, of which ten thousand were residents of this District;

That, during the period named, Edward C. Linden, Louis P. Wild, John N.Pistorio, James C. Callan (the appellant), Joseph B. Caldwell, George N. Sloan, John Fallon, Anton Fischer and Frank Pistorio were members of the said local assembly, each pursuing the calling of a musician;

That, on the 17th of July, 1887, said local association imposed upon Franz Krause, one of its members, two fines, one of $25 and the other of $50, which he refused to pay upon the ground that they were illegal; and

named members of this assembly are hereby suspended for having performed with F.Krause in direct violation of the official notice of said Krause's suspension from this assembly. You will, therefore, not engage or perform, directly or indirectly, with any of them-Louis Naecker, August Naecker, Charles Arndt, Louis Naecker, Jr., Herman Feige, Gus. A. Bruder, Fritz Boetcher, Herman Arndt, Julius Schultz, Louis Brandt, Casper Windus, Ernest Arndt, Christian Feige.

"By order of the Assembly. "[SEAL.]

E. C. LINDEN, JR.,
Recording Sec'y."

To this information the defendants interposed a demurrer, which was overruled. They united in requesting a trial by jury. That request was denied, and a trial was had before the court, without the intervention of a jury, and with the result already stated.

It is contended by the appellant that the Constitution of the United States secured to him the right to be tried by a jury, and, that right having been denied, the police court was without jurisdiction to impose a fine upon him, or to order him to be imprisoned until such fine was paid. This precise question is now, for the first time, presented for determination by this court. If the appellant's position be sustained, it will follow that the statute (Rev. Stat. Dist. Col. § 1064) dispensing with a petit jury, in prosecutions by information in the police court, is inapplicable to cases like the present one.

That said Linden, Wild, Pistorio, Callan, Caldwell, Sloan, Fallon, Fischer, with sundry other persons, whose names were unknown,did, on the 7th day of August, 1887, unlawfully and maliciously combine, conspire and confederate together to extort from Krause the sum of $75 on account of said fines; to prevent the parties first above named-Krause, Naecker, and others--and each of them, from pursuing their calling and trade anywhere in the United States; and to "boycott," injure, molest, oppress, intimidate, and reduce to beggary and want, not only said persons and each of them, but any person who should work with or for them, or should employ them or either of them. The information charges that the manner in which the defendants, so conspiring, proposed to effect said result, was to refuse to work as musicians, or in any other capacity, with or The third article of the Constitution profor the persons first above named, or with or for vides that "the trial of all crimes, except in any person, firm or corporation, working with cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and or employing them; to request and procure all such trial shall be held in the State where the other members of said organizations, and all said crime shall have been committed; but other workmen and tradesmen, not to work as when not committed within any State, the musicians, or in any capacity, with or for them, trial shall be at such place or places as the Conor either of them; or for any person, firm or gress may by law have directed." The Fifth corporation that employed or worked with Amendment provides that no person shall "be them or either of them, and to warn and threat- deprived of life, liberty or property without en every person, firm or corporation that em- due process of law." By the Sixth Amendployed or proposed to employ the said persons, ment it is declared that "in all criminal prosor either of them, that if they did not forth-ecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to with cease to so employ them and refuse to employ them, and each of them, such person, firm or corporation, so warned and threatened, would be deprived of any custom or patronage, as well from the persons so combining and conspiring as from all other members of said or ganization in and out of the District.

The information further charges that, on the 8th day of August, 1887, the said persons, among whom was the appellant, in execution of the purpose of said conspiracy, combination and confederacy, sent and delivered to each member of "The Washington Musical Assembly, No. 4308, K. of L.," and to divers other persons in the District, whose names are unknown, a certain printed circular of the tenor following:

"SANCTUARY WASHINGTON MUSICAL ASSEMBLY, 4308, K. OF L.,

"WASHINGTON, D. C., August 8, 1887. "Dear Sir and Brother: In accordance with a resolution of this assembly and in compliance with the constitution and by-laws of the order,

a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."

The contention of the appellant is that the offense with which he is charged is a "crime" within the meaning of the third article of the Constitution, and that he was entitled to be tried by a jury; that his trial by the police court, without a jury, was not "due process of law" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment; and that, in any event, the prosecution against him was a "criminal prosecution," in which he was entitled by the Sixth Amendment, to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.

The contention of the government is that the Constitution does not require that the right of trial by jury shall be secured to the people of the District of Columbia; that the original

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