a general action. And for these purposes swiftness and facility of locomotion under all circumstances are most essential conditions.

In support of this theory of rapid and desultory operations, the following remarks, made to the Committee by M. Maistiat, are of great interest, for they determine the nature of the vessels available for these purposes, and especially adapted to harass this country.

The perfection of a ship of war would evidently be to unite great force of armament, with great swiftness of motion, and great stores for a cruise but in the present state of nautical science, it is impossible to combine these three elements, in the highest degree, since each of these requires such an amount of space and tonnage as to be incompatible with the others. I even think that it would be to the disadvantage of France if this problem could be solved, because in that case England would retain all her relative superiority in the means of maritime warfare. Instead, therefore, of attempting to combine these three elements in the highest degree, would it not be better to aim either at the maximum of force or the maximum of velocity in our vessels? We should then have some vessels, 1st., with a maximum of force and all the velocity which could be combined with it, and 2dly, other vessels with a maximum of velocity, as well armed as they could be without prejudice to their swiftness. Such, in my opinion, ought the naval constructions of France to be. On the one hand, a maximum of force is indispensable to engage with success an enemy's ship within broadside range, though an enemy of a superior velocity has nothing to fear even from a stronger vessel from which he can escape. A maximum of velocity, therefore, enables a weaker vessel to brave the superior force of the enemy. Force is of use only in presence of an enemy powerfully armed; velocity enables you to harass and escape his armaments. Velocity is, therefore, the natural weapon against an enemy better armed and more vulnerable on different points. It is the natural and indispensable weapon of the party weakest in resources, least powerful at sea, and most daring by national character (?) It is, therefore, the natural weapon of France.

In another point of view our geographical position recommends the same selection of the means of maritime warfare. Let us suppose a war breaking out with England in the Mediterranean, or elsewhere, for it would equally be fought out in the Mediterranean. Suppose a fleet at Toulon which can put to sea, a fleet specially composed of vessels of first-rate power, but with only so much auxiliary steampower as is necessary to manoeuvre in action or to conquer the imperious difficulties of navigation. England must keep her eyes on such a fleet, and must therefore maintain a large share of her maritime resources in the Mediterranean. Her vessels would be far from their stores of coal; our vessels would be near our own. Hence the increased British convoy of supply would be more than ever obliged to pass the Straits of Gibraltar, and to pass our western coasts, and

afterwards between the coasts of southern France and of Algiers. Suppose then a few of our vessels of great velocity laying wait in our Atlantic or Algerine ports! England would be obliged to convoy her supplies on the whole length of passage; and to establish a complete system of defence though not a French cruiser were in sight. If these convoys are in sailing vessels (which they must be as steamers only carry the coal they consume), they will be exposed to continual surprises. They must, therefore, be defended by swift steamers; and France will be enabled to keep up this incessant system of alarm by having recourse only to these inexpensive principles in the structure of her vessels.' (Vol. i. p. 167.)

But

M.

Hence (the extreme avidity with which the Committee adopted the plan for the creation of a general steam fleet; which would be extremely formidable if it were as easy to launch an entire squadron of vessels as it is to create them in a parliamentary report or a government estimate. although the whole tendency of the opinions of the Commission was in favour of this increase of the fleet in steam frigates and smaller vessels, we find, from the evidence, that very considerable alterations and additions would be required in the whole existing navy to bring it at all near the views of the Commission and the intentions of the Government. Collas gives us a complete estimate of these transformations. For the line-of-battle ships now afloat he reckons the alterations in the hull and the purchase of machinery at 720,000 francs each, which, with the addition of the cost of machinery for the 'Austerlitz,' the 'Jean Bart,' and the Turenne,' would expend about ten millions of francs on this point only. But although the French have 38 frigates afloat, only one of them, the 'Pomone,' has been fitted with an auxiliary screw; and there are at present no vessels in the French fleet of the character of our new screw steam frigates the Arrogant' and the Imperieuse.' Consequently, to effect the change recommended by the Commission, no less than 19 frigates, and at least as many lighter vessels, must be transformed or built, and fitted with steam power. The expense of the frigates alone would be no less than thirty millions of francs. Of the proposed corvettes 8 only exist which can be fitted for steam; 4 others might be adapted for the screw, being now on the slips. But the 36 swift steam corvettes are all to be built; and at the lowest computation they would cost 28,440,000 francs. The sum required, therefore, for the first outlay to bring the fleet up to its normal strength is not much short of four millions sterling. Again, the constitution of the fleet as recommended by the Commission would require in the next ten years the construction of

