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marine, or other person in the army or navy of the United States, or attached 10 troops in the service of the United States, shall be allowed to vote or hold office in said Territory, by reason of being on service therein."

It will be perceived that the act of Congress is clear and explicit on this subject. It prescribes the qualifications only of those who " shall be entitled to vote at the first election, and shall be eligible to any office within the said Territory; but the qualifications of voters and of holding office at all subsequent elections shall be such as shalt be prescribed by the legislative assembly.The provisos have no application whatever to the subject, inasmuch as they only prohibit the legislature from permitting persons to rote who are neither native nor naturalized citizens, nor have declared on oath their intention to become citizens, and certain officers, soldiers of the army, &c.

Now, then, it is clear, first, that as regards all elections but the first, the qualifications are not prescribed by the act of Congress; and, second, the qualifications with the restrictions before mentioned, for all subsequent elections, are to be designated exclusively by the territorial legislature.

It is certain, then, that the question now raised as regards the pretended right of persons to vote who possess the requisite qualifications under the act of Congress for voting at the first election, but are excluded by subsequent territorial legislature now in force, has no foundation whatever in law, and such votes would be wholly illegal. Under these circumstances, I trust that no one will attempt to vote who is excluded by the territorial law; and that if such illegal attempt is made, such a clear violation of the act of Congress, and of the laws of this Territory, will be arrested and prevented by the judges of election.

The second question is:

Will voters at the elections in October, who possess all the qualifications provided by the territorial act of the 20th of February, 1857, which is the last act on this subject, be also required to possess other and different qualifications contained in preceding territorial enact. ments, or is the last law the sole rule of action on this subject? This last act is the general election law, providing for a new and entirely distinct apportionment of members for both branches of the territorial legislature, as also the qualifications of voters at that and all succeeding elections, and is entitled “An act to define and establish the council and representative districts for the second legislative assembly, and for other purposes.” The first section designates, by name, the several counties of Kansas which are to constitute the several council districts; the second section designates, by name, the several counties of Kansas which are to constitute the respective representative districts; the third section apportions members among the several representative districts according to the census provided for in the convention law; the fourth section apportions, in the same manner, the members among the several council districts; the fifth and last section is in these words :

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“Sec. 5. Every bona fide inhabitant of the Territory of Kansas, being a citizen of the United States, over the age of twenty-one years, who shall have resided six months in said Territory before the next general election for members of the council and house of representatives, and no other person whatever, shall be entitled to vote at any general election hereafter to be held in this Territory: Provided, however, That nothing in this act contained shall be considered to apply to, or affect in any manner the provisions of an act entitled 'An act to provide for taking the census, and election for delegates to a convention.'

"This act to take effect and be in force from and after its passage.

The langnage of this section is clear and explicit. It is an act prescribing the qualifications, and all the qualifications, of voters at all future elections. The law is perfect and complete in itself, without any reference whatever to preceding enactments. The language is free from controversy. Every bona fide inhabitant,” &c., “shall be entitled to vote,” &c.

&c. The words are imperative. It is the language of command from the proper authority, and no one has any right to interpolate restrictions contained in preceding enactments. It is a well settled principle of law, as well as of common sense, that when any subsequent statute proceeds to regulate an entire subject in general and comprehensive language, it is of full force and effect in and of itself, and no restriction or addition can be made to its provisions by reference to any preceding enactments. In such a case there can neither be addition nor subtraction, and the number of qualified voters can neither be augmented by adding to them those who were permitted to vote by preceding laws, nor be lessened by subtracting those who were restricted from the right of suffrage by previous enactments. The words “every citizen,' &c., and “no other” shall vote, include all who are described in the act, and exclude all others. Besides, the right of suffrage is the most sacred known to the American people. It is the basis upon which repose all their institutions.

It is a right highly favored in our law; and in all such cases to deprive any one of this right the words must be clear and unambiguous. But in this case there is no ambiquity; and independent of the fact that this act, as regards elections and the qualifications of voters, is an act complete in itself, and prescribing all the provisions applicable to this subject, any interpretation by which a restriction as regards the right of voting, contained in a preceding law, should be superadded to those required in this act, would create a direct and positive repugnance to its clear and explicit language, and therefore would be most clearly repealed by virtue of that universal principle of jurisprudence, that when two statutes contain provisions which are repugnant, repellant, or contradictory, either by way of addition or subtraction, the last statute must prevail.

