henceforward, though not disappear, yet, certainly, begin to decay. This all the historians of those times, both Christian and Pagan, unanimously confess. We have reason to believe them, for they assign a cause fully adequate to the effect; which was, the hiring of mercenary troops from amongst the barbarous nations, to fight their battles. But EMULATION, the only thing they had occasion for, to preserve and keep alive their martial spirit, while the Romans and their mercenaries charged together under the same ensign, whether of the cross or the eagle, they had still, in all its vigour.

It may be here just worth while to observe, that our citizen is very apt to forget his own principles. His charge against the unsocial spirit of Christianity is founded in this, "that its professors are actuated only by heavenly, not earthly affections." Yet here, to take off all he can from the merit of their acknowledged BRAVERY, he says, it arose from a spirit of military emulation.

In conclusion, let me here repeat my complaint, that Rousseau, in this accusation of the slavish spirit of Christianity, has once more slurred his usual sophism upon us; and, instead of the spirit of Christianity, has given us the spirit of Popery; which does, indeed, by stifling all freedom of enquiry in religious matters, prepare us for a slavish submission to civil tyrants. An exploit, in which the church of Rome so much triumphs, that all the advocates of Popery, and all the enemies of the Reformed, from BELLARMINE down to VOLTAIRE, have made the FACTIOUS SPIRIT OF PROTESTANTISM the constant topic of their calumny and abuse.

After all the instances of ILL FAITH here given, with what astonishment must the public hear the Ci

tizen of Geneva boast to the Archbishop of Paris, that he is A MAN MADE UP SOLELY OF TRUTH; THE ONLY AUTHOR OF THIS AGE, AND OF MANY OF THE FOREGOING, WHO HATH WRITTEN WITH GOOD FAITH *.

CHAP. V.

IN WHICH AN OBJECTION TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THIS ALLIANCE IS REMOVED.

HERE I should have concluded this Second Book, but that it appeared reasonable to obviate an objection, which may seem to affect our fundamental principle, the REALITY of this free convention. The objection is this, "That as the two Societies are supposed to be formed out of one and the same number of individuals, those very men who compose the state composing the church also, it is a convention of the same individuals with themselves, under different capacities. Which convention is as trifling and ineffectual as that which one individual would make with himself." The objection, we see, goes upon this

* Mes ennemis auront beau faire avec leurs injures; ils ne m'ôteront point l'honneur d'être UN HOMME VERIDIQUE EN TOUTE CHOSE, D'ETRE LE SEUL AUTEUR DE MON SIECLE, & DE BEAUCOUP D'AUTRES QUI AIT ECRIT DE BONNE FOI. Lettre à M. de Beau. mont, p. 65.-Now, with all his good faith, he has surely a very unsound mind or memory. In writing against me, he says, as we have seen above, QUE LA LOI CHRETIENNE EST, AU FOND, PLUS NUISIBLE QU'UTILE A LA FORTE CONSTITUTION de l'etat. But when he writes against the French philosophers, he says just otherwise: NoS GOUVERNEMENS MODERNES DOIVENT INCONTESTABLEMENT AU CHRISTIANISME LEUR PLUS SOLIDE AUTORITE.

Emile, v. iii. p. 200.

suppo

supposition, that the circumstances which prevent one individual's compacting with himself do unavoidably attend a compact attempted to be made by many individuals with themselves, under the distinction of two Societies.

Now, to shew the supposition groundless, is to overthrow the objection. But we shall do more; we shall not only shew our free convention to have none of the circumstances attending it, which prevent one individual's compacting with himself; but, that it hath all the circumstances that make a compact binding between two.

Let us see what it is which prevents a man's contracting with himself. It is of the essence of all contracts that there be, 1. The concurrence of two wills; and, 2. A mutual obligation on two persons for the performance of their mutual promises. But one man having but one will, there is no foundation for a compact, which requires the concurrence of two wills and having but one person, there is no efficacy in the compact; because no obligation: for what a man promises to himself, himself can acquit. Therefore an obligation, which the obliged can destroy by the sole act of his will, is not real but fanciful. Hence it appears, that a man's contracting with himself is, of all fancies, the most impertinent.

Thus, we see, the defect of that compact of one individual with himself, proceeds from the want of two wills and two persons. If then, two Societies have really two distinct wills, and two distinct personalities; the subject matter's being one and the same (of which these two artificial bodies are composed) cannot possibly hinder those two societies from entering into compact; nor that compact from having all the effects of such as are adjudged most real,

VOL. VII.

Р

That

That two such societies have two distinct wills and personalities I shall shew. When any number of men form themselves into a society, whether civil or religious, this society becomes a body, different from that aggregate which the number of individuals composed before the society was formed. Else the society would be nothing; or, in other words, no society would be formed. Here then is a body, distinct from the aggregate composed by the number of individuals: and is called factitious, to distinguish it from the natural body; being, indeed, the creature of human will. But a body must have its proper personality and will, which, without these, is no more than a shadow or a name. This personality and will are neither the personality and will of one individual, nor of all together. Not of one, is self-evident. Not of all, because the MAJORITY, in this factitious body, hath the denomination of the person and of the will of the society. We conclude then, that the will and personality of a community are as different and distinct from the will and personality of the numbers of which it is composed, as the body itself is. And, that as in the erection of a community, a factitious body was created, so were a factitious personality and will. The reality of this personality is clearly seen in the administration of the law of nations, where two states are considered as two men living in the state of

'nature.

But the force of this reasoning will be better seen and supported by an example. The writers of the law of nature and nations allow that the second convention, as it is called, in a pure democratic state, is as real and binding as the same convention in a state of any other form. The second convention is that whereby protection and allegiance are mutually promised by

sovereign

sovereign and people: "For in the collective body

(says Hooker) that have not derived the principality of power into some one, or few, the whole " of necessity must be head over each part*:" So that here the people contract with themselves. And yet is the contract adjudged most real. This conclusion is founded on the very principle I lay down to prove the reality of the convention between church and state; namely that, in entering into society, a factitious person is created. In a democracy, this person, the sovereign, is the WHOLE: and, with this person, the natural persons of all the individuals

convene.

If this be the case, then it follows that the self-same number of individuals, which have formed and erected, of themselves, one society or factitious body, endowed with a distinct personality and will, may erect, of themselves, as many such societies as they please. Because the body, personality, and will, of such societies being all factitious, the storehouse, from whence they come, is as inexhaustible as the wants of mankind. Whereas, were the will and personality of the individuals, the will and personality of the society composed by them, then, on the contrary, the selfsame number of individuals could not erect above one society: Because their personality and will being already bestowed upon one society, they had them not to give again, in order to animate any other.

Here then we have two societies, made up of one and the same number of individuals, with each its distinct personality and will; each different from the personality and will of the other, and from the personality and will of the individuals. But the different natures of the societies not only make their wills and Eccl. Pol. b. viii,