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of this opportunity to refer to my native State; but I am sorry to confess that the reference is to her adversity instead of prosperity. Truth and justice to the people of the glorious old Commonwealth demand this at my hands. Pennsylvania is now groaning under the heaviest debt of any State in the Union, it being over $41,000,000. The principal part of the annual interest on this unprecedented weight is drawn out of the labor, sweat, and blood of the people by direct taxation. Many devices have prevailed to place her in this unfortunate situation. I will, at this time, speak but of one aggravation and imposition among the many, hoping that it will induce abler hands than mine to expose others equally dishonorable. I allude to the operation of temporary loans. The sum of $460,435 67 was negotiated (I call it a sham loan, and I will prove a part of it so before I am done) with sundry banks; one of them the Farmers' Bank of Schuylkill county, that reports she furnished $50,000 of the above sum. If she did, it was more money, I believe, than the actual bona fide capital paid in by the stockholders. At the time the aggregate amount of money, by her own showing, deposited with her by the State treasurer for eight months ending the 1st day of January, 1855, was $326,379 14.

The act authorizing the loan referred to was passed on the 9th day of May, 1854. On the 1st day of June immediately following, being but twenty-one days thereafter, this bank had in her possession $54,000 of the State funds, and on the 1st day of August following this amount was increased to $56,433 99. With nearly this sum of the people's money constantly due by the bank to the State, was it not an easy matter to loan her $50,000? If John Smith places $56,000 in your hands for an indefinite period, without interest, I suppose no one will doubt that you can, if you choose, loan John Jones $50,000, with interest. That this bank actually loaned the State $50,000 of her own capital-capital actually paid in-is a humbug that outstrips Barnum's woolly horse, or his mermaid cat with the codfish tail, No man who knows the bank, unless he is demented, or is a fool right out, will believe any such thing. You could as soon persuade the people of Schuylkill county to believe that the moon was made of green cheese, or that the Natural Bridge of Virginia was built by human hands. It is a cock and bull story, and would lose nothing in comparison if placed side by side in Barnum's book with his premium humbug.

On the first day of August, 1854, according to her own showing, this bank had of the State's funds $56,000; being $6,000 more than she reports to have loaned the State. Now, which of the parties was indebted to the other? Of course the bank owed the State $6,000. Then whose capital was it that the bank lent to the State? The answer is at hand. It was the people's money which was first paid into the treasury-then by the hands of the treasurer placed in the bank, there to remain just as long as the cashier chose to use it, without interest. In other words, the State treasurer, on the first of June, 1854, handed $54,000 to the cashier, who either passed $50,000 of it back again or (which is more likely) held on to it, to shave the people who paid it into the treasury-and thus, for the favor of handling $50,000, the State is fleeced out of $3,000 per annum at least. This sum the bank would make out of it at simple interest alone. How long the people will suffer themselves to be thus humbugged and bled time alone can determine. It is not at all unreasonable to believe that this snug sum of $56,000, placed by the State treasurer in the hands of the cashier, was by him retained, to be used, in part, to carry on an electioneering campaign, in which he came out third best; and for the further purpose of accommodating the public at the rate of from three to five per centum per month-in which latter event the bank may very easily have realized out of the use of this State deposit at the rate of from $18,000 to $20,000 profit per annum. And this, too, under the pretext of her having loaned the State $50,000. Should this species of State and bank financiering not cease, and our State Legislature and State officers not interfere, but continue to sanction it, you will find, before the year 1870, the debt of Pennsylvania will be at least $60,000,000. Mark that!

To evade investigation by examining into the facts connected with this sham loan, the bank's advocates will tell you that the money spoken of as being on deposit with her was otherwise appropriated and provided for. If so, will those wiseacres be good enough to tell the people how it came that, by the showing of the bank herself, she had, at various times, from $54,000 to $56,000 on deposit, long after she had loaned the State the $50,000? Look at her own report and you will find that $56,433 99 was in her possession on the first day of August, 1854, eighty days after the loan was authorized to be made.

I will simplify this transaction, by bringing it home to Schuylkill county, so that he who runs may read. Suppose, for instance, that the county, instead of the State, had negotiated this loan of $50,000 with the bank, while, at the same time, the county had a large amount of funds which she was not using, on deposit in the same bank; and suppose further, that previous to the consummation of the negotiation, the treasurer of the county should deposit $54,000 more with the bank, and this, or a larger sum, continually to be kept in it to the end of the time for which the loan was made. Under such circumstances, where would be the necessity of the county contracting such a debt, and paying interest on it when, at the same time, I repeat, she had on deposit in this very same bank a larger sum for which she was allowed no interest? This is precisely the situation between the State and this bank, according to her own statement made to the State authorities for 1854, in which it will be seen that the bank has received over $1,500 for interest. Further comment is entirely useless. This bank has made application for an increased capital of $100,000, for the great favor she has done the State in the sham loan to her of $50,000, by which she has, without doubt, realized more profit in clear cash in one year, than forty of the best farmers in Schuylkill county have done. It must, of course, be accommodated, whilst the tax-payers may see how they pay their taxes, to make up a larger deposit for the bank this year.

