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and assailable points, and no efforts are spared to fortify them. They fear a fatal blow from the Constitution, and to compass it have their efforts been mainly directed. To bring it within the constitutional power of Congress they have labored hard. The Constitution is ramified for scraps of power upon which to base this work. Clauses and parts of clauses are seized upon and tortured into shape to sanction it. Fine spun arguments are had to confuse; logical and plausible deductions, from false or assumed premises, are made to perplex the public mind; and the grand climacteric of this-and that which is really to be the strength of this bill-is interest, grandeur, magnificence, power.

Pretenses-I do not use the word in its offensive sense; but I do not know one more dignified to convey my meaning-are set up as express powers in the Constitution, authorizing this legislation by Congress. Many are named, and some I will give, with comments upon them as I proceed. All these claimed powers are found in the eighth section of the Constitution.

Pacific Railroad-Mr. Hamilton.

Third. The eleventh clause, by which power is conferred upon Congress "to declare war," is also relied upon. But upon this I do not dwell. It is, manifestly, so far-fetched a reason, or rather pretext, that I consider comment unnecessary. What legitimate and constitutional connection this power has with the construction of these roads, it is impossible to discern, though, suprising as it may appear, it has received the sanction of some in high position.

Fourth. The twelfth clause of this section, which grants the power to Congress "to raise and support armies," is, at times, urged as a sufficient power to construct these roads. How is the work to raise and support_armies-ah! not that, but to transport them? Then we are to understand that these are to be United States military roads, that we are by this bill to construct. Is this so? Is this its primary object? Is it to be built for this purpose at all? No! A different motive, a different object, another purpose prompts their construction.

Mr. McDOUGALL. It is not proposed to build the Pacific road as a great military road but it is necessary as a military road. We do not claim it under that power of the Constitution.

Mr. HAMILTON. I presumed that you did not. There is no argument for the building of this road as a military road. We are in profound peace; my hope is, that we may so remain; my belief is, that, by observing good faith, pursuing an upright course, and by attending to our own affairs, this peace can be almost perpetual. I hate that ill omened croaking about war. "In peace prepare for war" has robbed millions of money from the people in this country, and has ingulphed Europe in debt, and crushed its labor. It is the potent cry upon this floor to pass the most flagrant measures. It is the standing argument for standing armies and standing navies, the curses and scourges of the world.

Fifth. From the thirteenth clause, which grants to Congress the power "to provide and maintain a Navy," is deduced this power; that is, to trans

Navy. My immediately preceding remarks, apply equally to this false assumption of power. We know that is not the object of the construction of these roads.

The first, is the third clause of this section, which confers upon Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." This clause has been, ever since the organization of the General Government and the agitation of this subject, more or less, depended upon by the advocates of a system of internal improvements, for the power by which Congress is to build turnpikes, railroads, canals, telegraphs, &c., and improve rivers and harbors. It has, in its day, in the evolutions of this system, been eagerly seized upon, and as hastily abandoned, by its votaries; still, in time, though, to be renewed. For it must be remembered that this assumed power, by Congress, to enter into this system of improvements, is a vagrant power; it has no positive, physical, material existence; it has no fixed abode, no settled home nor habitation; it roams over the Constitution, locates upon any part, uses it, for the time, just as the interests, the views, or the prejudices of localities or communities might adapt its appli-port material, &c., to the Pacific coast for the cation. Common sense, common understanding, common good is the touchstone to bring this and kindred subjects to constitutional exposition and construction. Let me ask, is this bill to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the States, or with Indian tribes? Are these roads to be constructed for this purpose; for this complex, difficult, and most interesting object? Who will So say? No! Allow me further. "To regulate commerce" is not to make commerce, much less to build roads for its transit. The regulation of commerce necessarily presupposes the preexistence of commerce. If, under the power to " regulate commerce," Congress can build roads of all kinds, and improve rivers of all kinds, then Congress, under the same power, and without any stretch of it, can build wagons and cars to run upon the roads, and ships and vessels to navigate the high seas, and the rivers, and embark in the transportation of all kinds of merchandise. If, under this power, Congress can do this, it can make commerce; it can enter into agriculture, manufactures, &c., and produce the commodities it would transport. There is no such power conferred upon Congress any where in the Constitution to absorb all the powers of the people, either in their individual or State capacity.

Second. The seventh clause of this section, which confers power upon Congress "to establish post offices and post roads," is, to some extent, relied upon to build the roads.

In all candor let me ask the friends of this bill whether these are post roads, established as post roads, intended as such in their construction? Let me ask, would the Government have the hardihood to construct post roads and post roads purely to California, such as these, at such an expense, in such a manner, upon such a scale? Is the Government to build such post roads? A candid answer to this must at once dissolve the pretext, explode the reliance put upon this clause. Nay, more; does Congress, under this clause, possess power to build any roads, fill up valleys, cut down mountains, in States and out of States? Mr. Jefferson thought not. Congress can establish post roads; but in his language, does not this differ somewhat from building or constructing them?

Sixth. The fifteenth clause, which confers upon Congress the power "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasions," is involved in this road. No more than in any other. Others are as indispensable to the full execution of this power; and all roads, from the rudest to the most magnificent, could be, upon the same principle, constructed by Congress."

Seventh. The general welfare clause, as it is commonly called-the first clause of the eighth section, by which Congress has power to lay and collect taxes, &c., &c., and "to provide for the common defense and general welfare"-has been often seized upon, in its day, to help constitutional expounders, when in great straights, to base the power of Congress upon, to engage in such improvements; but it is now more used to give force to other clauses than to maintain anything by its own virtue. It is often now, I may say always, used by friends of internal improvements, either to round a period or ornament an argument, and to cover, by its general, high-sounding, and good, strong English, the weak and insufficient clauses relied upon. A solid, safe, and an enduring construction has settled this, that from it Congress derives no power, but that in it is comprehended the beneficent results of the judicious exercise of the expressed powers.

Eighth. The next and last, the war-worn and veteran argument in favor of the constitutionality of this and other like works, is, "that it is a

national work."

I have read the Constitution of the United States. I am somewhat familiar with its provisions. In the discharge of my public duties here I consult it, that I may always maintain with fidelity the solemn oath I took in this Hall to support it. I look in vain-1 never saw such a power, such a clause, such words in it. Congress shall have power to construct national works!"-there is no such language in it. The word "national," the word "nation" is not

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found in it. These States are named by it the "United States of America." Those good ar ticles in the Constitution, articles nine and ten of amendments, which doubly secure what it was intended to be, a "union of free and independent States," and not a conglomerate "nation," defines and prescribes too clearly the powers of Congress, and the rights of the States and of the people, to be misunderstood:

"ART. 9. The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others ertained by the people.

