a ground very different from that of their predecef fors, it is not likely that the controversy will ever be renewed. The rubbish being now removed, and the foundations laid, it is time to begin the fuperftructure. The progress which I have made in it is, I am fenfible, very inconfiderable; yet I flatter my. felf, that the little I have done, will be fufficient to il luftrate the importance of the study, and to recommend the fubjects of which I am to treat, to the attention of others.

After the remarks which I have now made, the reader will not be surprised to find, that I have ftudiously avoided the confideration of those questions which have been agitated in the prefent age, between the patrons of the fceptical philofophy, and their opponents. These controverfies have, in truth, no peculiar connexion with the inquiries on which I am to enter. It is indeed only by an examination of the principles of our nature, that they can be brought to a fatisfactory conclufion; but fuppofing them to remain undecided, our fceptical doubts concerning the certainty of human knowledge, would no more affect the philofophy of mind, than they would affect of the branches of phyfics; nor would our doubts concerning even the existence of mind, affect this branch of science, any more than the doubts of the Berkeleian, concerning the existence of matter, affect his opinions in natural philofophy.

any

To what purposes the philofophy of the human mind according to the view which I propose to take of it, is fubfervient, I fhall endeavor to explain, at fome length, in the following fection.

PART SECOND.

SECTION I.

Of the Utility of the Philofophy of the Human Mind.

IT has been often remarked, that there is a mutual connexion between the different arts and fciences, and that the improvements which are made in one branch of human knowledge, frequently throw light on others, to which it has apparently a very remote relation. The modern difcoveries in astronomy, and in and in pure mathematics, have contributed to bring the art of navigation to a degree of perfection formerly unknown. The rapid progrefs which has been lately made in aftronomy, anatomy, and botany, has been chiefly owing to the aid which these sciences have received from the art of the optician.

Although, however, the different departments of science and of art mutually reflect light on each other, it is not always neceffary either for the philofopher or the artift to aim at the acquifition of general knowledge. Both of them may safely take many principles for granted, without being able to demonftrate their truth. A feaman, though ignorant of mathematics, may apply, with correctnefs and dexterity, the rules for finding the longitude: An aftronomer, or a botanift, though ignorant of optics, may avail himself of the use of the telescope, or the microscope.

Thefe obfervations are daily exemplified in the case of the artift; who has feldom either inclination or leifure to fpeculate concerning the principles of It is rarely, however, we meet with a man of science, who has confined his ftudies wholly to one branch of knowledge. That curiofity, which he has been accuftomed to indulge in the courfe of

his art.

his favorite purfuit, will naturally extend itself to every remarkable object which falls under his obfervation; and can scarcely fail to be a fource of perpetual diffatisfaction to his mind, till it has been so far gratified as to enable him to explain all the various phenomena, which his profeffional habits are every day prefenting to his view.

As every particular science is in this manner connected with others, to which it naturally directs the attention, fo all the purfuits of life, whether they terminate in fpeculation or action, are connected with that general science, which has the human mind for its object. The powers of the understanding are inftruments which all men employ; and his curiofity must be small indeed, who paffes through life in a total ignorance of faculties, which his wants and neceffities force him habitually to exercise, and which fo remarkably diftinguifh man from the lower animals. The active principles of our nature, which, by their various modifications and combinations, give rife to all the moral differences among men, are fitted, in a ftill higher degree, if poffible, to intereft thofe, who are either difpofed to reflect on their own characters, or to obferve, with attention, the characters of others. The phenomena resulting from these faculties and principles of the mind, are every moment foliciting our notice; and open to our examination, a field of discovery, as inexhaustible as the phenomena of the material world; and exhibiting not lefs ftriking marks of divine wisdom.

While all the sciences, and all the pursuits of life, have this common tendency to lead our inquiries to the philosophy of the human nature, this last branch of knowledge borrows its principles from no other science whatever. Hence there is fomething in the ftudy of it, which is peculiarly gratifying to a reflecting and inquifitive mind; and fomething in the conclufions to which it leads, on which the mind refts

with peculiar fatisfaction. Till once our opinions are in fome degree fixed with refpect to it, we abandon ourselves, with reluctance, to particular scientific investigations; and on the other hand, a general knowledge of fuch of its principles as are moft fitted to excite the curiofity, not only prepares us for engaging in other pursuits with more liberal and comprehenfive views, but leaves us at liberty to prosecute them with a more undivided and concentrated attention.

It is not, however, mer ly as a fubject of fpeculative curiofity, that the principles of the human mind deferve a careful examination. The advantages to be expected from a fuccessful analysis of it are various; and fome of them of fuch importance, as to render it aftonishing, that, amidst all the fuccefs with which the fubordinate fciences have been cultivated, this, which comprehends the principles of all of them, fhould be still fuffered to remain in its infancy.

I fhall endeavor to illuftrate a few of these advantages, beginning with what appears to me to be the most important of any; the light, which a philosophical analysis of the principles of the mind would neceffarily throw, on the fubjects of intellectual and moral education.

The most effential objects of education are the two following: Firt, to cultivate all the various principles of our nature, both fpeculative and active, in fuch a manner as to bring them to the greatefi perfection of which they are fufceptible; and, Secondly, by watching over the impreffions and affociations which the mind receives in early life, to fecure it against the influence of prevailing errors; and, as far as poffible, to engage its prepoffeffions on the fide of truth. It is only upon a philofophical analysis of the mind, that a fyftematical plan can be founded, for the accomplishment of either of these purposes. There are few individuals, whofe education has D

been conducted in every respect with attention and judgment. Almoft every man of reflection is confcious, when he arrives at maturity, of many defects in his mental powers; and of many inconvenient habits, which might have been prevented or remedied in his infancy or youth. Such a confcioufness is the first step towards improvement; and the perfon who feels it, if he is poffeffed of refolution and steadiness, will not fcruple to begin, even in advanced years, a new courfe of education for himself. The degree of reflection and obfervation, indeed, which is neceffary for this purpose, cannot be expected from any one at a very early period of life, as these are the loft powers of the mind which unfold themselves; but it is never too late to think of the improvement of our faculties; and much progress may be made, in the art of applying them fuccefsfully to their proper objects, or in obviating the inconveniencies refulting from their imperfection, not only in manhood, but in old age.

It is not, however, to the mistakes of our early inftructors, that all our intellectual defects are to be afcribed. There is no profeffion or purfuit which has not habits peculiar to itself; and which does not leave fome powers of the mind dormant, while it exercises and improves the reft. If we wifh, therefore, to cultivate the mind to the extent of its capacity, we must not reft fatisfied with that employment which its faculties receive from our particular fitua tion in life. It is not in the awkward and profeffional form of a mechanic, who has ftrengthened particular muscles of his body by the habits of his trade, that we are to look for the perfection of our animal nature: neither is it among men of confined pur. fuits, whether fpeculative or active, that we are to expect to find the human mind in its highest state of cultivation. A variety of exercises is neceffary to preferve the animal frame in vigour and beauty; and