was under the more immediate protection of the civil magistrate; and so, distinguished from those that were only TOLERATED. How closely these two interests were united in the Egyptian policy, which afterwards became the model of civil wisdom to the rest of mankind, is notorious to all who are the least acquainted with antiquity. Nor were the polite republics of Rome and Athens less solicitous for the common interests of the two societies than that sage and powerful monarchy, the nurse of arts and virtue. But an Established Worship, as we say, is the universal voice of nature, and not confined to certain ages, people, or religions. That great voyager, and sensible observer of the various manners of men, John Baptist Tavernier, speaking of the kingdom of Tunquin, says, "I come now to the political description " of this kingdom, under which I comprehend the Religion, which is almost every where in concert with "the civil government for the mutual support of " each other*" It is true, there are exceptions to this, as there are to all the general practices of mankind. Ovington tells us, p. 278, that, amongst the Bannians of India, this alliance is not between religion and the state, but BETWEEN RELIGION AND TRADE; every profession differing from another as much in its modes of worship, as in its ways of traffic. The enemies of our alliance may perhaps improve upon this hint; for as unwilling as they seem to be, that the church should profit by an alliance with the state, they would not, I suppose, be averse to trade's

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* Je viens à la description politique de ce royaume, dans laquelle je comprens la religiou, qui est presque en tous lieux de concert avec le gouvernement civil pour l'appuy reciproque ae l'un & de l'autre. Relation Nouvelle de la Royaume de Tunquin, cap. x. à la fit,

2

profiting by an alliance with the church.-Now, if the foregoing account may explain the true origin of this general practice, the practice, we presume, will corroborate what, hath been said of the force of the motives here delivered; the wisest and most experienced lawgivers, as we see, concurring to act upon them.

But when I say that all regular policied states had an established religion, I mean no more than he would do, who, deducing civil society from its true original, should, in order to persuade men of the benefits it produces, affirm, that all nations had a civil policy. For as this writer could not be supposed to mean, that every one instituted a free state, on the principles of public liberty; which yet was the only society he purposed to prove was founded on truth, and productive of public good; because it is notorious, that the far greater part of civil policies are founded on different principles, or abused to different ends; so neither would I be understood to mean, when I say all nations concurred în making this alliance, that they all exactly discriminated the natures, and fairly adjusted the rights of the two societies, on the principles here laid down; though an establishment resulting from this discrimination and adjustment be the only one I would be supposed to recommend. On the contrary, I know this union has been generally made on mistaken principles; or, if not so, hath degenerated by length of time; whence it hath come to pass, that the national religion in the Pagan World hath been most commonly a slave to the state; and in the Christian, the state sometimes a slave to the church. And, as it was sufficient for that writer's purpose, that those societies, good or bad, proved the sense all men had of the benefits resulting from civil policy in general, though they were oft mistaken

in the means; so it is for ours, that this universal concurrence in the two societies to unite, shews the sense mankind had of the usefulness of such an union. And lastly, as that writer's speculative principles are not the less true on account of the general deviation from them in the actual forming of civil societies; so may not these plain principles of alliance, though so few states have suffered themselves to be directed by them in practice; nor any one before, that I know of, delivered them in speculation: especially if, as in that case, so in this, we can derive such mistake and degeneracy from their causes. It would draw me too far out of my way to explain distinctly the causes of the mistake; and the intelligent reader, who carefully attends to the whole of this discourse, will not be at a loss to discover the most considerable of them; some of which I have already hinted at; and others, I may possibly, in the sequel, take occasion to mention. As for the degeneracy, it hath been observed, that the alliance is of the nature of the FŒDERA INÆQUALIA: Now, the common effect of such, Grotius informs us of, in these words; Interim verum est accidere plerumque, ut qui superior est in fædere, SI IS POTENTIA MULTUM

ANTECELLAT, PAULATIM IMPERIUM PROPRIE DIC TUM USURPET: PRÆSERTIM SI FŒDUS PERPETUUM SIT *.

CHA P. III,

OF THE RECIPROCAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THIS ALLIANCE.

AS, from the natures of the two societies, we discovered what kind of union only they could enter into;

* De Jure Belli & Pacis, lib. i. cap. iii, § 21.

so from their natures, together with the motives they had in uniting, may be deduced, by necessary consequence, the reciprocal TERMS and CONDITIONS of

this union.

From the mutual motives inducing thereunto, it appears, that the great preliminary and fundamental article of ALLIANCE is this, THAT THE CHURCH SHALL APPLY ITS UTMOST INFLUENCE IN THE SERVICE OF THE STATE; AND THE STATE SHALL SUPPORT AND PROTECT THE CHURCH.

1. But, to enable the two parties to perform this. agreement, there must needs be a MUTUAL COMMUNICATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE POWERS. For the province of each society being naturally distinct and different, each can have to do in the other's, only by mutual concession *.

2. But again, these societies being likewise as naturally independent one on the other, a mutual concession cannot be safely made, unless one of them give up its INDEPENDENCY to the other. From whence arises what Grotius, we see, calls MANENS PRÆLATIO; which, in his Fœdus inæquale, the more powerful society hath over the less, by the cession of its INDEPEN

DENCY.

Now from the two conclusions, which necessarily spring from this fundamental article of union, we de

* Hæ ambæ potestates inter se ut duo apices comparantur. His sua in utraque substantia, terrena scilicet & cœlesti, assignantur officia. Eæ ut principes suoque in ordine supremæ sociali tantum fædere conjunguntur, non altera alteri in suis quidem rebus subditur; & quo jure regi permittitur, ut super animarum salute, sed ex canonum auctoritate, decernat; eodem jure permittitur pontifici, ut delinquentes etiam pœnis temporalibus, sed forensi lege, non innata sibi potestate, coerceat. Bossuet, 1. vi. c. 29, F. T.

duce

duce all the terms, conditions, mutual grants, and concessions*, which complete this alliance.

For, from this obligation on the church to apply its influence to the service of the state, proceed a SETTLED MAINTENANCE FOR THE MINISTERS OF RELIGION, and an ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION with coactive power; which things introduce again, on the other side, the DEPENDENCY OF THE CLERGY ON THE STATE. And from the state's obligation to support and protect the church, proceeds the ECCLESIASTICAL SUPREMACY OF THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE; which again introduceth, on the other hand, the right of CHURCHMEN TO A SHARE IN THE LEGISLATURE.

Thus are all these rights and privileges closely interwoven, and mutually connected by a necessary dependence on one another. We have here, in a succinct manner, deduced each of them in the order in which they reciprocally arise: but the importance of the subject requiring a more minute examination into the reason and foundation of each GRANT and PRIVILEGE, We shall go over them again in a different order; and put together all that belong to the CHURCH under one head; and all that belong to the STATE under another: the first order being the properest for a general view; the second for a particular; but both necessary, to give a true idea of that mutual connexion with, and necessary dependence on, one another.

Christianæ politiæ antistites a summo jure recedebant, ut concordiæ litarent. Attamen cum remissio illa nisi certis limitibus concludatur, in abjectionis vitium desciscat, necessariæ sunt regulæ quædam, intra quas prudentia, quæ omnino in his negotiis adhiberi debet, se contineat. Porro regulæ illæ in eorum axiomatum cognitione constitutæ sunt, quæ communi utriusque reipublicæ suffragio sunt recepta; ex æquo & bono unitatis & concordiæ alendæ studio, ex utraque parte quamplurima remissa. Marca, in præfatione secunda. F. T.

Let