nected with human happiness? The long reign of error in the world, and the influence it maintains, even in an age of liberal inquiry; far from being favourable to the fuppofition, that human reafon is deftined to be for ever the fport of prejudice and abfurdity, demonftrates the tendency which there is to permanence in established opinions, and in eftablished inftitutions; and promifes an eternal stability to true philofophy, when it fhall once have acquired the afcendant; and when proper means fhall be employed to fupport it, by a more perfect fyftem of education.

Let us fuppofe, for a moment, that this happy æra were arrived, and that all the prepoffeffions of childhood and youth were directed to fupport the pure and fublime truths of an enlightened morality. With what ardour, and with what transport, would the understanding, when arrived at maturity, proceed in the fearch of truth; when, instead of being obliged to ftruggle, at every step, with early preju dices, its office was merely to add the force of philofophical conviction, to impreffions, which are equally delightful to the imagination, and dear to the heart! The prepoffeffions of childhood would, through the whole of life, be gradually acquiring ftrength from the enlargement of our knowledge; and, in their turn, would fortify the conclufions of our reafon, against the sceptical fuggestions of disappointment or melancholy.

Our daily experience may convince us, how fusceptible the tender mind is of deep impreffions; and what important and permanent effects are produced on the characters, and the happiness of individuals, by the cafual affociations formed in childhood among the various ideas, feelings, and affections, with which they were habitually occupied. It is the bufinefs of education not to counteract this conftitution of nature, but to give it a proper direction: and the mifer

able confequences to which it leads, when under an improper regulation, only fhew, what an important inftrument of human improvement it might be rendered, in more fkilful hands. If it be poffible to intereft the imagination and the heart in favor of error, it is, at least, no lefs poffible to intereft them in favor of truth. If it be poffible to extinguish all the most generous and heroic feelings of our nature, by teaching us to connect the idea of them with those of guilt and impiety; it is furely equally poffible to cherish and strengthen them, by establishing the natural alliance between our duty and our happiness. If it be poffible for the influence of fashion to veil the native deformity of vice, and to give to low and criminal indulgences the appearance of fpirit, of elegance, and of gaiety; can we doubt of the poffibility of connecting, in the tender mind, these pleasing asfociations, with purfuits that are truly worthy and honorable?-There are few men to be found, among those who have received the advantages of a liberal education, who do not retain, through life, that admiration of the heroic ages of Greece and Rome, with which the claffical authors once infpired them. It is, in truth, a fortunate prepoffeffion, on the whole, and one, of which I should be forry to counteract the influence. But are there not others of equal importance to morality and to happiness, with which the mind might, at the fame period of life, be infpired? If the first conceptions, for example, which an infant formed of the Deity, and its firft moral perceptions, were affociated with the early impreffions produced on the heart by the beauties of nature, or the charms of poetical description, those serious thoughts which are reforted to, by moft men, merely as a fource of confolation in adverfity; and which, on that very account, are frequently tinctured with fome degree of gloom, would recur fpontaneoufly to the mind, in its beft and happiest hours; and would infenfibly

blend themselves with all its purest and most refined enjoyments.

In those parts of Europe, where the prevailing opinions involve the greatest variety of errors and corruptions, it is, I believe, a common idea with many reipectable and enlightened men, that, in every country, it is moft prudent to conduct the religious inftruction of youth upon the plan which is prefcribed by the national establishment; in order that the pupil, according to the vigour or feeblenefs of his mind, may either shake off, in future life, the preju dices of the nursery, or die in the popular persuasion. This idea, I own, appears to me to be equally ill-founded and dangerous. If religious opinions have, as will not be difputed, a powerful influence on the hap pinefs, and on the conduct of mankind, does not hu manity require of us, to rescue as many victims as poffi le from the hands of bigotry; and to fave them from the cruel alternative, of remaining under the gloom of a depreffing fuperftition, or of being diftracted by a perpetual conflict between the heart and the understanding?—It is an enlightened education alone, that, in moft countries of Europe, can fave the young philofopher from that anxiety and defpondence, which every man of fenfibility, who, in his childhood, has imbibed the popular opinions, muft neceflarily experience, when he first begins to exan ine their foundation; and, what is of ftill greater in portance, which can fave him, during lite, tron that occafional scepticism, to which all men are liable, whofe tystems fluctuate with the inequalities of their fpirits, and the variations of the atmosphere.

I fhall conclude this fubject, with remarking, that, although in all moral and religious fyftems, there is a great mixture of important truth; and although it is, in confequence of this alliance, that errors and abfurdities are enabled to preferye their hold of the belief, yet it is commonly found, that, in proportion

as an established creed is complicated in its dogmas and in its ceremonies, and in proportion to the number of acceffory ideas which it has grafted upon the truth, the more difficult is it, for those who have adopted it in childhood, to emancipate themselves completely from its influence; and, in thofe cafes in which they at last fucceed, the greater is their danger of abandoning, along with their errors, all the truths which they had been taught to connect with them. The Roman Catholic fyftem is fhaken off with much greater difficulty, than those which are taught in the reformed churches; but when it loses its hold of the mind, it much more frequently prepares the way for unlimited fcepticifm. The cau fes of this I may perhaps have an opportunity of pointing out, in treating of the affociation of ideas.

I have now finished all that I think neceffary to offer, at prefent, on the application of the philofophy of mind to the fubject of education. To fome readers, I am afraid, that what I have advanced on the fubject, will appear to border upon enthutiafm; and I will not attempt to justify myself against the charge. I am well aware of the tendency, which speculative men fometimes have, to magnify the effects of edu cation, as well as to entertain too fanguine views of the improvement of the world; and I am ready to acknowledge, that there are inftances of individuals, whofe vigor of mind is fufficient to overcome every thing that is pernicious in their early habits: but I am fully perfuaded, that these inftances are rare; and that, by far the greater part of mankind continue, through life, to pursue the fame track into which they have been thrown, by the accidental circumftances of fituation, inftruction, and example.

PART SECOND.

SECTION II.

Continuation of the fame Subject.

THE remarks which have been hitherto made, on the utility of the philofophy of the human mind, are of a very general nature, and apply equally to all defcriptions of men. Befides, however, thefe more obvious advantages of the ftudy, there are others, which, though lefs ftriking, and lefs extenfive in their application, are nevertheless, to fome particular claffes of individuals, of the highest importance. Without pretending to exhauft the fubject, I fhall offer a few detached obfervations upon it, in this fection.

I already took notice, in general terms, of the common relation which all the different branches of our knowledge bear to the philosophy of the human mind. In confequence of this relation, it not only forms an interefting object of curiofity to literary men of every denomination; but, if fuccefsfully prof ecuted, it cannot fail to furnish useful lights for directing their inquiries; whatever the nature of the fubjects may be, which happen to engage their attention.

In order to be fatisfied of the juftness of this obfervation, it is fufficient to recollect, that to the philofophy of the mind are to be referred, all our inquiries concerning the divifions and the claffifications of the objects of human knowledge; and also, all the various rules, both for the investigation, and the communication, of truth. Thefe general views of science, and these general rules of method, ought to form the subjects of a rational and useful logic; a ' ftudy, undoubtedly, in itself of the greatest impor