"ART. 10. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

Though the Constitution, without these amendments, was, in fact, what was expressed, yet the tenacious jealousy of our fathers for their individual rights, and the rights of the States, demanded a fixed, plain, unequivocal declaration. We have it; and whatever power is found enumerated in it, Congress possesses, and none other, except that it may make laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry into execution these expressed powers, and none other. So we have, in plain, good English, what powers Congress possess, and it can exercise no other; and that, in the execution of these powers, it shall pass necessary and proper laws, and no other.

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In the Constitution there is no power to make "national works." There is nothing in it to show what "national works "are. There is nothing in it to show their location or their character. There is nothing in it to make these railroads and telegraphs, or any other railroads, telegraphs, or canals, turnpikes, or other roads. Upon what a wide sea of opinion would we be cast if the power" to construct national works were in the Constitution! Or if this power can be deduced from the Constitution as it is, where would we be, and to what would our inquiries lead? Where would we begin, where would we end, as to what is absolutely national, what qualifiedly national, and what not national at all? Are these railroads more national than the Hudson and Erie, the Pennsylvania Central, the Baltimore and Ohio, the Virginia Central, the Erie canal, or the Chesapeake and Ohio canal? And are the thousand other cross channels of communication less national than these? These are to be the subjects of congressional legislation, if there be such power in the Constitution. But there is none; and the friends of this, and kindred projects, must resort to clauses in the Constitution providing for other and quite different objects, as I have before shown. They do resort to these clauses, these express powers, and boldly maintain that this bill is to carry them into execution.

Let this resort be tested by sober reason. They may admit that there is no express power to build these roads, but that it is necessary and proper to carry the powers before enumerated into execution.

How is it "necessary and proper"-for these are the words of the Constitution-let me ask the candid and reflecting mind? Is the building of these roads "necessary and proper" to " establish postroads?" Nay, is it either necessary or proper for Congress to build such roads to carry the mail to California?-for who, I ask, engaged for himself in private enterprise, would undertake to construct such roads for the single purpose of establishing either "post roads" or transporting the mail? Is it "necessary and proper" to " raise and maintain armies," to provide and maintain a Navy," that such roads should be by Congress constructed? Can self-respect so far forget itself as to assert that such roads should be built as military roads? Is it "necessary and proper" in order to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the States, and with the Indian tribes," that these roads be built? Disjoin these two strong words,

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necessary and proper," by substituting "or" for "and." Is it either necessary or proper to build such roads to execute these purposes? Comment here is superfluous. The question answers itself.

Here are the clauses of the eighth section— that section which gives to Congress its active power-strewn all around me; but where is the clause, the article, the section, authorizing Congress to construct a "national work?"

No such power being conferred upon Congress, no law "necessary and proper" is required to

33D CONG....2D SESS.

execute it. Congress cannot suppose a power, and then pass a "necessary and proper" law to execute it. Congress cannot decree the importance of an object; indeed, give to it, by its weight and importance, a kind of constitutional sanction or necessity, and then pass a "necessary and proper" law to secure it. One is as flagrant a violation of the Constitution as the other, and both equally to be avoided. Often have I wondered at the bold declarations made on this floor of the constitutional power to aid "national works," as if really they were specified with legal accuracy in the Constitution, precisely defined in their character and objects, and absolutely designated and located. And my wonder is not diminished when, finding no such language in the Constitution, I behold the friends of the internal improvement system, to secure the result, engaged in throwing into hotchpotch all the enumerated powers of the Constitution-the whole eighth section, with the preamble-and mixing them well, pack them away for use, as exigencies may demand, very characteristically labeled "National works,' "National defences," "National glory," "National ends," "National results," "National greatness, "National liberality," ," "National Treasury," "National appropriations."

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Mr. McDOUGALL. I do not claim it under the eighth section.

Mr. HAMILTON. Under what section, then, of the Constitution, can you claim it?

I want no such amalgamation of powers; no subverting old names, and old and well-defined landmarks, and appearing under new names and new signs, not known to, and not warranted by, the Constitution. Take this instrument as it is; read it in its good, strong, plain Anglo-Saxon; understand it, interpret it, apply it by the rules of common sense, and you have a Constitution in force, and operating, as formed by the Convention, not as twisted, perverted, misconstrued by interest, caprice, or prejudice, directed by astuteness, design, or ignorance.

Mr. Jefferson, with that unsurpassed prescience which so much distinguished him, saw to what these dangerous innovations and perversions would lead, and often warned his countrymen to avoid them-rather to bear temporary inconvenience than to impair the fabric of our constitutional liberties by conceived notions of necessity and expedience. Talented men there were in his dayambitious men, who, when a power was wanted to secure a favorite object, soon, by their zeal and their intellect, wrought it out. Against such Mr. Jefferson spoke in the inspiration of the Constitution, and in his true republican tone. A rigid, a strict, constructionist of the Constitution he was; a sincere lover of his country, he evinced that love in the fidelity with which he maintained the rights of the States and of the people; a great reformer and progressionist, he always manifested his sincerity by his efforts to confine the Federal Government to the just, and proper, and necessary exercise of its constitutional powers; devoted to the union of the States, he knew that union was to be perpetuated by confining the General Government to the discharge of its own legitimate duty.

A recurrence, Mr. Chairman, to the opinions of this eminent and successful statesman, is both pleasant and instructive. They inspire with the confidence of right. The recollection that, in his day, these questions were met and mastered, and that now they are to be met again, reinvigorates the arm that is to strike. I take pleasure in calling the attention of the committee to the following extracts, containing some of his opinions upon subjects kindred to this, and hope that their examination will not be fruitless. To James Madison, March 6, 1796, he wrote:

"Have you considered all the consequences of your proposition respecting post roads? I view it as a source of boundless patronage to the Executive, jobbing to members of Congress and their friends, and a bottomless abyss of public money. You will begin by only appropriating the surplus of the Post Office revenues; but the other revenues will soon be called into their aid, and it will be a source of eternal scramble among the members, who can get the most money wasted in their State; and they will always get most who are meanest. We have thought, hitherto, that the roads of a State could not be so well administered, even by the State Legislature, as by the magistracy of the county, on the spot. How will they be when a member of New Hampshire is to mark out a road for Georgia? Does the power to establish post roads, given you by the Constitution, mean that you shall make the road, or only select for those already

Pacific Railroad-Mr. Hamilton.

made, those on which there shall be a post? If the term be equivocal, (and I really do not think it so,) which is the safest construction? That which permits a majority of Congress to go to cuttting down mountains and bridging of rivers, or the other, which, if too restricted, may be referred to the States for amendment, securing still due measures and proportion among us, and providing some means of information to the members of Congress, tantamount to that occular inspection, which, even in our county determinations, the magistrate finds cannot be supplied by any other evidence?"

