A doubtful or obscure declaration is not to be imputed.

Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 120 (29:81), quoting State v. Stoll, 84 U. S. 17 Wall. 436 (21:655); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 12-45 (27: 839-851).

Motives are substantial and actual under this Act of 1875.

Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U. S Quincy v. Steel, 120 U. S. 247 ington v. Pillsbury, 114 U. S.

125 (27:880); 26); Farm9:114).

If some title, right, privilege or immunity, on which the recovery depends, will be defeated by one construction of the Constitution or a law of the United States, or sustained by the opposite construction, the case will be one arising under the Constitution or Laws of the United States within the meaning of the Act of 1875, otherwise not.

Starin v. N. Y. 115 U. S. 257 (29:390); Hartell v. Tilghman, 99 U. S. 547 (25:357); Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co. 108 U. S. 18 (27:636); Chew Heong v. U. S. 112 U. S. 536 (28: 770).

The reported cases where the question, "Has the federal circuit court the right to enjoin a State from violating the contract clause of the Constituton?" has been decided are: N. O. Water Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674 (29:525); St. Tammany Water Works Co. v. N. O. Water Works Co. 120 U. S. 66 (30:564); N. O. v. Houston, 119 U. S. 265 (30:411).

State governments should have their Constitutions and laws interpreted by their own judicial tribunals.

Venable v. Richards, 105 U. S. 636 (26:1196). Where verdict of jury allows no interest, the court can allow none.

Cochrane v. Murphy, 4 La. Ann. 6; Bedford v. Jacobs, 5 Mart. N. S. 448; Commandeur v. Russell, Id. 461; Dale v. Downs, 7 Mart. N. S. 225; Chain v. Kelso, Id. 263.

No interest was due till the account was liquidated.

Redfield v. Iron Co. 110 U. S. 174 (28:109). Messrs. T. Alexander and N. C. Blanchard, for defendants in error:

circuit court had no jurisdiction; and if it did not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy as to the effect or construction. of the Constitution or some law, upon the determination of which the recovery depended, then it was not a suit so arising. Starin v. New York, 115 U. S. 248, 257 [29: 388, 390]; Little York Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199 [24: 656].

The case at bar was in effect an action at law to recover a balance alleged to be due the petitioners or plaintiffs upon a contract with the defendant, and the maintenance of the cause of action involved no federal question whatever, nor is any such indicated in the judgment rendered. But the jurisdiction seems to have been rested upon the averments in plaintiff's petition, that under article 209 of the State Constitution of 1879, providing that "No parish or municipal tax for all purposes whatsoever shall exceed ten mills on the dollar of valuation," the City of Shreveport, being so situated as to need all the revenue from such a tax, cannot raise funds to pay its just debts; that, therefore, plaintiffs are deprived by that article, "if same be valid and operative," of the remedy of enforcing payment by the levy of taxes, although their contract was entered into in 1871; and that so said article impairs the obligation of such contract. This contention, however, required the circuit court to assume that the Courts of Louisiana would hold that the city could lawfully avail itself of the constitutional limitation in question as a defense to the collection by taxation of the means to liquidate the indebtedness, notwithstanding that would be to apply it retrospectively, to the destruction of an essential remedy existing when the contract was entered into; whereas, the presumption in all cases is that the Courts of the States will do what the Constitution and Laws of the United States require. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co. 108 U. S. 18. [27: 636]; Neal v. Del. 103 U. S. 370, 389 [26: 567, 571]. And we find in accordance with that presumption that the Supreme Court of Louisiana holds, and had held prior to the commencement of this suit, that article 209 "must have a rigid enforcement with regard to all

Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595 (24:793); Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 535 (18:403).

The remedy enters into and forms a material part of the obligation of a contract, and a statute, or provision of a State Constitution, which impairs the remedy, or lessens its efficiency, is prohibited by the Constitution of the United States.

Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 314 (21:357); La. v. N. O. 102 U. S. 203 (26:132); La., Nelson, v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716 (28:574).

