when impressed upon cotton or woollen goods; for the property in a trade mark consists in the exclusive right to the use of that mark as applied to some particular manufacture." This gives us the true doctrine to which we have before alluded. Then there must be an intention on the part of the person adopting a name already in use to impose on the public. "Imposition on the public," said the Lord Chancellor, continuing his judgment in the American Cloth case, "is indeed necessary for the plaintiff's title, but in this way only, that it is the test of the invasion by the defendant of the plaintiff's right of property; for there is no injury done to the plaintiff if the mark used by the defendant be not such as may be mistaken, or is likely to be mistaken by the public for the mark of the plaintiff." In Macandrew v. Bassett (10 L. T. Rep. N. S. 65) Wood, V. C. inquiring whether the plaintiffs in that case had acquired a right to a trade mark, by that quantum of user in the market, from the cir cumstances mentioned? said "This, to some extent, but, as I think, when one investigates it, not to any very serious extent, would seem to raise the question of how far the particular character of this right which now, after the Lord Chancellor's judgment, I must call property, is to be carried? The expression has been used by many judges (but I was not the first to use it), that the right to a trade mark is not property, but is the right of the plaintiff, who comes here for assistance, to protect himself against fraud by others using that which he has appropriated as designating his goods, and so palming off upon the public goods made by them, as goods made by him. Whether this is to be called property or not, really seems to me to be a question of nomenclature. But I say that when the Court has used the expression it is not property,' it has meant that it is not like copyright property in this sense, that a man cannot say, 'I have invented a particular name;' he must show over and above that that he has applied that name to his goods, and that by selling the plaintiff's goods with his designation in the market, the defendant is imitating the plaintiff's goods, and palming off the plaintiff's goods as his own. I find no difference with the Lord Chancellor's views in that respect. Whether it is property or not is not material."

Thus we must consider that to entitle the owner of the name of a newspaper or a particular mark upon a marketable commodity to the equitable relief of the Court of Chancery against another using the same name or mark, it must clearly appear, in the first place, that the publication is similar to that of the plaintiff, or that the commodity is of the same description; and in the second place the adoption of the name or mark must result, or be reasonably likely to result, in imposition on the public.

Inconvenience by reason of similarity is no ground of relief.

DEEDS EXECUTED BY INSOLVENT DEBTORS.

OUR attention has been directed to a passage in an article which we published last week, entitled "Landlords and Bankrupt Tenants," in which it was stated that it might be taken that an unstamped executed deed is useless for any purpose. The writer certainly overlooked the recent case of Ponsford v. Walton (18 L. T. Rep. N. S.; 37 L. J. 113, C. P.), decided last January by the Common Pleas (Bovill, C. J., Byles and Montague Smith, JJ.), which, quantum valeat, decided that such a deed, being a constructive fraud upon creditors, might, to use the words of Bovill C. J., found a valid act of bankruptcy. It may be well to examine the grounds of this decision, and, in the first place, we will point out that, supposing that the decision be not overruled, its effect is limited to the single purpose of proving an act of bankruptcy. The case, as counsel for the plaintiff stated in argument, is very distinguishable from Hodgson v. Wightman, and Pritchard v. Timothy, referred to in our previous article, in each of which it was sought to enforce rights under the deed as an operating deed. Then as to the grounds of the decision, Bovill, C. J., said, "It seems to me that at common law the deed operated on its execution as a valid deed to transfer the debtor's property, and was sufficient, therefore, to found a valid act of bankruptcy." Byles, J., said, "We should disturb what has been settled for more than fifty years if we held that a deed of assignment of all the debtor's property to the