To Albert Gallatin, October 13, 1802, he wrote: "You know my doubts, or rather convictions, about the unconstitutionality of the act for building piers in the Delaware, and the fears that it will lead to a bottomless expense, and to the greatest abuses. There is, however, one intention of which the act is susceptible, and which will bring it within the Constitution; and we ought always to presume that the real intention which is alone consistent with the Constitution. Although the power to regulate commerce does not give a power to build piers, wharves, open ports, clear the beds of rivers, dig canals, build warehouses, build manufacturing machines, set up manufactories, cultivate the earth-to all of which the power would go if it went to the first-yet a power to provide and maintain a Navy, is a power to provide receptacles for it, and places to cover and preserve it. In choosing the places where this money should be laid out, I should be much disposed, as far as contracts will permit, to confine it to such place or places as the ships of war may lie at, and be protected from ice; and I should be for stating this in a message to Congress, in order to prevent the effect of the present example."

To Albert Gallatin, June 16, 1817:

"You will have learned that an act for internal improvement, after passing both Houses, was negatived by the President. The act was founded, avowedly, on the principle that the phrase in the Constitution which authorizes Congress' to lay taxes, to pay the debts, and provide for the general welfare,' was an extension of the powers specifically enumerated to whatever would promote the general welfare; and this, you know, was the Federal doctrine. Whereas, our tenet ever was, and, indeed, it is almost the only landmark which now divides the Federalists from the Republicans, that Congress had not unlimited powers to provide for the general welfare, but were restrained to those specifically enumerated; and that, as it was never meant they should provide for that welfare but by the exercise of the enumerated powers, so it could not have been meant they should raise money for purposes which the enumeration did not place under their action; consequently, that the specification of powers is a limitation of the purposes for which they may raise money. I think the passage and rejection of this bill a fortunate incident."

To Robert J. Garnett, February 14, 1824: "Third. The giving to Congress the power of internal improvement, on condition that each State's Federal proportion of the moneys so expended shall be employed within the State. The friends of consolidation would rather take these powers by construction than accept them by direct investiture from the States. Yet, as to internal improvement particularly, there is, probably, not a State in the Union which would not grant the power on the condition proposed, or which would grant it without that.

"The best general key for the solution of questions of power between our Governments, is the fact that every foreign and Federal power is given to the Federal Government, and to the States every power purely domestic.' I recollect but one instance of control vested in the Federal over the State authorities, in a matter purely domestic, which is that of metalic tenders. The Federal is, in truth, our foreign Government, which department alone is taken rom the sovereignty of the separate States.

To Edward Livingston, April 24, 1824:

"I thank you for the copy of your speech on the question of national improvement, which I have read with great pleasure, and recognize in it those powers of reasoning and persuasion of which I had formerly seen from you so many proofs. Yet, in candor, I must say it has not removed, in my mind, all the difficulties of the question. And I should really be alarmed at a difference of opinion have, as companions in sentiments, the Madisons, the with you, and suspicious of my own, were it not that I Monroes, the Randolphs, the Macons, all good men and true, of primitive principles. In one sentiment of the speech I particularly concur: If we have a doubt relative to any power, we ought not to exercise it.' When we consider the extensive and deep seated opposition to this assumption, the conviction, entertained by so many, that this deduction of powers, by elaborate construction prostrates the rights reserved to the States, the difficulties with which it will rub along in the course of its exercise; that changes of majorities will be changing the system backwards and forwards, so that no undertaking under it will be safe; that there is not a State in the Union which would not give the power willingly, by way of amendment, with some little guard, perhaps, against abuse; I cannot but think it would be the wisest course to ask an express grant of the power. A Government held together by the bands of reason only, requires much compromise of opinion; that things even salutary should not be crammed down the throats of dissenting brethren, especially when they may be put into a form to be willingly swallowed, and that a great deal of indulgence is necessary to strengthen habits of harmony and fraternity. In such a case, it seems to me it would be safer and wiser to ask an express grant of the power. This would render its exercise smooth and acceptable to all, and insure to it all the facilities which the States could contribute to prevent that kind of abuse, which all will fear, because all know it is so much practiced in public bodiesI mean the bartering of votes. It would reconcile every one, if limited by the proviso, that the Federal proportion of each State should be expended within the State. With

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this single security against partiality and corrupt bargaining, I suppose there is not a State, perhaps not a man, in the Union who would not consent to add this to the powers of the General Government."

To William B. Giles, December 26, 1825:

"I wrote you a letter yesterday, of which you will be free to make what use you please. This will contain matters not intended for the public eye. I see, as you do, and with the deepest affliction, the rapid strides with which the Federal branch of our Government is advancing towards the usurpation of all the rights reserved to the States, and the consolidation in itself of all powers, foreign and domestic; and that, too, by constructions which, if legitimate, leave no limits to their power. Take together the decisions of the Federal court, the doctrines of the President, and the misconstructions of the constitutional compact, acted on by the Legislature of the Federal branch, and it is but too evident that the three ruling branches of that department are in combination, to strip their colleagues, the State authorities, of the powers reserved by them, and to exercise themselves all functions, foreign and domestic. Under the power to regulate commerce, they assume, indefinitely, that also over agriculture and manufactures, and call it a regulation to take the earnings of one of these branches of industry, and that, too, the most depressed, and put them into the pockets of the other, the most flourishing of all. Under the authority to establish post roads, they claim that of cutting down mountains for the construction of roads, of digging canals, and, aided by a little sophistry on the words general welfare,' a right to do not only the acts to effect that, which are specifically enumerated and permitted, but whatsoever they shall think or pretend will be for the general welfare. And what is our resource for the preservation of the Constitution? Reason and argument? You might as well reason and argue with the marble columns encircling them. The Representatives chosen by ourselves? They are joined in the combination, some from incorrect views of Government, some from corrupt ones, sufficient voting together to outnumber the sound parts; and with majorities only of one, two, or three, bold enough to go forward in defiance. Are we, then, to stand to our arms with the hot-headed Georgian? No. That must be the last resource, not to be thought of until much longer and greater sufferings. If every infraction of a compact of so many parties is to be resisted at once, as a dissolution of it, none can ever be formed which would last one year. We must have patience, and longer endurance, then, with our brethren while under delusion; give them time for reflection and experience of consequences; keep ourselves in a situation to profit by the chapter of accidents; and separate from our companions only when the sole alternatives left are the dissolution of our Union with them, or submission to a Government without limitation of powers. Between these two evils, when we must make a choice, there can be no hesitation. But, in the meanwhile, the States should be watchful to note every material usurpation on their rights; to denounce them, as they occur, in the most peremptory terms; to protest against them as wrongs to which our present submission shall be considered, not as acknowledgments or precedents of right, but as a temporary yielding to the lesser evil, until their accumulation shall overweigh that of separation. I would go still further, and give to the Federal member, by a regular amendment of the Constitution, a right to make roads and canals of intercommunication between the States, providing sufficiently against corrupt practices in Congress (log-rolling, &c.) by declaring that the Federal proportion of each State of the moneys so employed, shall be in works within the State, or elsewhere, with its consent, and with a due salvo of jurisdiction. This is the course which I think safest and best, as yet.”

