33D CONG....2D SESS.

Sir, rely upon it, practically it would be impossible to carry out such a system. It would be unjust to the bar, because the appeals in such cases would be for smaller sums than to the Supreme Court; and the result would necessarily tend to concentrate the emoluments in the hands of that part of the profession who resided in the place where the local appellate court was held, to the exclusion of practitioners in the States where the district courts are held from whose judgment appeals would be taken. This is one of the defects of the proposed substitute, and one which would be found difficult to obviate in practice as creating a hostile feeling, a feeling of jealousy among different States, and the bars of different States, and operating unjustly upon the members of those bars.

There is yet another objection to the substitute of the honorable Senator from Illinois. It would be absolutely impracticable for many district judges of the United States to perform the duties of both district and circuit judges within their districts, even without sitting in the appellate court. I think the honorable Senators from Massachusetts would tell you that in Boston it could not be done. I am sure the honorable Senators from New York will tell you that, in New York, it would be absolutely impracticable. There the district judge even now, is unable, of himself, to get through with the business of the district court. If you also confer on him the jurisdiction of the circuit court, you could not expect a decision in the first instance, from which an appeal could be taken, until years after the suit was brought. In Pennsylvania the same evil would exist, though in a less degree. It would also apply to the United States courts in Baltimore, in New Orleans, and perhaps in other places. In those quarters of the country, where the large commercial cities exist, it would overwhelm the district courts, or you would have to organize another court of ori- || ginal jurisdiction, if you throw the circuit court duties upon the hands of the district judge, in addition to his own proper duties, and also require him to sit in the appellate court. This objection alone to the system would seem to render it impracticable.

Judicial System-Mr. Bayard.

hans defer too much to his opinions. On the other hand, it might be, that some of them would be restive under the consciousness of inferior power, if they deemed their presiding associate unequal to themselves in knowledge and capacity, yet from his position in the Supreme Court, having the right to revise, and perhaps the power to overrule, their decisions. The reesult would be that in the deliberations of the appellate court, when differences of opinion existed,(which would certainly be the case sometimes, and might occur not unfrequently,) between the Suprem Court, Judge, and a majority of the district judges, they would overrule him in the court below; but they would overrule him with the knowledge, that in the superior tribunal, with predetermined opinions, and his pride of opinion enlisted, their decision would come before him for revision. Suppose such a decision should be reversed by the Supreme Court. Is it in human nature to expect that the judges so overruled would not be apt to defend their own opinion, and the soundness of that opinion, against the decision of the Supreme Court? Have we not all sufficient experience of humanity to know, that though a man may commence on the line of defense, yet where pride of opinion comes in question, he is but too apt to shift his ground, become an aggressor, and question the capacity, if not the motives, of the tribunal by which his decision has been overruled. I ask then, if a court so constituted, would not more probably, (supposing the judges of our district courts to be, as most of them I doubt not are, able men,) produce a state of feeling and consequent criticism, and comment, on the reversal of their decisions, which would tend to undermine public confidence in the Supreme Court, far more than under any other system which could possibly be devised?

Sir, the plan of the honorable Senator from Illinois, from the character of the appellate courts which it proposes to organize, is also open to the objection which I have stated to the present system, on the score of possible bias, in a higher degree, because there is much less probability of a collision of opinion between the Supreme Court Judge and a single judge of a district court, as our circuit courts are now organized, than there would be between the same judge and his associates in a court composed of four or six associates, who were men of intelligence and capacity; and more especially on questions with which they might be more familiar than the judge who, under this rotary system, would preside at distant intervals over their deliberations.

I submit that, if a fatal blow could be struck at the Supreme Court of the United States, it would be done by the organization of such appellate tri

Further, sir, on the question of delay, regard the effect. The Senator from Illinois proposes to have, in each circuit, an appellate court, composed of all the judges of the district courts of the circuit, together with a Judge of the Supreme Court. In each State of this Union, there is at least one United States district judge; in some States there are two such judges. You have from four to five States generally in a circuit. Then, according to this plan, you would have an appellate court composed of from five to seven members. Each judge of the court would have his own proper duties|bunals, with an appeal to the Supreme Court, as pressing upon him, especially in the large cities, to such an extent as to occupy all his time. How frequently would your appellate court adjourn for want of a quorum. An appeal could be taken to this appellate court but once a year, instead of twice a year as to the circuit courts. Owing to the want of a quorum, and the fact that appeals to the appellate court would include all suits within the jurisdiction of the present circuit, as well as district courts, they would probably remain a long time in this intermediate appellate court, and then the decision would not be final. There might be a further appeal to the Supreme Court. Certainly, if this last appeal were denied, or curtailed by increasing the sum requisite to an appeal, the people of the States would not be satisfied to submit to a local tribunal decisions upon questions of magnitude, without giving them the right also of going before the general tribunal of last resort, the highest tribunal of the land. The result, in my belief, would produce increased delay in the disposition of causes, even beyond that which

now exists. * .

Again, sir, what would be the effect of the probable constitution of such a court, upon the character, standing, and weight of the Supreme Court? A Judge of the Supreme Court is to preside in these local appellate courts. You cannot prevent men from feeling the differences in the dignity of their positions. His brethren on the bench would naturally feel, not that he was a better man-for he might be less able-but that he occupied a higher position than themselves, and would per

SENATE.

serve the Supreme Court in the public esteem and confidence, by any other means than the wisdom and learning, and impartiality, which the decisions of that court may exhibit. As long as you select proper men for the bench, and select them from different quarters of the country, the commanding influence of public virtue, of learning, of ability, and of impartiality, will have its due effect upon an intelligent people, and will secure the standing of that court, so that it will retain the appellation which it has heretofore received, "the sheetanchor of the Federal Union."

