member his coming to me on the occasion of a motion of Mr. Birch. "Lord," says he, "what a foolish motion is this of Birch "about No Popery"!! I do assert that he came to my house in the manner I have described. From his conversation I sqon discovered that he had been with the ministry. He, however, assured me, that we should certainly negative Birch's "foolish motion," and away he went, leaving me in the full persuasion he felt much anxiety to negative Mr. Birch's "foolish motion about No Popery ;" and yet did this very gentleman afterwards actually vote on the same side with Mr. Birch in favour of his "foolish motion.' But, notwithstanding these miserable shifts of canting hypocrisy, I will ask those who are now present, whether, in any single instance, this gentleman has expressed the slightest degree of satisfaction at that discovery of abuses which gave to every true friend of his country, the gratifying prospect of a correction of the lavish expenditure of the public money? I remember not even a solitary instance in which he has expressed any satisfaction at any such discovery of public abuses and corruptions. That this apathy is not confined to that gentleman, was abundantly clear, from the expressions used by other gentlemen in a former discussion. At that time they arrogated merit to themselves for their forbearance to oppose the measure under their consideration. "We "have made," say they, "no opposition to "the vote of thanks to col. Wardle, but "we object to ministerial threats, and to declaring that the D. of Y. was un"worthy of his situation." Such is the spirit by which those gentlemen are actuated; and I have felt conviction from repeated observations, that upon any question having for its object the correction of public abuses, it was madness to look for the support or co-operation of any contractor, pensioner, placeman, or place bunter [Hear! hear!] In no instance when such a question is brought forward, do the gentleman, and those who act with him, omit to burst out into the old cry, that it is a mere party question, which is quite a wrong thing to agi ate quite improper for gentlemen to bring forward party matters. Is there then, it may be asked, a party to support corruption? In truth, if we may judge of the conduct of the pub ic prints, such might be the infer

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ence; for all those newspapers, with very few exceptions, which during the investigation supported and commended the lau dable exertions of col. Wardle, have suddenly abandoned him, for no other reason as it should seem, but that the tendency of his measures to destroy corruption, has, at the same time, an ultimate tendency to destroy the influence of both the parties in this country, the Outs as well as the Ins. The notice of this motion, I cannot but consider in any point of view as most improper; and as neither the gentleman who gave that notice, nor any other gentleman on his behalf, has thought proper to bring forward the question, I am decidedly of opinion, that such notice ought to be expunged from the record of our proceedings. We are now called upon to enter into a consideration of circumstances, that have occurred subsequently to the Vote of Thanks, which was passed by this court to col. Wardle, on whose conduct we are required to sit in judgment, and, seriously weighing all the circumstances that make both for and against him, to express our opinion of his conduct. It will be recollected, that when col. Wardle first brought forward his charges in the House of Commons, he had not, out of the whole body of the members composing that assembly, the active support of one single individual. The difficulty and endless trouble of detecting and substantiating the exist ence of abuses, I happened to be personally enabled to appreciate very correctly; for in the discovery and exposure of the enormous abuses that have been practised in Christ's Hospital, I did incur a degree of trouble, labour, and anxiety, the extent of which was beyond what I could have expected to have been possible; and after all my exertions, instead of receiving the thanks of those whom it was the object of my exertions to benefit, what did I meet with? obloquy, persecution, and misrepresentation; nay, the Vicar himself has not scrupled to represent me as an enemy to ali religious and political establishments. That this gentlem in has so many motives for feeling sore at the institution of inquiry into Public Abuses, I did not know, until I accidentally discovered that his brothern-1.w actually enjoys a pension of no less than 1,700. per annum for life, [Hear! hear!], so that, between the Vicar and his brother-in-law, there are no trifling interests to protect.- -(To be continued.)

LONDON :-Printed by T. C. HANSARD, Peterborough - Court, Fieet - Street; Published by R BAGSHAW, Brydges-Street, Covent - Garden :---Sold also by J. BUDD), Pall-Mall.