In conclusion, I respectfully suggest to the people of Pennsylvania, and those of Schuylkill county in particular, that it might be well to petition the Legislature urging the immediate investigation of the loan of $50,000, taken by the Farmers' Bank of Schuylkill county, under the act approved May 9, 1854. If this be done, it will be proved by her own official statement, that, on the 1st day of June, 1854, twenty days after the passage of the law authorizing the loan, the bank had of the State's money in her possession, or in that of her cashier, $54,000; on the 1st of July, $43,000; on the 1st day of August, $56,433 99, and on the 1st day of September, $47,556 95, being an average of $50,495 47 for four months, within a fraction, immediately after the passage of the law, and that the State has paid interest all this time on $50,000, whilst the bank held an equal sum of the State's money, and paid no interest.

Mr. Chairman, thus much have I considered it a bounden duty to say to the tax-payers of Pennsylvania on the subject of the awful debt hanging over them, and of the sham or humbug loan. They have the facts and figures before them; and if I know the people of this great and glorious old Commonwealth, they will declare that the State has been invaded by certain vampires, who have been preying upon her vitals. Thus situated, it is expected that every man will do his duty, that he will cry aloud and spare not.

KNOW-NOTHINGISM.

For information and the benefit of all parties, I publish with my remarks an extract from a speech delivered by Mr. Littlejohn, Speaker of the present New York House of Representatives, on the subject of the new order or party called Know-Nothings, and will merely suggest, that, provided this party is led on in other districts by the same material (to wit, a defeated candidate for Congress) as, it is alleged the order in Schuylkill county is, the people in such case are prepared to believe every word uttered in the following speech, made by Mr. Littlejohn. Let the gentleman speak for himself:

"Mr. LITTLEJOHN (Speaker) had supposed that, when he last addressed the House, it would be the last he would have to say on this question. But since then nothing but charges upon charges had been made against his character

Ho. OF REPS.

as a man. He was no man of change. He would, in what he had to say, endeavor to treat every man in the proper spirit. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Petty] had said he [Mr. L.] had come down on the floor to speak. Mr. L. said, if, when he took the chair as Speaker of this House, bis constituency was to be deprived of his voice, forever begone the honors of the chair. He disclaimed that he asked a single vote to place him in the chair of the House. No one had a scrap of paper from him containing any pledge. Thus he denied that he had deceived any one. Whenever spoken to on the subject, he had always replied that he intended to leave the matter to the Whigs of the House. He had not wanted to be returned to the House, but his party friends insisted upon his receiving the nomination, and he took it.

"As to his connection with the Know-Nothings, he would tell all he knew of it. Last March, while a member of this House, some of his friends asked him to attend a lecture. He went with them to a room, where he was assured by the officers of that society that he was to do nothing that was contrary to anything against which his conscience would revolt. He was asked to make a promise. He did make the promise; and if his recent course was treason, make the most of it. If he had perjured himself, make the most of that. He now declared himself opposed to the principles of this association. As to his pledge to vote against William H. Seward, rooted might be his tongue to his mouth if he ever made such a pledge. He would give as briefly as he could a complete exposition of Know-Nothings; but he would say, from the moment he left that room in this eity to this, he never entered it again. It was enough for him to say that he saw in that room what would prevent an honest man from ever entering again. As to whom he saw there, their names would never be divulged by him. This organization, in its original idea, was simple to meet the banding of men on one side, to meet the banding of men on the other. But no political nomination was to be made. And thus far it was right. But what was it now? Was it an institution to which an honorable man-a freeman-a Christian-could belong? He thought it was not. He believed men here belonging to it were honest, but that they were deceived by political tricksters. In July last a grand lodge was organized, called a grand council. Go to New York and you find the grand president-J. W. Barker-occupying a power in the State equal to a monarch: and this grand president alone appoints one deputy in each county; and what sort of a man will this deputy be? Why, a second self. And what does this deputy do? He is armed with the power to create as many lodges in the towns of the State as he pleases. He selects nine men as the nucleus of these lodges, to establish them; this second self of J. W. Barker selects these nine men, and these nine men select three delegates to the grand council, to make nominations and oaths to bind body and soul of the innocent members of the order. These officers are thus the creatures of one manJames W. Barker-in New York.

"Did ever a man conceive anything so humble in a Republican Government? These delegates are to remain as such three years. Two hundred lodges send thus six hundred men to this council, all of whom are the creatures of Barker. The duty of these men, this grand council, is to

make oaths to bind men who are invited to hear lectures,

and to make no nominations. Original Know-Nothingism was to use influence against foreign influence. This, as a Whig, he, Mr. L., would go with. Mr. L. had read here

proceedings of the grand council, the purport of which was,

that no delegate was to be received who did not sustain their State ticket, and members not voting for-Ullman were expelled. Mr. L. commented on these proceedings, pointing out their tyranny. He inquired if in Europe there was any power so despotic? Had anything in this broad land ever been heard of equal to this? Was ever a man called upon and required to say, under oath, whether he did that which the Constitution says he may do; whether he voted against a certain man? And what was the crime of voting for Governor Clark? And yet this society, called American, expelled men for voting for Governor Clark. Was such a society worthy of the name of American? And he would predict that, in twenty-four months, no man will be found who will acknowledge his connection with such a political engine. Who are the men on this executive committee? He would not say it of all, but some of them were men of broken reputation, whose names were on the criminal calendar of New York-men corrupt.