The friends of this bill rely upon another power. It is the power of Congress to dispose of the public domain," to improve it, and facilitate its sale or disposition by aiding in the construction of roads through it. Reduce this to the simple inquiry, and it is answered. Is this the object of the roads? Are they made for this purpose? Is Congress called upon to build such roads in order to sell the public domain? Are such roads" necessary and proper" for this purpose? Are the friends of the bill reduced to this extremity? Argument upon this point is unnecessary to show its utter fallacy.

I shall now, Mr. Chairman, apply my remarks to the other branch of the subject. Whether it be expedient for Congress to complicate itself with this work? Whether it be right, proper, or beneficial for Congress to engage in this enterprise? If I have shown that this is to be a Government work, directly or indirectly, under this bill, I think that it is at once established, that it is inexpedient. The numberless and impressive lessons of the past, are a sufficient warning for the present and the future. The common mind of the country is against Government having anything to do with the construction of works of this kind, and it is based on the most substantial principle, and the most solid experience. Many evils will inevitably result, and more are likely to result from the entanglement of the Government in it. Many are patent upon the face of the bill; how many are latent, time alone can develop. Mr. Chairman, I shall briefly review some of them.

First, under the bill-though upon its face these roads are to be constructed by parties under con

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tracts, and the Government is to give no more than is proposed by the bill, whereby the extent of its liability is supposed to be fixed, yet it provides that if the contractors fail, from any cause, to prosecute the work, the Secretary of War is required to relet it. Then, as soon as contracted for, the Government is involved without the hope of escape, and the road may be thrown half, or less than half, finished, indeed, just commenced, upon its hands, when all the powerful influences of the gigantic and varied interests concerned in its construction will throw the whole ponderous scheme upon the Treasury of the United States. In all the relations of our legislative experience, we are impressed with the lesson that it is our first duty to prevent a dangerous project from getting a foothold, for that once obtained, its future efforts will be commensurate with the value of the objects to be obtained, inspired by the past with the full hope of future success.

It provides further, that contracts be made with parties to build it; these parties may not have a corporate existence. Some of them may die or become insolvent, and then the adjustment of rights, and of liabilities, are to be thrown upon the Government with the road, in the end; or, if a corporation, you give to it a State of lands, besides money, and all power to get more.

By the bill, too, these roads are to be surrendered to the United States, and wherever located in States, to go to these States, and where located in the Territories, to remain in the United States, reserving the power in Congress to regulate and restrict the charges for transportation in the States. Then it is ultimately to be absolutely a Government work in the Territories, and, in fact, by virtue of the power to control the charges for transportation in the States in which it may be located, a Government work there, with all the consequent corruptions and expenditures, broils and intrigues, as to whether they shall be free or compensating roads, and, at last, all to be paid by the labor of the country. This will alike be injurious to sections of the Union, and to the individual tax-payer. It might place the former beyond fair competition, and impose upon the latter the keeping up of the roads, if not the expense of making additional ones. For if they become entirely Government roads, tolls will be brought to the lowest point, and, possibly, removed entirely. This will secure an accumulation of business at these points; so much so, that another road, or track, may be required, and Government, from the clamor of apparent necessity, may be induced to build it. Whilst this is doing, other sections are denied. Their position might be much benefited; their resources more speedily and thoroughly developed by other roads. These canno: be built; individuals cannot compete with the United States; States cannot; a toll road cannot exist with a free road. The United States refuse to go beyond the localities where these roads are constructed. The strong arm of the Government is exulting over and depressing another section of the Union, and yet all are to contribute equally to its support. Cities and lands along the line of travel, and at the termini, thrive, prosper, rise; cities and lands out of the line of travel droop and sink. And then will come clamor

Pacific Railroad-Mr. Hamilton.

ries, “a line of military posts," to be "garrisoned by a sufficient force;" in addition, to establish "station houses;"" each to be guarded by a sufficient force;" and also, is to open by the troops a "common road along the entire line of the railroad through the Territories, and to keep this road in good traveling condition, with safe bridges and ferries across the streams, to sink wells at convenient distances, and to protect all these railroads and telegraph lines, and persons employed thereon, from all hostilities and depredations of the Indians;" and then we have, in the third section of the bill, the proviso, "that all contracts made in pursuance of the provisions of this act, shall be taken and considered as part of such contracts." Put this and that together, and see what obligations the United States have incurred! What liabilities are impending over the Government! What complicated results may ensue! What litigation, what expense, what cost may flow from it, and what gross wrong may be done! An army of five thousand men-a standing army-to guard these roads, and that, too, by contract! A standing police to protect them from Indian and other depredations! And I do not exaggerate the number of men that will be required to do this. There is, too, an increase of the Army lurking here. For there will be, then, like now, clamors about depredations, and clamors for more soldiers, until you have the roads peopled with soldiers; and thus munificently, through this channel, spend public money upon localities and upon the persons who are the inseparable companions of soldiers at posts. There is prudence and caution and sagacity, in this contract by the parties with the United States for those posts. The United States are to protect these roads, and if not protected, the want of it must be supplied by means. These roads are to traverse deserts, pass through the lone wilderness, thread mountains, where the red man yet holds sole dominion. Distance from civilization and habitation may combine both the Indian and white depredator against the rich commerce that is to pass over them. But, with all this, I protest against Government contracting to protect this property. Like all other property of all other citizens, let this be protected. Not otherwise. The United States may in some particular fail; the contractor will off-set; the United States will be unable to fulfill all its stipulations; and for which, damages will be claimed. Congress is to be the recipient and redresser of complaints; without information, without time for examination; all that can be, will be got from Congress.