trustees for the benefit of the creditors, was not an act of bankruptcy." "It was said that it was only an escrow until registered, but it seems by the evidence that it was acted on, and by the defendant himself." Montague Smith, J., speaking of the necessity for the deed to be stamped, said "That depends on the effect of the deed, and the purpose for which it was used. It seems to me that it was rightly received in evidence because it was not put in by the plaintiff for the purpose of claiming under it, or of showing it to be a valid deed, but of showing that there had been what amounts to a constructive fraud according to the decisions; that is that the deed was one which the law does not sanction, and is only valid when the forms of the Bankruptcy Act have been complied with." Now it is observable that the deed here referred to was a deed of assignment, so that we may put out of consideration deeds of arrangement and composition where there is no assignment, and with respect to these the remark made in our article of last week holds good, that if not stamped they are useless for any purpose. Beyond this we should be very slow to proceed, because we are immediately brought into direct conflict with Ponsford v. Walton, which was decided by three very able judges, yet it is somewhat remarkable that Willes, J., left the court immediately before judgment was delivered. Some suggestions, however, do occur to us. We would ask whether a deed of assignment to trustees for the benefit of creditors is fraudulent per se immediately upon its execution by the debtor notwithstanding there exist the intention to render it a valid deed under the Bankruptcy Act 1861? If A. executes such a deed tomorrow may a creditor at any time between to-morrow, and twenty-eight days, supposing that time to be taken for registration, found upon the deed a valid act of bankruptcy? Bovill, C. J., says in his judgment, "It has been argued that, until it was signed, and the twenty-eight days had expired, it was to be considered only in the nature of an escrow. Had that" he adds, "been made out in point of fact, there might have been some ground for the defendant's argument; but the opinion of the jury on that point should have been taken; that was not done, and besides there were no facts to warrant such a finding by the jury." From this we may assuredly conclude that if no intention can be shown to have existed to make the deed merely an escrow, the execution of the deed by the debtor may be proved against him as an act of bankruptcy before he has an opportunity of obeying the requirements of the Bankruptcy Act. This indeed was the argument used in the case of Selby v. Graves, where Ponsford v. Walton was cited in support of the proposition that there was an act of bankruptcy the moment the deed was executed. And Willes, J., apparently accepted the proposition, for he said that it would be inconsistent that looking at the 129th section of the Act of 1849, the landlord should be in another position than he would ruptcy at the date of the deed. have been, if there had been an act of bank

We assume, therefore, that the position must be accepted. The execution of a deed of assignneither stamped nor registered may be given in ment is an act of bankruptcy, and although evidence, sections 194 and 195 of the Bankruptcy Act 1861, notwithstanding.

THE LAW AND RELIGIOUS SECTS.

A CORRESPONDENT of a contemporary attempts to establish the proposition that every sect which is not proscribed by law is an established church or sect according to law. That is to say, it is not upon a level with trades unions who, as the law is at present regarded, cannot put the law in force for their protection against fraud. Such a sect, says this writer, can put in motion the criminal courts against those who steal its goods, or disturb its public celebrations, or defame its ministers, or outrage the religious feelings of its members by overt blasphemy; and it can put in motion the civil courts against the enemies from without, or the false brethren from within, whose malpractices against the good estate of the communion are of a kind over which the former courts have no jurisdiction at all, or none that is exclusive. It is not what is called a state establishment; but it is just as much established as if it enjoyed (according to the Erastians) or suffered (according to the

Voluntaries) the bond of connection with the Government, or, as the phrase goes, the State. The new SOLICITOR-GENERAL for Ireland is cited in support of the above propositions, and also Burn's Ecclesiastical Law and Merivale's Cases in Chancery. In the former (vol. ii., "Dissenters," pp. 209-20), and in the latter (vol. ii., Attorney-General v. Pearson, pp. 375-420) the following passages are cited, with approval, from the judgments of the great lawyers who sat at the hearing below, or in the House of Lords, of the once celebrated case of Evans v. The Chamberlain of London, in error; and upon whose advice the Lords Spiritual and Temporal of that high appellate court acted, in reversing (July 5, 1762), the judgment of the Court of Hustings, upon which the error was brought.

The passages thus alluded to are worth quotation here. They run as follows:

FOSTER, J.: I shall found my opinion upon the Toleration and Corporation Acts. I shall consider the Corporation Act in the light of a prohibition to the electors. It was considered in that light in the case of Mayor of Guildford v. Clarke. the whole spirit and frame of it-the Act of ToleBut I am clearly of this opinion; from ration is not to be considered merely as an Act of connivance and exemption from former laws. It might be legal, and that they might be entitled to was made that the public worship of Dissenters the public protection. Upon different occasions in the Act the religious worship of the Dissenters is spoken of as a mode of worship tolerated by the Act. This clearly shows that the mode of worship among the Dissenters is legal and authorised by law.

