II. Of the Objects of our Thoughts, when III. Remarks on the Opinions of some mod- IV. Continuation of the same Subject.-In- VI. Of the Errors to which we are liable in Speculation, and in the Conduct of Affairs, in consequence of a rash Ap- plication of general Principles, VII. Continuation of the same Subject.-Dif- ferences in the intellectual Characters CHAP. V. Of the Influence of Association in regulating the Succes- SECT. I.-General Observations on this Part of our ib. V.-Application of the Principles stated in the foregoing Sections of this Chapter, to explain the Phenomena of Dreaming, 288 Of the Influence of Association on the Intellectual and on II. Of the Influence of the association of Ideas on our Judgments in Matters of Taste, 324 III. Of the Influence of Association on our IV. Continuation of the same subject.-Of V.-Continuation of the same subject.-Ef- fects produced on the Memory by committing to writing our acquired VI.-Continuation of the same subject.-Of VII. Continuation of the same subject.-Im- portance of making a proper Selection among the Objects of our Knowledge, 382 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND. INTRODUCTION. PARTI. Of the Nature and Object of the Philofophy of the Human Mind. THE prejudice which is commonly entertained against metaphyfical fpeculations, feems to arite chiefly from two causes: First, from an apprehenfion that the subjects about which they are employed, are placed beyond the reach of the human faculties; and, fecondly, from a belief that these fubjects have no relation to the business of life. The frivolous and abfurd difcuffions which abound in the writings of moft Metaphysical authors, afford but too many arguments in juftification of these opinions; and if fuch difcuffions were to be admitted as a fair fpecimen of what the human mind is able to accomplish in this department of science, the contempt, into which it has fallen of late, might with B juftice be regarded, as no inconfiderable evidence of the progrefs which true philosophy has made in the prefent age. Among the various fubjects of inquiry, however, which, in consequence of the vague use of language, are comprehended under the general title of Metaphyfics, there are fome, which are effentially distinguished from the reft, both by the degree of evidence which accompanies their principles, and by the relation which they bear to the useful sciences and arts: and it has unfortunately happened, that these have shared in that general difcredit, into which the other branches of metaphyfics have justly fallen. To this circumftance is probably to be ascribed, the little progrefs which has hitherto been made in the Philofophy of the Human Mind; a fcience, fo interefting in its nature, and fo important in its applications, that it could scarcely have failed, in these inquifitive and enlightened times, to have excited a very general attention, if it had not accidentally been claffed, in the public opinion, with the vain and unprofitable difquifitions of the school-men. In order to obviate these misapprehenfions with refpect to the fubject of the following work, I have thought it proper, in this preliminary chapter, first, to explain the Nature of the truths which I propose to investigate; and, fecondly, to point out fome of the more important Applications of which they are fufceptible. In ftating these preliminary obfervations, I may perhaps appear to fome to be minute and tedious; but this fault, I am confident, will be readily pardoned by those, who have ftudied with care the principles of that science of which I am to treat; and who are anxious to remove the prejudices which have, in a great measure, excluded it from the modern fyftems of education. In the progrefs of my work, I flatter myself that I fhall not often have occafion to folicit the indulgence of my readers, for an unneceffary diffufenefs. |