CHAPTER XX.

THE CONFERENCE OF BLOEMFONTEIN, JUNE 1899.

DURING the month of May, in Pretoria, I had interviews with most of the members of the Transvaal Executive, and with nearly all the members of the First and Second Volksraad, and with many of the official heads of departments. As in Bloemfontein, I found a widespread disbelief in the firmness of purpose of the Imperial Government, and an idea that they were seeking to obtain control by peaceful means which they knew they were unable to get by the use of force, thinking war too dangerous and expensive.

As I have already mentioned, I found in Pretoria, as in Bloemfontein, the same singular reliance on the Queen's dislike to war, as a contributing cause, among all the well-known other causes, towards preventing the Imperial Government from ever, under any circumstances, redressing the Uitlanders' grievances by force of arms. It was useless to endeavour to explain-what the most superficial acquaintance with home politics tells any one-that, however great the influence on foreign negotiations the Queen's unique experience has naturally given her, and however intelligible and laudable her desire for peace, Her Majesty could not conceivably entertain the wish—even if she had the power -to prevent the adoption of measures, military or other, recommended by responsible Ministers as essential to the dignity, and therefore the safety, of the Empire and its citizens. The Afrikander, educated in English law schools, knew all about Royal policy, as well as everything else political. A statement by the Afrikander State Secretary and a

letter from General Joubert, published at the beginning of the war, showed their reliance on the Queen's influence, and their disappointment at its not having interfered with the firmness of the Imperial Government.

Nevertheless, there was a small but well-informed section, who eventually would have influenced the President and the Executive, but for the Afrikander State Secretary, State Attorney, and others of the party, who ultimately decided the fate of the negotiations. General Joubert was strongly opposed to a war policy, and advised redress of the Uitlander grievances and harmonious co-operation with the Imperial Government; he was alone in the Executive Council.

Before the Conference I had interviews in Pretoria with members of the Free State Executive, who, however, so far from being more pacific, as Johannesburgers imagined to the last, were far more warlike, following implicitly the lead of Councillor Fischer.

When I went to Bloemfontein, therefore, I felt assured that the Conference would be abortive.

It is needless to go at length into the proceedings. Very few words will explain them. The High Commissioner, as a basis for discussion of all differences between the two Governments, proposed that immediate and satisfactory representation in the Legislature should be secured to the Uitlanders; and proposed, as the minimum concession which would secure this end, a five years' retrospective franchise law for all inhabitants, and one-fourth representation in the Volksraad. When the Uitlanders were thus put in a position to redress their own grievances without calling on the Imperial Government, the High Commissioner would be prepared to discuss the settling of questions of the legal interpretation of the Conventions by an arbitration Commission-from which all foreigners were excluded-and to settle, by personal negotiation, matters which were neither Uitlander grievances nor questions of legal interpretation.

President Kruger, relying on the assurances of the Afrikander party, led by Executive Councillor Fischer in Bloemfontein (followed by President Steyn), and State Secre

tary Reitz in Pretoria, miscalculated the Imperial policy. He thought the minimum demand was a maximum; that a mere bargain was being introduced; that, if he held firm, the Imperial Government would retreat; and never, under any circumstances, would resort to arms to redress the balance of power between Boer and Uitlander.

The President, therefore, in regard to the franchise claim produced a most wonderfully-drafted franchise law-honeycombed with pitfalls-a product of the ingenuity of Executive Councillor Fischer-six months' notices, and proofs of lawabidingness, and of right to franchise in country of origin, and continuous two years' registration, and income of £200 a year; and, after five years, the same proofs all over again. So, at the end of seven years and a half from 1899, if one had spent a large portion of one's life attending to the matter, the franchise would be attained. And then offered this boon, only if Swaziland would first be annexed to the Transvaal, and only if an agreement were made that all future controversies with the Imperial Government would be settled by arbitration.

The High Commissioner pointed out that this extraordinary scheme did not provide for the immediate, or even the speedy, attainment of the franchise by persons who had been for a long time in the Republic; and on the 5th June declared the Conference altogether at an end.

As will have been seen, I was not surprised at this result. Nevertheless, I did my best to avert it. On the 1st June, the first day of the Conference-after the preliminary meeting to settle hours and procedure, of 31st May-I issued the following memorandum which was printed at the Official Printing Press, and circulated among the members of the Executives and Volksraads of the two States ::

SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM ON THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC.

I. Since the issue of my memorandum of the 1st May, addressed to the Executive and the Volksraad of the South African Republic, I have ascertained several facts, some unknown at the time of writing and some occurring since, which necessitate some further observations.