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court:

Unless this suit was one "arising under the Constitution or Laws of the United States," the

Constitution of the United States, and with regard to all future operations of the city government of every kind whatever. But it is perfectly clear that the rights of antecedent contract creditors are protected by the Constitution of the United States, and they are entitled to have them enforced 'in all respects as if' this provision of the Constitution 'had not been passed.' Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 535 [18:403]. The fact that the Act of the State is a constitutional provision instead of a mere legislative Act does not affect the case. Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. McClure, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 515 [19: 998]. It is apparent, therefore, that whatever percentage of taxation may be required to meet the maturing obligations in interest or principal of antecedent contract creditors must, in any and all events, be levied." Moore v. N. O. 32 La. Ann. 747.

Constitutions as well as statutes are construed to operate prospectively only, unless, on the face of the instrument or enactment, the contrary intention is manifest beyond reasonable.

question. There is nothing on the face of article 209 evidencing an intention that it should be applied to antecedent contracts, and the highest tribunal of the State has declared that it cannot be so applied.

It is impossible, under these circumstances, to sustain the jurisdiction of the circuit court upon the ground, not that the city had been, but that it might perhaps be, allowed to interpose to defeat the enforcement, by the appropriate means, of payment of an alleged indebtedness, a constitutional provision inapplicable by the ordinary rules of law, and so determined to be by the deliberate decision of the state supreme court.

Nor can it be held that a dispute or controversy as to the effect of the Constitution of the United States upon article 209 of the Constitution of the State was involved in determining in this action whether the defendant was indebted to the plaintiffs, and if so, in what

amount.

The prayer of the petition was that judgment might be rendered for the amount claimed, and also that article 209 might be declared null and void; and some considerations supposed to bear upon the latter subject were addressed to the jury by the learned judge who presided upon the trial, to which the verdict made no response in terms; but it does not appear that an order for the assessment of taxes to pay the amount awarded or for any supplementary proceedings of like nature, to the entry of which said article might in any view be claimed to be an obstruction, was authorized by statute to be made part of the judgment in such a case as this. And the judgment was simply for the recovery of so much money, to be thereafter collected as provided by law.

When, in the instance of a judgment rendered on contract in a state court, remedies for its collection existing at the time of the making of the contract, are taken away, in substance, by State Constitution or statute, and the deprivation enforced by the final judgment of the state courts, a writ of error under section 709 of the Revised Statutes enables this court to vindicate the supremacy of the Constitution and Laws of the United States and administer the proper remedy; but had this record in its present shape come before us in that way even, we should have had no alternative save to dismiss the writ.

In cases originally brought in the circuit court, or by a removal from a state court, it is made the duty of the circuit court to dismiss or remand the same whenever it appears that the suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within its jurisdiction, or that the parties to the suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable.

As remarked in Bernards Township v. Stebbins, 109 U. S. 353 [27: 960], it has been the constant effort of Congress and of this court to prevent the discrimination in respect to suits between citizens of the same State and suits between citizens of different States, established by the Constitution and Laws of the United States, "from being evaded by bringing into federal courts controversies between citizens of

IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Louisiana, to review a judgment for a peremptory writ of mandamus. Reversed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Charles W. Hornor, for plaintiffs in error:

The nature of this motion is simply dilatory. Beecher's Case, 8 Coke 58 (a); Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Co. 3 H. L. Cas. 795.

The statute nowhere authorizes the city to guaranty and warrant payment of contractors. State Bank v. Orleans Nav. Co. 3 La. Ann. 294; Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat 244 (4: 559).

Messrs. T. Alexander and N. C. Blanchard, for defendants in error:

Instead of issuing an alternative writ of mandamus, it is equally proper for the court to grant a rule to show cause.

High, Extr. Legal Rem. § 503.

This is frequently done in the United States Courts.

Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 65 U. S. 24 How. 376 (16: 735); U. §. v. N. O. 98 U. S. 381 (25: 225).

It is also proper under the practice of the Louisiana Courts.

Savage v. Holmes, 15 La. Ann. 334; Morris v. Womble, 30 La. Ann. 1312.

In a mandamus proceeding to enforce collection of a judgment against a municipal corporation, the judgment itself cannot be impeached collaterally. The respondents are concluded by the judgment at law.

Rock Island Co. v. U. S. 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 435 (18: 419); Davenport v. U. S., Lord, 76 U. S. 9 Wall. 409 (19: 704); U. S. v. N. O. supra; La., Nelson, v. St. Martin's Parish Police Jury, 111 U. S. 716 (28: 574); High, Extr. Legal Rem. $396.

