any member of the established church to suspect, that a settled revenue may be injurious to the state, as making the clergy too powerful: and that it is UNJUST in any who are not of the established church to refuse payment of tythes, on pretence of their contributing to the maintenance of opinions different from their own. The suspicion of churchmen is absurd; because it appears, from what we have but now observed, that this policy hath a very contrary effect; a settled maintenance destroying that mutual dependency between clergy and people, from whence only can arise the power of churchmen to do mischief. In the church. of Rome, besides the endowed clergy, there are several orders of religious which possess nothing, but depend on the charity of the people. And yet, for many ages, these wens and botches of a corrupted church got all the power and influence of churchmen to themselves, from the endowed clergy, notwithstanding the immensity of their possessions. And the state throve accordingly.—The refusal of dissenters is unjust; because this maintenance is not assigned by the public for the support of opinions, but for the use and service of the state, as such. With as good reason, therefore, might they refuse to pay other taxes which, in their several applications, are for the same civil purpose. The difference is only accidental: Churchofficers happen to have religious opinions; and civil officers, sometimes, have none*

3. A Third Corollary is: That as a fixed and public maintenance began with an established church, so it must end with it. For the members of a church unestablished have no right, let their association, for that purpose, be as extensive as it will, to support their * See note [E] at the end of this Book.

ministers

ministers by an appropriated endowment. All they can do for them is by voluntary contribution; a fixed maintenance being solely in the power of the state to bestow, both as it is a common tax, and as it requires a public sanction for its exaction: and the state could neither wisely nor justly affix a settled maintenance on the clergy of a church with which it was not in alliance. Not wisely, because the advantage in breaking the dependency between clergy and people, which the state gains by a fixed maintenance, would be greatly overbalanced by the inconvenience of giving so considerable a share of its property to a society independent of it. Not justly, because no contribution to a public maintenance could be lawfully demanded of those who are not members of an unestablished church so pretending. For in this case it would indeed be for maintenance of opinions, which they think erroneous; and to which no man can be obliged to contribute; as all men justly may, to that which, by covenant and compact, is expressly directed to promote the good of that civil policy of which they are members.

II. The second privilege the church receives from this alliance is, a place for her superior members in the court of legislature; which, with us, is THE BISHOPS' SEAT IN PARLIAMENT. For as it necessarily follows (as we shall see presently) from that fundamental article of alliance of the State's supporting and protecting the Church, that the church must, in return, give up its independency to the state, whereby the state becomes empowered to determine in all church matters, so far as relates to it as a society; as this, I say, necessarily follows, the church must needs have its superior mem bers in the court of legislature, to prevent that power, which the state receives in return for the protection it

affords,

affords, from being perverted to the church's injury: for the church's giving up its independency to the state, without reserving some share in the legislature, would be making itself, instead of a subject, a slave, to the state. Besides, without these ecclesiastics, no laws could be reasonably made in the court of legislature concerning the church; because no free man, or body, can be bound by laws to which they have not given their consent. So that as the church, when she entered into alliance, cannot justly, we must presume she did not willingly give up her independency, without the reservation of such a privilege. This shews the necessity of their sitting and acting in the legislature, in all affairs ecclesiastical. That they should act too, when they are there, like the other members, in civil matters, is very useful to the community: as giving additional sanction to its laws, when the people see that church and state have concurred in their enacting.

From this account of the grounds and original of this privilege, may be deduced the following COROLLARIES:

1. "That churchmen who sit in the higher house "of legislature in consequence of this alliance, are to

be considered first, not as REPRESENTATIVES in"deed, but yet as GUARDIANS OF THE CHURCH: "the qualification for the exercise of this office being "their baronies. They are in the second place to be "considered as BARONS like the other members of "that house." For not to allow that bishops sit as guardians, would be to take away the most useful, and even the necessary end of their sitting, which is, to watch over the interests of the church. Besides, this office implies, that the church still continues a distinct, though an allied society; whereas to sit only as barons supposes the CHURCH not only united to, but incorpo

rated

rated with, and dissolved in, the STATE, while lay fees alone are seen to give one and the same privilege both to the secular and spiritual lords.

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2.

"That yet, notwithstanding, these churchmen (though they sit as guardians as well as barons) do not, on the other hand, by virtue of this alliance, constitute or compose any distinct or THIRD ESTATE " in parliament." For this would be attended with all the mischiefs of a contrary extreme, by putting the allied church again in possession of its independency, while it had a negative on the acts of the state. And

this evil, which no management could prevent, so neither could time itself remedy: for the union, which is in its nature dissolvable, would by churchmen's sitting as a third estate become perpetual; every estate of legislature being essential to that government whereto it belongs. But whatever is essential can never be separated or taken away, without a change in the government itself.

These are the two extremes so hurtful both to religion and civil government, so destructive of that benefit which a rightly formed alliance is fitted to produce. Yet the common system hath joined these two discordant parts together; and made the bishops, at once, guardian barons and a distinct estate.

3. A Third corollary is, "That as the bishops' " right to sit in parliament began with the alliance, so "it must end likewise with it." It hath been shewn that the bishops sit there, ne quid ecclesia detrimenti capiat: For the church, by this alliance, having given up its supremacy to the state, which had now, whenever the grant should be abused, opportunities to do her injury, the principal churchmen are placed in a court of legislature, as watchmen to prevent the misVOL. VII. chief,

I

Till the Norman Conquest, the BISHOP and the ALDERMAN sat together on the bench, in one common judicatory. William made a fit and proper separation of the magistracy, as the terms of an alliance, between the two societies, require. Which, had it not been for an accident of the times, the accumulating superstition and the rapacious spirit of usurpation in the church of Rome, would have been of great advantage to the community, by marking out and ascertaining the proper bounds and limits of each SOCIETY. For churchmen were very improper ministers of the crown, to judge in causes merely civil, both from the peculiar nature of their office, and the implied prohibition of their master; who himself disclaims all temporal jurisdiction. Besides, the practice of the BISHOP's sitting with the ALDERMAN rendered the original of the former's coercive power, there exercised in a coequality, very doubtful and uncertain. As the Alderman's authority was seen to be from the state, men would be naturally misled to think that the bishop's was from the church; at a time too, when churchmen allowed so little to the civil magistrate; whereas all coercive power being derived from the state, and to be exercised only for its use, it is of the highest moment not to have it misunderstood. From henceforward the CHURCH became, in a more just and proper sense than before, ONE OF THE THREE ESTATES OF THE REALM. But it was not till long after that they became, as properly, AN ESTATE IN PARLIAMENT.

For, though the bishops and prelates sat in Parliament as BARONS, and as GUARDIANS of the church, in spiritual matters, even from the Conquest, yet it. was not till the twenty-third year of Edward I. that churchmen constituted an ESTATE IN PARLIAMENT. They and the Commonalty receiving this quality or condition