VOL. XVI. No. 7.] LONDON, SATURDAY, AUGUST 19, 1809.

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[Price 1s.

"The ground on which this Corruption is defended is most curious. It is necessary, say those who " justify the existence of a corrupt venal Representation, that property and influence should be repre"sented. What is meant by this I know not; are not property and influence represented by both the King and the Aristocracy? But miad what these ingenious knaves would add to the natural induence "of the different branches of our constitution; they would, on that natural influence, engraft a pur"chased, veral, and corrupt influence, not sanctioned by the constitution, absolutely hostile to its "existence. All wealthy men have a natural influence over every man who has not leisure or inclina"tion to mix in the discussion of political subjects. This necessary and unavoidable inquence nɔ poor "man grudges to the rich; it is a consequence which naturally arises out of the condition of society. "But although the poor man grudges not this influence, it goes to his very heart to see the children of "the corrupt and ve sal electors of some paltry Borough provided for by places, while his own children "are doomed to the workhouse."- MR. MALLETT's Speech at the Middlesex Meeting.

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-[194 exaggerations and diminutions upon oceaSUMMARY OF POLITICS. sions of this sort, the direct contradictions BATTLE OF TALAVERA.- This battle, which the opposite accounts contain, are the particulars of which will be found in so common and so notorious, that, to say the Official Dispatches, inserted below, the truth, little reliance is to be placed in appears, from those dispatches, to have official accounts of a battle. Since, therebeen not less hard-fought on the side of the fore, we had gained a triumph, and taken French, than it was glorious, in its result, some cannon and standards; since we had to the English army and its Commander. these proofs of victory to produce, it was We have here another proof (if such proof above all things desirable, that, if the fact had been wanted) of the decided superi-was so, we should have been furnished with ority of English over French troops, and, a detailed statement of the enemy's superioof course, an additional groun of confi-rity of numbers.--Sir Arthur Wellesley dence, that, if the battle should, at last, says that the army under him had to fight 1 to be fought here; if the independence with "more than double its numbers." It of England should be to be fought for is, therefore, particularly to be regretted, upon English ground, we shall, though that he has no where stated what the force we were to be inferior in numbers and ex- of the enemy was; that he has no where perience, finally succeed in expelling the furnished us with the means of judging of enemy.There has been great loss, on the amount of that force; that he has no our side, in this battle; and, such loss we where stated the amount of the Spanish are not well able to spare; but, the glory, force, nor afforded us any means of judging if all things be correctly stated, and if it thereof; that he has not even given us should hereafter appear, that we pursue one single phrase, by which we can be the enemy, does, in my estimation, far led to judge of the amount of his own exceed the loss. Sir Arthur Wellesley, if force. The news-papers state without the all be truly stated, has risked much, and, least hesitation, that the French army conwhile so doing, has certainly not been sisted of forty or forty four thousand men, under the governance of that, almost that the English army consisted of twenty supernatural circumspection, for acting upon thousand, which twenty thousand beat the which certain commanders appear, in a said forty thousand, the Spanish army not recent case, to have been much ap- having had the smallest share in the batpiauded; but, for my part, as far as I can tle; and, upon the supposition of these judge of the matter, the r was proper; numbers being correct, Sir Arthur conit appearing to have been one of those firms this very flattering statement; for, cases where to risk was to be prudent. in speaking of the battle, he calls it, this There is, however, besides the loss of va-long and hard-fought action with more than luable lives, something, belonging to this double our numbers Now, I must conbattle, to lament; and that is, the ground fess, though very reluctantly, that all this for dispute as to comparative strength, which does not give me satisfaction. The Morais left by the dispatches of sir Arthur Wel-ing Chrome says:-- Whatever may lesley. I had to complain of this gentle- "be the value of the ultimate advantages man before upon this same ground. The" to which it may lead, it is with heartfelt