When at the time a debt was contracted there existed no limitation on the rate of taxation by a municipal corporation, any subsequent legislative repeal or modification of the taxing power, so as to deprive the holder of the contract of all adequate and efficacious rem

edy, is within the inhibition of the Constitution.

Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 535 (18: 403); Wolff v. N. O. 103 U. S. 358 (26: 395); Ralls Co. Ct. v. U. S. 105 U. S. 733 (26: 1220).

As long as a city exists, all state laws, whether in the form of a statute or constitutional provision which withdraws or restricts her taxing

powers so as to impair the obligations of their contracts, are absolutely void.

See above authorities.

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court:

and seventh claims, in speaking of the shoe as rocking, can only refer to its swinging on a hinge at its rear end, and the term "rocking" is not used in the sense in which it is used in the plaintiff's patent.

7th. On a proper construction of claims 1 and 2 of plaintiff's patent, the defendants have not infringed it. [No. 108.]

Argued Dec. 4, 5, 6, 1888. Decided Jan. 7, 1889.

APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court

of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, in favor of plaintiff, for damages in an action for the infringement of letters patent No. 74,342, granted to Alvaro B. Graham February 11, 1868, for an improvement in harvesters. Reversed.

AL.

CYRUS H. McCORMICK ET AL., Exrs. of CYRUS H. MCCORMICK, Deceased, ET Appts.,

PETER

v.

(See S.C. Reporter's ed. 1-19.)

Patent for harvesters— characteristics of—infringement -limitation of claim-first and second claims-construction of the term “rocking."

In a suit for an infringement of letters patent, No. 74,342, granted to Alvaro B. Graham, February 11, 1868, for an improvement in harvesters, held: 1st. The capacity of the finger beam to rise and fall freely at either end, spoken of in the specification of plaintiff's patent, was not a new thing with him, but had been used for many years in mowing and reaping machines.

2d. It was also old to have a lever connected by a loose connection by which the driver could tip up the front edge of the finger bar arbitrarily and secure it so that it could not fall below the inclination at which he had set it, although it was left free to tip up further automatically.

3d. As the finger beam in defendants" machine does not have the motion which results from the combination of the elements specified in the first claim of the plaintiff's patent and does not rock forward and backward in the sense of that claim or in the sense described in plaintiff's specification, it does not infringe such first claim. Nor does it contain the swivel joint, M, described in the first claim, located and operating as in the plaintiff's

patent.

4th. The first claim of that patent must, in view of the state of the art, and of the special limitation, put upon it, on the requirement of the Patent Office, be limited to the special construction and arrangement set forth in that claim.

5th. The second claim of the patent contains, combined, all the elements set forth in the first claim with the addition of the rigid arm 1, which is made to rock backward and forward by positive action in either direction; while in defendants' machine, there is no such rigid arm, but only a connection by which the front of the finger beam can be lifted while it falls by its own weight when released, instead of being positively forced down as in the plaintiff's patent. This species of lifting device was old.

6th. In defendants' patent, the second, fifth

Fourth, that the patent was invalid for want of novelty, and that the alleged invention was set forth and described in various prior patents recited in the answer;

Fifth, that the patent was invalid by reason of the alleged invention having been in public use and on sale for more than two years before application therefor, with the knowledge and consent of the patentee;

Sixth, that the patent was invalid by reason of the alleged invention having been shown. and described in a prior patent obtained by the same patentee, under date of July 23, 1867; and by reason of the fact that the application for the patent in suit was in fraud of the rights of the assignees under the first patent;

Seventh, that the patentee, having, prior to the application for the patent of July, 23, 1867, assigned that application and the invention to which it related, and the exclusive right to the machine exhibited therein (baving at the time a claim in that application for the subject matter here in controversy), could not lawfully by subsequent independent application, obtain separate exclusive title to the part of the machine thus assigned, or convey such title to this complainant;

Eighth, that if the subsequent patent (the one in suit) were not altogether invalid, in so far as it related to the machine exhibited and described in the first, the assignees of the first patent had such interest or equities in the sec ond as made them necessary parties;

Ninth, that complainant had not such title under the patent sued upon as to enable him to maintain this suit; and

Tenth, that the defendants held a license un- . der the Graham patent of July 23, 1867.