liament and people, by conjoining himself with them. But this request, suit, and supplication, will not yet be granted, though with much importunity and many loyal expressions desired. And,

2. By labouring to take his evil counsellors from him; they being confidently assured, and piously persuaded, of the king's sweet disposition, and readiness to comply with them, in any thing which might conduce to the good, either of church or commonwealth, if he were not overswayed and deluded by the feigned, flattering, and crafty counsel of those about him, who look with a sinister eye upon our state. Now this seems to me to be all that is aimed at, in this present military and martial design: For the parliament do not purposely, and in their first intentions, intend by their soldiers to cut off any (for, if any be slain by them, it, is by accident), but to preserve and keep the peace of the kingdom, to maintain the privileges of parliament, the laws of the land, the free course of justice, the protestant religion, the king's authority and person in his royal dignity, and to attach, arrest, and bring such as are accused, or imagined, to be the disturbers and firebrands of the kingdom, unto a fair, just, equal, and legal trial, which no man can think unlawful in our law-makers: And therefore, both senators and subjects, in the prosecution of this design, stand for the safety of their prince's person. And,

3. They stand for his state, wealth, honour, and reputation, for I conjoin all these together. Kings acquire and accumulate more honour, respect, wealth, and power, by their meekness towards, tender love of, and vigilant care for their subjects, and their safety, as we see in Queen Elisabeth and Tiberius, so long as he was such, than by tyrannising over, and cruelly oppressing and handling of them, as we see in Caligula. If our gracious sovereign would be but pleased to consider the honour and prosperity which his predecessors have enjoyed, by following the advice of their parliaments, and the dishonour our nation hath in divers designs received abroad, and the grievous troubles, vexation, and discord, we have had at home, since parliaments have been disused, and laid asleep, he would then certainly see, that they seek his wealth, honour, reputation, and welfare, who desire to reconcile and conjoin him unto his parliament, and advise him to govern his people by parliaments, and endeavour to free him from the power and hands of those, who, being themselves, desire likewise to make him an enemy unto parliaments, And,

4. They stand for his posterity: For, as evil-gotten goods slip and waste away, and seldom continue to the third generation; so kings cannot be sure, that their posterity shall peaceably and successively enjoy their crowns, except themselves rule and govern according to law, righteousness only establishing the crown and throne, both upon princes, and their posterity; and therefore they, who assist not the king in those things, ways, and courses, which are illegal, grievous, yea, destructive to the commonwealth, are his children's and posterity's best friends.

Those who labour, with their lives and estates, to defend and maintain the king's soul, honour, reputation, wealth, person, and posterity, obey and stand for him.

But the parliament, and all those who side with them in this present design, labour, with their lives and estates, to maintain and defend the king's soul, honour, reputation, wealth, person, and posterity.

Therefore the parliament, and all those who side with them in this present design, in so doing, obey and stand for him.

It should seem, by what hath been spoken, That neither parliament, nor people, doth intend the least indignity, dishonour, or disloyalty to the king; and it is most perspicuously and clearly to be seen, in all the king's gracious messages and declarations, That he hath no design upon his people, or parliament, neither intends any harm, opposition, or oppression unto them, but professeth to rule them according to law and equity: How then comes it to pass, that either the parliament will not, or dare not, confide in the king?

