were badly outgeneralled by Lee and Jackson, and the Union army suffered several defeats, culminating in the second Bull Run. Washington and the North were terrified. Halleck telegraphed to the man who had been deposed in his favor, "I beg of you to assist me in this crisis, with your ability and experience." Pope had been proved incompetent. Lincoln saw but one thing to do, and without consulting a single soul he did it. Although the public was hostile to McClellan, although the Secretary of War detested him, his organizing skill was again needed, and the President decided to use it.

Lin

When the cabinet met on September 2, Stanton came in and said in great excitement he had just learned from General Halleck that McClellan had been placed by the President in command of the forces in Washington. coln soon entered. Chase asked if the story was true. The President said it was. Several members showed regret, and Stanton remarked that no such order had issued from the War Department. The President remarked that the order was his. He then explained. The army and the whole country were demoralized, and something must be done. Who else could so well reorganize the shattered army? If the Secretary of War or any other member could

name a general as fit for this task he would appoint him. As a fighting general he ad

mitted McClellan was a failure. He had the "slows." He had never been ready for battle, and probably never would be. Now, however, organization and defence were needed, and he was the best man in the country for that. After a long and patient talk most of the members were reconciled, but Chase said he feared the reinstatement would prove a national calamity.

After a few days spent in organization, McClellan was sent off to meet Lee, who suddenly threatened an invasion of Maryland. By slowness, the Northern general allowed his opponent to concentrate his forces, and then, when the battle of Antietam was finally fought September 17, McClellan, with almost twice as many men, allowed Lee to go away without pursuit. Lincoln had been telegraphing McClellan several days before not to let Lee get off without being hurt, and to destroy his army if possible, but it was in vain. McClellan thought his well-fed troops in no condition to follow the ragged Southerners. Still, Antietam was technically a victory, discouragingly indecisive as it was, and the President decided to use it as an excuse for the great step of emancipation. The memorable cabinet meeting is best described in the entry in Secretary Chase's diary:

66 MONDAY, September 22, 1862. State Department mes

"To department about 9. senger came with notice to heads of departments to meet at 12. Received sundry callers. Went to White House. All the members of the cabinet were in attendance. There was a general talk; and the President mentioned that Artemus Ward had sent him his book. Proposed

to read a chapter which he thought very funny. Read it, and seemed to enjoy it very much; the heads also (except Stanton), of course. The chapter was 'HighHanded Outrage at Utica.'

“The President then took a graver tone and said: "Gentlemen: I have, as you are aware, thought a great deal about the relation of this war to slavery; and you all remember that, several weeks ago, I read to you an order I had prepared on this subject, which, on account of objections made by some of you, was not issued. Ever since then my mind has been much occupied with this subject, and I have thought, all along, that the time for acting on it might probably come. think the time has come now. I wish it was a better time. I wish that we were in a better condition. The action of the army against the rebels has not been quite what I should have best liked. But they have been driven out of Maryland, and Pennsylvania is no longer in danger of invasion. When the rebel army

I

was at Frederick I determined, as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland, to issue a proclamation of emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I said nothing to any one; but I made the promise to myself and (hesitating a little) to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out, and I am going to fulfil that promise. I have got you together to hear

I do not wish your advice

what I have written down. about the main matter; for that I have determined for myself. This I say without intending anything but respect for any of you. But I already know the views. of each on this question. They have been heretofore expressed, and I have considered them as thoroughly and carefully as I can. What I have written is that which my reflections have determined me to say. If there is anything in the expressions I use, or in any minor matter, which any one of you thinks had best be changed, I shall be glad to receive the suggestions. One other observation I will make. I know very well that many others might, in this matter as in others, do better than I can; and if I was satisfied that the public confidence was more fully possessed by any one of them than by me, and knew of any constitutional way in which he could be put in my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield it to him. But, though I believe that I have not so much of the confidence of the people as I had, some time since, I do not know that, all things considered, any other person has more; and however this may be, there is no way in which I can have any other man put where I am. I am here. I must do the best I can, and bear the responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to take.'”

It was only a few days before this meeting that Lincoln had told the ministers he did "not want to issue a document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bull against the comet." To the same men he had said:

"I admit that slavery is the root of the rebellion, or at least its sine qua non. The ambition of politicians may have instigated them to act, but they would have been impotent without slavery as their instrument. I will also concede that emancipation would help us in Europe, and convince them that we are incited by something more than ambition. I grant, further, that it would help somewhat at the North, though not so much, I fear, as you and those you represent imagine. Still, some additional strength would be added in that way to the war, and then, unquestionably, it would weaken the rebels by drawing off their laborers, which is of great importance; but I am not so sure we could do much with the blacks. If we were to arm them, I fear that in a few weeks the arms would be in the hands of the rebels; and, indeed, thus far we have not had arms enough to equip our white troops. I will mention another thing, though it meet only your scorn and contempt. There are fifty thousand bayonets in the Union armies from the border slave states. It would be a serious matter if, in consequence of a proclamation such as you desire, they should go over to the rebels. I do not think they all would not so many, indeed, as a year ago, or as six months ago - not so many to-day as yesterday. Every day increases their Union feeling. They are also getting their pride enlisted, and want to beat the rebels. Let me say one thing more; I think you should admit that we already have an important principle to rally and unite the people, in the fact that constitutional government is at stake. This is a fundamental idea going down about as deep as anything.

"Do not misunderstand me because I have mentioned these objections. They indicate the difficulties that