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"joy and pride that we congratulate the "country upon the accession of glory "which it has derived from a victory "which will be for ever memorable on its "annals. Sir Arthur Wellesley has in "many instances eminently distinguished "himself as a general, and had he done "nothing before, his brilliant conduct on "the late occasion would entitle him to "rank in the first Order of British Heroes. "And such an army! Oh! that we could "erect a monument to every man that "fell; that we had palms and crowns, "wealth and honours to bestow upon each "survivor. But the immortals need no record "of their fame, and so long as the English heart beats high at the recollection of • devoted patriotism, holy zeal, and unconquered and unconquerable valour, it will "require no better passport to its affec"tions, than I was in the battle of Talavera."

very defective (not to give it any more pointed epithet) with respect to the Spa nish force? That force must have con sisted of, at least, 40 or 50 thousand men, which, joined to our 20 thousand, gave the allied army so decided a superiority over that of the French, that to talk of the "glory" of the victory must be ridiculous, unless the Spanish force did not act, did not come into the battle. Sir Arthur Wellesley says," "Your Lordship will observe, that the at"tacks of the enemy were principally, if "not entirely, directed against the British "troops. The Spanish Commander-in"Chief, his officers and troops, manifested

every disposition to render us assistance, "and those of them, which were engaged, "did their duty; but the ground, which

they occupied, was so important, and its "front at the same time so difficult, that I "did not think it proper to urge them to "make any movement on the left of the enemy while he was engaged with us.”

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This passage is, to me, totally incomprehensible. Let us see a little how the thing stands. The Spanish army were. upon the right of the line; and, besides this, the Spanish infantry did, it seems, form two lines in the rear of the English army. The fact is, that sir Arthur's description of the position previous to the battle is not to be understood by any one, who was not there; and, all we distinctly know from his dispatch, is, that there was a Spanish army present, which was not attacked, and a very small part indeed of which was engaged. Well, now, how came it to be so?" The ground they occu

-I will not say any thing about holy "zeal," which phrase I rather dislike, as savouring a little of the wildish; but, for the rest, I cordially agree in the sentiments of the Morning Chronicle; but, then, this agreement has for its indispensible condition, that, the French army had the advantage in point of numbers; and that they were in fact driven from the field of battle.- -It has been the constant practice of our news-papers, when a battle with the French was in expectation, to represent the force of the French as being very much inferior to the force expected to engage with it, whether belonging to ourselves or our allies, and, after a battle, it has been a practice not less constant, to represent the French force as being pied was so important, and its front so greatly superior in numbers to the force "difficult, that he did not think it proper against which it had fought. I know "to urge them to make any movement of no exception; of not one solitary "while he was engaged." Bless us! How instance, wherein this has not been the is this? Why were they placed, then, in It is not more than fourteen days such a difficult" front? And, how could ago, that the ministerial papers stated the the ground be of importance in any way amount of the Spanish army, ready to co-except that of being conducive to the operate with ours, at 87,000 men; our own army they stated at 28,000, with sir Arthur Wellesley; while, the French army they reduced almost to nothing, or, at least, they spoke of it in a way to induce the public to believe, that it was quite unable to face the joint force, which we and the Spaniards had to bring against it. How, then, are we to account for the increase, the sudden increase, of the French force? How are we to account for this total reverse of circumstances, as to relative force, in so short a time?-But, is there not something aukward; something