There was another power centered with these nine men, which was, that any five men of these councils may reject or black-ball any applicant. Was this Democratic? But why was this? Why, James W. Barker might lose the power and control he had. This scheme was perfect, and could not be altered in three years. There was no power to alter it. It has been said the councils may instruct these three delegates to overcome the designs of J. W. Barker. But this is not true. The by-laws gave the right of appeal to J. W. Barker from the councils to the grand council. These schemes are perfect; they are not known to the masseshad not been to him, but he had learned them since his arrival in Albany.

"The next was, directing measures to be taken in regard to offending councils. And what was the offense? They had dared to act independently. The grand council had made nominations, and because some dared to exercise their rights as freemen, to go against the nominations-not knowing, perhaps, they had been made-they were to be expelled. If this grand council could do this much, what was there they might not do? He remembered the inquisition-the acts of the Jesuits--but their powers would be as nought compared with this organization. Who knows but the thumb screw-the tortures of the inquisition-might yet be ordained by this New York council? But American power and American freemen will never, he believed, submit to the establishment of this organization.

"The sin was in intentionally taking such an oath, and he considered it one which he ought now to be forgiven. It was a sin against his country. It was like an oath to commit murder. It was a murder of the man's rights. If a man breaks a wicked oath, would the Creator punish

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him for it? No, sir. He was willing to risk his reputation and all else upon it; and so will the one hundred and thirty thousand others, when they will come to have calmly considered this question. He had read an oath published by this association, taken in the third degree, in which men are required to swear they will not divulge the secrets of the society, even before a legal tribunal."

PENNSYLVANIA FAITHFUL TO THE CONSTITUTION.

One word more on another subject—which is to me, and, I believe, to most national men of all parties, a very unpleasant one-and I have done. It is the thing of arraying one portion of the Union against the other-the North against the South, or the South against the North-of making comparisons or distinctions which may lead, and have already led, to unpleasant controversies which are productive of sectional jealousies. I acknowledge that I was much edified by the eloquence of the gentleman from Georgia, [Mr. STEPHENS,] and the gentleman from Ohio, [Mr. CAMPBELL,] a few days since. It was pleasant to hear from those gentlemen of the increasing prosperity of those two great States. May God speed them to still greater prosperity; but we err, in my opinion, in quarreling about the increase of wealth, &c., of one State over the other, in pitting one State, or the great men of one State, against another. Why be jealous of each other? No national man can find a just cause to be so. I do not believe that the people of Pennsylvania care a straw whether the sweet potato crop of Georgia is more valuable than the hay crop of Ohio, or whether more pumpkins are produced in Massachusetts than cabbages in New York; but I do know that they feel a deep and an abiding interest in the preservation of the Union as it is, the Constitution as it is, and that a large majority will cling to it as the true-hearted mariner would to his ship in a storm until the last plank is severed from the hull.

EXECUTION OF UNITED STATES LAWS.

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DEBATE IN THE SENATE,

FRIDAY, February 23, 1855. On motion by Mr. TOUCEY, the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to consider the bill reported by him, from the Committee on the Judiciary, to protect officers and other persons acting under the authority of the United States.

The bill provides that, if a suit be commenced or pending in any State court, against any officer of the United States, or other person, for or on account of any act done under any law of the United States, or under color thereof, or for or on account of any right, authority, claim, or title, set up by such officer, or other person, under any law of the United States, and the defendant shall, at the first term of the State court after the passage of the act, or at the first term of the State court after the suit shall be commenced, file a petition for the removal of the cause for trial into the next circuit court to be held in the district where the suit is pending, or, if there be no circuit court in the district, to the district court invested with the powers of a circuit court next to be held in the district, and offer good and sufficient surety for his entering in that court, on the first day of its session, copies of the process against him, and also for his there appearing and entering special bail in the cause, if special bail was originally requisite therein, it is then to be the duty of the State court to accept the surety, and proceed no further in the cause, and any bail that may have been taken shall be discharged, and the copies being so entered in the United States court, the cause shall there proceed in the same manner as if if it had been brought there by original process. The party removing the cause is not, however, to be allowed to plead or give evidence of any other defense than that arising under a law of the United

States.

Mr. TOUCEY. Mr. President, I do not propose to enter into any discussion of this bill, but merely to state its operation and effect. The bill proposes to apply to this class of cases, arising under the laws of the United States, substantially the provisions of the twelfth section of the judiciary act of 1789. It is designed that where an officer is serving a process under the laws of the United States, and there is resistance to the execution of

Execution of United States Laws-Debate.

that process, if suits are brought against him for the performance of official duty, or against those who are acting under him and by his direction, that his defense may be transferred to the courts of the United States and its validity be there determined. The bill carefully provides that no security shall be lost. It carefully provides that no defense shall be set up in the court of the United States except only the defense that he was acting under the process of the law of the United States. It is a clear case, arising under the Constitution, and the object of the bill is to extend and apply the judicial power of this Government to the protection of the officers of the Government in the discharge of their official duty.