Lord MANSFIELD said:

There never was a single instance, from the Saxon times down to our own, in which a man was ever punished for erroneous opinions concerning rites or modes of worship, but upon some positive law. The common law of England, which is only common reason or usage, knows of no prosecution for mere opinions. For atheism, blasphemy, and reviling the Christian religion, there have been the common law. But bare nonconformity is no sin instances of persons prosecuted and punished upon by the common law. And all positive laws, inflicting any pains and penalties for nonconformity to the established rites and modes, are repealed by the Act of Toleration; and Dissenters thereby exempted from all ecclesiastical censures.

are

Nonconformity is rendered by that Act not only innocent but lawful. . . . The protecting clauses of that statute have put it not merely under the connivance, but under the protection of the law-have established it. For nothing can be

plainer than that the law protects nothing in that very respect, in which it is at the same time, in the eye of the law, a crime. Dissenters, by the Act of Toleration, therefore, are restored to a legal consideration and capacity.

The writer argues from the foregoing that the Church should be levelled down to that equality with other sects before the law, in which is found, he contends, according to Lord MANSFIELD, the true character of Church establishment, "and by virtue whereof every nonconformist congregation, enjoying the common protection thereby assured, is in fact a Church establishment."

LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE.

WE have received the following replies to some objections to the present matrimonial relation :—

MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY BILL.

Blackstone has observed that even the disabilities which the wife lies under are for the most part intended for her protection and benefit.

If these so-called disabilities (i.e., from acting as a rival and antagonist to her husband) did not exist, with what justice could the law compel the husband to support, from his earnings, or income,

his wife, however lazy, dissipated or hostile to him induce a man to marry to place over himself in she may be, as it does at present? What could that case a rival and enemy? As it is, the wife has by far too many abilities to worry and ruin her husband.

From some parts of the marriage service the wife might suppose that the husband really intended to endow her with all his worldly goods.

The supposition is confirmed by the fact. The wife can by law spoil, destroy, remove all her husband's goods, money, &c. If she elope with a paramour, and take away all her husband's property she cannot be punished, because the marriage husband, whose exertions in nine cases out of ten has given her a title to them equally with the have gained them.

The husband, a drunken, idle fellow, may take his wife's earnings, and spend them as he lists. By legislation prevent this injustice; but re

member that in nine out of ten cases it is the wife who takes the man's earnings, and spends them as she lists. If he does not give her enough she goes before the magistrate, at the instance of the poor-law authorities, and has him imprisoned, with or without hard labour. The wife need not work at all for her living, or for the support of the family. The statement that she can be compelled to work for their joint support is, therefore, not founded in fact.

Cases arise in which a wife is compelled to live with her husband and endure his brutality.

In a great number of these cases the wife might get her living apart; she cannot be compelled to live with him; if he ill-treats her in any way, she can have him imprisoned with hard labour. What is that to the grievance of a husband being compelled to keep his wife, however faithless, depraved, or reckless she may be; she may leave him for as long a period as she likes, and return to him as often as she likes; he cannot refuse to receive her, when she returns to annoy and ruin him; he cannot refuse to support spurious offspring. If she has an income of her own, she can throw it away, or expend it upon her private pleasures or her paramour.

The police records daily show the cruelty, heartlessness, and recklessness of wives, who are always most leniently dealt with and excused by the magistrates.

The husband may take the children (if any) out of the power and the protection of their mother. This seems to be the only hold, and a very insufficient one it is, that the husband has upon his wife for her good conduct. If it were other. wise, no sooner were there a family, but the wife, in the great majority of cases, would hold the rod over the husband's head, by threatening to leave him and carry away the children, all to be sup

ported in idleness and luxury by the earnings and labour of the husband and father. He would have no alternative but to submit to the wife's insolence or to the separation, with consequent ruin of himself and the children. A premiuin would be offered to all wives to trump up accusations against their husbands to goal them into madness or cruelty, that they might carry off his income under the pretext of educating the children.

