plies a knowledge of the relative fituation of the different points with refpect to each other, we must conclude, that the perception of figure by the eye, is the refult of a number of different acts of attention. These acts of attention, however, are performed with fuch rapidity, that the effect, with refpect to us, is the fame as if the perception were inftantaneous.

In farther confirmation of this reafoning, it may be remarked, that if the perception of visible figure were an immediate confequence of the picture on the retina, we should have, at the first glance, as diftinct an idea of a figure of a thousand fides, as of a triangle or a fquare. The truth is, that when the figure is very fimple, the process of the mind is fo rapid, that the perception feems to be inftantaneous; but when the fides are multiplied beyond a certain number, the interval of time neceflary for thefe different acts of attention becomes perceptible.

It may perhaps be asked, what I mean by a point in the outline of a figure, and what it is that conftitutes this point one object of attention? The answer, I apprehend, is, that this point is the minimum vifibile. If the point be less, we cannot perceive it: if it be greater, it is not all feen in one direction.

If these observations be admitted, it will follow, that, without the faculty of memory, we could have had no perception of visible figure.

CHAPTER THIRD.

Of Conception.

BY Conception, I mean that power of the mind, which enables it to form a notion of an abfent object of perception; or of a fenfation which it has formerly felt. I do not contend that this is exclufively the proper meaning of the word, but I think that the faculty which I have now defined deferves to be distinguished by an appropriated name.

ers.

Conception is often confounded with other pow

When a painter makes a picture of a friend, who is abfent or dead, he is commonly faid to paint from memory: and the expreffion is fufficiently correct for common converfation. But in an analysis of the mind, there is ground for a distinction. The power of conception enables him to make the features of his friend an object of thought, so as to copy the resemblance; the power of memory recognifes these features as a former object of perception. Every act of memory includes an idea of the paft; conception implies no idea of time whatever.*

According to this view of the matter, the word conception correfponds to what was called by the fchoolmen fimple apprehenfion; with this difference only, that they included, under this name, our apprehenfion of general propofitions; whereas I fhould wish to limit the application of the word conception to our fenfations, and the objects of our perceptions. Dr. Reid, in his Inquiry, fubftitutes the word con

* Shakespeare calls this power "the mind's eye."

Hamlet. My father! Methinks I see my father.
Horatio." Where, my Lord?

Hamlet." In my mind's eye, Horatio."

Act i, Scene 4.

Q

ception inftead of the fimple apprehenfion of the schools, and employs it in the fame extenfive fignificacation. I think it may contribute to make our ideas more diftinct, to reftrict its meaning :-and for fuch a reftriction, we have the authority of philofophers in a cafe perfectly analogous.-In ordinary language, we apply the fame word perception, to the knowledge which we have by our fenfes of external objects, and to our knowledge of fpeculative truth: and yet an author would be juftly cenfured, who should treat of these two operations of the mind under the fame article of perception. I apprehend there is as wide a difference between the conception of a truth, and the conception of an absent object of fenfe, as between the perception of a tree, and the perception of a mathematical theorem.-I have therefore taken the liberty to distinguish alfo the two former operations of the mind: and under the article of conception shall confine myself to that faculty whofe province it is to enable us to form a notion of our paft fenfations, or of the objects of fenfe that we have formerly perceived.

Conception is frequently used as fynonymous with imagination. Dr. Reid fays, that "imagination, in "its proper fenfe, fignifies a lively conception of objects of fight."This is a talent" (he remarks) "of importance to poets and orators; and deferves "a proper name, on account of its connexion with "their arts." He adds, that "imagination is diftinguished from conception, as a part from a "whole."

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I fhall not inquire, at prefent, into the proper English meaning of the words conception and imagina tion. In a ftudy fuch as this, fo far removed from the common purposes of fpeech, fome latitude may perhaps be allowed in the ufe of words; provided only we define accurately thofe we employ, and adhere to our own definitions.

The bufinefs of conception according to the account I have given of it, is to prefent us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived. But we have moreover, a power of modifying our conceptions, by combining the parts of different ones together, fo as to form new wholes of our own creation. Ifhall employ the word imagination to express this power and, I apprehend, that this is the proper fenfe of the word; if imagination be the power which gives birth to the productions of the poet and the painter. This is not a fimple faculty of the mind. It prefuppofes abftraction, to separate from each other qualities and circumstances which have been perceived in conjunction; and also judgment and taste to direct us in forming the combinations. If they are made wholly at random, they are proofs of infanity.

The first remarkable fact which ftrikes us with refpect to conception is, that we can conceive the objects of fome fenses much more easily than those of others. Thus we can conceive an abfent visible object, fuch as a building that is familiar to us, much more eafily than a particular found, a particular taste, or a particular pain, which we have formerly felt. It is probable, however, that this power might be improved in the cafe of fome of our fenfes. Few peo

each other.

* In common discourse, we often use the phrase of thinking upon an object, to express what I here call, the conception of it.-In the following passage, Shakespeare uses the former of these phrases, and the words imagination and apprehension as synonymous with -Who can hold a fire in his hand, By thinking on the frosty Caucasus ? Or cloy the hungry edge of appetite, By bare imagination of a feast? Or wallow naked in December's snow, By thinking on fantastic summer's heat? Oh no! the apprehension of the good Gives but the greater feeling to the worse.

K. RICHARD II. Act i. Scene 6.

ple, I believe, are able to form a very diftinct conception of founds; and yet it is certain, that by practice, a perfon may acquire a power of amusing himself with reading written mufic. And in the case of poetical numbers, it is univerfally known, that a reader may enjoy the harmony of the verfe, without articulating the words, even in a whisper. In fuch cases, I take for granted, that our pleasure arises from a very ftrong conception of the founds which we have been accustomed to affociate with particular written characters.

The peculiarity in the cafe of visible objects, feems to arise from this; that when we think of a found or of a tafte, the object of our conception is one fingle detached fenfation; whereas every visible object is complex; and the conception which we form of it as a whole, is aided by the affociation of ideas. To perceive the force of this obfervation, it is necef, fary to recollect what was formerly faid on the subject of attention. As we cannot at one inftant attend to every point of the picture of an object on the retina, fo, I apprehend, we cannot at one inftant form a conception of the whole of any visible object; but that our conception of the object as a whole, is the refult of many conceptions. The affociation of ideas connects the different parts together, and presents them to the mind in their proper arrangement; and the various relations which thefe parts bear to one another in point of fituation, contribute greatly to ftrengthen the affociations. It is fome confirmation of this theory, that it is more easy to remember a fucceffion of founds, than any particular found which we have heard detached and unconnected.

The power of conceiving visible objects, like all other powers that depend on the affociation of ideas, may be wonderfully improved by habit. A perfon accustomed to drawing, retains a much more perfect notion of a building or of a landscape which he has