jury to determine from the circumstances attending the transfer of the bill, the time at which the indorsement was made. (1 M. & Rob. 341; 5 B. & Adol. 902; 2 M. & W. 739, 853; 4 M. & W. 57.) Anderson v. Weston, 6 Bing. 296. 2. (Alteration of bill-Pleading.) Assumpsit by the indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange. Plea, that before the bill became due, and whilst it was "in full force and effect," the date of it was altered by the drawer, whereby it became void Held, that the plea was bad, because it did not allege the alteration to have been made after acceptance. Langton v. Lazarus, 5 M. & W. 629.

3. (What is a bill of exchange.) A note, written by a creditor, at the foot of an account, requesting the debtor to pay that account to A B, and which the creditor delivered to A B for the purpose of getting in the money for the creditor, is not a bill of exchange, or order for payment of money within the Stamp Act. Norris v. Solomon, 2 M. & Rob. 266.

BOND. (Liability of surety on, when discharged.) Debt on bond against a surety. The condition recited, that the chancellor, masters, and scholars of the university of Cambridge had appointed B., C. & J. their agents for the sale of books printed at their press in the university, and that the defendant had offered to enter into a bond with them as a surety; and it was conditioned, that if the said B., C. & J., and the survivors and survivor of them, and such other person and persons as should or might at any time or times thereafter, in partnership with them or any or either of them, act as agent or agents of the said chancellor, &c. or their successors, for the sale of books as aforesaid, did and should duly account to the said chancellor, &c., and their successors, for all books delivered or sent to them or any or either of them for sale as aforesaid, and should pay all moneys which should become payable to the said chancellor, &c. in respect of such sale, then the obligation to be void, &c. : Held, that by the retirement of J. from the partnership of B., C. & J., the defendant, as their surety, was discharged from all further liability on this bond. University of Cambridge v. Baldwin, 5 M. & W. 580.

CHARTER-PARTY. (Construction of.) Under a charter-party, the defendant's ship was to proceed from London to Bombay, and there discharge her cargo; and then load a cargo, with which she was to proceed direct to London, the merchant to have the privilege of sending the ship to Calcutta from Bombay, on paying for the extra time occupied thereby. If the ship returned from Bombay direct to London, the merchant was to have the power of sending her to one part of the Malabar coast to receive cargo, paying for the extra time; Held, that the defendants, after discharging at Bombay, were not bound to take on board a cargo there for Calcutta. Cockburn v. Wright, 6 Bing. N. C. 223.

COINING. (Joint uttering.) Where one of two persons in company utters counterfeit coin, and other counterfeit coin is found on the other person, they are jointly guilty of the aggravated offence under 2 W. 4, c. 34, s. 7, if acting in concert, and both knowing of the possession. Reg. v. Gerrish, 2 M. & Rob. 219. CONTRACT. (For delivery of goods to arrive by a particular ship.) The defendants, by their broker, entered into a contract for the sale to the plaintiffs "of 50 tons of palm oil, to arrive by the Mansfield, &c. &c. In case of non-arrival, or the vessels not having so much in after delivery of former contracts, this contract to be void." At the time this contract was entered into, the defendants had several vessels on the coast of Africa for the purpose of obtaining palm oil, and amongst others the Mansfield and the Watt. After the date of the contract, the Mansfield was loaded with 315 tons of palm oil, and sailed homewards. On her arrival at Cameroons, the defendants' agent ordered the captain of the Mansfield to transship part of her cargo to the Watt, which was the larger vessel. This transshipment was accordingly made bona fide and without fraud, for the purpose of enabling the Watt to proceed home with a full cargo. The Watt proceeded on her voyage, and arrived at Liverpool on the 8th of April, 1838, and the Mansfield on the 20th of May following. The Mansfield, on her arrival, had on board 235 tons of palm oil, but the contracts made previously to the above con

tract amounted to 228 tons, leaving only 7 tons applicable to this contract, which were delivered by the defendants to the plaintiffs: Held, in an action for the non-delivery of the oil, first, that the arrival of the oil in the Mansfield was a condition precedent, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the oil brought by the Watt. Secondly, that the contract for the 50 tons was entire, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the 7 tons brought by the Mansfield over what was required to satisfy former contracts. Lovatt v. Hamilton, 5 M. & W. 339. COVENANT. (To repair.) A covenant by a lessee to put premises into "habitable repair," binds him to put them into such a state as that they may be occupied, not only with safety but with reasonable comfort, for the purposes for which they are taken. Belcher v. M'Intosh, 2 M. & Rob. 186.