Putting all these things together, this is to be a Government work, either entirely, or in connection with individuals or corporations; and as objectionable in the one as in the other aspect-the one to be as diligently and as scrupulously avoided as the other.

There are, however, other general considerations disconnected with the bill itself, which should deter Congress from embarking in such enterprises.

First. Our Government is not fitted to engage in such works. It has enough to do to attend to its well defined constitutional powers. No one ever dreamt, in the early days of the Union, that it to be business of this Government to

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one is as likely to be fatal as the other. By exciting the hope that Government may do it, prevents effort, both communal and individual. Individual effort is frightened off, because it cannot enter into competition with the Government. And when the end comes all are to be disappointed in the little that is done. The Government cannot engage in these works with ability and efficiency, and others are deterred by the attempt. The best illustration of this stand-still policy is, when the country was persuaded to look to the General Government for the construction of such works from the year 1820 until General Jackson dispelled the illusion by several judicious vetoes, when the country, abandoning this idea, turned in upon itself; and see the progress since.

Third. It is a great, hazardous, untried work in which the United States are to be involved. Not so much so for individual or private enterprise, industry, and interest. A road, or roads, to California, will be made. It is merely a question of time. When Kansas and Nebraska are settled, when our population from this side shall have pressed up to the base of the mountains, and when the population shall, on the other side, press up to meet it, then shall go with it, as naturally and as necessarily, these roads. But now, without a population, without protection, without labor, without shelter, without provisions, without material, Congress is called upon to engage inextricably in this work, that is to be forced through by money and by money alone. For money, sufficient money, can make any of the routes prac

ticable.

Fourth. Even in the hands of individuals it would be a formidable political engine; in the hands of corporations still more so; but, in the hands of the Government, a second Bank of the United States. Its influence and power would be retroactive. Being in the Government, it would make itself a part of it and impress it with its power. Like the United States Bank, having the impress of the Government, and possessed of its money, controlling the banks in the States, and thus trying to control the people, these great and leading trunks being put by the Government above all competition, and supported by it, influencing the numerous railroads in the States, and they, in turn, operating upon the people, might present a power truly potent and dangerous.

Combine all the railroads in the United States, as were the banks in the States by the United States Bank, by a leading spirit, as these roads would be-and what terms might they not dictate -at least what might they not obtain? They might only be limited by the demand. Independent and separated by State lines and organizations, and upon a competing equality, railroads, whilst they are able to exert some, cannot exert that joint, united, comprehensive power, so dangerous to free institutions and good and wholesome legislation. They are corporations; and but consolidate the corporations in the United States, give them a common head, a unity of power, and what might we not fear.

This is a gigantic scheme; it is an enterprise comprehending all the elements of power. Connected with Government, it spreads out the hope

we, will com Gard discontent, and then, it may dig canals, construct railroads, and telegraphs, of gain-the prospect of place. To genius, pre

debts, Government taxes-that system so much abhored, and so much to be shunned.

But yet more: this bill, besides giving to the contractors the immense land donations and the sum per mile, if the charge for transportation for the United States Government should exceed a certain per centum, then Congress is to pay what it shall think reasonable. Here is the place for active, very active legislation. The Collins line appropriations of the last Congress can be here reenacted. Here is a sluice for the public money, and whether that per centum is exceeded or not, Congress will be importuned, if not besieged, and the whole power of these roads will be brought to bear to secure the amount wanted.

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an offering of place; to corruption, an illimitable scope; to power, unbounded strength.

However this great work may be inaugurated, the combination of all these elements will incessantly labor to produce the grand result; that is, to have it a splendid, magnificent Government work. Let it become so, and consequences will not be problems!

deepen and widen rivers, dig out harbors, for ment; to capital, activity and investment; to the private purposes. No one with the most compre-speculator, golden harvests; to the office hunter, hensive view of Federal powers, thought to claim for the Government this internal police of the States and the people. It, too, would cost the Government, I may safely say, quadruple what it would cost individuals. In all its operations the Government is looked upon by the operators as a public goose, and he is the most fortunate, the most sagacious, and adroit, and often the most honored, who can pluck her the most The people are strong, can work and pay taxes, and when collected and in the treasury, projects, plausible, enticing, and capacious, are found ready waiting to take them. There is never a paucity of projects when there is money in the Treasury, and there is never a scarcity of friends to laud, and extol, and press them until it is out.

But there is a provision in this bill full of danger, and which may entail upon the Government the most complicated difficulties. If these roads, by the aid of the Government, are constructed Second The engagement of the Government by the contractors, under the contract authorized in such works paralyzes independent effort. Even by the bill, the Government takes upon itself the the rumor that the Government may engage, paraobligation to establish on the roads in the Territo-lyzes. It either frightens, or it excites hope, and

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Lieutenant Whipple estimates the cost and equipment of the road from Fort Smith, on the western boundary of Arkansas, to San Pedro, on the Pacific, a distance of one thousand eight hundred and forty-nine miles, at $166,230,000; add to this for the road from the Mississippi to Fort Smith, and from Southern California to San Francisco, and we have $200,000,000; add to this twenty-five per cent. for deficiency in estimate, and to this, I think, experience will justify me in adding fifty per cent. more, because of its connection with the Government, and the sum for cost

33D CONG....2D SESS.

and equipment of this one (the southern) road will amount to $350,000,000. There is no estimate for the northern road; but basing it upon a like calculation of cost and equipment, its length being one thousand seven hundred miles, we have about the sum of $250,000,000 for cost and equipment; so that, for both roads, we have the enormous sum of $600,000,000. I do not say that it will cost so much, but the official data furnished us indicate this cost. There, too, in its ramifications is the $61,500,000 which the Government is to pay in twenty-five years. There, too, is the fortynine million five hundred and twenty thousand acres of land to be disposed of. There, too, is the standing army of four, or five, or six thousand to be strung along these routes. What will not this immense stake invite? What elements will it not combine? What struggles will it not create? What shocks will it not produce? Separated, they will be strong; united, all powerful. Ponder, too, that our Government, by this bill, is to be connected with, to be chained to, this magazine. Remember that our Government is to direct, to control, to superintend it, to be its depository, its guardian, and, ultimately, part of itself. But $50,000,000 are now disbursed by the General Government, and see the struggles it produces, and the evils it generates and entails. With these stupendous sums, and these immense combinations made the subjects of active operations, identified and connected with the Government, as they are, we may well apprehend dangerous legislation and tremble for the safety of the Republic.