1. I have ascertained that the majority, if not all, of the members of the Volksraads of the South African Republic and Orange Free State have been under an impression that the action of the former Republic, as regards the negotiations with the British Government during the last six months, as previously, has been taken under my advice.

2. That certain matters enumerated in my memorandum of 1st May, as being in a condition in which the proper course was still open to discissusion, have been advanced a step further (and complicated) by replies sent to the British Government and other action.

3. That further questions under the Conventions with the British Government have been opened by acts of which I was unaware.

II.—I, therefore, find it necessary to inform the Executives and the Volksraads of the two Republics that this impression on the part of the Members to whom I have referred is unfounded.

My advice during no period has been given on all matters relative to the foreign affairs of the South African Republic, but only on matters specifically referred to me. These matters I have already enumerated in my memorandum of 1st May.

For all action taken since October last the present legal advisers of the Government are solely responsible.

III.—I desire to place on record the following facts.

1. I strongly disapprove of the course adopted in connection with the Swaziland protocol negotiation, in which the offer of the High Commissioner to negotiate a new protocol extending the jurisdiction of the High Court to include Bunu was, contrary to my written advice, in the first instance rejected, and then, after strong remonstrance from the High Commissioner, accepted, after unnecessary friction had been created and a loss of dignity had accrued to the Government of the Republic. (The facts are more fully set out in my last memorandum.)

2. I consider the action of issuing a subpoena to the British ViceConsul of Johannesburg highly inexpedient in view of the strained relations with the Imperial Government, as well as being contrary to International Law, in view of the special practice concerning consuls in Pretoria.

3. I consider it was exceedingly inadvisable, in view of pending negotiations with the British Government, to prosecute Messrs. Webb and Dodd, of Johannesburg, in connection with their presenting a petition to be forwarded to the Queen.

4. I consider the tone (I do not criticise the arguments) of the reply to the Dynamite Concession despatch of the British Government exceedingly ill-advised; and more especially ill-advised the reference to an alleged British opium monopoly, a reference calculated to have no effect but that of arousing ill-feeling in Great Britain and South Africa alike, and consequently of aiding the efforts of those desirous of precipitating

a war.

5. I dissent, as I have already stated, from the published opinion of the present State Attorney, unfavourable to the power of the Government of the South African Republic, to cancel the Dynamite Concession; and I agree with the contrary opinions of Mr. Schreiner, Prime Minister of Cape Colony, Mr. Advocate Curlewis, and Chief Justice Gregorowski. As the British Government claim that the monopoly is a breach of the Convention of 1884, unless the Republic has power to cancel the concession, a new cause of controversy, over a question of no material interest to the Republic, arises.

6. I hold illegal, and a breach of the Swaziland Convention of 1894 with the British Government, the proclamations of the Government of the South African Republic of 6th March and 28th April, 1899, relative to the importation of dynamite and fire-arms into Swaziland, rendering practically useless the existing concessions. Here, again, a new controversy with the British Government has been quite recently created. This is more gratuitous, as the Swaziland Convention of 1894 provides for the expropriation of any concession by compensation to be fixed by arbitration.

7. I consider, from what I have learned of its purport, the recent reply of the Government of the South African Republic to the last suzerainty despatch of the British Government has placed the claim of the Republic to be free from suzerainty on a wrong legal basis-a basis unwarranted by the facts. (The original reply of April, 1898, was based on my opinion of 11th February, 1898.)

8. I am of opinion that the legal advice on which the recent war tax on non-burghers was imposed of highly doubtful validity, at the least, but quite apart from that question, of singular inopportuneness. Here again another controversy with the British Government has been needlessly occasioned.

9. I am strongly of opinion that the proposed clause in the new Grondwet (and the legal advice on which it was based) subjecting all foreign residents to military service in time of war, is a flagrant breach of international law; one sure to incur the reprobation of the whole world, and to exclude the Republic from the category of civilised states. I adhere to the conclusions in the learned opinion of advocate J. W. Wessels on this subject, published in the Press.

10. I consider the legal advice on which was based the recent resolution of the Volksraad disfranchising those burghers on whom the franchise had been conferred for defending the Republic during the Jameson Raid, not merely unfounded on legal principle-being ex post facto and retroactive legislation—but most inopportune and calculated to hamper the negotiations with the British Government at the Conference of Bloemfontein. Doubt has thus been thrown on the reality and the permanence of any grant of franchise to resident Uitlanders as the result of the Conference.