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and it comes to pass that she finds no favor in his eyes, or he dislikes her, because he has found some uncleanness in her, i. e. somewhat that is odious to him, though it may not be to another; then it shall not be in his power to turn her out of doors, without any more ado, but let him write her a bill of divorcement: (i. e. an instrument or writing, whereby he makes known to her, and all others, that for some weighty reasons to himself he puts her away, as being no longer his wife,) and give it into her hand, and so send her out of his house; having furnished her with what was fitting and requisite.

This interpretation places thé law in the light of a protection, instead of a condemnation, of the wife; and gives the bill of divorcement the character of a letter recommendatory, instead of a stigma; and the condition of providing the wife with all necesaries, which seems to have been the practice and a requisite condition, or obligation on the part of the husband, corresponds with that view of its meaning. The circumstance of the prohibition of her re-marriage with her first husband, in case of her divorce from her second, or his death, because as to the first she was defiled, negatives the supposition, that adultery was the ground of the first divorce; for it is a necessary implication, that at the time of her first divorce, and that of her second marriage, she was not a defiled woman, which could not possibly be intended if adultery was the ground of her first divorce. The intended putting away of Mary by Joseph privily, was for the preservation of her character, which could not have been done if adultery was held to be the sole cause of divorce. From all these considerations it seems to be clear, that dislike from some personál cause, and not adultery, was the ground, on which the law required the bill of divorcement; and that it was rather a condition of restraint imposed on the husband, than the grant of a privilege to him: it restrained him from putting her away on other terms, as probably they had been in the habit of doing.

If such is the true construction of the law, it is not allowable to suppose our Saviour's exposition to be wholly inconsistent with it, which it must be, if adultery was interpreted by him to be the ground, and only ground, of divorce. The word fornication must therefore necessarily have another meaning, and a meaning consonant to the language of the law, viz. what in Hebrew was meant by the matter of nakedness," or in Greek by άoxμv πράγμα, οι Ρύσις.

It does not appear that the word Ilopveía is elsewhere used to signify what is meant by the last above word, i. e. an involuntary indecency, or pollution: but the sense in the other place seems to be to denote a voluntary crime, such as whoredom, lasciviousness, and, figuratively, idolatry, by the daughters of Israel; and

unless the interpretation can be so extended, it seems impossible to. reconcile the law, and our Lord's interpretation of it. Nor can the propriety of the term fornication be maintained in the latter, if it meant adultery, since it is descriptive of a distinct crime, viz. the sexual commerce between unmarried persons; a crime of a very different dye from that of adultery; the latter was accordingly a capital offence; the other, not so. (See further observations as to this in the note at the end, p. 15.) But whatever may be the true construction of our Lord's exposition, it was a commentary on the law of Moses, and not the promulgation of a new law; that law was binding on the children of Israel, and on them only, its exposition therefore could not extend it further. Our Lord was addressing the Jews, and not the Heathen world, to whom he had not then opened his commission. His exposition, in the 19th of St. Matthew, leaves no doubt that he did not mean to extend the law, or practice of divorce, but to restrain it within the original lenity of the law; nay, he expresses his disapprobation of it as a deviation from the original law of God pronounced on the creation; and apologises for it, as being a dispensation allowed on account of the hardness of the hearts, or perverseness and obstinacy of the temper of the Jews, and as a prevention of greater probable evils; such as murder, if the practice of the putting away their wives were suddenly put a stop to.

If then the law was not binding on any but the Jews, what possible ground can there be for extending it to the Christian world? Can it be believed that our Lord would abrogate, or exempt them from, the original law of God, then remaining as to them in full force? To suppose this to have been his intent, would be to admit the possibility of an inconsistency in his conduct; for such it must undeniably have been, wholly to repeal God's original law (which the universal allowance of divorce would amount to) emanating from perfect wisdom, and granting that dispensation to the Heathen world without a reason, which was granted to the Jews for a particular reason of necessity, or policy applicable to them alone.

If, therefore, these observations are not fraught with error, the undeniable conclusion must be, that Divorce, even for adultery, has not the warrant of scripture; but that marriage, as a spiritual vow and contract, is indissoluble.

The language of St. Paul, is an indisputable confirmation of the above conclusion; he says, "And unto the married I command, yet not 1, but the Lord, let not the wife depart from her husband: but and if she depart, let her remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband: and let not the husband put away his wife."

1 Cor. vii. 10,.11.

It is to be observed, that our Saviour's discourses were addressed to the Jews living under the law; St. Paul's epistle was addressed to the Corinthians, a Gentile nation, not under the law; this will account for the difference of the doctrine of each from that of the other, and explain why the excepted case was allowed by our Lord, and why St. Paul, who states himself to be speaking the command of God himself, absolutely and without any exception or qualification, prohibits the husband from putting away his wife; this is repeated in the 39th verse: "The wife is bound by the law, as long as her husband liveth, but if her husband be dead, she is at liberty to be married to whom she will." When St. Paul treats of the case of marriages of Christians with infidels, he expressly declares, that, in the conduct he recommends, he speaks not by divine authority, but from his own judgment only. He advises them not to leave their husbands, or wives, so long as the latter would live with them; but if they would depart, they were to be allowed so to do, for in such cases a brother, or sister, (i. e. Christians) were not under bondage.

