Bills affecting any matters with which the governor is specially charged in his Instructions, or any central subject, or the interests of another province may be reserved, if not previously sanctioned by the Governor-General.

(f) Bills of the central Legislature, which the Governor. General, desires to see passed into law, may be passed over the head of chamber which refuses to introduce or pass the Bill in a form acceptable to the Governor-General, if the Governor-General certifies that the Bill is essential for the safety, tranquillity or interests of British India or any part thereof. Such a Bill if passed by one chamber and thrown out by the other, may become law as soon as the GovernorGeneral signs it in the form agreed to by one chamber, or in the form recommended by the Governor-General.

is passed by even one chamber, the Governor-General can still pass it into law by simply signing the Bill over the head of both the chambers. Bills passed in such an extraordinary manner, however, must be laid before Parliament, and must receive His Majesty's assent. And if the Governor-General considers such a law to be immediately necessary, he can put it into force even before the Royal Assent has been received; and the law will be a full, proper law unless disallowed by His Majesty in Council.

(g) All these powers of the Governor-General are in addition to his right to pass Ordinances in times of emergency which have the force of law for a period of six months.

To sum up: The Viceroy can :

(1) Pass Ordinances for six months having the force of laws;

(2) Pass Bills over the head of one or both dissenting chambers;

(3) Prevent the introduction or consideratlon of Bills he disapproves of;

(4) Return Bills passed by both Houses for reconsideration and passage in the form recommended;

(5) Delay any Bill by reserving it for Royal consideration;

(6) Simply veto Bills passed by both Houses-all this;

(7) In addition to the Royal Powers of Disallowance.

VI. Critique of the Constitution of the Indian Legislature.

Apart from the inevitable limitation on its powers as a non-sovereign law-making body, the Indian Legislature is thus very effectually restricted, even in the primary functions of law-making. The peculiarity of a double-chamber constitution provides an internal, inherent check upon the possible, though unlikely, excesses of a democratic institution, the real significance of which is apt to be lost sight of by a consideration merely of the letter of the law. The device of Joint Committees, and members' conferences and Joint Sessions are all intended to minimize or avoid those dangers of extreme Indian nationalism, which have not yet matured. In the life-time of the first Indian Legislative Assembly, the extraordinary powers of the Viceroy had to be used twice only:-in certifying the so-called Princes' Protection Bill, and the clause in the Finance Bill of 1923 restoring the increase in Salt Duty which the Assembly had rejected. In both cases the cogency of the popular opposition to the Governmet action was never denied; and both these measures may be taken to be somewhat of an abnormal character. But making due allowance for all factors, it cannot be said that the Viceregal or Executive control over the presentday Indian Legislature is theoretical or shadowy only; or that the extension of the powers of that body under the Act 1919 errs, if at all, on the side of over-confidence in the people.

Another similar internal check upon possible excesses by these beginnings in the way of democratic legislature is to be found in the composition of the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State. These two chambers do not represent each a

of

distinct and different set of interests, as the House Lords and the House of Commons do; nor is the elected element in either returned on such a materially different basis as that of the Senat and the chambre des deputes in France. Both the chambers of the Indian Legislature represent substantially the same interests property, community ΟΙ status; and are elected on nearly the same basis. And yet they tend to be rather tiresome hindrances to one another than salutary checks. The bicameral legislature was unknown in India until 1919, while this creation of that Act cannot but appear as a wholly unnecessary and retrograde measure to radical thinkers, all the more objectionable because the constitution of the two chambers displays no real difference in representation. The presence, similarly, of the official element, though much reduced, is deplored as evidencing a want of confidence in the elected popular element that the latter has done nothing to deserve. Official element must, indeed, find a place in the Legislature as much to provide expert information on technical questions of administration, as to bring the executive into sympathy with the Legislature, But such official element should get into the Legislature, not virtute officii as is the case in India to-day, but by simple election in the ordinary way. For the complete realisation of modern responsible government in democratic states demands that the chief ministers of the state shall be appointed to heir office because they possess the confidence of their country men as evidenced by their election. They are officials because they have been elected legislators; not legislators because they have risen to be important officers of state. In India, however, the doctrine of complete responsibility to the popular assembly is not yet accepted. The central government is frankly non-responsible in India, and responsible, if at all, only to the British Parliament. The Provincial governments are only partially responsible; and even there with considerable reservation. Complete responsibility of the Indian government to the Indian people may be an ideal to be ultimately aimed at; but it is not yet a fact of our political situation. Under the circumstances, the

Government retaining in the legislature a non-responsible official element virtute officii, cannot be reproached for having betrayed an ideal that they have not yet accepted.

Besides the frankly official, there is a still further-though yet smaller-element in the central Indian Legislature, which gives considerable indirect influence to the Executive over the Legislature. The nominated non-officials in the Council and the Assembly make a very small number; they are, besides, nominated not at the absolute discretion of the Executive, but rather in accordance with some well-known conventions about representing important minorities, which are intentionally left out from the rigid provisions of the statute or the statutory rules. But even so, the presence of a power of nomination, however restricted in scope or numbers, is inconsistent with the creation of a fully democratic legislature. The only justification we might plead on broad grounds of national policy in favour of the continuation of this archaic and inconsistent mechanism is that the Indian people must take time to be habituated to these somewhat novel forms of government; that the Indian electorates are yet in the process of education; that they have yet to perceive their powers and possibilities; that until they realise their responsibilities, those sections of the population which under existing condtions may not succeed in getting a representation by direct election. and which are yet too important to be ignored altogether, would best find representation through this power of nomination vested in the supreme governing authority. On this justification the offence appears shorn of much of its sting, though, of course, its inherent inconsistency cannot be altogether obscured.

Even in the elected section of the Legislature, the representation of the people is obtained on no uniform principle. The authors of the Joint Report on the Indian Constitutional Reforms had pronounced against the retention of the communal electorates, as being opposed to history, and perpetuating class divisions which it would not be in the interests of nation

*

building to encourage. "We regard any system of communal electorates, therefore, as a very serious hindrance to the deve lopment of the self-governing principle. " said Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford. And yet a special electorate for the Muhammadans is retained in all provinces for the local as well as the central legislatures. But the case of the Muhammadans in India may be allowed to stand apart, and be judged rather by political expediency than by strict logic. What, however, distinguishes the Muslim case does not apply to the other communal electorates, like those of the Sikhs in the Punjab. And if representation should not be allowed to communities which would perpetuate racial or religious distinctions, it is still less politic, from the stand-point of nation-building, to institute. separate electorates for economic classes. And yet the constitution of the Indian Legislatures provides for all these. It has Muhammadan, non-Muhammadan, and general electorates; further divided into urban and rural constituencies, or a cross division on economic lines superimposed upon the main division on communal lines. It has special electorates for Europeans, for commerce and for land-holders, again a medley of interests and communities, which are presumed to have an inherent opposition inter se, and therefore given special representation; but which might quite safely have been left to the general territorial electorates for adequate representation. Altogether, then, this careful combination of communal, and racial, and economic and official elements in one and the same representative body precludes the easy combination of them all so as to form a strong, compact, working majority for or against the Government. For political parties of the Western type have yet to be developed in India; and even when they do develop, it is doubtful if they would be quite on the lines of the English party system. The existence of these complex and cross divisions must tend to stereotype a conflict of interests, which would in all probability have been obviated, if from the begin. ning the new principles of constitutional evolution had dropped any connection with the principles of representation other

* See paras 229-31 of the Report.