At present this state of things exists: If, under any law of the United States, there be resistance to the execution of process, the marshal and deputy marshal, and those who aid them, are liable to be brought before the State courts in actions demanding heavy damages in every county in a State, and there be liable to just such verdicts and judgments as may be rendered. By the operation of this bill, the validity of the defense in such a case, as it is an action arising under the laws of the United States entirely, upon the service of process, on any act done under the law of the United States, or the authority of the United States, may be decided by the courts of the United States. That is the simple provision of the bill. Application is to be made to the court of the State, and the court of the State is to direct the transfer to be made.

I have myself such confidence in the courts of the several States of this Union that I entertain no doubt whatever that the provisions of this bill will be executed. Its object, as I have said, is, that where an officer of the United States is sued for acts done in carrying out any law of the United States, and his defense depends exclusively upon the existence of that law, and his action is under that law, the decision of his defense shall be transferred to the United States courts. I have no doubt that the State courts entertain such respect for the Constitution of the United States and the

laws passed in pursuance of it, that the provisions of this bill will be promptly and surely executed. I feel the most entire confidence that this will be done, and therefore the Committee on the Judiciary have incorporated into the bill no provision whatever looking to the result of any resistance on the part of a State court. I think it is presented in such a form that no one who acknowledges that this Government has judicial power, and that it is its duty to protect those acting under its laws by the administration of the judicial authority conferred by the Constitution, can take any valid exception to it.

Mr. CHASE. Mr. President, while the Senator from Connecticut was urging the Senate to proceed to the consideration of this bill, the exclamation, "Nigger bill!" proceeding from some Senator-I know not whom-apprised us that the measure to be aoted on belonged to that class which has, by usage here, precedence over all other legislation. The promptness with which the Senate agreed to take it up is but one new proof of that favor with which every proposition supposed to favor the interests of slavery is regarded here, and of that determination with which every such proposition is urged to a final vote, no matter with what prejudice to the public business and the public interests.

It was but yesterday that I presented some petitions of the PEOPLE, praying for such action on this very subject of slavery, as they thought the interests of the country and the principles of the Constitution required. I asked for no debate. I sought no discussion. I asked only for a reference to a select committee, so constituted as to secure for the petitioners a candid and impartial hearing. Was it granted? Did the Senate make haste to show its respect for the great right of petition, and for the numerous and respectable citizens whose wishes I made known? No, sir. Then there was no time. The presentation of the petitions had been too long delayed. But eight days of the session remained. Not even the respect of reference could be extended to them. The petitions of the people were thrust upon the table" to sleep the sleep that knows no waking." Sir, no more time was then occupied by me than

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SENATE.

was necessary in order to state, in the briefest and simplest terms, the contents of the petitions, and the reasons in support of the motion for reference. All that I asked was, that those of us who concur in the general objects, and for the most part, also, in the particular demands of the petitioners, might have an opportunity, without consuming one hour's time, or even ten minutes in this Chamber, of placing upon the records of the country, in an authentic form, our deliberate judgments upon that great question, in regard to which it concerns every section so deeply to understand accurately the true views of every other. Even that was refused, and no reason, except want of time, assigned. To-day, sir, one day later in the session-only seven days remaining now-this bill, reported only six days ago, is forced upon us, against remonstrance and without regard to the condition of business. Why this urgency? Why this relentless determination to coerce the passage of this bill? Why do those Senators, almost, if not altogether, without exception, who voted to lay the petitions of the people on the table, vote now, with equal unanimity, to take up and act upon this bill? Why all this to-day?

Why, sir, the explanation is simple. This bill is framed in the interest of the ruling class. Its object is to secure the stringent execution of the fugitive slave act. Its great purpose is to avoid the effect of recent State legislation to protect the personal liberty of the citizen endangered through the operation or through the abuse of the fugitive slave act.

The Senator from Connecticut tells us that the object of the bill is simply to extend the principle of the twelfth section of the judiciary act of 1789 to other classes of cases than those provided for in that section. That section authorizes the removal, on the application of the defendant, from State courts to Federal courts, of certain suits brought by a citizen against an alien, or by a citizen of one State against a citizen of another. This bill authorizes the removal from State courts to Federal courts of suits of every description, civil or criminal, whether prosecuted by States or individuals, against any person for any act done

under or under color of a law of the United States. The Constitution of the United States secures to aliens and to citizens of States, other than the State of the plaintiff, the right of trial in a court of the United States. No expounder of the Constitution has hitherto asserted the rights of every person sued for an act done under a Federal law, or under color thereof, to such a trial. It is a mistake, therefore, to say that the twelfth section of the judiciary act and this bill are founded upon a common principle.