First, It is because they see, that some about the king are potent with him, who affect not the parliament, nor their proceedings; have that influence in his councils, and are so predominant and prevalent with him, that they have often varied and altered him from his words and promises. It is a maxim in law, The king can do no wrong: For, if any evil act be committed in matters of state, his council; if in matters of justice, his judges must answer for it; and therefore I will not lay any fault upon the king, but rather impute the faults, which have been of late obvious unto many, unto some about him, or in great favour with him. Great discouragements, I grant, the parliament, in their proceedings, have had from the king; but I dare not imagine, that they came originally and primarily from him, but from some about him, in regard of that vast difference, which is between his words spoken to his parliament with his own mouth, when he was with them, and the messages sent unto, and the heavy charges laid upon them, in his letters and declarations, now when he is absent from them. He said once, That on the word of a king, and as he was a gentleman, he would redress the grievances of his people, as well out of parliament, as in it. Again, That he was resolved to put himself freely and clearly upon the love and affection of his English subjects. Again, We do engage unto you solemnly the word of a king, that the security of all and every one of you from violence is, and ever shall be, as much our care, as the preservation of us and our children. And yet, what actions and passages have of late fallen out, quite contrary to all these expressions? The parliament, and all who side with it, assist it, or obey it, in any of the commissions or orders thereof, being assaulted, opposed, yea, now at last proclaimed traitors. Again, his majesty doth profess the detestation of a civil war, and abhors, as he saith, the very apprehension of it: But this mind neither seemed to be in them who came with his majesty to the house of commons, nor who accompanied him to Hampton Court, and appeared in a warlike manner at Kingston; nor in divers of those who have been with him, and employed by him at York, Hull, Leices

tershire, Lancashire, Somersetshire, Northamptonshire, and other places; and therefore we must needs conceive, that the king is put upon these courses and ways by his evil counsellors, and, consequently, that the parliament cannot confide in his words and promises, until those counsellors be put from him, or forsaken by him. And,

Secondly, Because of that trust which is reposed in them. I dare boldly say, That, if the king should take or make those protestations, which he makes in his messages and declarations, unto any one of the parliamenthouse, for the performance of any promise, either unto them or theirs, which did simply or solely concern themselves, they would believe and obey him, and, without any further question, confide in him; but they cannot do this in the case and place wherein they are. The trust, reposed by the people in the parliament, is as well to preserve the kingdom by making of new laws, when and where there shall be need, as by observing and putting the laws already made in execution: And therefore, in regard of this truth, they dare not hazard the safety, preservation, and sole managing of the land to his majesty alone, upon his bare word; because, if after such confiding of theirs in the king, upon his faithful promise unto them, he should be over-swayed, and seduced by some wicked counsellors, to lay some illegal impositions, taxations, and burdens upon his people (as he did soon after the granting of the petition of right unto the subject) the kingdom then would (and might justly) blame them as the authors of their grievances, that had so lightly given away their liberty and freedom, by subjecting them to an arbitrary power. And indeed, if we would but consider it without passion and partiality, the case is no other but this: If the parliament should wholly confide in the king's words and promises, then there were no more requisite in them, than this, To make a declaration unto his majesty of the grievances, burdens, annoyances, and illegal proceedings in all, or such and such courts or persons, to the great oppression and heart-breaking of the subject, and, having so done, to obtain some serious promise and protestation from the king to take off all these pressures, and to be careful for the future, that no such shall be imposed upon them; and then to confide in the king, and to break up the parliament, and repair every one to his own house. Now, if sense, reason, experience, and knowledge will tell us, that this is far from, or comes far short of the true nature and duty of a parliament, then let us think, that it is reason (as the case now stands) that the parliament should not confide in the king. And,

Thirdly, Because it were very dangerous for the time to come. Admitting our present sovereign were as prudent as Solomon, yea, as pious as David, yea, like him, a man after God's own heart; yet it were dangerous for the parliament so to confide in him, that they should trust the managing of all the great and weighty affairs of this kingdom wholly and solely unto him, and consequently granting him an arbitrary power to rule us according to the dictates of his own conscience, or as the Lord would move and persuade his heart. This, I

say, is not safe; because, if they grant, give, or settle this power upon him, as King of England, then all other succeeding kings will challenge and claim it as due, or think they are not respected as their predecessors; whence, if any of them prove tyrants, or tyrannous oppressors, we shall be most miserable and wretched slaves.

Object. Some, perhaps, may here object, That although princes should not use their absolute power, by doing always what they list, yet they ought not to be circumscribed, limited, or restrained in their government, by any tye or obligation of law.

Answ. 1. First, It is much better, considering the corruption of our nature, to be withheld, by some restraints of law and covenant, from that which is evil, and which we cannot justify before God in the court of conscience, than to be boundless, lawless, and left to live as we list, and to do whatsoever seems good in our own eyes.