Should there be in some cases cruelty, as a setoff we may consider the much greater cruelty of the law, which compels a husband to receive back at any time his wife, after any number of desertions, however depraved she may be, coming back with the avowed intention to annoy or ruin him. The injustice of the law by which the unfaithfulness of the husband will entitle a wife to a judicial separation, but not to a divorce.

As an affair of justice, no one can maintain that the act or course of acts of adultery on the part of the wife and on that of the husband constitutes an equal amount of criminalty. A wife, if unfaithful, is not only useless, but to a high degree mischievous.

As a matter of social economy it has been thought that for the sake of the children of a marriage, it would be as unwise as cruel to offer inducements to women to get up accusations against their husbands with a view of forming second marriages themselves, or of crippling the resources of their husbands. The writer of these remarks has had abundant occasion for observing cases of hard working professional and working men wearing themselves out in labour, while their wives are enjoying themselves safely in adulterous intercourse, producing a spurious progeny, &c. The proposed legislation would embitter indefinitely the relations of husband and wife. The wives would feel that it was always in their power to hold the rod over their husbands by threatening to bring accusations against him, with a view to a separation, they to have the husband's hardly earned money under the pretext of educating the children, and in all cases absolved from all duties of contributing towards the support of the family, The only excuse for it being that it has been carried out, to a certain extent, in America; the promoters averring, not that it has led to a better state of relations of man and wife, but that the results are no worse than they are in England, with the equity system of settlements on the wife for her separate use.

Nothing can be more flagitious than the recommendations of the Select Committee on the Married Womens' Property Bill in their penultimate paragraph, that no relief should be granted to husbands from liability for their wife's debts, although they should be allowed to keep all their own money for their own use or abuse. In their statements on this point they exhibit a disgraceful ignorance both of law and of fact. It appears that, by law, the husband cannot be freed from that liability, whatever may be his wife's income, or her conduct and character, however depraved; it is almost certain that, in fact, County Court judges, juries, &c., would, in almost all cases, decide against the husband, and in favour of their own_class-fellow, the tradesman who supplies the goods.

The promoters of this Bill look simply to one grievance of some few married women; and are quite incapable of looking at it in relation to the relation of husband and wife-the most important question of the day.

As an instance of the bearings of the present provisions of the law, as administered by police magistrates, we may adduce the following: Within the past few weeks, a woman was brought up before the magistrate at a police court, for a gross assault upon her husband, she having torn his face to pieces when he remonstrated against her coming home at two in the morning. It was proved that she had ruined her husband in his business; not long before, she had endeavoured, by some horrible assault, to destroy his virility, and had been frequently charged with assaults upon him. The magistrate simply required her to find security for good behaviour.

Very lately, a man who eloped with a married woman was charged with robbery of goods, &c., belonging to the husband, and which were found in their possession. The wife was allowed to give evidence that she took them away, and that her paramour knew nothing of it; they both marched off in triumph with the property, and at least one of the children of the married couple with them. On a perusal of the evidence before the Select Committee on the Married Women's Property (as well as the committee) appear to be prejudiced or committed to the principle of the Bill. Very few of them gave evidence in a straightforward or satisfactory manner; it was all hearsay evidence. The legal witnesses were ignorant of the law they professed to expound. Even the Americans, and all alike, utterly ignored the bearings of the proposed alteration on the authority of husbands, &c. &c. It would appear that they all thought it

Bill, it will be seen that almost all the witnesses

was only necessary to legislate as if wives were all virtuous women. Husbands' rights and husbands' wrongs were kept entirely out of sight.

In answer to a question whether it would conduce to conjugal happiness, &c., for a wife to spend her time haggling and bargaining with men, buying and selling shares in the market, &c., Mr. Westlake replies to the effect that he thinks it would be not worse for them than for single women, who can do so at present-which is no answer at all.

Mr. Fisher, of Vermont, in answer to the question whether the wife is bound, where the husband cannot, and she has money, to support the household, says in reply, "Of course, it is done with great cheerfulness and pleasantness"-which, again, is no answer to the question, and can be only partially, if at all, true in the greater number

of cases.

There is nothing in the evidence to warrant the conclusions come to in the report. It does not appear that a single witness is both qualified and willing to tell the whole truth. The evidence is a mass of the suppressio veri and suggestio falsi.