In conclusion, it may not be improper for me to say, that I weigh well the convenience and importance of railroad connection with the Pacific coast; and it is my hope and expectation that, before many years, it will be secured; but whilst estimating it, I confess that I cannot discover an overruling necessity that obliges us to cast aside every prudential consideration. We have a communícation with this coast, and such a communication now as will justify us in examining deliberately all projects for other as near or more speedy communications, and coming to calm and well digested conclusions, consistent with our constitutional obligations, and our duties to our constituents and the country.

THE TARIFF AND REVENUE.

SPEECH OF HON. J. Z. GOODRICH,
OF MASSACHUSETTS,

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
January 24, 1855.

"The working" of the existing and proposed tariffs com-
pared for fourteen years, from 1847 to 1861-Expenses of
the Government from July, 1854, to July, 1861, estimated
at $52,000,000 annually, and reasons for it--At this esti-
mate, public debt, under the existing tariff, increased,
from 1854 to 1861, $16,552,043 97, or imports increased
$78,493,201-Under the Secretary's proposed tariff the
debt increased $72,204,176, or imports $419,028,452-
Under the committee's proposed tariff, the public debt
increased $96,089,783, or imports and foreign debt $630,-
623,127.

The House being in the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union

Mr. GOODRICH said: Mr. CHAIRMAN: At a caucus of members of Congress, held some two or three weeks ago, the honorable gentleman from Tennessee, [Mr. JONES,] a member of the Committee of Ways and Means, submitted the following resolution; which was adopted:

"Resolved, That it is right and proper that the duties imposed by law, upon goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the United States from foreign countries, should be so modified and reduced, at the present session of Congress, preserving the principles of the tariff act of 1846, as will materially diminish the amount of revenue annually collected from customs."

The purpose being thus announced, of bringing this subject up for action at the present Congress, I have examined it with some care, so far as it relates to the question of revenue, and desire to submit the results of that examination to the House.

Referring to some of the tables which accompany his annual report, the Secretary of the Treasury says:

Tariff and Revenue-Mr. Goodrich.

"These tables combined exhibit the growth of our commercial marine, of our exports and imports, and the receipts and expenditures of our Government, and prove that the receipts into the Treasury are sufficient to meet all reasonable expenditures, discharge the public debt, and allow a reduction of the rate of taxation, with almost a certainty that our increasing commerce will give an increase of revenue equal to the reasonable demands of the future."

Therefore he calls the attention of Congress to the propriety of reducing the revenue from customs," and recommends a plan of reduction. The majority of the Committee of Ways and Means recommend a different plan, or rate of reduction, and reported a bill at the last session in accordance with it. The gentleman from Tennessee, whose resolution was adopted by the caucus, is one of the majority of the committee who reported that bill, and is known to be in favor of it.

By "reducing the revenue from customs," the Secretary means "a reduction of the rate of taxation" or duty-not a reduction of the gross revenue, for he deems it "almost a certainty that our increasing commerce will give an increase of rev

enue.

." This increasing commerce must obviously be expected to bring increased importations, as otherwise there could be no "increase of revenue," but a reduction rather, the duty being reduced. While, then, it is proposed to reduce the rate of duty or tariff on imports, the gross revenue from this source, it is confidently expected, will be increased; in other words, the loss to the revenue, occasioned by reducing the rate of duty and adding to the free list, will be more than made up by increased importations at the reduced rate.

"The present tariff," says the report of the Secretary, "has eight schedules, or different rates of duties, as follows: The first of one hundred per cent., the second of forty per cent., the third of thirty per cent., the fourth of twenty-five per cent., the fifth of twenty per cent., the sixth of fifteen per cent., the seventh of ten per cent., and the eighth of five per cent. The bill prepared by the committee has five schedules, as follows: The first of one hundred per cent., the second of twenty per cent, the third of fifteen per cent., the fourth of ten per cent., and the fifth of five per cent. And the bill prepared at this Department has but two rates of duty: the first of one hundred per cent., and the second of twenty-five per cent.

Such are the alterations in the rates of duty proposed by the Department and by the Committee of Ways and Means, as compared with the present tariff.

The following is a "comparative statement of the working of the existing tariff, of the project of the Secretary of the Treasury, and of the bill of the Committee of Ways and Means:"

Our imports for the year ending June 30, 1853, were $267,978,647.

The revenue at the rate of duty in the existing tariff, was $58,072,390 26.

At the rate proposed by the Secretary, it would have been $10,363,069 75 less, or $47,709,320 51. At the rate proposed by the Committee of Ways and Means it would have been $14,315,309 10|| less, or only $43,757,081 16.

The average annual imports for the six years ending the same time, that is, June 30, 1823, were $196,357,284.

The average annual revenue for these six years, under the existing tariff, was $40,907,718 29.

Under the tariff proposed by the Secretary, it would have been only $33,643,018 93.

Under that proposed by the Committee of Ways and Means the average would have been only $30,333,311 75.

Taking this comparative statement, prepared by the Secretary himself, as a guide and basis of calculations, we may arrive at pretty accurate results as to the working, the practical working, (for that is the point,) of these different tariffs, and their effect upon the revenue of the Government, and upon the foreign indebtedness of the country. And these results will show that, under a tariff like either of those proposed by the Secretary and committee, there would be either a large deficiency of revenue, or a large increase of foreign indebtedness, caused by increased imports and increased excess over exports. It is to this point I wish to call the attention of the House and the country.

The imports for the year ending June 30, 1854, were something more than one tenth larger than

Ho. OF REPS.

those of the previous year, but the revenue was only about one tenth larger. If, then, we add one tenth to the revenue that would have accrued from the imports of 1853, at the rates in the Secretary's bill, and also at the rates in the bill of the Committee of Ways and Means, we shall have very nearly the amount that would have accrued, at those rates, from the imports of 1854. This would give us the same comparative statement for 1854 which the Secretary has furnished for the six preceding years, and is as follows:

Under the existing tariff, the revenue for the year ending June 30, 1854, was $64,224,190 27,

Under the tariff proposed by the Secretary, it would have been, ascertained as above by adding one tenth to the amount, at the same rate, for the preceding year, only $52,480,252 56.