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defeat of the enemy? What, here are two wings of an army drawn up for battle; the left wing is attacked by the whole of the enemy's force; it is attacked by the whole, mind, or else away goes the statement about double our force;-the left wing is attacked by the whole of the enemy's force, double in number to that of our left wing; the battle lasts about eight and forty hours; it is so obstinate and bloody as to take off in killed,wounded and missing, more than every fourth man of the left wing; and yet, strange to relate, the ge neral commanding that wings does not

either insist upon i boldly assert and abide by it, that the Spanish troops were to be looked upon as nothing at all in the battle; or, that the French were not double our number, and in fact that the superiority of numbers, and a very great superiority too, was on our side. ———This leads us to what is by far the most important consideration, connected with our muli ary operations in Spain. If the statemerts now it before us be correct, the remaining force of sir Arthur Wellesley, incuding General Crauford's brigade, can, scarcely amount to more than twenty, thousand effective men, while, allowing, the French to have lost ten thousand men, in the battle, their remaining force, col

thirty thousand meu. Things standing thus, either sir Arthur must change his mode of employing his right wing, or he must be pretty nimble in retreating with his left. We find him two days after the battle; we find him still upon the field,

think it proper to urge the right wing, or any part of it, to come to his assistance! And why, because the ground occupied by the right wing was "so important" and the front so difficult." Very true. As much of this importance and difficu'ty as you please, at the outset; but, what need was there of occupying this ground any lenger; why keep the whole of the right wing standing upon that ground, when they could not possibly be wanted there, and when, for forty eight hours, the whole (mind that!) of the enemy's force was engaged in repeated attacks upon the left wing, which, in point of numbers, was not half so powerful as that enemy?These questions should be answered. Nay, they demand an answer, especially as it ap-lected near our army, amounts to about pears, that we have upwards of 5 thousand men, in killed, wounded and mis-ing, while, of the Spanish killed, wounded and. there is no mention at all. Why, th again I ask, did not the Spanish part of the army come forward to the assistance of ours? And, if they did not seem dis-not having advanced an inch, and stating posed to do it without, why were they not urged to come forward? Again and again, I say, give me an answer to these questions.- -In stating the relative force of the two armies, we are not to suppose, however, that the enemy will follow our example. He will include all those, who were drawn up against him, and whom, infact, he did attack. He will not call it an army of 20 thousand men that he fought with; but, probably, an army of 100 thousand or upwards; for, upon the most extraordinary supposition, that the whole of the enemy rushed upon the left wing, paying no more attention to the right wing than if it had consisted of so many stones or clods of earth; upon this most wonderful supposition, if it should be adopted by the world, the world will give the enemy credit for having attacked the whole of the army, right as well as left. Indeed, this is so obviously just, that any attempt to produce a contrary opinion must be treated with contempt. What should we say, if the French, in giving an account of one of their victories, and in making a comparison of numbers, were to chuse to consider three fourths of their own numbers as constituting no part of their force during the battle? Should we not laugh such a statement to scorn? And if we make such statements shall not the world laugh at us?--Do we chuse to consider the Spanish troops as nothing? I much question that. But, it appears to me, that we must

as one of his reasons for remaining im moveable, that he was in want of provisions. This situation of affairs is not very promising, and I think there can be little doubt, that the fruit of this victory must be a retreat to the shores of the Atlantic. The cold manner in which sir Arthur Wel-` lesley speaks of the conduct of the Spanish, troops ought to be quite sufficient to convince the whole country, that nothing is to be expected from them, that whatever fighting there is to be done must be done by us alone; and, in short, that we are carrying on a war in Spain, in which war nobody but the French and us really take an interest. But this is our old way. We have, for some years past, taken it into our heads to become deliverers. There is scarcely a nation in Europe, which in its turn, has not experienced more or less of our benevolent efforts in this way; and, in every instance, as far as I can recollect, an anxiety for success, that is to say for the deliverance, seems always to have been entertained by the deliverers and never by the parties to be delivered. We are the universal Medecin Malgré-lui; and hitherto it has invariably happened, that, as in the case of interferences between man and wife, both parties have finally joined in kicking and cuffing us off the scene, and in sending us home loaded with reproaches and execrations. And, which is the most pro voking of all, we never, even in the smallest degree, profit from experience. We