Why, sir, just think of the consequences of this bill. One man claims title to real estate under a patent of the United States, and enters upon the land and cuts some timber. It happens that somebody else claims a superior title, and sues him for trespass before a justice of the peace. Under this bill the defendant may remove the cause to the circuit court. So if a man engaged in the military service of the United States should maltreat, or even kill, a citizen, claiming that it was done in virtue of Federal law, whether criminally proseuted by the State or sued in a civil action for damages, the defendant could remove the cause into a Federal court and compel the prosecutor, whether State or individual, to submit to Federal jurisdiction. Numberless other cases might be put, by way of illustration, and will doubtless occur to Senators. Assuredly, sir, the Constitution contemplated no such subjection of States and citizens to Federal authority as this.

Sir, this bill is a bill for the overthrow of State rights. It is a bill to establish a great central, consolidated, Federal Government. It is a step, let me say a stride rather, towards despotism.

But it is a natural step. When Congress usurped the power to legislate for the reclamation of fugitive slaves, without constitutional warrant, this further legislation became necessary to the complete humiliation of the States.

Sir, there was once a Senator from South Carolina on this floor too clear sighted not to perceive that the enactment of a fugitive slave act was utterly irreconcilable with that theory of State rights, which he, in common with South Carolina's greatest statesmen, professed to believe in, and too

33D CONG....2D SESS.

noble and ingenuous to deny the inconsistency which he perceived, or to pursue a sectional advantage at the expense of violated theory. That Senator, [Mr. Rhett,] upon this floor, declared the fugitive slave act repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. Here are his words:

"I take up the Constitution, and I find that all it says with respect to fugitive slaves is contained in the second section of the fourth article, and it is a mere quotation in that section. The section begins as follows:

"The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.' "Then follows in the next sentence the qualification with respect to fugitives from justice and fugitive slaves:

A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.'

No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on the claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.'

"Now, these two clauses are exactly similar in purport, except in one particular. In the one case the fugitive criminal is to be delivered up on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he has fled; in the other, the fugitive slave is to be delivered up on claim of the party to whom he belongs. In neither clause is it stated that the fugitive is to be delivered up by the State authorities. Yet it is clear these clauses can refer to no other authority for their enforcement, because no other authority is spoken of. It is an affair between two States. The fugitive is to be delivered up. To be delivered up, he must be seized-he must be in the possession of those who deliver him up. No authority within a State can seize a criminal against the laws of another, but the authority of the State itself to which he has fled. This is the law of nations, and is acknowledged by the act of 1793, with respect to fugitive criminals, but is denied with respect to fugitive slaves. In the former case, the State authorities are to seize and deliver up the fugitive criminal, but in the latter, according to this act, State authorities have nothing to do with the fugitive slave. In the former case, the Constitution is only a treaty stipulation between sovereign States; in the latter, it is a matter of congressional legislation, although Congress is not referred to in either case in the Constitution. Is there any ground, in reason, for this difference of con

struction?

"Let us apply the acknowledged rules of construction I have laid down for ascertaining the meaning of the Constitution. It will not be claimed that Congress possesses the power to legislate on the subject of fugitive slaves as necessary and proper to carry out any expressly granted power.. It is a distinct substantive matter itself, and can contribute in no way to enforce any other grant of power. The power, if it exists at all, must be by special grant, laid down in the Constitution. Now, sir, look at the clauses in the Constitution I have quoted. Is there one word in either of the two clauses referring to fugitive criminals and fugitive slaves, conferring any power on Congress to legislate upon these subjects? No power whatever is given to Congress. Congress is not even mentioned in them. What is the inevitable inference? Why, that Congress has no such power. "This view of the Constitution is confirmed, if we look into the sections immediately preceding and succeeding the section relating to fugitive criminals and fugitive slaves. In both of these sections Congress is given power to act. The first section provides: Full faith and credit shall be given, in each State, to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State, and the Congress may, by general law, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof. And in the third section it is provided that 'the Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the Territory or other property belonging to the United States.'

"Here, then, is this remarkable state of things. Three sections follow each other in the fourth article of the Constitution. The first and the third give to Congress the power to legislate. The second, lying between them, gives Congress no power to legislate. What must be the inevitable inference? Why, that it is the plain meaning of the Constitution that Congress should not have the power to legislate with respect to fugitive criminals and fugitive slaves. To infer that such a power exists under such circumstances, is not only to claim a power without a special grant in the Constitution, but to seize it, although virtually negatived by the special grants.

"And, sir, it is not difficult to perceive why the Constitution withheld all power from Congress to legislate on the subject of fugitive criminals and fugitive slaves, and has left this whole matter to the States for enforcement. The framers of the Constitution knew very well that it was a very delicate matter for citizens, without a State, to attempt to seize any persons within it. Slaveholders knew that there was but one way by which their fugitive slaves could be effectually recovered to them, when entering another State, and that State a free State. The power, the police, the judiciary of the States, must be engaged. The faith and duty of the States must be implicated. Every man in the free States must be bound, as a party to the constitutional compact, to deliver up to him his slave, on his mere 'claim.' This is the great efficient remedy provided in the Constitution for the recovery of fugitive slaves; and the claim being made, it rested with the State or the State authorities to do one of two things-' deliver' up the slave or pay for him."