Under the tariff proposed by the bill of the Committee, the amount, ascertained in the same way, would have been only $48,132,789 28.

This and the comparative statement of the Secretary shows that the revenue would have fallen off, in the last seven years, at the rates of duty in his bill, supposing the imports to have been the same, $55,652,133 87. And at the rates in the bill of the committee the falling off would have been $79,537,741 23.

But, it may be said, and probably will be, that if either of these tariffs had been in operation, there would have been an increase of importations, (stimulated by the lower rate of duty,) and a consequent increase of revenue. Very well. But would that increase have been a corresponding one; that is, equal to the difference in the rate of duty? Suppose, then, there would not only have been an increase of importations, but an increase sufficient to have given the same revenue as the existing tariff has given, what must that increase have been in the seven years? Under the tariff of the Secretary it must have been $322,741,439; and under the bill of the committee, the increase must have been $512,618,904.

These are facts, the substantial correctness of which will not be controverted.

But would such an increase of imports have done the country any good? Even under the existing tariff, the excess of imports over the exports for the seven years ending June 30, 1854, was $93,755,818. And what has been the condition of things since that time? Everybody knows what it has been. Money has been scarce, the market rate of interest for it averaging, in all our commercial cities, twelve to eighteen per cent. per annum, and probably even higher, and, until quite recently, large shipments of specie have been made every week to Europe, to pay our foreign debt, or that part of it which was the most pressing. Why did we send specie? Because we had nothing else to send, or not enough of anything else. Was not every nerve strained to remit what we could in cotton, flour, wheat, and other agricultural and manufactured products? Suppose our imports of foreign fabrics had been $322,000,000, or $512,000,000 more, what more could we have done to export domestic products in lieu of specie? If our ability to export would have been correspondingly increased, then why did not our increased imports in 1853 and 1854, over those of 1851 and 1852, have this effect? That increase was $143,000,000; but the exports for 1853 and 1854 increased over the two previous years only $81,000,000, and of this increase $38,000,000 were in specie in the last year. Notwithstanding the export of this large amount of specie in 1854, the excess of imports over the exports in 1853 and 1854, was more than $63,000,000.

In what way could $322,000,000, or $512,000,000 more of foreign cotton, woolen, and silk goods, and iron, and other articles, have helped us to any considerable amount of means to increase our exports? Not by giving us any more cotton, wheat, and flour to export. And all we had to spare of those articles we sent abroad, and as fast as we could. Nor could we have sold that additional amount of imports in the markets for specie, and thereby increased our ability to pay abroad; for no such process could have increased our specie; and what we had, we could export as well without being thus surfeited with foreign goods as with. No, our ability to export is not measured by our imports. Our difficulty under the present

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33D CONG....2D SESS.

tariff is, we have imported $93,000,000 more than we have been able to pay for, with all our gold, and that difficulty, under either of the proposed tariffs, would have increased just in proportion to the increase of imports and indebtedness abroad. We had no means to pay for more, and how, except upon a credit and postponement of the evil day, could we have imported more? And if we could not have imported $322,000,000 more under the tariff of the Secretary, and $512,000,000 more under that of the committee, then our revenue, under the former, would have been $55,000,000, and under the latter $79,000,000 less.

Total imports

Averaging

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be paid for foreign labor and its products, while being established; labor was employed and well
our own labor is unemployed. Reaction, as I rewarded; the resources of the country were being
have said, will be sure to come, and, judging from developed, and our foreign commerce and trade,
the imports at New York for the months of Sep- growing and reaching out into all parts of the
tember, October, November, and December last, world, kept pace with our internal trade and in-
and for three weeks in January, compared with dustry. In this state of things the tariff of 1846
those for the corresponding months and weeks of was established, and notwithstanding the one or
the previous year, the point of reaction has already two hundred millions of gold from California, then
been reached, and we have commenced the de- unexpected, which have come in to aid us appa-
scending scale. From January to August inclu-rently, but not really; apparently, by deluding us
sive, there was an increase of a few thousand dol-
lars. After that the imports fell off as follows:

September

October........................
November....................................

December......

Three weeks in January*.

1853. 17,292,704 .12,182.925 12,584,927 .13,928,292 ..11,996,970

67.985.818

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1854.
14,266,888
11,031,038
8,631,842

9 315,846
9,286,880

52,532,494

In November and December, and three weeks in
the present month, the falling off was $11,275,621,
nearly one third. This was at New York only.
With the exception of the last five years, the
imports from 1834 to 1839 were the largest. This
was under the sliding scale tariff of 1832, which
reduced the rate of duty gradually to twenty per
cent in 1840. The imports, as the duty gradually
came off, run up to $162,000,000 in 1839, and for
the five years ending with that year, they exceeded
the exports $157,383,505. We all remember the
It drained the country
effect
of this large excess.

of its specie to pay its indebtedness abroad, and
produced a commercial revulsion, which required
years to recover from.

Nobody can fail to see that our principal difficulty has arisen from importing too much, and that still further importations, whether at one rate of duty or another, would only have increased our → foreign debt and aggravated the evil. We could not, then, have increased our revenue by an increase of imports in the last seven years, under any tariff, without making matters worse, and for a considerable time to come, perhaps for the next seven years, there is every reason to anticipate a arge falling off. There is much to justify this anticipation in the present condition of things, in which, confessedly, great inactivity prevails in almost every department of industry, affecting injuriously every interest, public and private, unless it be that of the money lender, who is receiving his one and two per centum a month. And there is equal reason to apprehend such a falling off from the enormous increase of importations for the last few years, which the nature of the case and the history of the past assure us must be followed by reaction, and, if much longer continued, a tremendous reaction too. This increase in five years Well, in 1840, the duties came down to twenty is without a parallel in any other equal period percent. And did our "increasing commerce" then since the origin of the Government, as the follow-keep up our imports? No. They were brought down from $162,000.000 in 1839 to $107,000,000 ing comparison, as far back as 1829, will abundantly show: in 1840, to $127,000,000 in 1841, to $100,000,000 in 1842, and to $64,000,000 in 1843. What caused this? Not the twenty per cent. duty. Under other circumstances the immediate effect of the reduced duty would have been to increase import101,687,723 ations. But, in the existing state of things, the 235,969,964 imports were reduced in spite of the tendency of Or, assuming that the imports for five years, the reduced rate of duty to increase them; and the reduction was caused by the impoverished from 1854 to 1859, will be the same as from 1849 condition of the country, brought on by the large to 1854, and dividing the whole thirty years into periods of ten years each, and comparing the over importations of the previous years. We had different periods, we shall find the comparison to not done our own work, but had hired Europe to do it for us. We had contracted an immense for"be as follows: eign debt, and when the pay day came, we reeled like a drunken man under the weight of the pressure. If the duty had been five per cent. it would have made no difference. The ability of the country had been exhausted by substituting foreign for home labor, and its imports, from necessity, fell off, and its Treasury was emptied. This state of things continued till the policy was changed, and home labor was employed and encouraged instead of foreign labor; and it would have continued to this day, if the policy and tariff of 1840 had not been changed; and it requires no prophet's vision to see that the present state of things will not only be continued but aggravated a hundred fold, if that policy and that tariff should be substantially restored by the passage of the bill of the Committee of Ways and Means.

from

141829 to 1834..

