If then it can be shewn, that our adversaries have here taken for granted a thing, which, though by reason of mistaken notions of government, was never in dispute, is yet utterly false; we shall quite overthrow all that ostentatious declamation by which they have endeavoured to discredit a test-law. I say, therefore, that this pretended right of every qualified subject to a share of the honours and profits in the disposal of the supreme magistrate is altogether groundless and visionary.

Let it be remembered, that, in the third chapter of the first book, it hath been proved at large, that

REWARD IS NOT ONE OF THE SANCTIONS OF CIVIL

SOCIETY: the only claim which subjects have on the magistrate, for obedience, being protection.

Now the consequence of this is, that all places of honour and profit, in the magistrate's disposal, are not there in the nature of a TRUST; to be claimed, and equally shared by the subject: but of the nature of PREROGATIVE; which he may dispose of at pleasure, without being further accountable, than for having such places ably supplied.

All right of claim then being absolutely at an end; and consequently, all injustice, in excluding at pleasure; we might here finish our discourse, having taken from our adversaries the great palladium of their

cause.

But, secondly, should we for argument's sake suppose, what is absolutely false, that the subject had a right; yet still it will be found to be amongst those rights, which are not claimable. For let it be again remembered, that in speaking of moral duties, we observed, they were of two kinds, of perfect and imperfect obligation: and therefore answerable to these, must needs be the rights arising from them. Those

which

which arise from the duties of perfect obligation being claimable; and those from imperfect obligation, not So. But an equal dispensation of public honours and profits can never be thought other than in the class of duties of imperfect obligation, such as, in private men, gratitude, hospitality, charity; and consequently the right to them cannot be claimable, even when abusively withheld.

But, to leave nothing unanswered, let us, for a moment, wave these advantages; and, for argumentsake, as before, suppose this COMMON RIGHT OF SUBJECTS; and then the proposition will come to this, -That to exclude a citizen from his civil rights, for matters of opinion, is a violation of the common rights of subjects.

This proposition, we see, is founded on these two others, 1. That opinions cannot be punished, because punishment can be inflicted only for matters in which the will is concerned, and the will is not concerned in matters of opinion. 2. If opinions could be punished, they are not within the civil magistrate's jurisdiction; his care extending only to bodies. Now if it can be made appear that these two latter propositions give no support to the former, we must conclude that the objection is, even in this sense, vain and groundless.

To the first proposition I reply, that it is indeed universally true; but not at all to the purpose: the disqualification, by a test-law, being no PUNISHMENT in the true sense of the word, which is that implied in the proposition. To the second, I say, that it is not universally true for that when opinions do, directly and necessarily, affect the peace of society, they then come within the magistrate's jurisdiction; and that this exception takes place in the case before us; the. opinions,

opinions, which a test-law makes matter of disqualification, directly and necessarily affecting the peace of civil society.

1. The first assertion is thus proved; evil of all kinds, and whencesoever proceeding, man hath, by nature, a right to repel. Evil which proceeds not from the will is called a mischief; and may be simply repelled and this repulsion is called RESTRAINT: evil which proceeds from the will is called a crime; and may, not only, be repelled, but have additional pain, more than sufficient for the restraint, inflicted on the author; and this repulsion is properly called PUNISHMENT. That punishment should not be inflicted for a mischief, that is, for an evil in which the will is not concerned, is plain from hence; the end of that additional pain, more than is sufficient for restraint, called punishment, being a satisfaction to justice, for the reformation of the offender, and for example to deter others; it would be absolutely unjust to inflict avenging pain for what was involuntarily committed and altogether impertinent to attempt to deter, by example, from involuntary actions. The utmost therefore that can be inflicted for a mischief is restraint; that is, just so much pain, when the mischief proceeds from a rational agent, as is necessary to repel that mischief. Thus is restraint properly annexed to mischief; and punishment to crimes.

Such distinct and precise moral modes, one would think, it was not very easy to confound. And yet they have been confounded; so as utterly to embarras all our reasonings on this subject. It is true, while they are considered in their application to irrational and rational agents, the difference is seldom mistaken; but when they are both applied to rational agents,

then

then it is that men begin to confound the ideas, and lose sight of all these marks of distinction. For, 1. pain being an inseparable idea in punishment; and every restraint of a rational agent having some degree of pain attending it; this idea common to both led them to think the two terms, in each of which it was found, were synonymous. 2. Restraint of a rational agent being defined to be an infliction of just so much pain as is necessary to repel the evil, and punishment to be an infliction of more than is necessary for that purpose, men considered the difference as only from less to more and applying this to mischiefs and crimes set together in comparison, instead of applying it to mischiefs compared with mischiefs, and crimes with crimes, even this small difference was lost and confounded. Because, where the mischief is vastly more obstinate, and difficult to eradicate than the crime, there the pain attending the mischief must be more and greater than that attending crime. The use and solidity of our distinction may be illustrated by this example. There are four sects, whose principles, our adversaries will not deny, ought to be restrained-The ATHEIST, the ENGLISH PAPIST, the GERMAN ANABAPTIST, and the QUAKER, all hold opinions pernicious to civil society. But these having different degrees of malignity, must have different degrees of restraint. The ATHEIST, who is incapable of giving security for his behaviour in community, and whose principles directly overthrow the very foundation on which it is built, should certainly be banished all civil government. The ENGLISH PAPIST, who owns a foreign ecclesiastical power superior to all temporal dominion, should not be tolerated in any sovereign

state.

The GERMAN ANABAPTIST, who holds capital punishment to be sinful, should be debarred the magistracy.

magistracy. And the QUAKER, who believes even defensive war to be unchristian, should be excluded, in states upon the continent, the common liberty of residing in frontier places. Now these different degrees of pain do not make one a punishment, and the other, a restraint; but, being every one proportioned to the malignity of their respective evils, and no more than what is just necessary to repel them, they are all equally mere restraints. But now extend these pains and penalties, to the burning of the Atheist; to the banishing of the Papist; to the denying of civil protection to the Anabaptist; and of religious toleration to the Quaker; and then, notwithstanding the same diversity of degrees, they are all punishments, and none mere restraints. Because more pain is in every case inflicted, than is necessary to repel the respective evils.

I have only then to shew, that the pain inflicted by a test-law is no more than just necessary to repel the evil of diversity of sects when got into the administration: and, consequently, that it is a restraint only.

To make this evident, let us suppose a person able, in one certain place only, to do mischief; and that he is disposed to do it: it is plain, there are no other means of repelling this evil than by debarring his entrance into that place. These means then are necessary but what is necessary to repel an evil is a restraint only. But were this pain extended; and, because the person can do mischief in one place, he is debarred entrance into ten, then the pain becomes a punishment; because more than necessary for repelling the evil. This is exactly the case in hand. Diversity of sects can do mischief only by getting into the administration: therefore to keep them out, is, for

the