marine engines to the enormous amount of 36,000 horse power, computed at the rate of 5,425 horse power yearly for the first four years, and 2,383 horse power yearly for the last six years; and this, in addition to what is required for the maintenance of the existing fleet. It is evident that such an amount of production would involve an amount of expenditure and mechanical resources superadded to the present charges of the French dockyards, which could only be accomplished by efforts of a very extraordinary character, if at all. With regard to the present establishments of France for the construction of steam machinery in the ports, it is in evidence that Toulon has the means of executing all repairs, but no more, that Rochefort can produce new steam machinery to the amount of 650 horse power per annum, Lorient 500, Brest 650, and Cherbourg 300 —in all, 2,100 horse power. At the present moment the only work in hand in the machinery department of Cherbourg is a pair of screw engines of 200 horse power. Indret, however, the steam establishment in the Loire, two leagues from Nantes, is capable of far greater production; and it is said that 4000 horse power per annum might be constructed there. The present French Government has just added 500 pairs of hands to the workmen employed there. But the Loire at Indret is not ten feet deep, and this important factory has been placed in a position where no large vessels whatever can be completed. The Commission therefore recommended the suppression of Indret altogether, and the transfer of the principal steam workshops to the dockyards and arsenals, especially to Brest, Toulon, and Cherbourg. It is asserted by M. Collas that the private yards of M. Cavè at Paris, M. Schneider at Creusot, M. Benet at La Ciotat, Perrhugues at Toulon, and Mazeline at Havre, could alone suffice to supply the navy with all the steam machinery it requires. But this statement must be taken with considerable abatement, for none of these establishments, except perhaps M. Cavè's, have yet produced machinery of the size and power required for the larger vessels of the navy, and they all have to contend against enormous duties on the metals, and even on coal, which act as a powerful check on the fabrication of machinery in France. It may be added, that the number of slips and dry docks now existing in the French arsenals is so small that these operations could only be carried on very gradually"; whilst the private and public establishments

*The total number of cales de construction, or slips for building frigates and corvettes in all the arsenals of France, is but 25; and of these 9 are at Lorient, a port which is of no use for any other pur

for the construction of powerful marine steam engines in France are still so limited that it would be impossible to obtain this immense quantity of machinery at a short notice without giving large orders abroad, and this resource would be cut off in time of war. To these considerations must be added the important fact, that France has no private or mercantile steam fleet of any importance. The small Mediterranean packets are wholly unfit for military service; the communications with foreign countries are almost entirely kept up by foreign packets; France has no mail packets to America, Australia, or the West Indies, and her own coasting trade is not carried on by steam. Even her rivers are not navigable by steamers of large burden.

Supposing, however, the number of frigates in the French fleet to be fixed at forty-five or fifty, all being eventually provided with steam power, the attention of the Commission were next directed to the mode in which such a force could be most effectually distributed. On this subject all the members of the Commission seem to have concurred in the opinion, that it was desirable to have at all times a large number of frigates so dispersed over the globe, that on the first arrival of news of a declaration of war, they could instantly pounce with the greatest effect on the trading vessels of England. Admiral Hernoux said that the only use of frigates henceforth was to harass the 'commerce of the enemy, especially in the Indian seas.' M. Collas, the Secretary of the Commission, proposed a scheme expressly adapted in time of peace, to prepare for the moment when all the possessions of England might be attacked at ' once, and especially her trade at the outset of the war. To strike the trade of England is to compel her to make peace. England possesses at this moment the maritime commerce of 'the world with Europe; to ruin this commerce everywhere at once, and so to oblige England to maintain peace from the 'dread of immense disasters, is the object of my plan.'

6

Admiral Lainè added that, although the frigates sent for 'this purpose to India might be in jeopardy, yet that was no 'reason to forego harassing the commerce of the enemy, espe'cially as they might give support to the native population 'whenever it was disposed to revolt against England. Another member suggested that a blow might be struck with great effect at Aden. The same weapons might be employed, it was argued, with equal effect on our trade up channel, and to keep our coasts in constant alarm.

pose, as it has only 17 feet water on the bar. There are, however, 40 slips for line-of-battle ships, which might be used for vessels of a smaller class.

One of the most competent witnesses examined by the Committee was M. Normand, a private shipbuilder at Havre, who said:

-:

'If I may express an opinion on the maritime warfare to be waged by France, I should say that she can only carry on a guerre de course in the Channel and in distant seas. For the Channel we want swift vessels, with screw-propellers and a light draught of water, capable of running into our ports on every part of the coast. They should be real birds of prey, able to fall upon the enemy's vessels where they chose to attack them, and to escape with certainty when they are compelled to retire. Such vessels, which it is not very easy to construct to perfection, ought to be studied and tried in time of peace, and they might be used with advantage to protect the fisheries or to convey the mails. For our distant cruisers we want very large frigates, swift sailers, with an auxiliary screw to enable them to manœuvre in calms or in action. They ought to carry, besides their coal, large supplies of stores, and a heavy armament. We ought also to have avisos, the swiftest that can be built, like the British vessel, the Banshee," which has done fifteen or sixteen knots an hour. But we have nothing beyond twelve knots and a half.'

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Perhaps M. Normand expressed the opinion of a builder particularly interested in the construction of vessels of this class. But his evidence on the relative excellence of English and French machinery is of great weight.

Q. You think, then, that English machinery is superior to ours? A. It is superior in every respect, both in the adaptation of the whole and in the proportion of its parts; superior in design, and superior in execution. I think nothing has been made in our workshops so perfect, for example, as the machines of Mr. Penn or Mr. Miller. Living in a country where an enormous deal is done for the home trade and for abroad, encouraged by the British Admiralty, which deals liberally when it gives these orders, they have made the most perfect machines that exist.'

One of the causes of this marked inferiority is, no doubt, the excessive price of iron in France. Iron plate, such as is used in the construction of vessels, costs just twice as much in France as in England, and the consequence is that the French have not a single iron steamer in the port of Havre engaged in the packet trade to the Channel ports. Another difficulty, with which the whole French marine has to contend, both in trade and in war, is the fact that scarcely any of the French ports on the ocean, except Brest, will admit vessels of the first class; and on this ground the scheme of the transatlantic packets has again been postponed, because it would be necessary to deepen and enlarge the ports at which vessels of such dimensions would arrive.

But on this point of the French harbours, the very ports