fefs all the intellectual and moral improvement of which their nature is fufceptible. "Original genius" (lays Voltaire)" occurs but seldom in a nation "where the literary taste is formed. The number "of cultivated minds which there abound, like the "trees in a thick and flourishing foreft, prevent any fingle individual from rearing his head far above the "reft. Where trade is in few hands, we meet with ce a small number of over-grown fortunes in the "midst of a general poverty: in proportion as it "extends, opulence becomes general, and great for"tunes rare. It is, precifely, because there is at "prefent much light, and much cultivation, in "France, that we are led to complain of the want "of fuperior genius."

To what purpose, indeed, it may be said, all this labor? Is not the importance of every thing to man, to be ultimately eftimated by its tendency to promote his happiness? And is not our daily experience fufficient to convince us, that this is, in general, by no means proportioned to the culture which his nature has received?-Nay, is there not fome ground for fufpecting, that the lower orders of men enjoy, on the whole, a more enviable condition, than their more enlightened and refined fuperiors?

The truth, I apprehend, is, that happiness, in fo far as it arifes from the mind itfelf, will be always proportioned to the degree of perfection which its powers have attained; but that, in cultivating these powers, with a view to this most important of all objects, it is effentially neceffary that such a degree of attention be bestowed on all of them, as may preferve them in that state of relative ftrength, which appears to be agreeable to the intentions of nature. In confequence of an exclufive attention to the culture of the imagination, the tatte, the reafoning faculty, or any of the active principles, it is poffible that the pleasures of human life may be diminished, or

its pains increased; but the inconvenienees which are experienced in fuch cafes, are not to be afcribed to education, but to a partial and injudicious education. In fuch cafes, it is poffible, that the poet, the metaphyfician, or the man of tafte and refinement, may appear to disadvantage, when compared with the vulgar; for fuch is the benevolent appointment of Providence with refpect to the lower orders, that although not one principle of their nature be com pletely unfolded, the whole of thefe principles preferve among themfelves, that balance which is favorable to the tranquillity of their minds and to a prudent and steady conduct in the limited fphere which is affigned to them, far more completely, than in those of their fuperiors, whofe education has been conducted on an erroneous or imperfect fyftem: but all this, far from weakening the force of the foregoing obfervations, only ferves to demonftrate how impoffible it always will be, to form a rational plan for the improvement of the mind, without an accurate and comprehensive knowledge of the principles of the human conftitution.

The remarks which have been already made, are fufficient to illuftrate the dangerous confequences which are likely to refult from a partial and injudicious cultivation of the mind; and, at the same time, to point out the utility of the intellectual philofophy, in enabling us to preferve a proper balance among all its various faculties, principles of action, and capacities of enjoyment. Many additional obfervations might be offered, on the tendency which an accurate analysis of its powers u ight probably have, to fuggeft rules for their farther improvement, and for a more fuccefsful application of them to their proper purposes: but this fubject I fhall not profecute at prefent, as the illuftration of it is one of the leading objects of the following work. That the memory, the imagination, or the reafonig faculty,

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are to be inftantly ftrengthened in confequence of our fpeculations concerning their nature, it would be abfurd to fuppofe; but it is furely far from being unreasonable to think, that an acquaintance with the laws which regulate thefe powers, may fuggest some useful rules for their gradual cultivation; for remedying their defects, in the cafe of individuals, and even for extending those limits, which nature feems, at first view, to have affigned them.

To how great a degree of perfection the intellectual and moral nature of man is capable of being raised by cultivation, it is difficult to conceive. The effects of early, continued, and fyftematical education, in the cafe of thofe children who are trained, for the fake of gain, to feats of ftrength and agility, juftify, perhaps, the moft fanguine views which it is poffible for a philofopher to form, with respect to the improvement of the fpecies.

I now proceed to confider, how far the philofophy of mind may be useful in accomplishing the second object of education; by affifting us in the management of early impreffions and affociations.

