NOTARY PUBLIC. (Seal.) The official acts of a notary public must be authenticated by his official seal, and not by a scrawl. Hinckley v. O'Farrel, 4 Blackford, 185.

OHIO RIVER. (Boundary.) Where land is bounded by the Ohio river on the Indiana side, the owner's right extends to low water mark. Stinson v. Butler and another, 4 Blackford, 285. PARTNER. (Separate property of.) The separate property of each member of a copartnership is liable to be attached for the debts due from the copartnership; and having been thus attached, the lien acquired is not to be defeated by a subsequent attachment by his separate creditor, or by an assignment under statute 1836, c. 238. Otherwise in the case of an assignment under statute 1838, c. 163. Allen v. Wells, 22 Pick. 450. PATENT RIGHT. (Nature of.) The exclusive right of property in the invention of, or improvement on, any new and useful art, machine, &c., is the creature of statutory law, and must be strictly regulated by its provisions. Higgins v. Strong and another, 4 Blackford, 182.

2. (Assignment of.) The assignment of a patent right is not valid, unless the assignment be recorded in the office of the secretary of state of the United States; and a note given to an assignee for such a right, whose assignment had not been so recorded, is invalid for the want of consideration. Ib.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. (Sale to reimburse advances.) A commission merchant having received goods to sell at a certain limited price, and made advances upon them, has a right to reimburse himself by selling them at the fair market price, though below the limit, if the consignor has refused, upon application and after a reasonable time, to repay the advances. Parker v. Brancker, 22 Pick. 40.

2. (Conveyance of real estate by attorney.) Under a letter of attorney authorizing the attorney to make sale of real estate and receive the purchase money, he has authority to execute the proper instrument required by law to carry the sale into effect. Valentine v. Piper, 22 Pick. 85.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. (Prolongation of time of pay

ment.) A prolongation of the time of payment, given by a creditor to his debtor without a new contract founded on a valid consideration, though given without the consent of the surety of the debtor, will not exonerate the surety from his liability. Coman and another v. The State, 4 Blackford, 241. RELEASE. (Of one of two promisors.) A release of one of two joint promisors, will not discharge the other from liability, unless it be a technical release under seal. Shaw v. Pratt, 22 Pick. 305.

2. (Same.) A writing not under seal, signed by the holder of a joint promissory note, set forth, that in consideration of the transfer of certain notes to him by J. B. P., one of the joint promisors, he thereby agreed to discharge the joint note so far as J. B. P. was liable thereon, except that such writing should not operate to affect an action commenced by him against the other joint promisor. It was held, that the other joint promisor was not released by such writing. Ib.

3. (Same.) The joint note, in such case, being payable in instalments, a part of which were not due at the time of the transfer, it was held, that, under the agreement between the holder and J. B. P., the notes transferred, which also were not then due, should be applied in payment of such of the instalments as were not due, and not in discharge of those upon which the action in question was founded.

Ib.

RIOT. Indictment against three persons for a riot. Plea, not guilty. Verdict of guilty as to one, and of not guilty as to the others. Held, that upon this verdict, a judgment could not be rendered against the defendant found guilty. Otherwise, if the indictment had been against the defendants together with others whose names were unknown. Turpin v. The State, 4 Blackford, 72.

SALE. (Tenants in common of vessel.)

Where the tenants in

common of a vessel are not engaged jointly in purchasing or building ships for sale, they do not stand in such a relation of mutual trust and confidence towards each other in respect of the sale of such vessel, that each is bound, in his dealings with the

other, to communicate information of all the facts within his knowledge, which may affect the price or value, but they may deal with each other as if they were owners of separate property. Matthews v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48.

2. (Same.) Thus, a tenant in common of a vessel, in contracting with his co-tenant for the purchase of his share, at a certain price, is under no legal obligation to disclose that a third person had previously agreed with him to purchase the whole of the vessel at a higher rate. Ib.

3. (Same.) But if there be any studied efforts on the part of such tenants in common to prevent his cotenant from coming to the knowledge of the truth, or if there be any, though slight, false and fraudulent suggestion or representation, then the transaction is void. Ib.

4. (Same.) In order to avoid a sale under such circumstances, it is not necessary that the false representation should be the predominant motive inducing the sale, but it is sufficient if it was a motive at all inducing to the sale. Ib.

