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vifion only extends to a few inches; yet fo ftrong is the affociation between the original perceptions of fight, and the conceptions which they habitually produce, that it is not poffible for us, by any effort of our will, to prevent thefe conceptions from taking place.

From these obfervations it appears, that when the conceptions of the mind are rendered fteady and permanent, by being ftrongly affociated with any fenfible impreffion, they command our belief no lefs than our actual perceptions; and, therefore, if it were poffible for us, with our eyes fhut, to keep up, for a length of time, the conception of any fenfible object, we fhould, as long as this effort continued, believe that the object was prefent to our fenfes.

It appears to me to be no flight confirmation of these remarks, that although, in the dark, the illufions of imagination are much more liable to be miftaken for realities, than when their momentary ef fects on the belief are continually checked and corrected by the objects which the light of day prefents to our perceptions; yet, even total darkness is not fo alarming to a perfon impreffed with the vulgar ftories of apparitions, as a faint and doubtful twilight, which affords to the conceptions an opportunity of fixing and prolonging their existence, by attaching themselves to fomething which is obfcurely exhibited to the eye.-In like manner, when we look through a fog, we are frequently apt to mistake a crow for a man; and the conception we have, upon fuch an occafion, of the human figure, is much more diftinct and much more fteady, than it would be poffible for us to form, if we had no sensible object before us; infomuch that when on a more attentive obfervation, the crow shrinks to its own dimensions, we find it impoffible, by any effort, to conjure up the phantom which a moment before we feemed to perceive.

If thefe obfervations are admitted, the effects which

exhibitions of fictitious diftrefs produce on the mind, will appear lefs wonderful, than they are fuppofed to be. During the representation of a tragedy, I acknowledge, that we have a general conviction that the whole is a fiction; but, I believe, it will be found, that the violent emotions which are fometimes produced by the diftreffes of the ftage, take their rise, in moft cafes, from a momentary belief, that the dis. treffes are real. I fay, in moft cafes; because I acknowledge, that independently of any fuch belief, there is fomething contagious in a faithful expreffion any of the paffions.

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The emotions produced by tragedy are, upon this fuppofition, fomewhat analogous to the dread we feel when we look down from the battlement of a tower. In both cafes, we have a general conviction, that there is no ground for the feelings we experi ence; but the momentary influences of imagination are fo powerful as to produce thefe feelings, before reflection has time to come to our relief.

*With respect to the dread which we feel in looking down from the battlement of a tower, it is curious to remark the effects of habit in gradually destroying it. The manner in which habit operates in this case, seems to be by giving us a command over our thoughts, so as to enable us to withdraw our attention from the precipice before us, and direct it to any other object at pleasure. It is thus that the mason and the sailor not only can take precautions for their own safety, but remain completely masters of them. selves in situations where other men, engrossed with their imaginary danger, would experience a total suspension of their faculties. Any strong passion which occupies the mind produces, for the moment, the same effect with habit. A person alarmed with the apprehension of fire, has been known to escape from the top of a house, by a path which, at another time, he would have considered as impracticable; and soldiers, in mounting a breach, are said to have sometimes found their way to the enemy, by a route which appeared inaccessible after their violent passions had subsided.

CHAPTER FOURTH.

Of Abstraction.

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SECTION I.

General obfervations on this Faculty of the Mind.

THE origin of appellative, or, in other words, the origin of those claffes of objects which, in the schools, are called genera, and fpecies, has been confidered by fome philofophers as one of the most difficult problems in metaphyfics. The account of it which is given by Mr. Smith, in his Differtation on the Origin of Languages, appears to me to be equally fimple and fatisfactory.

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"The affignation" (fays he) " of particular names, "to denote particular objects; that is, the inftitution "of nouns fubftantive; would probably be one of "the firft fteps towards the formation of Language. "The particular cave, whofe covering fheltered the favage from the weather; the particular tree, "whofe fruit relieved his hunger; the particular "fountain, whose water allayed his thirft; would "first be denominated by the words, cave, tree, foun"tain; or by whatever other appellations he might "think proper, in that primitive jargon, to mark "them. Afterwards, when the more enlarged ex"perience of this favage had led him to obferve, "and his neceffary occafions obliged him to make "mention of, other caves, and other trees, and other "fountains; he would naturally bestow upon each "of thofe new objects, the fame name by which he "had been accustomed to exprefs the fimilar object

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"he was first acquainted with. And thus, those "woods, which were originally the proper names of "individuals, would each of them infenfibly become "the common name of a multitude.”*

"It is this application" (he continues)" of the "name of an individual to a great number of objects, "whose resemblance naturally recals the idea of that "individual, and of the name which expreffes it, "that feems originally to have given occafion to the "formation of thofe claffes, and affortments, which, ❝in the schools, are called genera and Species; and of "which the ingenious and eloquent Rouffeau finds "himself fo much at a lofs to account for the origin. "What conftitutes a fpecies, is merely a number of "objects, bearing a certain degree of resemblance to "one another; and, on that account, denominated by a fingle appellation, which may be applied to "exprefs any one of them."+

This view of the natural progrefs of the mind, in forming claffifications of external objects, receives fome illuftration from a fact mentioned by Captain Cook in his account of a small ifland called Wateeoo, which he visited in failing from New Zealand to the Friendly islands. "The inhabitants," fays he, were " afraid to come near our cows and horfes, nor did "they form the least conception of their nature. "But the sheep and goats did not furpass the limits

*The same account of the progress of the mind in the formation of genera, is given by the Abbé de Condillac. "Un enfant appelle du nom d'Arbre le premier arbre 86 que nous lui montrons. Un second arbre qu'il voit en"suite lui rapelle la même idée; il lui donne le même "nom; de même à un troisième, à un quatrième, et voilà "le mot d'Arbre donné d'abord à un individu, qui devient 66 pour lui un nom de classe ou de genre, une ideé abstraite qui comprend tous les arbres en général."

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Dissertation on the Origin of Languages, annexed to Mr. Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments.

"of their ideas; for they gave us to understand that "they knew them to be birds. It will appear," he adds, “rather incredible, that human ignorance could "ever make fo strange a mistake, there not being "the moft diftant fimilitude between a fheep or goat, and any winged animal. But these people "feemed to know nothing of the existence of any "other land animals, befides hogs, dogs, and birds. "Our sheep and goats, they could fee, were very "different creatures from the two first, and therefore

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they inferred that they muft belong to the latter "class, in which they knew that there is a confider"able variety of fpecies."-I would add to Cook's very judicious remarks, that the mistake of these iflanders probably did not arise from their confider. ing a fheep or a goat as bearing a more ftriking refemblance to a bird, than to the two claffes of quadrupeds with which they were acquainted; but to the want of a generic word, fuch as quadruped, comprehending these two fpecies; which men in their fituation would no more be led to form, than a perfon who had only seen one individual of each species, would think of an appellative to express both, instead of applying a proper name to each. In confequence of the variety of birds, it appears, that they had a generic name comprehending all of them, to which it was not unnatural for them to refer any new animal they met with.

The claffification of different objects fuppofes a power of attending to fome of their qualities or attributes, without attending to the reft; for no two objects are to be found without fome specific difference; and no affortment or arrangement can be formed among things not perfectly alike, but by lofing fight of their diftinguishing peculiarities, and limiting the attention to those attributes which belong to them in common. Indeed, without this power of attending separately to things which our fenfes

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