were any persons among us, who doubted the superior wisdom of our monarchical form of government, their error was owing to those who changed its strong and irrefragable foundation in the right and choice of the people, to a more flimsy ground of title. Those who proposed repelling opinions by force, the example of the French in the Netherlands, might teach the impotence of power to repel or to introduce. But how was a war to operate in keeping opinions supposed dangerous out of this country? It was not surely meant to beat the French out of their own opinions; and opinions were not like commodities, the importation of which from France, war would prevent. War, it was to be lamented, was a passion inherent in the nature of man; and it was curious to observe, what at various periods had been the various pretences. In ancient times wars were made for conquest. To these succeeded wars for religion; and the opinions of LUTHER and CALVIN were attacked with all the fury of superstition and of power. The next pretext was commerce; and it would probably be allowed that no nation that made war for commerce ever found the object accomplished on concluding peace. Now we were to make war about opinions; what was this but recurring again to an exploded cause, for a war about principles in religion was as much a war about opinions, as a war about principles in politics. In the excellent set of papers alluded to by the right honorable gentleman [Mr. PITT], and which he had no doubt had been liberally distributed to the gentlemen who had lately got so many new lights on the French affairs, the atheistical speech of DUPONT in the Convention was quoted. Did they believe all the French to be atheists and unbelievers on account of that speech? If they did so believe, there' would certainly be no reason to complain of them for

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want of faith. But admitting that the French were all atheists, were we going to war with them in order to propagate the Christian religion by means contrary to the precepts of CHRIST? The justifiable grounds of war were insult, injury, or danger. For the first, satisfaction; for the second, reparation; for the third, security was the object. Each of these, too, was the proper object of negociation, which ought ever to precede war, except in case of an attack actually commenced. How had we negociated? Not in any public or sufficient form; a mode which he suspected and lamented, by his proposing it, had been prevented. A noble lord [BEAUCHAMP] had said, that he thought it his duty not to conceal his opinions on so important an occasion, by absence or by silence; formerly the noble lord did not think absence so great a crime. During the nine unfortunate years that he had maintained the same political connections with him [Mr. Fox] the noble lord's attendance had not been very assiduous; and he rejoiced to hear that the noble lord meant now to compensaté for past omissions by future diligence. When the triple league was formed to check the ambition of Louis the Fourteenth, the contracting parties did not deal so rigorously by him, as we were now told it was essential to the peace of Europe that we should deal by the French. They never told Lours that he must renounce all his conquests in order to obtain peace. But then it was said to be our duty to hate the French for the part they took in the American war. He had heard of a duty to love; but a duty to hate was new to him. That duty, however, ought to direct our hatred to the old government of France, not to the new, which had no hand in the provocation. Unfortunately the new French government was admitted to be the successor of the old in nothing but its faults and

its offences: It was a successor to be hated and to war against; but it was not a successor to be negociated with. He feared, however, that war would be the result, and from war, apprehending greater evils than he durst name, he should have shrunk from his duty if he had not endeavoured to obtain an exposition of the distinct causes of all wars, he dreaded that the most which had no definite object, because of such a war it was impossible to see the end. Our war with America had a definite object, an unjust one indeed, but still definite; and after wading through years on years of expence and blood, after exhausting invectives and terms of contempt on the vagrant congress, one ADAMS, one WASHINGTON, &c. &c. we were compelled at last to treat with this very congress, and those very men. The Americans, to the honor of their character, committed no such horrid acts as had disgraced the French; but we were as liberal of our obloquy to the former then as to the latter now. If we did but know for what we were to fight, we might look forward with confidence, and exert ourselves with unanimity; but while kept thus in the dark, how many might there be who would believe that we were fighting the battles of despotism. To undeceive those who might fall into this unhappy delusion, it would be no derogation from the dignity of office to grant an explanation. If the right honorable gentleman [Mr. PITT] would but yet consider—if he would but save the country from a war-above all, a war of opinion, however, inconsistent with his former declarations his measures might be, he would gladly consent to give him a generous indemnity for the whole, and even a vote of thanks. Let not the fatal opinion go abroad, that Kings had an interest different from that of their subjects; that between those

who had property and those who had none there was not a common cause and a common feeling.

"He knew that he himself should now be represented the partizan of France, as he had formerly been represented the partizan of America. He was no stranger to the industry with which these and other calumnies were circulated against him, and therefore he was not surprized; but he really was surprized to find that he could not walk the streets without hearing whispers that he and some of his friends had been engaged in improper correspondence with persons in France. If there were any foundation in such a charge, the source of the information could be mentioned; if it were true, it was capable of proof. If any man believed this, he called upon him to state the reasons of his belief. If any man had proofs, he challenged him to produce them. But to what was this owing? The people had been told by their representatives in parliament, that they were surrounded with dangers, and had been shewn none. They were, therefore, full of suspicion, and prompt of belief. All this had a material tendency to impede freedom of discussion; for men would speak with reserve, or not speak at all, under the terror of calumny. But he found by a letter in a newspaper, from Mr. Law, that he lived in a town where a set of men associated, and calling themselves gentlemen, [Mr. REEVES's association, Crown and Anchor] not only received anonymous letters reflecting on individuals, but corresponded with the writers of such letters, and even sometimes transmitted their slanders to the Secretary of State. He could not be much surprized at any aspersion on his character, knowing this; and therefore he hoped the House would give him the credit of being innocent till an open charge

was made; and that if any man heard improper correspondence imputed to him in private, he would believe that he heard a falsehood, which he who circulated it in secret durst not speak in public."

The Address was agreed to without a division.

At length the die was cast, and the various events of the war gave rise to frequent debates in parliament; but the disappointments and reverses, which the allied armies experienced in the campaign of 1794, prompted the leaders of opposition in both Houses to bring forward in the following session a variety of motions urging the necessity of setting on foot a negociation for peace. The grandest effort of all these was made by Mr. Fox on the 24th of March 1795, when in conformity to due notice previously given, he moved, " that the House should resolve itself into a committee to inquire into the state of the nation."

"This solemn mode of inquiry ought not," the orator observed, "to be resorted to, but in cases of peculiar emergency; and such he esteemed the present. Whatever differences of opinion might prevail concerning the general state of Europe, no man, he thought, would be hardy enough to deny that the dangers, which impended over this country, were many and great; and, at such a crisis, the commons would not do their duty to their constituents, if they afforded confidence to any administration, but on the strongest grounds, and the firmest conviction of its integrity and competence to the charge. He had introduced a similar motion in the year 1777, after the surrender at Saratoga; and though the majority then differed from him as to the cause of the misfortunes of the country, they did not think it consistent with the dignity or duty of the House, at so awful a moment, to decline going into an inquiry, by which all the strength of our