they cannot be necessary because fore-known. For it is easy to perceive that if the infinite knowledge of God is not the cause of these volitions and actions, they cannot be unavoidable by virtue of that knowledge. For no effect is necessary but by virtue of the cause which produces it.

Should it be said that fore-knowledge proves the necessity of every volition and action, without being itself the cause; we deny the premises, and challenge proof. It is essential to the perfection of knowledge that things should be perceived or known as they are. And the human mind can have no conception of any other knowledge.

To assert then that the necessity of volition and action is proved from the divine knowledge, is, substantially to affirm that there never was a free-agent in heaven or earth, and that it is impossible for the Deity to produce such an agent. For as it would be impossible for the Deity to create a being of whose volitions and actions he had not the most perfect knowledge, it follows, that if such knowledge proves the necessity of volitions and actions, it equally proves that it is impossible for any creature to exist who does not will and act, in every instance, by an absolute and unavoidable necessity. This doctrine, could it be once clearly established, would forever remove the ground on which the consciousness of guilt rests, and the primary principles on which the divine administration is founded in the distribution of rewards and punishments. Notwithstanding the various attempts which have been made to reconcile liberty and necessity, by the aid of the nicest metaphysical refinements, it still remains extremely difficult, not to say impossible, to enlist common sense on the side of a position so obviously sophistical. To detect the fallacy of the argument, it is only necessary to keep in view one point, and that is, that the first motion of the mind, the very commencement of volition, is as necessary and unavoidable as any act which may succeed. In what then does liberty consist? It is not possible to set bounds to omnipotence, with infinite space to exert itself in. Hence we can easily conceive of the possibility of the existence of other beings, and other worlds, in addition to those which it has pleased the Almighty to create. Nor is it difficult to conceive, with reference to the same perfection, the possibility of the existence of creatures endowed with such faculties, and placed in such circumstances as to be perfectly free and voluntary in their actions. All these real, or possible modifications, and variations are embraced in the knowledge of the omniscient Jehovah. For example: the revolt of the rebel angels, and the continuance of others in their allegiance, were known to God; but it was equally known that the first might have stood, and the latter might have fallen. Again; the transgression of the first man and woman was

embraced in the view of the infinite mind, nor were their capacity to retain their innocence, and their obligations to do so, less perceived. The following lines from Milton are very appropriate, and furnish some important ideas on the fall of man.

I made him just and right,

Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall.
Such 1 created all the ethereal powers.

Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell.
Not free, what proof could they have given sincere
Of true allegiance, constant faith and love:

When only what they needs must do appeared,

Not what they would? What praise could they receive!
-Offreedom both despoiled

Made passive both, had served necessity,

Not me..

If fore-knew, fore-knowledge had no influence on their fall,
Which had no less proved certain, unforeknown.

The extract from an Author quoted by Dr. A. Clarke, in his remarks at the close of his Commentary on the 2 Chap. of Acts, is very proper to be introduced in this place. It is in answer to the following objection; "If many things fall out contingently, or as it were by accident, God's fore-knowledge of them can be but contingent, dependent upon man's free-will." He answers; "It is one thing to know that a thing will be done necessarily, and another, to know necessarily, that it will be done. God doth necessarily fore-know all that will be done; but he doth not know, that those things which shall be done voluntarily, will be done necessarily he knoweth that they will be done; but he knoweth withal, that they might have fallen out otherwise, for ought he had ordered to the contrary. So likewise, God knew that Adam would fall: and yet he knew that he would not fall necessarily for it was possible for him not to have fallen. And as touching God's pre-ordination going before his prescience, as the cause of all events; this would be to make God the author of all the sin in the world; his knowledge comprehending that, as well as all other things. God indeed fore-knoweth all things, because they will be done; but things are not (therefore) done, because he fore-knoweth them. It is impossible that any man, by his voluntary manner of working, should elude God's fore-sight; but then, this foresight doth not necessitate the will; for this were to take it wholly away. For as the knowledge of things present, imports no necessity on that which is done; so the fore-knowledge of things future, lays no necessity on that which shall be: because whosoever knows and sees things, he knows and sees them as they are, and not as they are not so that God's knowledge doth not confound things, but reaches to all events, not only which come to pass, but as they come to pass, whether contingently or necessarily. As for example; when you see a man walking upon the earth,

and at the very same instant the sun shining in the heavens; do you not see the first as voluntary, and the second as natural! And though at the instant you see both done, there is a necessity that they be done, (or else you could not see them at all); yet there was a necessity of one only, before they were done, (namely, the sun's shining in the heavens), but none at all of the other, (viz. the man's walking upon the earth.) The sun could not but shine, as being a natural agent; the man might not have walked, as being a voluntary one." Taking the preceding arguments in the aggregate, a formidable objection is anticipated; viz. "If the fore knowledge of God is to be regarded only as a simple perception of things as they are, without having any influence on them, why should the sacred writers introduce this fore-knowledge, with special reference to certain important events? for if it has no influence on those events, it would appear superfluous to mention it at all in relation to them."