5. (Same.) Where B., a tenant in common of a vessel, after a third person had agreed to buy the whole of the vessel of him at a certain price, purchased the share of M., his cotenant, at a less rate, and an action was thereupon brought by M. to recover damages of B., on the ground, that he made fraudulent representations in purchasing M.'s share, it was held, that evidence tending to prove, that the sum paid to M. was the full value of his share of the vessel, was admissible for the purpose of disproving the fraud charged upon B., and that it was proper for the consideration of the jury on the question of damages; but that the price at which B. had agreed to sell the vessel was strong, although not conclusive, evidence of the value. Ib. 6. (Delivery.) If several chattels are sold together, for one gross sum, which is paid by the vendee, and a part of them is delivered, but the vendor refuses to deliver the rest, the vendee cannot, if he retain such as were delivered, recover back any portion of the purchase money, in an action for money paid, or money had and received; but his remedy is upon the special contract, for damages. Miner v. Bradley, 22 Pick. 457.

7. (Lease and not sale.) A sale was made of a wagon, upon the condition, that the vendee should take it and use it, and whenever he paid the purchase money, it should become his property, but that if he did not pay for it he should pay for the use of it; and it was accordingly delivered to him. It was held, that he became lessee thereof, by virtue of such contract, with the right of possession until the wagon or the purchase money should be demanded; and that, consequently, the owner could not, before such a demand should have been made, maintain trover against an officer who had attached and sold the wagon on execution as the property of the vendee. Fairbank v. Phelps, 22 Pick. 535.

8. (Same.) Where, in such case, the vendor, subsequently to the sale, demanded payment of the purchase money, but accepted a portion thereof in part payment, it was held, that he thereby impliedly waived his demand for any further payment at the time, and confirmed the sale subject to the condition. Ib. 9. (Fraud.) In an action upon a bond given by a vendee for the payment of the purchase money, it was held, that evidence of oral representations made by the vendor previously to the execution of the written contract of sale, was admissible for the purpose of proving fraud on his part, although it would be inadmissible to prove a warranty. Holbrook v. Burt, 22 Pick. 546. 10. (Same.) In such case, evidence that fraudulent representations were made by the vendor, would be immaterial, unless it appeared that the vendee relied on them. But the presumption would be, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the vendee did rely on such representations. Ib. 11. (Same.) Where a sale of land is effected by means of fraudulent representations on the part of the vendor, at a price exceeding its real value, and simultaneously with the conveyance of the land to the vendee, it is mortgaged back by him to secure the payment of the purchase money, the vendee may rescind the sale notwithstanding the equity of redemption is under attachment by his creditors, for the vendor is substantially in the same condition in which he was before the conveyance. Ib.

12. (Rescinding.) The question whether the sale is rescinded within a reasonable time is a question of law, where the facts are not in dispute. Ib.

13. (Fraudulent representations.) If a sale of land in relation to which a contract of guaranty exists, is effected by means of fraudulent representations, on the part of the vendor, in relation to the subject matter of the guaranty, the vendee is not obliged to resort for a remedy to the contract of guaranty, if it was not made between the same parties as the sale, but may rescind the sale. Ib.

SALE OF GOODS. (Passing of property.) A horse was purchased for eighty dollars, but neither the property nor possession was to pass until the purchaser had executed a note for the price. A note for only eight dollars was, by mistake, executed and delivered in pursuance of the contract. Held, that the property in the horse was not changed. Litterel v. St. John, 4 Blackford, 326.

SLANDER. (Words spoken in another state.) An action of slander lies in Indiana for words spoken in another state, charging the plaintiff with being guilty of larceny. Offutt v. Earlywine, 4 Blackford, 460.

2. (Same.) If the defendant in such action plead in justification

that the words are true, he cannot sustain his plea without proof, to the satisfaction of the jury, that the plaintiff was guilty of the offence charged. Ib.

3. (Same.) Words spoken in another state, actionable at common law, are actionable in Indiana. Linville v. Earlywine, 4 Blackford, 469.

TRESPASS. (Against survivor of two.) Where, in an action of trespass against two persons for an injury done by a dog of which they were alleged, in the declaration, to be the owners, one of the defendants died, it was held, that the action might be sustained against the other defendant without proving that the deceased defendant was a part owner of the dog, and consequently that the declaration of the deceased (which was admitted in evidence to prove that fact) that he and the other defend