The objects aimed at by that policy, on which it has chiefly been challenged, relate to war, and the independence of the two Dutch States. As regards the prospects of war, mere quietism and inaction would never have averted it. On the first international trouble in which the Empire was involved, the dominant Young Afrikander Governments of the Republics would have moved. Unless, indeed, that was anticipated by the disgusted British Colonials taking the law into their own hands and marching to the relief of their kinsmen in the Transvaal, in which civil war the Imperial Government would of course be immediately involved. For the threats of British Colonials throwing off the Imperial connection and making terms with the Boer, though no doubt meant when uttered, I do not think more than the petulance of just indignation at Imperial betrayal, though as to this I am not certain. But if this were the third one of three courses, one of which was inevitable, this again meant war for the Empire, and one ten times more terrible than the present. The High Commissioner's policy was the sole one that made for peace.

The independence of the Republic in the legitimate sense of that term, its freedom from external interference and its perfect autonomy, provided a régime of liberty and political equality for all civilised men were established, has never been threatened by that policy. Of this I am convinced, not alone by the High Commissioner's personal assurance to myself, but from a dispassionate consideration both of his methods and of what would be, if it were attainable, the most advantageous course to the Empire, to Europeans in South Africa, and to their mission of civilisation. As I have already stated, as my reason for supporting the independence of the Republics-constituted on a basis of equal rights for civilised men-I had hoped that their maintenance would conciliate the Dutch historic preference for Republican forms, and so promote the gradual fusion of Europeans in South Africa, which must be the aim of European statesmen of wider views. In this way, the self-ruling people of the two Republics would no longer have cause for race division

and would gradually fall into line with the world-wide Empire-a fusion towards which the first step would be the Confederation of all South African States under Imperial protection. It would not be the first time that the Empire sheltered a Republic within its bounds. The Seven Isled Republic rested once under the Pax Britannica, until that Minister, afterwards to live to be the Premier of Majuba Hill, ceded, as High Commissioner, the Ionian Islands to Greece.

But, above all things, the conservation of that glorious heritage of the past, the Imperial power, so lightly regarded even now by some of our fellow-citizens, has been shown, by the desperate war being waged, to have been jeopardised by the policy against which was set the action challenged of the present Imperial representative. As I have shown, war was sought to be averted by that action; but, if that action had not been taken, war would soon have come in a worse form.*

This book deals with policies and actions of persons rather than with appreciation of persons. Nevertheless, as it conveys a public moral, may I ask my countrymen to reflect what reason had they to expect that any Imperial representative, in full sight of a century's examples of Imperial vacillation and ingratitude, would be found at a crisis of the Empire's fate to reject a safe quietism for a path of duty almost certainly involving loss of fortune and fame and career?

The pathetic figure of a Frere going to his grave in obloquy, denounced by a wizard of eloquence-obloquy now, indeed, to be remedied by the slow wisdom of a tardy bust-might well have served to deter.

CHAPTER XXII.

MY LAST REMONSTRANCE.

ALMOST immediately after the Conference of Bloemfontein, I returned to Pretoria. The failure of the Conference to end as the Afrikander Party had hoped it would-in the High Commissioner's accepting an illusory scheme of franchisehad somewhat disconcerted their leaders. The High Commissioner-unlike some of his predecessors, as the old President ruefully recalled-had shown most unexpected firmness and penetration in dealing with the negotiators of the simple pastoral State. Still, the Afrikanders persuaded the Volksraad that it was merely a splendid chess move in the detested British game of diplomacy. They proceeded to try a long series of tedious and fatuous jugglings with issues soon to become so terrible. I made one last effort to awaken their misled people to the realities so soon to be upon them. I conversed with many members of the Volksraad, who were very courteous and willing to hear, and evidently doubtful whether, after all, as I had rightly foretold the Imperial policy before the Conference-and predicted the failure of the Conference, on the ground on which it failed-I might not now also be in the right as to the necessity of redressing without delay the Uitlander grievances, of unreservedly accepting the Bloemfontein minimum, and of working on the policy of Sir John Brand, in thorough accord with the Imperial power.