MR. COMMISSIONER KERR AND THE

CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT.

MR. J. H. TORR, the we.l-known deputy County Court Registrar, writes to us on the above subject. First, he quotes the commissioner's description of his original appointment, which runs as follows:

under-sheriff or judge of the Poultry Compter, I was on the 5th day of May 1859 appointed and under-sheriff or judge of the Giltspur-street Compter, and I find from divers treatises on the law and customs of London, and from legal documents examined by me, that there have from the earliest times been two Sheriffs Courts for the City of London, one appearing from its records to be holden before the senior sheriff of London at his compter or prison, and the other before the junior sheriff of London at his compter or prison, tion in personal actions, and separate prothonaeach of the said courts having unlimited jurisdictories, clerks, and other officers.”

Mr. TORR then goes on:

The Sheriffs' Courts are also described by Stow, Strype, and Hale, as inferior courts of record, having jurisdiction in all personal actions, without limitation as to amount, and in all actions founded on the customs of London, and acts of common council; and their proceedings are by declaration, pleading, and a jury, and inter se they are two distinct courts of record at common law. The judges of these courts were required to be counsellors learned in the law, and knowing in the customs of the city, in which qualifications the present under-sheriff is reputed, and, as we believe, at or above par.

At the date of the Act for constituting, and the commission issued for holling, the central court, in 1834, it would appear there was a judge of each court, for the commission then and now runs to all the judges of the Superior Courts of Common Law and to the Lord Mayor, the Recorder and Common Serjeant, and also to the judges of the Sheriff's Courts of the city of London for the time

being. But since then, one under-sheriff only, called the Judge of the Sheriffs' Court, has, for many years, held the office of judge; in each and both branches of the Sheriffs' Court, having been thus presided over at the same time by one judge, have come to be popularly known as the Sheriffs' Court of the city of London.

Furthermore, it is submitted that the offices of under-sheriffs of London, and judges of the Sheriffs' Courts were formerly a quasi corporation aggregate, now fused into a corporation sole, consisting formerly of persons, now of a person and his successors in such office, which is incorporated by law, in order to give the legal capacity and advantage of perpetuity which, in their natural persons or person, would not have been had.

The answer to be deduced then from the foregoing is in Mr. Kerr's words, "I was appointed under-sheriff and judge of each of the compters of the Sheriffs' Court of London:" and in conse quence he is for the time being the incorporation of the judges and judge of the Sheriffs' Court, and ex officio and eo momine a commissioner of the Central Criminal Court, duly commissioned as well as any one of Her Majesty's justices and judges, and he is in fact and law one of the justices and judges for the time being named in the commission of oyer and terminer for London and of gaol delivery for the gaol of Newgate.

acts and deeds have brought about the aggressive In the next place, Mr. Commissioner Kerr's inroads on the privileges of the City of London, Act 1867, out of which has arisen the question which are to be found in the last County Courts whether certain Acts of Parliament, and especially the County Court Act 1867, have not so remodelled and renamed the original Sheriffs' Court of the City of London, that it is no longer the Sheriffs'

Court mentioned in the Central Criminal Court Act 1834. It is proposed, therefore, to draw the answers from Acts themselves, and show the fallacy of the interpretation which Mr. Kerr and his advisers have put thereon.

The first Act to be looked into is the London

City Small Debts Act 1847, which recites that the City of London is a county of itself. That the Sheriffs Court is a court of ancient jurisdiction having cognisance of all pleas of personal actions to any amount. That it was expedient that all cases in which the debt or damage claimed did not exceed 201., should be commenced in the said court without writ and tried in a summary way under the provisions of that Act; and that all pleas of personal actions exceeding 201. should be commenced and tried in the said court as theretofore. as if that Act had not passed. The next is the Extension Act of 1852, which repeals the prior Act and extends the summary procedure to all actions not exceeding 501.