Sir, the Senator from South Carolina spoke in a spirit worthy of South Carolina. A slaveholder and a defender of slavery, he would neither con

Execution of United States Laws-Debate.

ceal his real opinion nor ask for any advantage for his section or his class at the expense of a violated Constitution. Would that a like spirit had controlled other Senators who have represented State-Rights constituents, and profess State-Rights doctrines. Then we should have had no fugitive slave act. Then this bill would never have been conceived.

The fugitive slave act was a gross impeachment of the honor of the Legislatures and the good faith of the people of the States. This bill is founded on the same distrust and suspicion of State legislation, and the same desire to control it by Federal authority.

Sir, have such or so great benefits flowed to the slave States, from the enactment of the fugitive slave bill, that you think it wise to risk this new experiment upon the Constitution of the country and the patience of the people? Is every suit against every man, who claims to have acted under color of a law of the United States, to be withdrawn from the State tribunal and transferred to the Federal? Such is the language of the bill. Such seems the intent of its framers. But I trust you will not go quite so far. There is scope and verge enough for your experiment without usurping the criminal jurisdiction of the States. Restrict, at least, your bill to civil suits. Do not undertake to arrest the sovereignty of the State when employed in its highest duty of investigating and punishing wrongs done to life or property within its jurisdiction.

The bill will be bad enough when limited as I now suggest. Even then it will leave every civil suit subject to removal-every civil suit against any person acting "under color of law;" against every person, officer or not; against the slavecatcher, or the agent of the slave-catcher. Is not this enough? Is it prudent or profitable to go further? Would it not be wise to restrict the bill yet further? Why not strike out the words

under color of law," and confine the operation of the bill to clear cases of action under a statute of the United States? Why extend the act to all persons claiming to have acted under Federal law? Why not confine it to officers and persons acting in aid of officers?

For sixty-six years the act of 1789 has been upon the statute-book. During all that time nobody has dreamed of such a law as this bill embodies. It is the monstrous birth of a bad time. Sir, the clearest and widest separation possible, under the Constitution, of the sphere of the National from that of the State judiciary, is the true means of peace and harmony. But this bill expresses the very wantonness of contempt for this principle. It is framed as if its express design was to bring on a desperate conflict between the courts of the States, and those of the United States.

Why, sir, who is to decide whether a suit is brought against a defendant for an act done under a law of the United States, or under color of it? Who is to decide? And what if a defendant shall claim a removal, and the State court shall refuse to grant it? What then? Will you submit; or will you resort to another act of Congress for the subjugation of the State court, and for the secure establishment of Federal despotism?

Sir, the end of this road is ruin. But I must close. I intervened, at first, with reluctance; but no other Senator seemed inclined to do so, and I felt that such a bill as this ought not to be taken up without objection, and passed without debate. Oppressed by a severe cold, hardly able to speak at all, and taken entirely by surprise, I have yet felt constrained to use what little capacity of utterance I have in stating the general objections to this bill. I am very sorry that I cannot state them more clearly, or speak more at large. Having performed this duty, I now move to postpone the further consideration of this bill until to-morrow. If that motion be rejected, I must content myself with proposing some amendments to the bill, which, if adopted, will make it less dangerous in practical operation, though they will not divest it of its evil principle, or avert its fatal effect as a precedent for consolidation and despotism.

I move that the further consideration of the bill be postponed until to-morrow.

Mr. TOUCEY. I hope the motion will not be agreed to. It is not proposed to debate the bill. It is so clear upon its face, that it does not require

SENATE.

discussion, unless it be on the part of those who maintain that the law of the United States under which any question might arise, is unconstitutional and void; and they cannot debate it unless they assume the ground that any such law ought to be passed upon finally by the courts of the States. But with those who hold that the Supreme Court of the United States is the highest judicial authority to pass upon the validity of the laws of the United States purporting to be enacted under the Constitution, I think there can be no question as to the propriety of this transfer of the cases. I hope the bill will not be postponed, but that it will be acted upon and passed to-day.

Mr. CHASE. On the question of postponement I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered; and being taken, resulted-yeas 9, nays 26; as follows: YEAS-Messrs. Brainerd, Chase, Fessenden, Gillette, Seward, Sumner, Wade, Walker, and Wilson-9.

NAYS-Messrs. Badger, Bell, Benjamin, Bright, Clay, Dawson, Douglas, Fitzpatrick, Geyer, Gwin, Hunter, Jones of Iowa, Jones of Tennessee, Mallory, Mason, Morton, Pearce, Pratt, Rusk, Shields, Slidell, Thompson of Kentucky, Thoinson of New Jersey, Toucey, Weller, and Wright-26.

So the Senate refused to postpone the further consideration of the bill until to-morrow.