My views on the critical nature of the situation having become known-partly owing to an imperfect version of my memorandum of the 1st June having been published in a

Johannesburg journal-I was requested by a representative of the Pretoria Press, a Government organ, to explain my views to the general public, already explained to the Executives and Volksraads in memoranda.

The Press of Pretoria of 13th June, 1899, accordingly published a report of an interview between its representative and myself, from which the following extracts are appended:

The situation is one of extreme gravity. There is a distinct danger of war, a danger not fully realised by many in both Republics. As far as I can see I do not think there is any party in the Republics desirous of precipitating actual (and immediate) war. But I am certain that a want of knowledge of the actual conditions of English politics and of the character and power of English statesmen, and of the present state of English public opinion with reference to the Republics and the status of the Uitlander, has led many men of influence in public affairs here to believe that war is impossible, and that therefore extreme steps may be taken, either in the direction of a denial of the rights claimed on behalf of the Uitlander, or of a demeanour towards the Imperial Government which, in my opinion, is unwise, without incurring any risk of actual warfare. Many here apparently think, even yet, that the Imperial Government is not in earnest in championing the claims of the Uitlanders to political rights. Possibly they will continue their disbelief until an actual concentration of troops on the border convinces them too late, when a spark may cause an explosion. I do not think that any true friend of the Republics or of the burghers should keep silence under such circumstances.

The High Commissioner gave me his views fully at Bloemfontein. I have seen nearly all the public men in all States and Colonies of South Africa, and all appear to me to be much more impressed than here in Pretoria with the gravity of the crisis and the necessity of the redress of the grievances of the Uitlanders. It will be readily agreed, I think, that the attitude of other conntries endorses this view. The attitude of Germany, evidenced through the fact of the Anglo-German Agreement with reference to the Rhodesian railways and telegraphs-the position of France with reference to the Dreyfus agitation precluding its taking part in outside matters-and the recent rapprochement of the United States and Great Britain, seem to me to indicate a strengthening of the position of Great Britain. It must also be remembered that only a small section

The assistant editor, Mr. Williams, now serving with General Buller's force in Natal.

P

of the British public exercise an influence on foreign affairs, viz., the educated upper and middle class, from which the officers of the Army and Navy are drawn. While there is, of course, a warlike feeling among the greater part of this section, they have a strong sense of justice, and they will sanction no war except for what seems to them a just cause. But it is not merely on the ground of the possibility of armed intervention, but of the necessity of doing justice, that steps should be taken to meet the just demands of the resident Uitlanders for equality of treatment as to political rights; and the burghers of the Republics have always wished to have justice and right on their side.

The present claim put forward on behalf of the Uitlanders by the Imperial Government is a purely political question, and avowedly is not based on any rights secured to the British Government or its subjects under Conventions with the Republics. Therefore, no question of the legal interpretation of the stipulations of those Conventions can arise at all. The Imperial Government claims political rights for its subjects resident in the Republic, not under the Conventions, but on account of its predominant interest in the peace of the whole of South Africa, and its concern for the welfare of its subjects resident in the territory of the Republic. There is, evidently, no room here for lawyers' arguments.

I am in favour of the widest possible extension of the franchise consistent with the retention of a considerable majority in the Volksraad for the present burghers.*

The resident Uitlanders should have a strong minority representation. A qualifying term of residence of five years, dating from the actual commencement of the residence, seems reasonable. With a settled scheme of redistribution there can be no prospect of overwhelming the power of the old burghers.†

I have no hesitation in saying that I have always maintained that to apply a wide and liberal interpretation to the provisions of the Conventions with the British Government is the right course to follow; and that controversies on trivial matters, and on any matters as far as possible, should be avoided. I hold that it is unsound to interpret international agreements of this kind in any merely technical way, such as might be defended in reference to a commercial contract drawn up by a solicitor. Critics may consider this as applying ethics or politics to the interpretation of Conventions. I consider it merely the application of common sense. And I also hold that a courteous and friendly reception should invariably be accorded to any proposition as to the interpretation of the Conventions put forward on behalf of the Imperial Government. It is undignified on the part of a small State; it is dangerous, inasmuch

*The Bloemfontein Minimum.

†This was pointed out by the High Commissioner at the Conference.