The 2nd section enacts, That all actions not exceeding 501, which shall after the commencement of the Act be commenced or tried in the Sheriffs' Court, shall be holden in the same court without writ, and be heard and determined in a summary way and according to the provisions of the Act." 'The 3rd section enacts, That all other actions and proceedings in the sheriff's court shall and may be commenced and carried on in the said court as if the Act had not been passed."

shall be

Here, then, are clear legislative declarations of the name, existence, and jurisdiction of the the same should be holden in the said court withthe small debts sued for therein. It was expedient Sheriffs Court of Londen, and that in respect of out writ, and determined in a summary way, and according to the provisions of the last Act, which also declares that the words "the court understood to mean the Sheriffs' Court, holden under the provisions and for the purposes of that Act; clearly showing that thereby a small debts side or brauch was to be taken out of, or grafted on, the common law stock of the original Sheriff's' confirmed by the 7th section, enacting that the Court and called the Sheriffs' Court, and that is judge of the Sheriffs' Court," and in case there shall be more than one judge, then one of such judges, shall preside at the trial in the said court of all actions and proceedings commenced or directed to be carried on therein under the provisions of that Act, and concluded by holding of the Sheriff's Court as well for the purposes of the Small Debts Extension Act 1852 as for the other purposes of the said Act.

These sections show clearly that the original common law jurisdiction of the Sheriffs Court is preserved; and that the judge, or one of the judges, of the Sheriffs' Court is to come and preside in the small debts side thereof at the trial of all actions, subject to the statutable summary procedure, wherein we have the anomaly of a court without a judge. For it is the judge or one of the judges of the Sheriffs' Court proper who shall preside at the trial in the small debts court of all actions, &c., under the provisions of the Act.

It must be known and remembered, too, that this is a local and special Act of Parliament, conferring on the City certain statutable provisions.

the Act of Parliament the court had no power to take them during the first four days of term. After the first four days the court was to fix the day. The court thought it would be convenient to take them on the earliest possible day, and it might be convenient to state that that was the course the court would adopt. The court would be glad to take them on the fifth day, but they were doubtful if they could. The court was to give public notice of the day of hearing and determining the appeals after the first four days of term. The proper course would be, on the fifth day the court would fix the day for hearing them, and the court proposed to fix Saturday, the sixth day of term and the following days de die in diem for hearing and determining these appeals. His Lordship hoped that there would be an endeavour made by the Bar to get through motions in the first four days without a list.

Thursday, Nov. 5. ELLIS v. WILLIAMS. Turner applied in this and five other appeals from decisions of the revising barrister for Merionethshire, that the cases might be entered, although the notice required by the 6 Vict. c. 18, had not been given. The 62nd section of the statute said that the appellant should within the first four days of term transmit to the master the case in writing, and also a notice stating his intention to prosecute such appeal. A similar notice was to be sent to the respondent. The 64th section said that "no appeal shall be entertained or heard unless such notice shall have been given." The learned counsel admitted that it had been held that the enactment as to the notice was imperative upon the court, but he added that the respondents for whose protection the notice was required were content to forego it.

The Court held that they had no power to hear an appeal unless the notice had been given, and they therefore refused the application.

THE NEW LISTS OF VOTERS. Liverpool.-The revised lists of voters for Liverpool and South-West Lancashire have been printed. The borough constituency of Liverpool is 39,645; of whom 1117 are freemen, 37,999 householders, and 529 lodgers. The number of voters on the register last year was 21,851. The register of electors for South-West Lancashire comprises the names of 21,221 voters, including 10,221 in the Liverpool district. Taking off a vote each from those who appear both as property owners and householders, the number of actual voters is reduced to 18,000. It is stated that the canvass for Mr. W. E. Gladstone, M.P., and Mr. Grenfell, M.P., is progressing satisfactorily, and that their return is confidently expected.

employed. Do you think the Legislature so intended, and that such a construction may be put on the Act? [Certainly not. The prohibition is against voting at A CANVASSER. such election. Otherwise the Act would be nullified, for candidate B. would employ the voters of his colleague, candidate C., and vice versa.-ED. L. T.]

PERSONATION-APPEAL.-A. personates B. at an election of town councillor, and is given into custody. When taken before the magistrates, at petty sessions, he pleads guilty, and is sentenced to one month's imprisonment. Can A. thereupon (notwithstanding his plea) give notice of appeal to the quarter sessions? M. (No.-ED. L. T,]

TURNPIKE TOLLS-EXEMPTION.-Does the exemption from toll, under the General Turnpike Acts of carriages conveying persons to or from county elections, extend both to the nomination and polling days? [Yes: for it may be that the nomination is the day of election.-ED. L. T.]