Mr. CHASE. I move to amend the bill by striking out the word "a," where it first occurs, and inserting "any civil," so that the operation of the bill shall be confined to suits of a civil nature, and not extend to criminal prosecutions. If amended as I propose it will read: "that if any civil suit be commenced," &c. Upon this amendment I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. TOUCEY. I think it unnecessary to call for the yeas and nays. There can be no objection to the amendment. This bill was not intended and does not apply to any except civil proceedings. Mr. CHASE. Very well; that removes one doubt; let the amendment be made.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. CHASE. I now move to strike out after "law of the United States," the words "or under color thereof," so that the clause will read: "that if any civil suit be commenced or pending in any State court against any officer of the United States or other person, for or on account of any act done under any law of the United States, or for or on account of any right, authority, claim, or title set up by such officer," &c.

Mr. BENJAMIN. I shall object to that amendment; and whilst I am on the floor, and making my objections to it, I may as well refer the Senate to a precedent on our statute-book, that has been on it for forty years, providing for this precise process in cases arising under the revenue laws. The provision to which I allude is the sixth section of an passed in 1815, and the bill now reported by the Judiciary Committee is a copy of that section, drawn in the precise language of that act. I will read the first few sentences of that law to the Senate, in order that the precise accordance of the two statutes may be perceived at once. In 1815, on the 3d of March, Congress passed a law, "providing further for the collection of duties on imports and tonnage." It imposed certain duties on the officers of the courts of the United States, as well as on revenue officers, and the sixth section of the law is in these words:

"That if any suit or prosecution be commenced in any State court against any collector, naval officer, surveyor, inspector, or any other officer, civil or military, or against any other person, aiding or assisting them, agreeably to the provisions of this act, or under color thereof, for any thing done, or omitted to be done, as an officer of the customs, or for anything done by virtue of this act, or under color thereof, and the defendant shall, at the time of entering his appearance in such court, file a petition," &c.

Then the act goes on to provide for the removal of the cause to the Federal court in the same way as the present bill provides. This mode of proceeding is coeval almost with the history of the legislation of the country. It is absolutely essential for the purpose of taking under the protection of the Constitution the process which issues from the courts of the United States in the execution of the laws of the United States.

Mr. TOUCEY. I wish to say that, in the draft of this bill, the language of other laws has been observed, not only in the instance referred to, but in other instances. The importance of this amend

33D CONG....2D SESS.

ment will be perfectly manifest upon adverting to the fact that when the defense is removed to the courts of the United States, it must be a valid defense under the law as adjudicated by the courts of the United States, or it avails the defendant or defendants in the suit not at all. These words were inserted for the purpose of effectually securing the right, as is usual in such cases, to officers of this Government to transfer their defense to the judicial authorities of this Government, in order that the courts of the United States may uphold the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court, in which we all have confidence. I hope this amendment will not prevail.

Mr. CHASE. Mr. President, the honorable Senator from Louisiana has stated with great clearness the position which he assumes; but I will call his attention to the fact that he is in error as to the agreement between the section of the act of 1815, which he has read, and the section of this bill which I propose to amend. The act of 1815 provides for the transfer of suits or prosecutions commenced against officers, and other persons aiding or assisting them; the whole acts are to be done by the officers of the United States, and persons whom they may lawfully call to their assistance; but such is not the provision of this bill by any means. It goes a great way beyond that. There is an obvious propriety in protecting officers engaged in the execution of revenue laws, while there is no such obvious propriety in attempting to protect from prosecution under State laws every person who seems to have rights under any law of the United States. Suppose a patent is granted to me under the laws of the United States, and somebody chooses to trespass upon my possession; that is an injury done to me under color of a law of the United States. He may claim some right against me under some other law. According to the provisions of this bill, if I commence a suit for that simple trespass against the trespasser in my immediate vicinity before a justice of the peace, that suit may be removed to a circuit court of the United States, and it may become absolutely impossible for me to obtain justice. So of a great many other cases which I might cite by way of illustration, if time and opportunity were permitted. But what I have said is enough to show, and I think to satisfy, the Senator from Louisiana that his argument, derived from the act of 1815, does not apply to the provisions of this bill The amendment which I propose is, therefore, necessary for the protection of the citizen against frivolous, vexatious, and arbitrary prosecutions. I cannot say that I hope it will be agreed to. I have very little hope that any amendment proposed to this bill will be agreed to, beyond that which the Senator from Connecticut has thought fit to accept. But so important do I regard it that I shall ask for the yeas and nays, and submit it to the country upon the vote of the Senate.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. TOUCEY. I will only say, that I am not able to conceive of any case where a patentee could set up a defense under his patent for an act of trespass.

Execution of United States Laws-Debate.

are taken separately, and for the purposes of this proposed act, there may be no connection whatever between an officer of the United States executing process of the courts of the United States, or executing a law of the United States, and a person who may have done the same thing.