In answer to this objection it may be observed that the sacred writings, wherever the prescience of the Deity is introduced, except in those passages where it is specially designed to exhibit the divine character. evidently mean something more than the simple perception of things. From many passages, the following are selected as proof of this proposition. "Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God," &c. Acts ii. 23. In this place fore knowledge considered merely as the perception of the divine mind with reference to the subject to which it relates, would appear, to say the least, very insignificant, especially as it is introduced after the "determinate counsel" of God with respect to the same subject. But when fore-knowledge is considered as embracing the counsel of eternal wisdom in the redemption of the world by Jesus Christ, and expressive of the highest approbation of the divine mind in the plan and execution of this infinite design, it gives dignity and importance to the whole subject. It heightens the malevolence and the guilt of those who with wicked hands crucified and slew" the Redeemer of the world, "a man approved of God."

Another passage is Rom. xi. 2. "God hath not cast away his people which he fore knew." Nothing is more obvious than that God did not fore-know all men in the sense which the apos tle designs to convey in this instance. For in the preceding chapters he had clearly spoken of the rejection and casting off of the Jews. But as he here affirms that God had not cast off his people whom he fore-knew, he could not have fore-known, in the Apostle's sense, those who were cast off.

The plain meaning is. God has not cast away those of Israel, whom he fore-knew as possessing the true and proper character

of his people. Such he ever has approved, and such he ever will approve. The subsequent verses sufficiently corroborate this sense.

Again 1 Pet. i. 2. "Elect according to the fore-knowledge (apoyoon) of God the father." Here it should seem that foreknowledge implies the choice and determination of the divine mind in the plan of electing and saving sinners, according (xara) to which he invariably elects men to salvation. Sufficient authorities might be produced to show that the word to know very frequent has the above meaning both in the old and new testa ment scriptures. And those who are disposed to consult learned authors, will find that it was used in the same sense by the best uninspired writers of antiquity. As the limits prescribed for these remarks will not admit of further illustration, the reader is desired to consult the following passages of scripture, which may greatly aid his enquiries on this subject; always recollecting that knowledge and fore knowledge are the same in relation to God.

"You only have I known of all the families of the earth: therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities." Amos iii. 2. "But he answered and said, verily I say unto you, I know you not." Matt. XXV. 12. "I know whorn I bave chosen." John xiii. 18. "And then will profess unto them I never knew you." Matt. vii. 23. Luke xiii. 25, 27. "The Lord knoweth them that are his." 2 Tim. ii. 19. .

The Attributes of God Displayed.

From the English Methodist Magazine.

REFLECTIONS ON THE STORK.

"THE STORK's the emblem of true piety;
Because when age has seiz'd, and made his dan
Unfit for flight, the grateful young one takes
His mother on his back, provides her food;
Repaying thus her tender care of bim

Ere he was fit to fly, by bearing her."-BEAUMONT.

THE Social affections are found to be stronger in their descent than in their ascent; the love of parents to their children, for instance, is commonly more ardent than that of children for their parents; though, from the state of things, and from the obligations which children owe their parents, one might reasonably expect it to be otherwise. However, there is a visible good design. in this wise distinction; we see in it, as in every object we seriously contemplate, the determination of wisdom. The offspring both of the human and the animal race, come into the world feeble and helpless; and if the parental affection were not exceed

ingly forcible, they must perish in their weak and forlorn condition; and the creation would thus be speedily brought to an end. There is not the same reason for the return of affection in the offspring, and, therefore, we rarely find it in the animal world soon as the young is able to provide for itself, a mutual forgetfulness generally ensues, and the parent grows as regardless of its offspring, as the offspring of its parent.

There is, however, one creature, which contradicts this almost general rule in the animal world; and which is as remarkable for its love to its parents, as other creatures are for their love to their young. This is the STORK, whose very name in the Hebrew language (Chesidah) signifies mercy, or pity, and whose name in the English seems to be taken from the Greek word Storge, which is often used in our language for natural affection.

The stork is a bird of passage, and is spoken of as such in Scripture; see Jerem. viii. 7, "The stork knoweth her appointed time," &c. Some say, that when they go away, the stork, which comes last to the place of rendezvous is killed on the spot. They go away in the night to the southern countries.

The stork has a very long beak, and long red legs. It feeds upon serpents, frogs, and insects; as it seeks for these in watery places, nature has provided it with long legs, and as it flies away, as well as the crane and heron, to its nest with its prey, therefore, the bill is strong and jagged, the sharp hooks of which enable it to detain its prey, which it might otherwise be difficult to hold. A friend of the writer, who has an estate bounded by a river, plentifully stored with eels, saw a heron one day carry off one of the largest of those creatures into his heronery, in spite of the efforts and undulations of the eel to oppose his flight. Thus we see the wise Provider has not given those creatures such bills for nought the storks dig with their's into the earth for serpents and "adders, which, however large, they convey to their young, to whom the poison of those reptiles is perfectly inoffensive. The plumage of the stork would be quite white, if it was not that the extremity of its wings are black, and also some small parts of its head and thighs. It lays but four eggs, and sits for the space of thirty days.

But that which renders it the most remarkable is, its love to its parents, whom it never forsakes, but tenderly feeds and defends, even to death. The learned and judicious Bochart has collected a variety of passages from the ancients, wherein they testify this curious particular, that the stork is eminent for its performance of what St. Paul enjoins, "Children's requiting their parents," 1 Tim. v. 4. This caused one of the seven wise men to reply to Cresus, when he asked, "which of the animals was the most happy?" "The stork, because it performs what is just and right by nature, without any compelling law."