AN ELECTOR.

THE RETURN.-Perhaps some of your correspondents will say if the return of a member of Parliament is liable to duty ? C. R.

FEMALE SUFFRAGE.-In the law courts of Scotland it has been finally decided that women have no legal claim to the suffrage. The question at issue was, how far the Act, known as Lord Romilly's, in virtue of which the masculine is to include the feminine gender, unless there be a proviso to the contrary, affected the 3rd section of the new Reform Act, which provides that every man shall be entitled to be registered as a voter who is of full age and not subject to any legal incapacity. It was argued that the word " included women also, because no specific provision was made against this; and also that legal incapacity was not chargeable against women. The Court of Appeal was uninfluenced by these arguments, and unanimously decided that women were not entitled to have their names placed on the register.

man

THE NEW REGISTER OF VOTERS.-Mr. George B. Morland, clerk of the peace for Berks, has issued the new register of voters, which forms a thick volume. It contains 7647 names, but there are many duplicates; the increase in the constituency consequent upon the Reform Bill is about 2000. The county is divided into eleven polling districts, as follows:-Abingdon, 807; Faringdon, 582; Hungerford, 448; Isley, 346; Maidenhead, 832; Newbury, 958; Reading, 1365; Wallingford, 282; Wantage, 512; Windsor, 638; and Wokingham, 877. The revising barrister, Mr. G. J. P. Smith, declined to allow any of the claims made by women. The new register of Parliamentary electors for the borough of Leeds has also been issued by Mr. C. Curwood, the town clerk. The area of the borough has not been increased by the new statute, but the constituency has been quadrupled. The number of names on the register in 1867 was 9443; the number on the present register is 37,510.

Upon the jury returning their verdict application was made to the learned judge for a certificate under the above section. His Lordship, however, refused to give it, thinking that the case was one in which in the exercise of his discretion he ought not to give the costs. Application was afterwards made to the master to tax the plaintiff's costs. This he refused to do, as there was no certificate or order for costs Hereupon an application was made to Willes, J. at chambers for an order for costs, but he referred the question to Hannen, J. The present motion was, therefore, made for an

order to the master to tax the costs; and it was argued that as an action for slander cannot be brought in the County Court, so the Legislature could not have intended that the section above quoted should apply to such an action, the inability to sue in any other court being a sufficient reason for bringing such action in such Superior Court," otherwise there would in such a case be a denial of justice. The court granted a rule to show

cause.

66

In the case of Re Hodgson, an important question of practice has arisen out of the provisions of the Vexatious Indictment Act (the 22 & 23 Vict. c. 17), the first section of which enacts that after the 1st Sept. 1859, no bill of indictment for any of the offences following, viz., perjury, subornation of perjury, &c., shall be presented or found by any grand jury unless the prosecutor or other person presenting such indictment has been bound by recognisance to prosecute or give evidence against the person accused of such offence, or unless the person accused had been committed to or detained in custody or has been bound by recognisance to appear to answer to an indictment to be preferred against him for such offence, or unless such indictment for such offence, if charged to have been committed in England, be preferred by the direction or with the consent in writing of a judge of one of the Superior Courts of law at Westminster, or of Her Majesty's Attorney-General or Solicitor-General of England, &c.; and which, by the 2nd section enacts, that where any charge or complaint shall be made before one or more of Her Majesty's jus tices of the peace that any person has committed any of the offences aforesaid within the jurisdic tion of such justice, and such justice shall refuse to commit or to bail the person charged with such offence to be tried for the same, then in case the prosecutor shall desire to prefer an indictment respecting the said offence, it shall be lawful for the said justice, and he is hereby required to take the recognisance of such prosecutor to prosecute the said charge or complaint, and to transmit such recognisance, information and depositions, if any, to the court in which such indictment ought to be preferred, in the same manner as such justice would have done in case he had committed the person charged to be tried for such offence. It appeared that an information had been laid against Mr. Hodgson for an assault, and upon the hearing he was convicted and fined 50s. He subsequently applied to the parties for a summons against the complainant for perjury alleged to have been committed upon the hearing of the said

Correspondence.