By far the greater part of the opinions on which we act in life, are not the refult of our own inveftigations; but are adopted implicitly, in infancy and youth, upon the authority of others. Even the great principles of morality, although implanted in every heart, are commonly aided and cherished, at least to a certain degree, by the care of our inftructors. All this is undoubtedly agreeablé to the intentions of nature'; and, indeed, were the case otherwise, fociety could not fubfift; for nothing can be more evident, than that the bulk of mankind, condemned as they are to laborious occupations, which are incompatible with intellectual improvement, are perfectly incapable of forming their own opinions on fome of the most important fubjects that can employ the human mind. It is ev

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ident, at the fame time, that as no fyftem of education is perfect, a variety of prejudices muft in this way, take an early hold of our belief; fo as to acquire over it an influence not inferior to that of the moft incontrovertible truths. When a child hears, either a speculative abfurdity, or an erroneous principle of action, recommended and enforced daily, by the fame voice which first conveyed to it those simple and sublime leffons of morality and religion which are congenial to its nature, is it to be wondered at, that, in future life, it should find it so difficult to eradicate prejudices which have twined their roots with all the effential principles of the human frame?—If fuch, however, be the obvious intentions of nature, with respect to those orders of men who are employed in bodily labor, it is equally clear, that she meant to impose it as a double obligation on those who receive the advantages of a liberal education, to examine, with the moft fcrupulous care, the foundation of all those received opinions, which have any connexion with morality, or with human happiness. If the multitude must be led, it is of confequence, furely, that it fhould be led by enlightened conductors; by men who are able to diftinguifh truth from error; and to draw the line between those prejudices which are innocent or falutary, (if indeed there are any prejudices which are really falutary,) and those which are hoftile to the interests of virtue and of mankind.

In such a state of fociety as that in which we live, the prejudices of a moral, a political, and a religious nature, which we imbibe in early life, are fo various, and at the fame time fo intimately blended with the belief we entertain of the moft facred and important truths, that a great part of the life of a philofopher muft neceffarily be devoted, not fo much to the acquifition of new knowledge, as to unlearn the errors to which he had been taught to give an implicit affent, before the dawn of reafon and reflection,

And unless he submit in this manner to bring all his opinions to the teft of a fevere examination, his ingenuity, and his learning, instead of enlightening the world, will only enable him to give an additional currency, and an additional authority, to eftablished 'errors. To attempt fuch a ftruggle against early prejudices, is, indeed, the profeffed aim of all philofophers; but how few are to be found who have force of mind fufficient for accomplishing their object; and who, in freeing themfelves from one let of errors, do not allow themselves to be carried away with another? To fucceed in it completely, Lord Bacon feems to have thought, (in one of the most remarkable paffages of his writings,) to be more than can well be expected from human frailty."Nemo adhuc tanta mentis conftantia inventus eft, "ut decreverit, et fi i impofuerit, theorias et no"tiones communes peuitus abolere, et intellectum "abrafum et æquum ad particularia, de integro, ap

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plicare. Itaque illa ratio humana, quam habemus, "ex multa fide, et multo etiam cafu, nec non ex "puerilibus, quas primo haufimus, notionibus, farrago quædam eft, et congeries. Quod fiquis, ætate matura, et fenfibus integris, et mente repurgata, "fe ad experientiam, et ad particularia de itegro ap"plicet, de eo melius fperaudum eft."

Nor is it merely in order to free the mind from the influence of error, that it is ufeful to examine the foundation of established opinions. It is fuch an examination alone, that, in an inquifitive age like the present, can secure a philofopher from the danger of ultimated fcepticism. To this extreme, indeed, the complexion of the times is more likely to give him a tendency, than to implicit credulity. In the former ages of ignorance and fuperftition, the intimate affociation which had been formed, in the prevailing fyftems of education, between truth and error, had given to the latter an afcendant over the