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having left in our possession 15 cannon, many waggons, baggage, cars, and a great number of wounded and prisoners; among which is a General Officer, and. "the field of battle covered with dead "bodies."--Now, either this is not true or there never could be a more favourable opportunity for pursuing and destroying an enemy. What, then, was the Spanish army at, that it did not pursue this enemy, who was fleeing in such consternation, and who was without the means of subsist-, ing? But, it is useless to continue these. questions; for the real fact must be evident to all the world. We must not, however, pass over unnoticed, the very material difference between the statements. in the English gazette and those in the Spanish gazette, as far as relates to the part which the Spanish army had in the battle. We have seen what Sir Arthur Wellesley says upon the subject, and we will now see what is said upon it in the Spanish gazette, a translation of which was published in the Morning Chronicle of the 15th instant: "The General Cuesta "writes on the 28th from the camp at

Talavera, that the enemy, amounting to "40,000 men, intended an attack upon "him; he re-passed the Alberche to take

are ready still to deliver any body or any thing. Russians, Germans, Swedes, Danes, Swiss, French, Italians, the Pope, the Turk; no matter whom or what, and now we have upon our hands, the Spaniards for the second time and the Dutch for the third. The news-papers inform us, that the Dutch say, that they do not want to be delivered; but that is nothing to us; we shall not believe them; we shall impute their refusal of our offers of deliverance to the "machinations of Buonaparté ;" and, in short, we shall believe nothing, which does not fall in with our perverse and absurd resolution to believe, that because we have good reason to fear the power of Buonaparté, all the rest of the world must necessarily fear that power also; that, because we hate him, all the rest of the world must hate him; and that, because our safety requires that we shall hazard our lives in war against him, it follows of course, that all the rest of mankind should passionately desire to expose themselves to all sorts of dangers and miseries in the prosecution of that war. This stupid way of thinking, perceived and encouraged by certain hireling writers on the Continent, has been the great cause of our warlike disasters; and, in spite of such long and such woeful experience, it appears to be at this hour as efficient as ever. -Is there, upon the whole earth, a nation besides this, who could entertain hope of success in Spain; who could persevere in the project of deliverance, after the dispatch of Sir Arthur Wellesley? What does common sense say must have been the real cause of the inactivity of the Spanish army? And, where was this army two days after the battle, when Sir Arthur was prevented from moving forward by the extreme fatigue of his troops, and by the numbers of wounded he had to take care of? Where was the Spanish army on that day, until when the French had, it seems, kept a rear-guard of ten thousand men in the sight of our army? Where was the Spanish army then? It had undergone no fatigue, nor had it any wounded to take care of. Why did it not then 29th, at ten in the morning, that the pursue the French? A translation of the "enemy, after attacking the greater part Spanish Gazette, which, by the bye, gives "of the night. He cannot express himself the Spanish army a full share of the vic- sufficiently to celebrate the admirable tory; this Spanish Gazette, of which the "courage of the English army and its excelMorning Chronicle has published a trans-"lent general, and of our own troops also." lation, says" that the enemy were totally "defeated, and compelled to retreat in "the greatest consternation, taking the road "to Toledo, without the means of subsisting,

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up the position agreed upon by the "General in Chief of the English.-At "five in the evening of the 27th, the enemy appeared, and attacking with impetuosity with the bayonet, were repulsed with much loss, and the action "concluded at eight o'clock at night. "On the 28th, the enemy repeated their "attacks until seven in the evening, and "were again repulsed by the English and Spanish armies, with that valour which distinguishes the two nations. The pre"tended King, who was present in person, retiring upon Santa Ollala, with "98 waggons of wounded soldiers. The. "division of brigadier-gen. Lacy is near

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Toledo, and the army of gen. Vanegas "was entering Aranjuez, with a determi"nation to occupy Madrid.-Gen, Cuesta "writes from the camp at Talavera, on the

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Here we see no distinction whatever made between the Spanish army and the English army, as to the share in the battle and the glory gained at Talavera.,