Are not the Judges of the Supreme Court now overworked? They sit here for more than three months in each year; and in every alternate year they sit for five or six months. Do gentlemen suppose that it is merely by sitting in court for four hours per day, and hearing the arguments of counsel, the judge is enabled to decide the cause? Do they not know that each cause requires investigation, and that, for a due investigation, a judge must not only have the general learning and reading to be acquired only by years of toil; but he must read also for the particular case, and if he means to decide rightly he must examine the leading authorities which are pressed upon his attention. Look, then, to the extent of labor encountered. Are they not continuously in session here, or on the circuits? They can allow themselves no holiday. When they leave this city, are you to give them no relaxation? Do you expect that the human mind, working day after day continuously, not upon the same case, but on the same general subject and same principles, will not become impaired, and give way sooner, and have a less vigorous action, than if a reasonable time were allowed for its relaxation in literary pursuits, or in any other occupation which accorded with the temperament and inclinations of the individual? I presume few Senators doubt that the Judges of our Supreme Court are overworked, and yet with all their work, they are unable to dispose of more than half the cases on their calendar at the single term of the court; even when they sit until the month of March, and adjourn to the 1st of April, and then sit again through April, May, and part of June.. Even with that extent of labor, besides their duties on the circuit, as the business has stood for the last six or seven years, such has been the course of events; and the difficulty will increase, unless we provide some relief.

Can it, Mr. President, be answered that they should dispose of their business more rapidly by curtailing the privilege of being heard 2 Whenever the time shall come that causes in courts of justice of last resort, where great interests and great principles are at stake, are decided without allowing a full hearing to each side, you may denominate it the administration of justice, but it will be but Turkish justice; a decision without a hearing; and of the two, I think the evil is almost, if not quite, as great, to decide without a hearing as to hear without deciding. The latter denies a remedy, the former perpetrates a wrong. The limited in the Supreme Court, in the discussion of causes, is the shortest which the judges felt they could fix, and even that limit in a great variety of cases, in the exercise of their discretion, they are obliged to abandon from the complexity of the cases, the number of questions which arise in their discussion, and the magnitude of the interests involved.,

I repeat the expression of the opinion confidently entertained, that your judges cannot pre

Sir, I hope the time will never come in this country-I am very sure that when it does come ours will no longer be a free country-when the rights of its citizens are finally adjudged without a full hearing, under the affectation of dispatch of business, and the prompt dispensation of justice. I would rather, in reference to the administration of justice, as in reference to the freedom of the press, see some abuse of the privilege, than have the right of the suitor to be heard by his counsel, curtailed to such an extent as to encounter the hazard of arbitrary decisions.

Mr. President, I have consumed more time than I intended or anticipated in this debate, and the views which I have suggested have been expressed in a more desultory manner than I could have wished. My excuse is, indisposition from the commencement of the session, which unfitted me for mental labor and condensation of my thoughts.

336 CONG....2D SESS.

The convictions of my own mind are clear as to the correctness of those views, and my regret is, that I have not the power to enforce them with an ability commensurate with the importance of the measure under discussion.

THE ANNEXATION OF CUBA.

SPEECH OF HON. W. W. BOYCE,
OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
January 15, 1855.

The House being in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union

Mr. BOYCE said: Mr. Chairman, I propose to make some observations on the annexation of Cuba. I consider it the great question in our foreign relations.

A feverish impatience seems to be seizing upon our people for territorial extension. In some quarters the cry is for the Canadas. Upon this point, we have been informed by a leading member from Ohio [Mr. CAMPBELL] that the people upon the northern frontier look with deep feeling to the annexation of the British Provinces of North America. In other quarters the cry is for the Sandwich Islands; some are wishing for another partition of Mexico; others are looking to the regions watered by the mighty Amazon; more are bent upon the acquisition of Cuba, and some have such inordinate stomachs that they are willing to swallow up the entire continent. These are all but various phases of the manifest destiny idea. I must confess, I do not sympathize with this idea. I think our true mission is conservatism, not indefinite extension.

Why do we desire further extension? Do we need any more territory? On the north we lose ourselves upon the verge of eternal snows; on the south we penetrate to the fierce heats of the equator; upon the east and the west we pause only on the beach of the two great oceans of the world. If we apply the instruments we find that the United States are ten times as large as Great Britain, Ireland, and France combined; three times as large as the whole of France, Great Britain, Ireland, Austria, Prussia, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark, nearly equal to the whole of Europe; as large as the Roman Empire when its eagles dominated from the Euphrates to the pillars of Hercules. If it be possible for a nation to have territory enough, we certainly have it, and whatever else we may need, we do not need any more space. If any one were to propose placing the whole of Europe, one of the great divisions of the globe, under a single Government, he would be deemed a madman, yet we realize territorially this idea, and still crave mcre. What a madness!

Do we need any more population? Why, our population is already near thirty millions, and increasing at a velocity so fearful that the boldest must tremble at the future. Our annual increase is a million. If we had the same density of population over our entire surface as in MassachuBetts, our population would be four hundred and twenty millions; and if we increase for the next century in the same ratio we have for the last sixty years, our population will be within a fraction of five hundred millions. What a prospect, and how short a time; for what is a hundred years to a nation; the Roman Empire existed twelve centuries-there are noble families in England who date back the luster of their houses four hundred years. A century to a nation is not more than a year to an individual. When we look beyond the present, and pierce the future, the increase of our population presents a great problem. When the vast surface of our territory shall be in a blaze with the fires of civilization; when the living tides of human beings flowing from the shores of the Atlantic shall be met by the returning tides from the Pacific; when the very gorges of the Alleghanies and the Rocky Mountains shall be full of people; when population shall be pressing upon the means of subsistence, what will become of the Republic, what will be the fate of liberty itself? Instead of desiring more population, we would be most fortunate if we could remain at what we are.

The Annexation of Cuba-Mr. Boyce.

A nation has sufficient population when it is able to protect itself from external force. We have already fully reached this point.