Answ. 2. Secondly, This also is better for others; for, as the crane had better keep his head out of the wolf's mouth, than put it into his mouth, and then stand at his mercy, whether he will bite off his neck, or not; so it is better for every wise man rather to keep and preserve those immunities, freedoms, prerogatives, and privileges, which God and nature hath given unto him for the preservation, prosperity, and peace of his posterity, person, and estate, than to disfranchise himself, and to relinquish and resign all into the hands of another, and to give him power either to impoverish or inrich him, either to kill, or keep him alive.

Quest. 7. I come now unto the last question, which is this: Suppose things come unto this height and issue, that the King will have the parliament to confide in him for all they desire of him, or otherwise he will by wars labour to have his will of them; then, Whether is this martial and military design, undertaken by the parliament, against that party which is owned and aided by the king, lawful, or unlawful? And, consequently, Whether may and ought we to assist them, or

not?

Answ. 1. First, In general, I answer concerning means by these propositions, to wit,

1. Means must be used for preventing and removing of all temporal evils.

2. The means to be used, for the removal of temporal maladies, must be always lawful; for we must never do evil, that good may come thereof.

3. The means to be used must be always conformable, answerable, and suitable to the malady; as, for example: A man must not take a sword to quench a fire, nor think to defend himself against an armed foe (who comes with his sword drawn, or musquet charged, or pistol cocked to take away his precious life) with fair words; but must consider what remedy, or means, is most proper for the preventing of the

evil feared. Now there is no means better against offensive wars, than defensive.

Answ. 2. Secondly, I answer in general again, concerning actions, by two propositions; to wit:

1. That, which is not lawful for a private person to do, is lawful for a publick: As for example, it is not lawful for a private person to take away the life of one, whom he knows to have robbed, or murdered some one or other, but it is lawful for the judge upon the bench, upon good proof, to do it.

2. That, which is not lawful for a private person, in his own particular cause, is lawful for him, in a publick: As for example, had Faux been ready to have given fire to his train, when the parliament had been full, and in the very instant, had fallen by a private man's sword, that act had not been punishable, but praise-worthy; but it is not lawful for a private man to take away the life of one, because he sees or knows, that he intends some mischief against his neighbour or acquaintance; but is bound only to endeavour to hinder, and prevent it, or at least, not to fall upon him, except he can, by no other means, prevent the death, and preserve the life of his brother; and neither is this, I think, lawful in all cases.

3. That, which is not lawful for a private and particular man to do, upon his own head, is lawful for him to do, being commanded by authority; As for example, if it be not lawful, for Sir John Hotham, to shut the gates of Hull, against the king, of his own accord; yet it is lawful, being warranted and commanded by the parliament. If it be not lawful, for the Earls of Essex and Bedford, to take up arms to suppress that party, which oppresseth the kingdom, of themselves, yet it is lawful, by the order and commission of parliament; as is proved by "The sovereign antidote to appease our civil wars.'

Answ. 3. Thirdly, If his majesty passed an act, not only of oblivion, but of justification to our brethren of Scotland, for their wars, or for taking up weapons against his instruments; then I cannot see wherein, or how our defensive arms should so much differ from theirs that they, in so doing, should be loyal subjects, and we disloyal traitors.

Answ. 4. Fourthly, A necessary war must needs be lawful; for the power and force of necessity is such, that it justifieth actions, otherwise unwarrantable. The transcendent axun of all politicks, or the law paramount, which gives law to all human laws whatsoever, is, salus populi, The safety of the people; and this supreme law of nations, salus populi, hath its immediate rise from the law of nature, which teacheth every worm, much more a man, and most of all a whole nation, to provide for its safety, in time of necessity. It is not always lawful for us to kill those, who stand at our doors, or who would keep us from coming out of our doors; but if our houses be blocked up, and we so hindered from commerce with others, or from seeking relief, for the sustentation of our own lives, that we, and ours, are in danger to