DEED. (Attestation, evidence of.) The alleged attesting witness to a deed proved that the signature was his handwriting; that he had no recollection of the transaction, but that he should not have signed the attestation if he had not seen the deed executed : Held sufficient. Doe d. Counsell, v. Caperton, 9 C. & P. 112. DEVISE. (What words carry a power to executors, and what an interest.) A testator, possessed of real and personal property, desired his executors, out of such moneys of his as might come to their hands, to purchase two annuities for W. and her children; with regard to the rest of his property, of what kind soever, he desired, his executors, after payment of his debts, to pay and make over the whole to his daughter M., the wife of B., and to the children of his daughter after her decease: Held, that the executors took a power to settle the freehold property upon the daughter for life, with remainder after her decease to her children and their heirs. Knocker v. Bunbury, 6 Bing. N. C. 306. EMBEZZLEMENT. A was employed as a town traveller and collector, to go round and take orders from customers, and enter them in the books, and receive the money for the goods supplied on them, but had no authority to take or direct the delivery of goods from the shop. A customer ordered of A two articles, of which he entered one only in the order book; but the prose

cutor's carman delivered both to the customer. The prosecutor made out an invoice for the first article, amounting to 6s. 6d., and B entered the other at the bottom as 4s. 6d. ; A received of the customer the whole 11s., but accounted only for the 6s. 6d. Held, that the offence committed was not embezzlement, but larceny. Reg. v. Wilson, 9 C. & P. 27.

EVIDENCE. (Secondary evidence.) The non-production of a document, after notice, does not entitle the opposite party to prove it by the production of the copy of a copy of the document the first copy ought to be produced. Everingham v. Roundell, 2 M. & Rob. 138.

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2. (Notice to produce; Secondary evidence; Declaration of executor.) A document deposited in a court of equity, by a party to a suit there, and scheduled in his answer, but which remains with an officer of that court, after an order to deliver it to the party, is sufficiently in the control and power of such party to let in secondary evidence, after notice to produce, and non-production thereof by the party.

In an action by a special administrator, under stat. 38 Geo. 3, c. 87, the declarations of the executor named in the will, made by him while he was the acting executor, are not admissible against the plaintiff. Rush v. Peacock, 2 M. & Rob. 162. 3. (Notice to produce.) In an action for work and labor, a notice to produce" all accounts relating to the matters in question in this cause," is sufficient to let in secondary evidence of an amount of work done, given by the plaintiff to the defendant, without specifying it by date or otherwise. Rogers v. Custance, 2. M. & Rob. 179.

4. (Contradicting witness.) Where a witness in cross-examination denies having used particular expressions in the presence of the parties, the opposite counsel examining a person to contradict the witness, is not at liberty to lead, by reading from his brief the words denied; the conversation spoken to by the first witness being evidence in itself. Hallett v. Cousens, 2 M. & W. 238.

5. (Declaration of assignee plaintiff—Refreshing memory.) The

declaration of a party suing as a representative of others, made before he became such, is evidence.

Where a witness had been examined before commissioners of bankrupt, shortly after the act of bankruptcy, semble, that he may refer to the deposition he then made, for the purpose of refreshing his memory as to the date. Smith v. Morgan, 2 M. & Rob. 257.

6. (Blind subscribing witness.) Although the subscribing witness to an instrument has become blind, the instrument cannot be proved without calling him. (Ld. Raym. 734; 1 M. & Rob. 258.) Crank v. Frith, 2 M. & Rob. 262.

EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES. (Evidence in answer to

alibi.) In answer to an alibi set up on a trial for felony, the prosecutor may show the circumstances under which the prisoner was seen near the spot in question, though those circumstances involve the commission of another felony by him. Reg. Briggs, 2 M. & Rob. 198.

2. (Depositions of deceased witness.) The depositions taken before the magistrates against a prisoner cannot be read against. him, where the witness has died since the examination, unless the depositions in cross-examination have been correctly taken, and returned to the Court. Depositions taken in cross-examination, at a subsequent time to those in chief, and not signed by the committing magistrate, are so irregular as to prevent the whole depositions from being read against a prisoner; and this, although both are proved by one of the committing magistrates to have been actually taken. Reg. v. France, 2 M. & Rob. 207. 3. (Depositions of prisoner before coroner.) The voluntary deposition on oath of A before a coroner, upon an inquest on the body of B, although A was then in custody, were held admissible against A on an indictment for a rape on B. Reg. v. Owen. 9 C. & P. 83.

4. (Deposition of prisoner on oath.) Where a magistrate returns with the depositions that a prisoner was sworn and made a statement, the statement cannot be received in evidence against him,