A Republic, a Federal Republic in particular, cannot exist without external pressure. It is the fundamental idea upon which the whole theory rests. Take away the pressure from without, and a Confederacy necessarily goes to pieces. As long as Carthage stood a rival to be dreaded by the Roman people, the Republic flourished in its greatest vigor; but when Carthage was overthrown, the Republic, relieved from external pressure, became the prey of factions; the Gracchi, Sylla, and Marius, Pompey and Cæsar, passed over the stage, convulsing the State with their struggles for power, making it bleed at every pore, and trampling under foot the glory and the liberty of Rome. The history of our own country is instructive on this point. Before the war of 1812, while the State was in dread of English power, sectionalism was unknown. We were one people. Patriotism was an American plant, indigenous to the soil. It grew as well on the bleak hills of New England as in the swamps of the South. Great men and great ideas made our history. But after that war had demonstrated our entire security from external force, sectional ideas and sectional parties arose. Factions usurped the stage. Narrow ideas loomed up into gigantic proportions. The North and the South became two hostile camps; and the gulf of separation has gradually been widening as we advanced in our career of greatness and power.

It is very clear that, do what else we may, we have nothing to gain by annexing more territory, to increase our population by a foreign supply. If we do not need any more territory, or any extraordinary addition of population by acquisition of territory, then the annexation of Cuba cannot be urged on either of these grounds. Then upon what grounds can it be urged? Perhaps it may be urged on the ground that it is necessary to us as a military position to protect our commerce. But I cannot admit this; and, in considering this point, I must assume that it is the settled policy of our Government not to permit Cuba to pass from Spain into the hands of any of the great European Powers. Taking this for granted, I say we have nothing to fear from Cuba. We have strong positions at Key West and Tortugas, which we are now fortifying, and which can be rendered impregnable. Our naval power is infinitely superior to that of Spain; we can effectually command the outlets to the Gulf of Mexico; and the idea of our commerce being in any danger from Cuba, is, I think, without the slightest foundation. Experience is the most conclusive argument on this point. Our commerce never has been disturbed from Cuba; and if we have not been disturbed in the infancy of our power, what have we to fear now in its maturity?

But I go further: so far from the acquisition of Cuba strengthening us in a military point of view, I think it would. be a source of infinite weakness. And if the history of the contests in Europe, between the great Powers, demonstrate any fact, it is that maritime colonies to a nation of secondary naval force are great drawbacks. Where did England strike her great rivals, and Hol land? Not in the heart of their

Ho. OF REPS.

the uncertain tenure of European tolerance. For my own part, I am unwilling to increase the Navy a single gun beyond what is necessary for the service of the country in its present condition. The people are already sufficiently taxed, and the Navy is already, in my opinion, a moth of adequate appetite. The conviction that we cannot acquire Cuba securely without a vast increase of the Navy, is an additional obstacle to my taking any steps in that direction.

But it may be said it will extend our commerce. I admit this. The annexation of Cuba would furnish an increased market for certain agricultural productions of the middle and northwestern States, and the manufactures of the eastern States, and to the extent of this increased trade; and even beyond it, under the preference given to our own vessels in the coasting trade, the shipping interest of the North would be benefited. Under the influence of these several causes, and others which could be presented, I have no doubt the free States would make a great deal of money out of Cuba, if annexed. Though I see the North would reap a golden harvest from Cuba, yet I cannot, however great may be the interest I take in the increase of northern wealth, forego the objections I have to the annexation of Cuba on other grounds. Besides, while I consider the advantage certain great forms of industry at the North would derive from the admission of Cuba, I cannot forget that the admission of Cuba might paralyze the vast slave interest at the South engaged in raising sugar. When I am told that the annexation of Cuba will extend our commerce, I reply—.

First. This mere moneyed motive is outweighed, in my mind, by other more important and more elevated considerations.

Second. That this advantage may be attained, to a considerable extent, by a course of policy short of annexation, by the modification of our own commercial regulations and those of Spain and Cuba. To understand my meaning on this point, I must briefly refer to the nature of our commercial relations with Cuba. The duties on foreign vessels in Cuba is $1 50 per ton; on Spanish vessels, sixty-two and a half cents per ton. The duties on foreign merchandise imported under the Spanish flag, are from seven to nine per cent. less than in foreign vessels, except a few articles paying specific duties, one of which is flour, the duty on which, in favor of the Spanish flag, is from $1 to $150 per barrel.

The United States, in order to coerce a repeal of these regulations, in 1832 passed an act by which Spanish vessels coming from Cuba were required to pay the same rate of duty on tonnage that was levied on American vessels in Cuba. In the same mistaken spirit of retaliation the United States, in 1834, enacted that Spanish vessels coming from Cuba should pay, in the ports of the United States, such further tonnage duty, in addition to the tonnage duty already payable, as should be equivalent to the amount of discriminating duty that would have been imposed on the cargoes imported in the said vessels, if the same had been exported from the port of Havana, in American bottoms; and further, that before such Spanish vessel should be permitted to depart from a port of the United States with a cargo for Cuba, such vessel should pay such further tonnage duty as should be equivalent to the amount of discriminating duty that would be payable for the time being upon the cargo, if imported into the port of Havana in an American vessel. The discriminating duties above alluded to amount to about eight per cent. The result is, that Spanish vessels leaving our ports with cargoes for Cuba, have to pay eight per cent. more than if they imported the same cargoes from any other foreign port. In our anxiety to monopolize the freights we have lost, to a very great extent, the sale of the merchandise. Under the influence of our acts of 1832 and 1834, the imports into Cuba, in Spanish vessels, from the United States, amounted, in 1849, to only Before we determine on the policy of acquiring $11,000, whereas the imports from England for maritime colonies, there is a prior question we the same period, in Spanish vessels, amounted to should consider. It is this: Are we willing to $4,345,300. That this striking difference is mainly pour out indefinite millions to build up such a attributable to our own regulations is obvious, Navy as will enable us to contend with the great from the fact that England stands on no more Powers for the supremacy of the seas? If not, favored footing in reference to the commercial regthen, indeed, would it be a short-sighted policy to ulations of Cuba than the United States, except acquire such colonies, which we would hold by her freedom from our own enactments. For ten

dom but in their extremities, their colonies. The contest now going on between the Allies and Russia, is most instructive on this point. If Russia had isolated maritime possessions, the Allies would wound her severely; but, as it is, she has no such vulnerable points; she is compact, massy, solid; and in vain, with frantic rage, the Allies dash their proud fleets and well appointed armies against her huge bulk.

