drew a right one. But if, from the wrong conclusion of the former, the supremacy of the magistrate was for ever excluded; yet from the right conclusion of the latter, he was admitted before his time. And all this confusion arose from a common error, admitted on both sides, that if church and state be distinct and independent societies, they must EVER remain distinct and independent.

The result from all we have seen was this, that the PURITAN principle established an IMPERIUM IMPERIO: and that HOOKER's introduced PERSECUTION FOR OPINIONS.

NOTES TO BOOK II.

P. 93. [A]

WE have a remarkable instance of this in the

state of Venice, which is a thorough tyranny, if ever there was any. Mr. Bayle tells us [Crit. Dict. Art. Abelard, Rem. (P)], that one day asking a friend, who had told him a thousand stories of the disorders of the Venetian ecclesiastics, how it happened that the state would suffer things so dishonourable to religion and society? his informer replied, that the good of the public obliged the sovereign to this indulgence; that the senate was not displeased to find the priests and monks fall under the public contempt for their debaucheries, for that in this condition they would have no credit to raise or foment sedition amongst the people; and that one of the reasons why the Jesuits were not acceptable to the sovereign was, because they knew how to preserve the decorum of their character; and so, gaining respect and reverence by a more decent exteriour, had it in their power to excite the populace to sedition.

P. 95. [B]. A jurisdiction somewhat resembling this we find in the famous court of Areopagus at Athens: which city was once the model of civil prudence as well as of religion, to the improved part of mankind. Isocrates, speaking of this branch of jurisdiction in the Areopagus, says, It was not occupied to punish crimes, but to prevent them- raro wewτov ἐσκόπων, δι' ὧν κολάσεσι τὲς ἀκοσμένας, ἀλλ ̓ ἐξ ὧν ἂν καὶ Τασκευάσεσι

Πασκευάσασι μηδὲν αὐτὲς ἄξιον ζημίας βελήσεσθαι ἁμαρτάνειν ἡγελο γὰρ τῦτο μὲν αὐτῶν ἔργον εἶναι. ΑΡΕΙΟΠ. ΛΟΓ.

P. 98. [C]. In this consists the MASTER-SOPHISM which runs through Tindal's whole book of the Rights of the Christian Church. He brings all along the confessed abuse of ecclesiastical government as an argument that the church is an imperium in imperio; whereas that evil consists in the legitimate exercise of two contradictory sovereign powers in one and the same republic; nothing of which there is, as we have shewn, in a church and state; though both sovereign and independent before alliance.

P. 100. [D]. The reason why, throughout this Discourse, I have taken it for granted, "That a full and free toleration, or liberty of worshipping God in the way every one shall chuse, is of natural equity, and consonant to the genius of our holy religion," is because Mr. BAYLE in his Philosophic Commentary, and Mr. LOCKE in his Letters on Toleration, have exhausted the subject, and vindicated this liberty with the fullest and clearest evidence. And I am not of an humour actum agere. M. Voltaire indeed has lately undertaken to write in favour of it. How he has acquitted himself is now (since those admirable discourses have been in the hands of all mankind) of little consequence to any but himself. Yet it must needs divert the Reader to observe the air with which he concludes" Cet ecrit sur la tolerance est une "requête que l'humanité presente tres humblement

au pouvoir et à la prudence. JE SEME UN GRAIN

QUI POURRA UN JOUR PRODUIRE UN MOISSON." -I sow a grain of seed (says he) which may, one day, produce a harvest. He had been much nearer the

truth,

truth, and that humility, which he here pretends to, if, with the man in the parable, he had confessed, that he had reaped where another had sown. Or if in courtesy, we will allow him his pretensions, of being a labourer in the Lord's heritage, he will have the grace to confess, that he has ill observed the precept of the Law, not to sow his field with MINGLED SEED: for his way throughout this discourse is to recommend toleration by abusing religion.

P. 110. [E]. When the QUAKERS first arose, the clergy generally claimed their tithes by DIVINE RIGHT; and there being nothing in the light within to direct those people up to that original, they regarded the exaction of tithes as an antichristian robbery; and rather chose to suffer, what they called, persecution, than comply with the demand.

In no long time after, the clergy in general gave up this claim. I think the priest's divine right to a tenth part, and the king's divine right to the other nine, went out of fashion together. And thenceforward the church and the crown agreed to claim their temporal rights from the laws of the land only.

One would think therefore, that when churchmen had changed their bad principles for better, the quakers might have done so too. To be candid, I will not suppose, they wanted this good disposition. But the smallest change in their religious system would have brought the whole into hazard. For here lay the difference between the church and the conventicle. The reform of the national religion from the corruptions of popery, was made on the principles of human reason guided by common sense. In which, whatever mistakes thè REFORMERS had committed (errors incident to humanity), their successors might VOL. VII. redress

Q

redress without blushing; and, what is more, without any danger of dishonouring religion. It was not so with the Quakers. For this sect being founded in modern inspiration (which is, by interpretation, fanaticism) to alter the least article of their creed was giving the lye to the Holy Spirit, as it came from the mouth of their founder, George Fox.

Payment of tithes, therefore, was still obstinately to be refused. And, to support their perseverance, they had recourse to another fetch of principle, "That whoever contributes to the support of a thing sinful is partaker of that sin." And tithes being apparently sinful, the desired conclusion was within call. This afforded much consolation to FRIends. It is true, the expedient was not without its inconvenience: for in the number of things sinful, they held war, especially an offensive war, to be one. And then an act of parliament, granting an aid for the support of such a war, brought on a new distress. What was to be done? The king would be obeyed. This they well knew, and therefore in dutiful silence paid their quota, and left it to their ill-willers to detect the prevarication. Thus stands the case at present with these conscientious people.

But to judge what indulgence is fairly due unto them, we should consider a little the true grounds of that complaisance which free-states are always disposed to shew to tender consciences. Now I apprehend they understand it to extend no further than to opinions which have no evil influence on the true and essential interests of society. For to carry the indulgence further would be a species of fanaticism, though of a different kind indeed, yet as mad as that which produces the tender consciences in question.

Of opinions thus injurious, there are various kinds;

from