It appears that the question, whether the marriage-bond was dissolved by adultery, and a divorce for that cause capacitated the parties to marry again? was the subject of a variety of opinions in the earlier Christian ages. Origen says, that in his time some Bishops gave permission to the parties to marry again, who were under their government. It was the subject of discussion in several councils, but the Latin Church always taught that the bond of marriage subsists notwithstanding the most legal divorce, and the council of Trent pronounced an anathema against all who should say the Church erred in teaching that doctrine; our church has continued to hold it, as is evident, not only from the ceremonial of marriage in the liturgy, but the law and practice of the Ecclesiastical courts, which grant no further relief in cases of adultery, than a separation à mensa et thoro; and adjudge it à vinculo matrimonii, only for canonical causes of impediment, such as consanguinity, &c. pre-existent to the marriage, and considered to vitiate or invalidate it ab initio; and the common law holds the marriage-bond to be indissoluble, and nothing short of the power of Parliament can release the parties from its obligation as a civil contract; as a spiritual one, it is out of the reach of human power.

1 Cor. vii. 12, 13, 15.

NOTES OR ADDENDA.

On the subject of divorce, in his sermon on the mount, our Saviour expresses himself in the following terms, viz.

"It has been said, whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a bill of divorcement.'

As these are not the words of the law of Deuteronomy, it is manifest that our Lord refers to the then prevailing construction of the law, and practice upon it, which allowed an unlimited power of putting away a wife, only giving her a bill of divorcement.

In the doctrine our Lord lays down, he corrects the error by stating, that there was but one allowable cause under the law, of putting away a wife, viz. that which he denominates fornication, which must be understood to be synonimous with the word translated uncleanness, used in Deuteronomy, i. e. both words. must have been intended to be descriptive of the same offence, or cause of putting away.

"But I say unto you, that whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever shall marry her that is so divorced committeth adultery."

It is clear that the term fornication signified something else than, and quite distinct from, adultery; if it meant that crime, why should not the latter word have been made use of? That it was not accidentally or indiscriminately used, is evident from the similar distinct application of it in the 19th chapter.

As the putting away for any other cause than fornication caused the woman to commit adultery, it is a necessary inference that if put away for that cause, she would not by a second marriage commit adultery. But if fornication meant adultery, she had already committed that crime, which on that construction becomes a title to a privilege or exemption, instead of a subject of punishment. The guilty woman put away could marry a second husband; the innocent woman put away could not, without subjecting herself to capital punishment for adultery. Is it possible to support such a construction? What then was the meaning of the term fornication, in the sense in which it was then used?

Some light may be possibly drawn from the comparative view of the following passage in the 22nd of Deuteronomy, 13th and following verses, with the law in the 24th chapter:

"If any man take a wife, and go in unto her, and hate her, and give occasion of speech against her, and bring up an evil name upon her, and say, I took the woman, and when I came to her I found her not a maid”.

On referring to the 24th chap. it will appear, that there is such a correspondence in the terms, in which the case put in each of the passages is described, as almost to induce a necessary supposition, that both refer to circumstances of a similar nature. The words in the 24th Deut. are,

"When a manhath taken a wife, and married her, and it come to pass, that she find no favor in his eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness in her, then let him write her a bill, &c."

Do not the words, " when a man hath taken a wife and married her," exactly tally with the words, "If any man take a wife, and go in unto her?" the latter expression implying marriage by consummation, and the former implying consummation by marriage.

Do not again the words," and it cone to pass, that she find no favor in his eyes," in the one passage, equally tally with the words, and hateher," in the other?

Again, in the alleged cause of dislike, there is the same resem blance or coincidence; the variance consisting in the specification, in the one case, of what is comprehended in or denoted by a single term in the other.

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In the 19th, the allegation of the husband is, I took the woman, and when I came to her I found her not a maid." In the 24th, the words are; "because he hath found some uncleanness in her."

The not being found a maid, necessarily implies uncleanness, or impurity. It appears by the margin of the bible, that the word translated into "uncleanness," literally signifies "matter of nakedness," it may therefore be material to examine whether that expression, and the word uncleanness, are convertible terms, i. e. that each of them conveys neither more or less, than the exact sense of the other. It is obvious, that the expression, " matter of nakedness," is figurative; and the sense or meaning of it can only be fixed by that in which it is elsewhere used in the Pentateuch; any ulterior use of it would rather tend to mislead, than assist in ascertaining its true construction.

A perusal of the 18th and 20th chapters of Leviticus, will enable us to fix the sense of it almost beyond all doubt.

In both chapters it is used to signify, carnal intercourse between a man and woman, whether lawful, or unlawful, as it constituted marriage, (of which it does not appear that there was then any ceremonial, and of which it is at this day a constituent part.) It is throughout the 18th chap. put for marriage, in the several degrees of kindred and cases in which it is prohibited: the word marriage is not once mentioned, although there can be no doubt but it was that which was meant to be prohibited. That the meaning of the expression was distinct, from that of the word