Heneage Finch, second son of the Earl of Nottingham, whose father, Serjeant Finch, was Recorder of London, and his uncle Lord Keeper in the reign of Charles I., had a hereditary claim to reverence as a lawyer. For his eloquence he was called "the silvertongued," as the great earl his father had been styled the English Roscius, and charged by Burnet (the reproach could not be levelled against himself) with being too eloquent on the Bench, in the House of Lords, and in common conversation. Born in 1649, a gentleman commoner of Christ Church, he was chosen solicitor-general to Charles II., January 1667, when only twenty-nine, but removed by James in April 1686. The circumstance of his being the Chancellor's son will account, still more than the gift of hereditary eloquence, for this rapid preferment. We learn from an amusing story in Roger North how general was the suspicion of undue influence. He speaks of Lord Nottingham's son, Heneage, as a famous orator in Chancery practice, and tells of one Ambrose Philips, a sharp hand in the court, treating for the Leicestershire estate of the Duke of Buckingham, and contriving to use the name of Mr. Heneage Finch in the treaty. It was told the duke that, if he let Mr. Finch have the purchase at an easy rate, it would be taken as a respect by the Chancellor, and turn to account in his causes, of which there were not a few between his grace and his creditors. He abated £2000 of the purchase money; but, when he found out that he had been imposed upon, and that the Chancellor's son was not the real purchaser, he filed a bill to recover the additional £2000, and had a decree in his favour. His early rank as a law officer of the Crown became

d North's Lives.

eventually a subject of regret to Mr. Finch, as it involved him in those legal prosecutions, which ensanguined the close of the reign of Charles II. In summing up the charge against Lord William Russell, he evinced, however, a courteous spirit, that set off, in graceful contrast to the fury of Jeffries and the technicalities of Sawyer, his elegant and polished oratory.

"As to the killing of the king, I am apt to think that was below the honour of the prisoner at the bar, but this is equal treason; if they design only to bring the king into their power till he had consented to such things as should be moved in parliament, it is equally treason, as if they had agreed directly to assassinate him. But the last objection (which I see there has been a great many persons of honour and quality called to prove,) is, that it is not likely my Lord Russell should be guilty of any thing of this kind, being a man of that honour and virtue, and so little blameable in his whole conversation. I do confess, gentlemen, this is a thing that hath weight in it. But consider, on the other hand, my Lord Russell is but a man, and hath his human frailties about him. Men fall by several temptations; some out of revenge, some by malice, fall into such offences as these are. My Lord Russell is not of that temper, and, therefore, it may be, these are not the ingredients here. But, gentlemen, there is another great and dangerous temptation that attends people in his circumstances, whether it be pride or ambition, or the cruel snare of popularity, the being cried up as a patron of liberty. This hath been a dangerous temptation to many, and many persons of virtue have fallen into it, and it is the only way to tempt persons of virtue, and the devil 'Phillipps' State Trials, vol. ii.

knew it; for he that tempted the pattern of virtue, shewed him all the kingdoms of the world, and said, "All these will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me!' Though he be a person of virtue, yet it does not follow, but his virtue may have some weak point in it; and I am afraid these temptations have prevailed upon my Lord."

Mr. Phillipps' characterises his speech as able and not unfair, and arrives at the sound conclusion, "that the trial of Lord Russell, defective as it undoubtedly was, and inconsistent with the practice and principles now happily established, was yet one of the least exceptionable of the state trials of that period."

In the prosecution of Algernon Sidney, Mr. Finch betrayed those arbitrary principles, subversive of all rational freedom, which had tainted the prerogative lawyers of the time. The doctrines in Sidney's written papers, which the Solicitor-General insisted on as principally manifesting the design of destroying the king, were the following, "That the king derives all his power from the people; that it is originally in the people; that the measure of subjection must be adjudged by the parliament, and if the king does fall from doing his duty, he must expect that the people will exact it, and" added the crown lawyer, "this is the more dangerous conspiracy in this man, by how much the more it is rooted in him, and how deep it is you hear, when a man shall write, as his principle, that it is lawful to depose kings if they break their trust, and that the revolt of the whole nation cannot be called rebellion."g

In the apology which Algernon Sidney left on the scaffold, he complains bitterly of his judges: "None State Trials, vol. xi.

State Trials, vol. ii.

but such as they would have suffered Mr. Solicitor, by a long painted speech to have misrepresented the evidence on both sides, to mislead the jury, to have represented Lord Howard's frequent attestations to God that he knew of no plot, believed that there was none, and took that which was spoken of as an invention of priests only, as willingness to confess it, and his many perjuries as a mark of the truth of what he had sworn, and by such constructions as were absurd, impossible, and false, to drive them headlong into a verdict, upon no evidence, in matters of which they were utterly incapable of judging.”

Notwithstanding his too ductile compliance with the behests of an arbitrary court, the young solicitor fared no better at the hands of the brutal Jeffries than, his less subservient rivals at the Bar. The following scene from a celebrated trial in the reign of James II., that of Lady Ivy, shows the readiness, with which the Chief Justice acted the part of an angry pedagogue, and of the mutual discredit with which the dignity of the Bench and the independence of the Bar emerged from these forensic controversies.h

"Solicitor-General.-We have here the husband's oath concerning this matter, that this woman, who now takes upon her to swear these forgeries and things, told him she could have £500, if she would swear against my Lady Ivy.

Lord Chief Justice. Is that evidence against the wife?

Solicitor-General. He is now dead it seems, but here is his oath.

Lord Chief Justice. Pray consider with yourself, could the husband have been a witness against the State Trials, vol. xii.

wife about what she told him upon an information for that offence of subornation?

Solicitor-General. No, my Lord, I think not. Lord Chief Justice. Could the wife be an evidence against the husband for the forgery?

Solicitor-General. No, my Lord, she could not; and yet she swears it upon him here.

Lord Chief Justice. That is not against him, man! he is out of the case; but against my Lady Ivy: and how can the oath of the husband be evidence here?

Solicitor-General. Suppose, my Lord, that both husband and wife were both as evidence against my Lady Ivy, were that good?

Lord Chief Justice. Certainly, that were very good.

Solicitor-General. Why then, my Lord, one of them says, that she saw such and such things done by Lady Ivy, and by him for her; and the other says such things were not done, but she confessed she could have £500 to swear they were done; shall not this evidence be admitted to contradict the other?

Lord Chief Justice. Why, good Lord! gentlemen, is the philosophy of this so witty that it need be confidently urged? Is it good logic, that, because they both were good witnesses against my Lady Ivy, therefore either of them is a good witness against the other? Shall the husband's oath be read against the wife to fix a crime upon her? Sure you do not intend this shall pass for argument, but to spend time.-Nay, be not angry, Mr. Solicitor, for if you be, we cannot help that neither. The law is the law for you, as well as

me.

Solicitor-General. My Lord, I must take the rule from you now.