1834 to 1839........

1839 to 1844.

1844 to 1849..

1849 to 1854.....

Amount.
$509,736,953

756,674,530

508,438,617 688,346,366 1,179,849,720

Total imports from 1829 to 1839. do

!} g do

1839 to 1849..

1849 to 1859..

annually. $101,947,391 151,334.906

137,669,273

.$1,266.411.483
1,196,784.983
2,359,699,440

The average, annually, would be as follows: For 20 years from 1829 to 1849..... $123,159,823 For 10 years from 1849 to 1859... 235,969,964

This shows an increase of nearly one hundred per cent. in ten years, and this, too, without any increase in the coming five years over the last five. The increase from 1849 to 1854 was really more than one hundred per cent. running up from $147,857,439 in 1849 to $304,562,381 in 1854. Now, who does not know that the country did not require this enormous increase of foreign products and fabrics to supply a legitimate and 19 healthy demand for consumption? It was proJuduced, in a great measure, by an extraordinary 10gold stimulus, which, with no sufficient counterevailing influence in our revenue laws, protecting sahome labor and interests, and developing, in this way, the almost infinite resources of our own country, instead of aiding foreigners to develop theirs, has really helped to impoverish rather than enrich us. With the fact of such an immense increase of imports before us, and staring us in O the face, how can we be at a loss to determine the principal cause of the paralysis which is resting Vupon the country, and producing such wide-spread -suspension of its industrial functions? Who can hesitate to believe that the country is losing, at this very time, from half to a million of dollars a day from this suspension? No doubt, as a relasource of national wealth, there is all this in our brunemployed labor, and it would be infinitely better, if we would resort to it, than all the gold that has ever come, or ever will come, from California.

But can this unparalleled increase of imports continue? No, not even with a hundred millions beof gold annually, that shall merely touch at New JaYork, on its way from the mines of California, to

But, at length, the tariff of 1842 was passed, and the policy of 1840 was abandoned, for a time at least. It took some little time to experience its beneficial effects either upon the business of the country, or upon the public revenue. The evil effects of the tariff and policy of 1840 continued through 1843, when the imports run down to $64,753,799, and the exports to $84,346,480. But, in 1844 everything began to move on well, the imports run up to $108,000,000, and the exports to $111,000,000, and they continued gradually to increase through 1848, when the imports were $154,998,228, and the exports were $154,032,131; the total imports, for the five years, being $648,925,962, and exports $650,015,918-excess of exports over imports a little over $1,000,000. There has been no period when the prosperity of the country seemed to be more healthy, or to rest on a more stable and firm basis. The Treasury, for all ordinary demands upon it, was being supplied; trade was active; manufactures were growing and

Fourth week in January, ascertained since date of this

speech. Total imports, 1845, $5,040,325; 1855, $2,053,774.

||

into false security, and the belief that we could live on our credit, and extravagantly, too, instead of on what we really earned-but not really, by bringing us sooner to see and consult our true interests, and promote our real national independence by learning-using our gold for this purpose to do, and doing for ourselves what, when learned, we can do as well, or better than England, France, or Germany can do for us-I say, notwithstanding this gold, we find all over our wide-spread country every interest, with scarce an exception, paralyzed and depressed. The Government is, indeed, rich. Its Treasury is overflowing. But multitudes of the people who have worked hard to produce such articles as are wanted for American consumption, and are good enough for Americans to consume; articles, too, which they are willing to sell at cost, or for the merest trifle over, find the market flooded with similar imported articles, which are sold not at cost -a prohibition against selling foreign fabrics at less than cost would often be a fair protection-no, not at cost, but at twenty, thirty, and sometimes fifty per cent. below cost; and the domestic fabric cannot be sold any better. This is ruin. They are forced to stop producing. They have stopped, and have nothing to do. Multitudes who have paid their tax on foreign imports, to fill the coffers of the Government, have been ruined by the excess of these imports, the market being overstocked and broken down by them, and are to-day without a shilling in their pockets, and nothing to do to earn one. Can such people go on and buy duties to keep up the revenues of the Govern and consume foreign goods, and continue to pay ment? No; they must stop buying till they have something to do to earn wherewith to pay, and the Government revenues will fall off.

Now, let us see what would have been the condition of our public finances at the end of the last seven fiscal years, if either of the tariffs of the Secretary or committee had been in operation, compared with what it was under the existing tariff; and what it would be at the end of the next seven years, those tariffs, or either of them, continuing in operation, assuming the imports to have been, and to continue, the same.

It appears, from a statement of receipts and expenditures, previous to June 30, 1853, prepared by the Register of the Treasury, and from the statement of receipts and expenditures for 1854, in the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, that the total receipts for the last seven years, exclusive of loans, Treasury notes, &c., $347,447,956 03 And the total expenditures for the

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Of this excess a little over $29,000,000 were applied to the redemption of the public debt, and the balance remained in the Treasury. This left a balance of public debt, July 1, 1854, of $47,242,206 11.

The receipts under the tariff of the e Secretary, would have been, as we have seen, $55,652,133 87 less, adding, of course, so much to the public debt, and making it, July 1, 1854, $102,894,339 98.

Under the committee's tariff, the receipts would have been $79,537,740 23 less, adding the same amount to the public debt, and making it, July 1, 1854, $126,779,926 34.

This increase of the public debt-the expenses being the same, and the balance in the Treasury remaining the same-would have been unavoidable, without the additional $322,741,439 of imports under the Secretary's bill, and $512,618,904 under the committee's bill, which would have made the excess of imports over the exports, in one case, $416,497,257, and, in the other, $606,374,722.

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