In this respect I certainly am forced to agree with the Senator from Ohio, that there is very great non-conformity between the two acts. He has instanced the case of a person who has a patent on which a piracy has been committed. Suppose a suit is brought against the person committing the piracy in the most simple and most economical of the State courts; and the defendant, the pirate against the rights of the patentee, comes forward, and alleges that he did what is complained of under color of a law of the United States, as the bill stands he may file his security and take his case into the district or circuit court of the United States, where it may be actually impossible for the humble individual who sued another in his immediate neighborhood to follow him and obtain a restitution of his rights. It would, in fact, put the most stupendous power in the hands of pirates on the rights of patentees, and it is a most forcible illustration of the effect of the bill. I think I can really see in the provisions of this bill a favorable opportunity offered to those so disposed, and have the ability so to do, to invade the rights of patentees in defiance of all the means patentees can usually command to protect their rights and God knows they have little enough protection now. Their rights under the Constitution are not protected. The provisions of the Constitution can rarely ever be enforced in their favor. We see every day the wealthy and powerful fattening and growing rich on their ingenuity, on their enterprise, and on their inventive genius, and this will throw into the hands of men who do such acts a power which they never dreamed the Congress of the United States would step forward voluntarily to give them.

I have no particular exceptions to take to the provisions of the bill if it shall be made to conform to the act of 1815, and carry out in reality the spirit of the judicial system as manifested in that act; but it seems to me we are about to take a step which will lead us far beyond what has ever before been considered just. I think it would be well for the Senate to make this amendment, or some other which will produce a conformity between this bill and the act of 1815. I think this will do it.

The question being taken by yeas and nays on the amendment, resulted-yeas 11, nays 24; as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. Brainerd, Brown, Chase, Fessenden, Gillette, James, Seward, Sumner, Wade, Walker, and Wilson-11.

NAYS-Messrs. Badger, Benjamin, Clay, Dawson, Douglas, Fitzpatrick, Geyer, Gwin, Hunter, Johnson, Jones of Iowa, Mallory, Mason, Morton, Pearce, Pettit, Pratt, Rusk, Sebastian, Slidell, Thomson of New Jersey, Toucey, Weller, and Wright-24.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. WALKER. I now propose an amend

which I had in view, perhaps even better than the amendment just offered by the Senator from Ohio, which has been rejected. It is to insert after the word "person" the words "acting in aid of such officer.' The first section will then read: "If any civil suit be commenced or pending in any State court against any officer of the United States, or other person acting in aid of such officer, for or think, a conformity between the act of 1815 and on account of," &c. That will bring about, I

this bill.

The amendment was agreed to.

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important legitimate business to occupy all the remaining time of this session. I have not detained the Senate by unnecessary debate; and it was my purpose not to say anything more than was necessary properly to present to the body such measures as my constituents required. But, Mr. President, if this everlasting subject of slavery must be constantly thrust before us to the exclusion of all other important business, and I think I can see that it must, until it shall be ultimately decided, I am the last man to regret it. I have long thought that slavery will be thrust between us and legislative business until it shall be finally settled. Every day, every hour that I remain in this Capitol, satisfies me, more and more, that such must be the result.

Mr. President, if Senators would reflect for a moment on what has transpired since the last session; if they would bear in mind the verdict of the people upon our action, I think some gentle. men here would pause before they agitate this subject again. Here, sir, we find those who call themselves Republicans and Democrats, who profess a regard for the will of the people, coming forward to thwart that will, as expressed in unmistakable language and action. Is not the rebuke which they have received at the hands of the people sufficient to warn some gentlemen of the North that they should stay their hand in this ruthless course of usurpation? But no, sir; that lesson is not enough; it must be repeated. This question must and will be met. Do gentlemen believe that the people of the North are in a spirit and temper further to allow their feelings to be tampered with on this subject? If so, let them proceed; let them go ahead; I am the last man who will regret it. If gentlemen, with their eyes open, in full view of the feelings of the people on this enormous subject, will agitate it, let them do I have sedulously restrained myself during the whole session froin bringing forward any measure at all calculated to excite the minds of the citizens of any section of the country on this or any other subject. I would cultivate "peace and good will towards all men," if they will keep their hands off, and permit me to do so; but I am the last man to shrink from the encounter if it becomes necessary.

so.

What, sir, is the nature of the proposition now before us? There are some Senators who profess a great regard for the rights of the States. I am one of those who have quite as much regard for the rights of the States as some who make louder professions on the subject than I do. I am one of those who, not only when an election is pending, but at all times, believe in the wisdom, the constitutionality, and the propriety of the Virginia resolutions of 1798 and 1799. Í ground myself upon those resolutions; and, standing upon them, I'denounce this bill as a violation, not only of the spirit of those resolutions, but as an attempt to trample upon the rights of the States and deprive them of the power to protect their own citizens from aggression and abuse. Do gentlemen sup. pose that the States, now awakened to a keen sense of their rights and the danger of consolidation, will ever submit to such a bill as this? I tell you nay. You have preached State rights until you have imbued the minds of honest people with the idea that there is something in the cry, whatever you yourselves may think about it.

Mr. TOUCEY. Where the words "circuit court" first occur, I observe there is an omission of the words "of the United States." I move that those words be inserted.

The amendment was agreed to.

have declared that your fugitive act of 1850 is a violation of the Constitution? I tell you, sir, that the idea is becoming universal in the free States, that it is a usurpation, and that you have no constitutional power to pass any such law. Applying