CHAPTER XVI. MY VIEW OF BOER v. UITLANDER. It will be seen, from the foregoing, that it was not without hearing what both sides had to say on the issue of Boer against Uitlander that I have been led to form my opinion on the first question, Was there reality in the claims made on behalf of the Uitlander? and on the second, Was there a definite purpose behind the treatment of the Uitlanders and the military preparations of Pretoria and the Afrikander propaganda through South Africa of ousting the British power from the whole sub-continent? That the indictment of the Uitlanders was, in the main, well founded, subsequent facts have made but too clear. Criticism of people with genuine grievances is easy to those who have not suffered under them; but, nevertheless, it may not be without political use, if I point out the errors, some of them of mere political tactics, but others much deeper, threatening the future peace of South Africa in the conduct of the Reform movement and the Uitlander agitation generally. As to the deeper mistakes there seems to have been a complete failure to grasp the Imperial importance of the policy of repression of the outsider followed by the Pretoria Government, and a marvellous marvellous under-estimate of the fighting power, of the dogged tenacity, of the far-sighted policy, of the next to superhuman secrecy of the leaders of the Boers, and an equally wonderful over-estimate of the Hollander influence-the Uitlanders failing to see that the old President had not the least objection to being supposed M to be led by Hollanders or "my Doppers," when he knew very well that he was leading in all the main lines of policy. If continued in, these errors bode ill for future peace and stability in South Africa. "Huis toe" was a theory too familiar to all the Uitlander centres. It meant that, after the most trivial reverse, the Boer commandoes would disperse to their farms, crying their call, "Let us home." Again, the theory that the ruling caste in the two Republics had no really national, however perverse, ideal, and were simply intent on the spoils of office, has been refuted by events. Their nationalist project was thought to be non-existent, partly because the British citizen saw that it would be desperate and dangerous to the Boers themselves, and partly because a money-making community, like that of Johannesburg, is apt to ascribe money-making motives to every action it does not understand. Nevertheless, it is clear enough now that there was a national purpose behind the exclusion of the Uitlander from office and from the spoils of office. The unfortunate episodes attendant on the Jameson Raid may be ascribed on the side of the raiders and the Johannesburgers largely to want of judgment. One section of public opinion in England was alienated from the raiders for lawlessness, and another from the Johannesburgers for want of gratitude to the raiders, displayed in not going to their assistance. The persistent putting forward of the grievances as if personal, and not as lese-majesté against the Empire, the asking for the franchise, and swearing allegiance to a flag stated by the petitioners to be foreign, puzzled and alienated people in England. "Why do people calling themselves British ask for the franchise? Either they are coming away and so remain British, and so have no right to it, or they are staying to swear allegiance to the Vierkleur, and, if so, what claim have they to our sympathy?" There The old President noted this error of the Uitlanders with grim amusement. After the Jameson Raid he observed: "I am supposed by the Uitlanders to be always guided by some one or other; it used to be Nellmapius, and then Dr. Leyds. Nellmapius is now dead, and Dr. Leyds is in Europe. Who is leading now?"" is much in this illogical, but understandable all the same. Lastly, the violent language and personal diatribes of some journals of the Uitlander press alienated British sympathy. It is true they were paralleled and surpassed by some of the Dutch journals, but Dutch is not read in England. Besides, such is not the tone of English controversy. The public taste is prejudiced against a course upheld by violent language and indulgence in personalities. The English public suspects it is a case of abusing the plaintiff's attorney. From what has been said, in dealing with the policy of President Kruger, it will be seen to what conclusion I have been led as to the anti-British purpose really underlying his treatment of the Uitlanders, as well as the other portions of his action to which they objected as primarily affecting their own lives. In the preceding chapter I have given a full statement of the reply of the Boer leaders to the Uitlanders' indictment. It will be admitted that it shows considerable skill in dialectics. But most important, as bearing on the present war, will be noted the repeated repudiation of anti-British purpose or policy. Independence is their aim in excluding the Uitlander from equality of vote or language. Defence is the meaning of their armaments: no aggression on the British power. Such are the protestations of Presidents and State Secretaries, Judges and Advocates, Journalists and Volksraad Members, Commandants and Field-Cornets, and Commanders of Artillery. There is a sense, of course, in which these assurances may be taken as being meant to represent the truth. Independence means Dutch independence, of a Dutch-ruled State, in which the resident foreigner cannot become a citizen. Defence means defence of the rule of a privileged race. No aggression on the British power means no present aggression; only aggression at a favourable opportunity. CHAPTER XVII. FROM THE RAID TO AFRIKANDER RULE IN PRETORIA, LET us now resume the thread of events after the Jameson Raid. Early in 1896, the Reform prisoners-as the Members of the Reform Committee of the National Union of the Uitlanders have come to be known-were placed on their trial in Pretoria charged with high treason, and were sentenced, four of them to death (afterwards commuted to a fine on each of £20,000) and the remainder to imprisonment, commuted to a fine of £2000 on each prisoner applying for release. Two of the latter refused to do so, and were not released until the Queen's Jubilee in June 1897.* The late Administrator of Rhodesia and the officers of his Expedition were handed over to the British Government, and, after trial in the Queen's Bench in England, under the Foreign Enlistment Act, were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment in May 1896. The next event of importance was the triumph of the militant Afrikander Party in the Presidential Election of 1896 in the Orange Free State. The former President afterwards State Secretary Reitz of the Transvaal, referred to in the already quoted letter of Mr. Theophilus Schreiner) had resigned owing to ill-health, and Judge Steyn, a member of the same party, was elected, defeating Mr. J. G. Fraser, These two were Messrs. Wools Sampson and W. D. Davies, now commanding in the Imperial Light Horse, a force composed almost exclusively of Uitlanders. The State Attorney, Dr. Coster, had consulted me on this matter, and I had recommended their unconditional release as a compliment to the head of the Imperial Government. for some years Chairman of the Volksraad. Mr. Fraser's policy was that of the President for twenty-five years, the late Sir John Brand, a policy which his opponents described as pro-British, but which was in reality statesmanlike in the highest degree, being a policy of fusing the Dutch and British people, by according equal rights to all new residents and a liberal franchise; and, above all, of working in harmony with the great Imperial Power which kept the seas and secured the safety and autonomy of his pastoral State. It was an evil day for South Africa when Sir John Brand's enlightened policy was defeated in the person of its standardbearer. If it had not been so, Brand's favourite saying "Alles zal recht komen would have been realised.* The increase of armaments in the Transvaal proceeded with feverish haste during 1896 and the following years. Orders already issued before the Raid, as is recited in the National Union Manifesto of 1895, for forts and artillery, were executed. Military experts, German and Hollander officers, were introduced from Europe to drill the younger Boer in the artillery; a short service system, enabling a large number to pass through this training to constitute a reserve force. Meanwhile, an Imperial organisation was instituted, called the South African League, to take the place of the disbanded National Union and the Reform Committee. It was not directed by the same leaders-part of the conditions of the release of the latter being three years' abstention from politics-and while advocating the redress of the Uitlander grievances, it was absolutely Imperialist in policy, placing in the forefront of its programme the maintenance of British supremacy in South Africa. There was no question here of swearing allegiance to the Vierkleur. Furthermore, by I have memoranda of discussions of Sir John Brand's policy with the public men to whom I have just referred, with the late Mr. Carl Borckenhagen and with Members of the Free State Volksraad. They are instructive, and in one sense encouraging, by showing that some at least among the Dutch-speaking people could grasp the truth that the unity of the European people is the only way of salvation in South Africa. |