We are now in the position of Russia, with all her advantages; we are the Russia of the western continent; we have a vast territory; we are compact and invulnerable, defiant of the world in arms. Shall we weaken our position by the acquisition of maritime colonies? That is the question. I think not.

33D CONG....2D SESS.

years preceding 1832, the average of foreign merchandise exported from the United States to Cuba, was $1,563,000; in 1849 the same class of exports amounted only to $276,000, of which only $11,000 was in Spanish vessels. In 1851, the value of cotton goods sent to Cuba from the United States, amounted only to $26,000, while the amount for the same period from Europe was nearly $3,000,000.

It is evident we have greatly affected our com. merce with Cuba by our acts of 1832 and 1834. Let us repeal them at once. It is time to abandon this policy of retaliation. We should further exercise our diplomacy with Spain to get some. modification of her restrictions. Let us seek commercial reciprocity with Cuba instead of annexation. The first, I believe, by judicious conduct, we might attain; the second we cannot but by force. By the first we will attain substantially all the moneyed advantages of annexation, and escape its political objections and dangers.

The whole argument for the annexation of Cuba, in a national point of view, may be summed up in the four propositions I have been considering.

1. More territory. 2. More population.. 3. Military position. 4. More commerce.

The first three have no merit; on the contrary, are full of disadvantages. The last has some merit, but is entirely outweighed by other adverse considerations. I conclude, therefore, on national grounds, that it is inexpedient to annex Cuba.

I propose now to consider the annexation of Cuba as a southern measure; for it is supported by many at the South on this ground; and, unless I greatly deceive myself, I hope to be able to show that it would be, under existing circumstances, a most perilous measure to the South.

How could the annexation of Cuba benefit the South? To answer this question understandingly, I would refer to the case of Texas. How did the annexation of Texas benefit the South? for I admit it did so greatly. The entire advantages to the South from the annexation of Texas, may be comprehensively stated in two propositions. First, it furnished a wilderness where the people of the South could go and improve their conditions. Second, it furnished a stable political community, reliable upon the slavery issue. Would Cuba fulfill these requisites? I think not; clearly not the first; because Cuba is an old settled country, settled before any part of the United States. It was discovered by the great Columbus himself, and has been the favorite seat of Spanish power for centuries. It is not only civilized, but populous; the population is variously estimated from one million two hundred thousand to one million five hundred thousand, and that on an area the size of the State of Tennessee. In order to realize a graphic idea of the extent and population of Cuba, we have only to imagine Tennessee with a range of mountains running longitudinally from east to west, instead of across, and with a population of one million two hundred thousand to one million five hundred thousand, instead of her present population of one million two thousand seven hundred and seventeen. The mere statement of the case in this light, is sufficient to show that emigrants would go on a wild goose chase if they went to Cuba expecting to get lands for nothing. Our people would stand a better chance to get such lands in Tennessee. The lands in Cuba must necessarily, to a very great extent, be in the hands of private holders, and our people moving to Cuba would have to buy lands at the prices of an old community. Cuba, therefore, could not fulfill the requisite of a wilderness to which southern men might go to get lands at nominal rates.

-Would Cuba be a stable political community, or, in other words, competent to self-government? 1 doubt it. Self-government involves two considerations-the race, and the training. There is only one race of people in modern times who have shown the capability of self-government, that is the Anglo-Saxon race, the race to which we belong; and with us it is still, in some degree, an experiment. But whatever question there may be as to other races, there can be but one opinion as to the incompetency of the Spanish race. At no time, and under no circumstances, have they been

The Annexation of Cuba-Mr. Boyce.

able to preserve republican institutions. The Spanish-American Republics, whose populations are of the same race and grade as the whites of Cuba, have become the by-word of history; every step in their insane career has been the melancholy blot and blur of free institutions. The Spanish Creole race of Cuba are the worst kind of materials with which to build up republican institutions. What has their political training been-the worst imaginable. They have always lived under the sternest despotism. For the last thirty years in particular, they have lived under martial law. They have had no political privileges, and are utterly ignorant of the machinery of free institutions. The touching picture which Tacitus draws of the Roman State under the tyranny of Tiberius, is the condition of Cuba. "Men," he says, were afraid of knowing each other; society was at a pause; relations, friends, and strangers stood at gaze; no public meetings, no private confidence; things inanimate had ears, and roofs and walls were deemed informers." What could we

expect from suddenly investing such a people with self-government, but a disastrous failure? But it may be said that our own people would go in upon annexation, and control the Cubans. But I do not think the American emigration would be large; at the South it would not, because agricultural emigrants never go in large numbers to an old country; from the North the emigration would be mostly commercial men for temporary sojourns. Whilst the emigration from the United States would not be large, its influence would be greatly weakened by the prejudice of the Creoles to our people, the prejudice of race and religion, which is intense in Cuba. If Cuba were annexed, and a slave State, but proved incompetent to self-government, she would not only be no benefit to the South, but a great calamity. If we are met at the threshold with this difficulty, we might, perhaps, forbear to go further, considering this as conclusive. But I shall pass on.

The next question is, would Cuba be a reliable slave community-that is, would slavery be likely to continue there?

In order to determine this question, we must consider the nature of the population and institutions of Cuba.