THE REFORM ACT 1867.-Your correspondent, "The Writer of the Letter in the Times," in his letter inserted in to-day's LAW TIMES, expresses his opinion to be "that the 40s. freehold franchise has been repealed by the new Reform Act." This is so clearly incorrect that I can only suppose your correspondent has not read the 56th section, which enacts as follows:-"The franchises conferred by this Act shall be in addition to, and not in substitution for, any existing franchises." Norwich, Oct. 31. A MANAGING CLERK.

Queries.

WHO IS ENTITLED TO VOTE?-Upon referring to the Act of Parliament, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, clause 11, I find that a voter is considered guilty of a misdemeanor who shall vote at any election for any county or borough if retained, hired, or employed for the purposes of the election. Having a vote for a borough, and being engaged in a county contest, I am desirous to know if I am entitled to vote

for the borough, as-though anxious to record my vote

I am not willing to make myself liable for a misdemeanor.-I am, Sir, yours, &c., AN ELECTOR.

[He may vote for the borough where he is not employed.

-ED. L. T.]

ELECTION LAW. By sect. 8 of the late Act, "No elector, who shall have been employed for any of the purposes of the election for reward, by any candidate at

such election shall be entitled to vote at such election." By the interpretation clause, election shall mean a member or members (as the case may be), and I would, therefore, submit that an elector employed by one candidate may vote for another by whom he is not

COURTS.

[CONTRIBUTED BY THE REPORTERS OF SEVERAL COURTS.]

THE

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. The learned judges who preside in this court during the present term are Cockburn, C. J. and Lush, Hannen, and Hayes, JJ., Blackburn, J. sitting at Nisi Prius.

A point of considerable interest and practical importance was brought under the consideration of the court in Gray v. West, which was an action for slander, tried before Hannen, J. in the Bail Court, at the sittings after last Trinity Term, when the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, with 107. damages. The plaintiff was a lodginghouse keeper, and the slander was spoken in the presence of a party who had intended taking lodgings, whereupon, in consequence, she declined to take them. This was the special damage alleged; but in consequence of the illness of the witness, who could not attend, such damage was not proved, and the case went to the jury upon the general question of the slander. The words were that the plaintiff was "a prostitute, a thief, and a liar." By the 5th section of the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142 (The County Courts Act 1867) it is enacted that "If in any action commenced after the passing of this Act in any of Her Majesty's Superior Courts of Record, the plaintiff shall recover a sum not exceeding twenty pounds if the action is founded on contract, or ten pounds if founded on tort, whether by verdict, judgment in default, or on demurrer or otherwise, he shall not be entitled to any costs of suit unless the judge certify on the record that there was sufficient reason for bringing such action in such Superior Court, or a judge at chambers shall by rule or order allow such costs."

plication, thinking that to grant a summons for perjury would be to try the case of assault over It was now said again, declined to grant it. that as perjury is one of the offences named in the 1st section, it was necessary that the case should first be adjudicated upon by the justices, but as they refused even to grant a summons, even the 2nd section would not apply, and so the prosecutor would be without power to bring the defendant to justice unless the court interfered to compel the justices to hear the information. The court granted a rule to show cause.

ESTATE AND INVESTMENT JOURNAL.

STOCK AND SHARE MARKET. THE funds continue flat, and will so remain until the elections are over, the Parliament assembled, and the change of Government inaugurated. After that will come a season of pause from agitation, and then the revival of trade and speculation may be looked for.

Home railway debenture stocks showed increased firmness, especially Great Eastern and South Eastern, which rose toper cent. The closing prices are annexed:-Great Eastern 5 per Cent. A, 106 to 107; ditto 5 per Cent. B, 1064 to; Great Western 5 per Cent., 1074 to 107; ditto, 60 per cent. paid, 6 to 63 prem.; London 4 prem.; South Eastern 5 per Cent. Debentures, and Brighton 44 per Cent., issued at 95, 3 to 110 to 111; and ditto scrip, 107. paid, 5 to 6 prem.

The following are the fluctuations of the week: