fentient and intelligent being; or, in other words, that they are all modifications and operations of himself. I fay nothing, at present, of the various fimple notions, (or fimple ideas, as they are commonly called,) which would arife in his mind; for example, the ideas of number, of duration, of caufe and effect, of perfonal identity; all of which, though perfectly unlike his fenfations, could not fail to be fuggefted by means of them. Such a being, then, might know all that we know of mind at prefent; and as his language would be appropriated to mind folely, and not borrowed, by analogy, from material phenomena, he would even poffefs important advantages over us in conducting the ftudy of pneumatology.

From thefe obfervations it fufficiently appears, what is the real amount of the celebrated doctrine, which refers the origin of all our knowledge to our fenfations; and that, even granting it to be true, (which, for my own part, I am difpofed to do, in the fenfe in which I have now explained it,) it would by no means follow from it, that our notions of the operations of mind, nor even many of thofe notions which are commonly fuggefted to us, in the first inStance, by the perception of external objects, are neceffarily fubfequent to our knowledge of the qualities, or even of the existence, of matter.

The remarks which I have offered on this doctrine will not appear fuperfluous to thofe who recollect that, although it has, for many years paft, been a fubject of controverfy in England, it continues ftill to be implicitly adopted by the best philofophical writers in France; and that it has been employed by fome of them to fupport the fyftem of materialism; and by others to fhew, that the intellectual diftinctions between man and brutes, arife entirely from the differences in their animal organization, and in their powers of external perception.

CHAPTER SECOND.

Of Attention.

WHEN we are deeply engaged in converfation, or occupied with any fpeculation that is interesting to the mind, the furrounding objects either do not produce in us the perceptions they are fitted to excite; or thefe perceptions are inftantly forgotten. A clock, for example, may ftrike in the fame room with us, without our being able, next moment, to recollect whether we heard it or not.

In these, and fimilar cafes, I believe, it is commonly taken for granted, that we really do not perceive the external object. From fome analogous facts, however, I am inclined to suspect that this opinion is not well-founded. A perfon who falls asleep at church, and is fuddenly awaked, is unable to recollect the laft words fpoken by the preacher ; or even to recollect that he was fpeaking at all. And yet, that fleep does not fufpend entirely the powers of perception, may be inferred from this, that if the preacher were to make a fudden pause in his dif courfe, every perfon in the congregation who was afleep would inftantly awake. In this cafe, therefore, it appears, that a perfon may be conscious of a perception, without being able afterwards to recollect it.

Many other inftances of the fame general fact might be produced. When we read a book, (efpecially in a language which is not perfectly familiar to us,) we muft perceive fucceffively every different letter, and muft afterwards combine thefe letters into fyllables and words, before we comprehend the meaning of a sentence. This procefs, however, pasfes through the mind, without leaving any trace in the memory.

It has been proved by optical writers, that, in perceiving the distances of visible objects from the eye, there is a judgment of the understanding antecedent to the perception. In fome cafes this judgment is founded on a variety of circumftances combined together; the conformation of the organ neceffarý for diftinct vifion; the inclination of the optic axes; the diftinctness or indiftinctness of the minute parts of the object; the distances of the intervening objects from each other, and from the eye; and, perhaps, on other circumftances befides thefe: and yet, in confequence of our familiarity with fuch proceffés from our earlieft infancy, the perception feems to be inftantaneous; and it requires much reasoning, to convince perfons unaccustomed to philofophical fpeculations, that the fact is otherwise.

Another inftance of a still more familiar nature, may be of ufe for the farther illuftration of the fame fubject. It is well known, that our thoughts do not fucceed each other at random, but according to certain laws of affociation, which modern philofophers have been at much pains to investigate. It frequently, however, happens, particularly when the mind is animated by conversation, that it makes a fudden transition from one fubject to another, which, at first view, appears to be very remote from it; and that it requires a confiderable degree of reflection, to enable the perfon himself by whom the tranfition was made, to ascertain what were the intermediate ideas. A curious inftance of fuch à fudden tranfition is mentioned by Hobbes in his Leviathan. "In a com"pany," (fays he,) "in which the converfation turn"ed on the civil war, what could be conceived more "impertinent, than for a perfon to afk abruptly, "What was the value of a Roman denarius? On a "little reflection, however, I was eafily able to trace "the train of thought which fuggefted the queftion: "for the original fubject of difcourfe naturally inN

"troduced the history of the King, and of the treach"ery of those who surrendered his perfon to his en"emies; this again introduced the treachery of Ju"das Iscariot, and the fum of money which he re"ceived for his reward.-And all this train of i

deas," fays Hobbes, " paffed through the mind of "the speaker in a twinkling, in confequence of the "velocity of thought." It is by no means improbable, that if the speaker himself had been interrogated about the connection of ideas, which led him afide from the original topic of discourse, he would have found himself, at first, at a lofs for an answer.

In the inftances which have been last mentioned, we have also a proof, that a perception, or an idea, which paffes through the mind, without leaving any trace in the memory, may yet ferve to introduce other ideas connected with it by the laws of affociation. Other proofs of this important fact shall be mentioned afterwards.

When a perception or an idea paffes through the mind, without our being able to recollect it next moment, the vulgar themselves afcribe our want of memory to a want of attention. Thus, in the inftance already mentioned, of the clock, a perfon, upon obferving that the minute hand had just paffed twelve, would naturally say, that he did not attend to the clock when it was ftriking. There feems, therefore, to be a certain effort of the mind upon which, even in the judgment of the vulgar, memoin fome measure depends; and which they dif tinguifh by the name of attention.

ry

The connection between attention and memory has been remarked by many authors. "Nec dubi"um eft," (fays Quinctilian, fpeaking of memory,) "quin plurimum in hac parte, valeat mentis inten" tio, et velut acies luminum a profpectu rerum quas " intuetur non averfa." The fame obfervation has

been made by Locke,* and by most of the writers on the fubject of education.

But although the connection between attention and memory has been frequently remarked in general terms, I do not recollect that the power of attention has been mentioned by any of the writers on pneumatology, in their enumeration of the faculties of the mind; nor has it been confidered by any one, fo far as I know, as of fufficient importance to deferve a particular examination. Helvetius, indeed, in his very ingenious work, De l'Efprit, has entitled one of his chapters, De l'inegale capacitè d'Attention; but what he confiders under this article, is chiefly that capacity of patient inquiry, (or as he calls it, une attention fuivie,) upon which philofophical genius feems in a great measure to depend. He has also remarked, with the writers already mentioned, that the impreffion which any thing makes on the memory, depends much on the degree of attention

*" Memory depends much on attention and repetition." Locke's Essay, b. i. chap. x.

+ Some important observations on the subject of attention occur in different parts of Dr. Reid's writings; particularly in his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 62.; and in his Essays on the Active Powers of Man, p. 78, et seq.-To this ingenious author we are indebted for the remark, that attention to things external, is properly called observation; and attention to the subjects of our consciousness, reflection. He has also explained the causes of the peculiar difficulties which accompany this last exertion of the mind, and which form the chief obstacles to the progress of pneumatology. I shall have occasion, in another part of this work, to treat of habits of inattention in general, and to suggest some practical hints with respect to the culture both of the powers of observation and reflection. The view which I propose to take of attention at present, is extremely limited; and is intended merely to comprehend such general principles as are necessary to prepare the reader for the chapters which are to follow.

"C'est l'attention, plus ou moins grande, qui grave plus ou moins profondément les objets dans la meinoire."

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