I shall put down the population at the lowest estimate, one million two hundred thousand. Of these, two hundred thousand are free negroes. I pause involuntarily at this startling fact; it is worthy to be pondered on by southern men. This army of free negroes are not such free negroes as ours are. Our free negroes are American free negroes, dwarfed by being in contrast with the greatest white race on the globe, the Anglo-Saxon race. There is a vast interval with us between the two races. The free negroes of Cuba are Spanish free negroes, elevated relatively by being in contrast with an inferior white race. There is no abrupt separation between the two races; they approximate and assimilate. Everything is relative in this world. When Gulliver was among the Lilliputians, he towered above them like a huge Titan. He could put whole armies in his pockets; take fleets with no weapons but his spectacles; when he ate a hearty dinner the corn market was excited; when he turned over, Government securities fell. But when he got among the Brobdinags, he was as harmless as an insect; he was the toy of children; he liked to have been drowned in a bowl of milk; a monkey took him on the top of a house, and frightened him out of his wits; the young princess used to put him in her bosom, like a little bird, very much to his alarm, however, for it would have been certain death to him, if he had fallen from this pernicious height. Thus we can understand the difference between the free negroes of Cuba and our own free negroes.. Of course there are, among the white race in Cuba, many individual exceptions, which stand out in bold relief from the free negro race; but the remark I make is, nevertheless, true in reference to the Creole masses.

To illustrate my meaning more fully, I take it, that the Creole masses are about equal to the Mexican masses; between the Mexican niasses and their free negroes, is no abrupt line of demarkation-the same state of things exists in Cuba. The free negro race stand, in a great degree, upon an equality with the Creole masses

Ho. OF REPS.

neither have any political privileges. This equality, which I have been dwelling upon, between the races, is fostered by the Spanish Government, as a great political idea, to check any tendencies on the part of the Creoles to revolution. In pursuance of this policy, in some instances, the free negroes have had special and exclusive advantages of schools; marriages between the two classes have been encouraged; and, what is a more striking fact still, free negroes have been enrolled in the army, taught, the use of arms, and instructed in military tactics, while the Creoles have been regularly excluded from the army. From these various considerations, I cannot but consider the free negro element in Cuba as most dangerous, and not augering well for the institution of slavery. there. Two hundred thousand Spanish free negroes. They strike me more like two hundred / thousand half-lit torches, which a single flash may light up, and set the whole island in a flame at any moment. When I remember that it was this same free negro race, under the workings of Spanish and French ideas, which upturned the entire social fabric in St. Domingo, and wreaked such infinite slaughter on the white race, my apprehensions from this source are not, by any means, diminished. Twenty thousand Spanish troops preserve the peace of Cuba now; but under different circumstances, and in the absence of a standing army, would the whites of Cuba be safe? They would, I think, be sleeping over a volcano.

The next element in the population of Cuba is the slaves: there are four hundred thousand of them. These slaves are not christianized, humanized, or civilized, to the same extent as our slaves. A large portion of them have been imported from Africa, and are still half savage. They cannot be relied upon for fidelity and loyalty to anything like the same extent as our slaves. Such are the slaves of Cuba.

I would now refer briefly to some of the slave regulations of Cuba. By the laws of Cuba every slave has the right, on complaint of ill usage, once every year, to hunt a purchaser, and his master is bound to permit him to be absent for a sufficient time for that purpose. When the slave finds a purchaser his master is obliged to sell him, not at his own price, but in case of disagreement between the master and purchaser, at a price to be fixed by a certain public functionary. The slave who can change his master when he pleases is hardly a slave; he is almost free. In populous portions of Europe the free laborer has no other privilege of freedom than the right to change his employer. Not only has the slave a right to change his master, but he has the right to buy himself; and not only the whole of himself, but any part of himself, the one fourth, or one third, or one half of himself; if he buys one fourth of himself, then for three months every year he is free to work for himself and do as he pleases. Every mother, before a child is born, has the right, on paying twenty-five dollars, to have the child declared free. These facts are full of meaning, and they show how the Spanish Government keeps the African idea impending over Cuba, like a portentous cloud, which she flashes up at intervals to retain dominion by the terror of its lurid glares.

There is another consideration on this branch of the case to which I would allude: the slaves brought into Cuba since 1820. Spain, by treaty of September 23, 1817, in consideration of £400,000 paid by England, engaged that the slave trade should be abolished throughout the Spanish do- . minions from the 30th May, 1820. By the ordinance of the King of Spain, of December, 1817, it is directed, that every African imported into any of the colonies of Spain, in violation of the treaty with England, shall be declared free. By the treaty between Great Britain and Spain, of June 28, 1835, for the purpose of "rendering the means for abolishing the traffic in slaves more effectual,' the slave trade is again declared to be totally abolished. Yet, in spite of the treaties and ordinance of the King of Spain, Africans, in vast numbers, have been imported into Cuba. One writer whom I have consulted, puts down the number of these Africans, who are called Bozal negroes, now in the island, at two thirds of the entire number of slaves. He says they abound in the rural districts, and may be easily recognized by their lan

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guage and the marks of the tattoo. An intelligent Cuban has lately informed me that nearly all the slaves in Cuba are Africans imported since 1820, and their descendants; that, until recently, it was estimated the entire slave population died out every ten years. Now, I wish to ask what would be the condition of this class, if Cuba were annexed, and they brought, without any modification of their condition by any supreme authority intermediate between the Spanish Power and our own, under the influence of the law of our Federal Government? This very question has already been decided by our courts. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the celebrated case of the Amistad, 15 Peters, 593, sustaining the decision of the circuit court, hold that "these negroes were unlawfully transported to Cuba, in violation of the laws and treaties of Spain, and the most solemn edicts and declarations of that Government. By those laws, and treaties, and edicts, the African slave trade is utterly abolished; the dealing in that trade is deemed a heinous crime, and the negroes thereby introduced into the dominion of Spain are declared to be free." If Cuba were directly annexed from Spain, without an intermediate state of separate independence in which a new fundamental law could be passed, great difficulties might arise on this point from the efforts of the Abolitionists.

The next item in the population is the white race. This is estimated at six hundred thousand, of which a small proportion are European Spaniards, the residue are Creoles-about equal, as a class, to the people of Mexico. Now, can these people be relied upon to preserve slavery? The country being an old settled country, there would be, as I have already said, no great tide of emigration from the South; the comparatively few southern men who would go there, would be counterbalanced by an equal and adverse emigration from the North. The continuance of slavery would, therefore, depend on the Creoles of Cuba. I would consider this bad security. Slavery is never secure, where the masters are an inferior white race. "There is, too, a marked tendency in the Spanish Creole race to emancipation. This is owing to several causes.

1st. The equality of the two races. They assimilate without difficulty; there is no gulf between them. The philosophy of African slavery consists in the superiority of the white race; where this superiority is wanting, there is no basis for the institution to rest upon, and it crumbles like a house without a foundation.

2d. The tendency of the Spanish democratic idea is to ultraism; they carry liberty to the extreme of anarchy. Every Spanish revolution is a socialistic revolution.

3d. Their inability to govern themselves produces bloody struggles, the leaders in which seek the aid of the slaves. Hence it has resulted, that the Spanish American colonies, who have set up for themselves, though under Spain they were slave communities, have all gone into emancipation. Have we any right to expect anything more from the Creoles of Cuba, than the Creoles of Central America? I think not.

From the rapid summary thus taken of the population and institutions of Cuba, I doubt whether Cuba would be reliable upon the slavery issue. Looking at the question of annexation in all its bearings, I doubt exceedingly whether it would be to the interest of the South to annex Cuba now, if it could be done without money or blood. But no one has any idea that Cuba can be thus easily acquired at the present time.

There are only three modes by which Cuba could be acquired, viz: 1. By purchase. 2. By war. 3. By treaty with Cuba as an indepenent Power.

The first method is impracticable, because Spain will not sell. The recent debate in the Spanish Cortez sets that point at rest. I go further, not only Spain will not sell, but no Spanish administration would dare to sell. The announcement of such a treaty would revolutionize Spain, and the Ministry who would have the temerity to sign a treaty so humiliating to the pride of the nation, would be torn to pieces by the infuriated mob. And hence I have always looked upon the mission of Mr. Soulé for this purpose, as a sterile idea, fruitless in itself, and unfortunate, from his European birth, in the agent selected. But, supposing

The Annexation of Cuba-Mr. Boyce.

this difficulty overcome, the price would be so enormous-$150,000,000 or $200,000,000-that I would not be willing to give it. I look upon the advantages to the South as too precarious to give so much money, especially when I see that the necessary effect of such an expenditure, would be to fasten a high tariff upon us indefinitely. There is no practical measure within the scope of Government power, from which the South would derive so vast a benefit, as from the reduction of the tariff to the lowest revenue standard. I should be very unwilling to abandon this great practical measure of deliverance to the South, for the uncertain hazards of annexation.

As to the second mode, war, I say nothing of the shocking injustice of wresting from a feeble Power, without provocation, her most valuable possession. I have no doubt we could succeed in this way, but at great cost of money, and men. The Spanish troops would make some resistance, the climate more. I cannot forget, too, that a large portion of the treasure expended would be wrung from the hard earnings of the southern people, and much of the blood shed would be the best blood of the South; for our system of taxation is unequal; and this being looked upon as a southern measure, the gallant young men of the South would volunteer with alacrity. But of all modes which could be devised for the acquisition of Cuba, for the benefit of the South, war is the most fatal. For no one who has any knowledge of the Spanish character, its pride, obstinacy, and revenge, can for a moment image that Spain would stop at any steps to blast the acquisition in our hands. The policy of Spain is obvious: she would cling to Cuba with the tenacity of a dying convulsion, and when she could hold on no longer, she would decree universal emancipation. But, it may be said, we would reverse this state of things in our territory of Cuba. But, just at this juncture, the people of the North, who have the control of the Federal Government, would, by a unanimous voice, bid us stay our hands; that non-intervention was their doctrine; that, by the Spanish law, there were no slaves in Cuba. The result would be, that the South, after all her sacrifices, would have acquired a free negro colony, the greatest curse imaginable. This result would be very amusing to the Abolitionists, but not to me. I have, therefore, no idea of blindly traveling a road which leads nowhere but over a precipice.

Another motive which makes me still more determined not to go to war with Spain for Cuba, is, that we of the South are upon the eve of a great struggle with a hostile majority of the North, and we will need all our resources, not to make foreign conquests, but to defend the very ground upon which we stand. I am, therefore, unwilling to weaken our resources, or complicate our position by an attack on Cuba; others, who hear only the songs of peace in the future, may take a different

course.

Cuba

As to the third mode, treaty with Cuba, this implies that Cuba has thown off the Spanish yoke, and established independence. If it were desirable to acquire Cuba, this seems to me to be the only mode it could be done beneficially to the South. By this mode we would escape the agitation of the slavery question in the territorial condition of Cuba. The question would be in a nut-shell, annexation or no annexation? The Wilmot proviso might precede and prevent annexation, it could not succeed annexation and mar it. would have organized her institutions. We would be enabled to judge, with some degree of confidence, as to her capability for self-government, and her reliability upon the slavery issue. We would know what we were getting, and run less risk of getting what we did not want. We would have gotten rid of the embarrassing questions arising out of the treaties, ordinances, and decrees of Spain. And then, nationally speaking, she would cost us nothing, neither men nor money.

It may be supposed, from these considerations, that I favor fillibustering. Not so. An impassable gulf intervenes between me and this policyduty. I cannot interfere with the domestic institutions of other people, for I wish other people not to interfere with the domestic institutions of our people. On the other hand, I cannot shut my eyes to the inevitable future. I see the world is in a transition state, and I feel that the independence

HO. OF REPS.

of Cuba is only a question of time. The final decision of this great question of annexation belongs appropriately to the future. I say, take no step now in that direction; wait and watch the course of events, and profit by them. I do not wish to shackle the ultimate action of the country. When the future rolls round, and Cuba emerges independent from its bosom, when the fruit is ripe, then let this great question be decided under the light of all the surrounding circumstances. I might stop here, but several hypothetical cases must be disposed of to manifest myself truly.

It may be said, suppose England or France seize Cuba, what then? There are some things socimprobable they need hardly be considered, and this is one. After England and France are done with Russia, they will not be in a mood to disturb anybody, much less will they want to jar on the United States. But neither England nor France want Cuba; in their hands it would be necessarily a free negro colony, and, therefore, worthless; but if either of them should want it, their mutual jealousy would prevent either from taking it. But if, in violation of all possibility, they should make the attempt, I say at once I would draw the sword and drive them into the sea.

Again, it may be said, suppose Spain refuses to satisfy our claims against her, what then? My answer is direct. I would not mingle up these claims with the question of Cuba. I would act towards Spain with extreme forbearance, for she is weak and we are strong. The truest greatness consists in great ideas. I would exhibit the country in this light towards Spain. I would act towards her with generosity and magnanimity. I would urge our claims in the most respectful manner. If, after a reasonable time, they were still disregarded, I would propose arbitration. If this failed, then, after assuring myself that our claims were well founded, and after sufficient and final notice, I would send out a fleet of steamers, seize some Spanish ships, pay the claims, and give a receipt in full.

But, it may be said, suppose Spain should attempt to Africanize Cuba, what then? For my part, I am clear that our Government should use every possible means to prevent this. I would stop at nothing, not even war. There is, however, an old saying, and a true one, that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. I would act upon this maxim. I would remove the causes leading Spain to this course. They are two-the fear of our designs upon Cuba, and the pressure of England. Let us take such a line of conduct as will remove the first cause; the Russians are removing the second cause, in which operation our Government could coöperate efficiently, by encouraging Spain. That, in my opinion, is the true line of our diplomacy. It is the interest of Spain to preserve slavery in Cuba-her interest and our policy concur We would be bunglers, indeed, if, under such circumstances, we could not produce the desired resuit. The policy of the South is not so much to have more slaves, as to have more people interested in slavery. Spain is so interested; we should let her continue thus.

I am glad to be able to fortify my opinions upon this subject by the authority of Mr. Calhoun. As late as May, 1848, he said, in his speech upon the "proposed occupation of Yucatan:"

"So long as Cuba remains in the hands of Spain, a friendly Power-a Power of which we have no dread-it should continue to be, as it has been, the policy of all Administrations ever since I have been connected with the Government, to let Cuba remain there."

I assume what he says as an axiom. I deduce from it a corollary, that we are not to buy Cuba, or go to war for it; because, if our policy is for Cuba to remain with Spain, it is against our policy to change that possession, with or without the consent of Spain.

This disposes of every mode of acquisition, except by treaty with Cuba as an independent Power. This is, from its very nature, a question for the future. When the contingency arises, then, and not till then, we should render a definite judgment.

Mr. Chairman, the acquisition of Cuba will open a new volume in our history. Former acquisitions were the necessities of location, or of circumstance. This is not. By this step we are fairly launched in the career of conquest, from

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which there is no outlet but to storm the future, sword in hand. From this career we have nothing to hope, and everything to fear; for our greatest success would be our greatest disaster.

The history of nations has been the history of their imaginations. The pomp of power, the thirst for dominion, the glare of glory, have been the empty baubles for which they have exhausted their energies, and slaughtered each other. There have been the dim lights by which poor humanity has hitherto advanced. Who can estimate the infinite miseries, the multitudinous slaughters, these barren vanities have entailed upon the human race. The book of time is bloody on every page with the horrid recital. Shall we learn nothing from it? Shall the past turn its sorrowing features upon us in vain? Shall we be insensible to the tears and agonies of history? or shall we furnish another instance of stupendous folly by embarking in the same insane career? I trust not. I trust we shall turn with aversion from the deceitful seductions of false glory, and be instructed by the disasters of universal humanity.

We may extend our dominion over the whole continent, our navies may ride triumphant on every sea, our name may be the terror of Kings, our decrees the destinies of nations, but be assured it will be at the price of our free institutions. I know not how it may be with others, but for my own part, I would not pay this price for all the power and all the glory that ever clustered around all the banners and all the eagles emblazoned in the pantheon of history.

Let us turn from the line of vulgar conquerors to the fathers of the Republic; let us learn from them, that the truest patriotism is the preservation of our institutions, the truest wisdom is moderation. In short, let our history be not the history of our imagination, but the history of our common sense. By this course we may not vaunt so many statues, so many triumphal arches, so many trophies of victory, and boundless dominion, but we shall have what is more glorious than these, we shall have our institutions preserved; we shall have the conquests of peace; the mighty march of civilization; christianity working out, unimpeded, her Divine mission; these will be our statues; these our triumphal arches; these the trophies of our victories; and they will be such as no nation before us have ever had.

THE NATURALIZATION LAWS-POLICY OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH.

SPEECH OF HON. W. R. SMITH,
OF ALABAMA,

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
January 15, 1855.

The House being in the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Unior.

Mr. SMITH, of Alabama, said:

Mr. CHAIRMAN: Propositions have been already made in this Hall, and at the other end of the Capitol, to repeal or modify the naturalization laws. That question is assuming proportions of considerable magnitude. In fact, sir, it is becoming the great question of the age. The time has come when American legislators will be forced, by the voice of the people, to take a stand upon this subject; and before this question, which in itself embodies the grand idea of American nationality, all mere party organizations will have to give way and retire.

Intimately connected with the advent of this question is the rise and progress of a new order of men, whose name and designation, up to this period, is as yet unknown, but whose existence, however shadowy and mysterious, is a fixed fact; and whose power in this country, for good or evil, has made itself felt from one end of the Union to the other.

Against this party the vituperations of the press have been leveled. Many of our honorable friends here have entered into the discussion of the subjects arising upon it with intense excitement. They behold in this new order nothing that is good, but some shadowy giant-some fabulous Hercules-some raw head and bloody bones-some mysterious destroyer-some lion, endowed with

voracious appetite, going about seeking whom it may devour. For my part, I have not been able to discover any of these dangers; I feel none of these apprehensions; and it is my purpose, on this occasion, to inquire into the existence of these dangers and apprehensions.

Sir, who compose this new party? So far as the public know, and so far as we all know, and so far as it is admitted, the party consists of native Americans, not aboriginals, not exactly cannibals, but free-born American citizens. And how can an American behold in an organization of his own countrymen such extravagant terrors? Who will say that an association of native Americans is less worthy of confidence than an association of mixed Americans and foreigners?

I assume that the admitted elements of this organization, being native American, absolutely exclude the idea that, as a party, they can have anything at heart but the glory, honor, and welfare of the country. And what do they propose to do? With all their dangerous appearance, their mysterious organization; with all their test oaths of secresy, as alleged, what do they propose to do? They have but one simple proposition to submit to the country, and that is, the purification of the ballot-box. That idea embodies the whole doctrine of the organization of this party. In order to bring about that result, what do they propose to do? They propose to exclude unnaturalized foreigners from the ballot-box, and to check immigration, by wholesome laws for that purpose. That is the utmost extent to which they propose to go.

Intimately connected, however, with this question, is one of a very delicate character--the question of Catholicism in this country. It is said that it is the policy of this new party to exclude Catholics from office. I have no doubt that such a policy is a part of their faith, not only because of their Catholic faith, but because the Roman Catholic Church in this country is so intimately connected with foreign influence in all its branches, that it is impossible to separate the two-and they have to take the whole or exclude the whole.

I do not pretend that I have, upon this occasion, any well arranged plan in reference to the repeal or modification of the naturalization laws. I have, however, some distinct propositions to make, which are radical in their character. I propose to strike at the root of the evil. I do not bring forward my proposition in the form of a bill, because nobody can suppose that this Congress will favor this reformation. It cannot be expected that an Administration which is so distinctly committed in favor. of foreigners and foreign influence as this, should take the back track. I do not suppose that during the present session of Congress any bill of the kind will receive any serious attention. I will lay before the committee, however, the propositions which must, in the main, meet the desire of the Native American party; but I do not wish to commit any person but myself for these propositions.

In the first place, it is well known that we now have no law by which a foreigner can be excluded. If there is any law requiring a foreigner to bring a passport, it is so loosely administered as to amount to nothing. Foreigners can come by millions, and there is nobody to exclude them, or to say nay. Is there any other country upon the face of the earth, properly organized, that admits an influx of foreigners without any restriction whatever? None.

RADICAL PROPOSITIONS.

I make this, then, my first proposition, that no emigrant should be allowed to leave the ship in which he comes until, upon his solemn oath, he renounces his allegiance to all foreign Powers, and until he swears that it is his bona fide intention to become an inhabitant of the United States. The necessity of this requisition shall be made known to him by the captain of the ship before he takes passage, and his passport shall contain in its face this requisition.

A word, sir, upon this proposition. I stated that we had no law, and no clause of a law, by

and who is to remain. Suppose, sir, that England, France, or Russia, or any other Government have a desire and an intention to make war upon the United States. In the absence of the law to which I refer, before any act of hostility should be committed, they could land upon our shores in merchant ships, in the form of emigrants any number of soldiers, from one hundred to a million. How easy would it be for the Czar to send one hundred thousand Russians to this country as emigrants. One hundred thousand immigrants arriving in New York in a month would create no excitement. Their promenading Broadway would not so swell the tide of that immense population as to be perceivable. They could go and equip themselves with American rifles, furnish themselves with American powder, and American bullets, and go in American cars to any portion of the country, and be ready at any time, to exhibit themselves as an armed force, in the heart of the country. This may never occur, but we know that the landing of an army in an enemy's country, in case of war, is a most important matter, and our laws enable an enemy to flood the country with his soldiers in the form of emigrants. I ask now, of American statesmen, if this thing ought to exist? Will any man say that it is his duty to live alone for this present day. Will any statesman say his duty stops with this hour? Will any statesman say he lives alone for his own age and his own generation? There may be no danger now, but we should look ahead, far into the future, and for that future supply, at this day, the lamentable deficiencies of our laws.

My second proposition, connected with the first, is, that no immigrant shall be allowed to land until he produces a passport from the proper authority of the United States, resident in the country from which the immigrant comes; which passport shall contain upon its face the requirements which I have read.

Now, sir, if there is any law requiring immigrants to bring passports to this country, it is so loosely executed as to amount to nothing.

My third proposition is: our consuls, and such other officers as may be appointed for such purpose, shall be instructed to give passports to no persons except those who are of sound health both in mind and body, of good character for sobriety and honesty; and upon satisfactory proof of the applicant that he has never been convicted for any crime; and the consul shall refuse passports to all notoriously rebellious and seditious persons, and to all persons, who, in their opinion, shall be liable to become a charge upon any of the United States as paupers. I will not pause to enforce this proposition with argument. The necessity of it must be palpable to every American statesman.*

My fourth proposition is as radical as all the rest. I would provide that the naturalization laws shall be so repealed and modified as to prevent all foreigners from voting who shall not have become naturalized, or who shall not have taken steps to

*The following letter from the Mayor of New York to the President, will illustrate what I have said about felons and paupers :

MAYOR'S OFFICE, NEW YORK, January 2, 1855. His Excellency, Franklin Pierce,

President of the United States: DEAR SIR: There can be no doubt that, for many years, this port has been made a sort of penal colony for felons and paupers, by the local authorities of several of the continental European nations. The desperate character of a portion of the people arriving here from those countries, together with the increase of crime and misery among that class of our population, with other facts before us, prove, conclusively, that such is the case.

It is unnecessary to refer to the gross wrong thus perpetrated upon this city. It requires from me no allusion to the jeopardy of our lives and property from this cause. Men who, by a long career of crime and destitution, have learned to recognize no laws, either civil or natural, cannot fail to produce feelings of terror at their approach.

The inherent right of every community to protect itself from dangers arising from such emigration, cannot be questioned. New York has submitted to it long enough. The disease and pauperism arriving here, almost daily, from abroad, is, of itself, a sufficient evil; but when to it is added crime, we must be permitted to remonstrate. We ask the interference of the General Government, as it is its duty to protect us from foreign aggression with ball and cannon,

land, France, and Russia, and all Governments in the East require every man who puts his foot upon their shores, to exhibit a passport. Thereby they can regulate immigration, and say who is to come,

ious and destructive, though coming in another form.

I call your attention to this subject, hoping it will receive from you that action which its very great importance to the whole country demands.