Now, let us see if there would not be direct repugnancy in this case under the construction contended for by those who assert that although the qualification of a territorial tax is not among the qualification of voters under the act of 1857, yet that it is a qualification under the

Vol. ii-8

act of 1855, and therefore still in force. Let us place them in opposite columns. Act of 1857 provides :

The act of 1857, as now construed, would "Every tona fide inhabitant of the Territory read as follows : Every bona fide inhabitant of Kansas, being a citizen of the United of the Territory of Kansas, being a citizen of States, over the age of twenty-one years, the United States, over the age of twentyand who shall have resided six months in one years, and who shall have resided six said Territory before the next general elec- months in said Territory before the next tion for members of the council and house general election for members of the council of representatives, and no other person what- , and house of representatives, and no other soever, shall be entitled to vote at any gene- person whatsoever, shall be entitled to vote ral election hereafter to be held in this Ter- at any general election hereafter to be held ritory."

in this Territory;'' but no such citizen shall le permitted to vote unless he has first paid a territorial

| tax. Is it not clear that the two provisions would be directly repugnant by the addition to the act of 1857 of a proviso and restriction not contained in that act, but in a previous law. The words of the act of 1857 are general. “Every citizen,” &c., shall be entitled to vote on a residence of six months. This language gives the right to vote, in clear and positive terms, to every citizen, &c., who has been a resident for the term prescribed by law. “Every citizen” are general and comprehensive terms, and they cannot be restricted by other words not contained in this law. By the 11th section of the act of 1855 no previous residence is required as a qualification for a voter, but the payment of a territorial tax is made a prerequisite. Now, it is clear, that if, when prescribing a previous residence of six months, in using the general and comprehensive language "every citizen,' &c., the legislature of 1857, besides that residence for the first time prescribed by law, had intended, in addition, to require the previous payment of a territorial tax, they would have said so; and not having said so, such words can be interpolated neither by judicial nor executive construction. In fact, it is not a case of construction at all, but of using words which the legislature have not used, and of making provisoes and restrictions for them which they have not made, and of excluding voters from the polls whom they have not excluded. Besides, this is no new question. It has occurred repeatedly in the several States and Territories of this Union, and, as a principle of universal adoption under such laws, it is well settled, without a single exception to the rule, that where one State constitution, regulating the right of suffrage, prescribes certain qualifications of voters, it is complete in and of itself, and is universally regarded as repugnant to so much of any previous constitution which either adds to, or subtracts from, such qualification. And the same rule prevails in relation to State and territorial laws. This is the great American rule of interpretation on this subject, amounting from long established and universal usage, to the force of law.

If there could have been any possible doubt on this subject, it is removed by the provisions of the territorial convention law, passed on the day preceding that on which was enacted the election law, and referred to and made the basis of many of the provisions of the latter. That convention law prescribes a previous residence of three months, and a registry, as qualification for voters; but is just as silent as the territorial election law on the subject of a payment of a tax, and yet no one has ever pretended that the pre-payment of any tax constitutes a necessary qualification for a voter for delegate to that convention.

No such payment of a tax was ever exacted, and was rarely, if ever, made. And such a construction as is now contended for, that because there was no direct repeal of the tax qualification, therefore it still existed, would render illegal the election of nearly every member of the constitutional convention, and impair the validity of all their acts. The election law of 1855, imposing the tax qualification, was general.

It applied to all subsequent elections, to "every inhabitant of this Territory, and of the county or district in which he offers to vote, and to all “ elective officers.” It was as general and comprehensive in its application to every election which could take place under any Territorial law as the legislature could make it, and would apply the restriction of the pre-payment of a territorial tax in voting for delegates to the convention, just as much as in voting for members of the territorial legislature in October ; upon this alleged principle, that restrictions or qualifications in preceding laws are not repealed by general provisions in a subsequent statute prescribing for subsequent elections the qualifications of voters. The convention law required a three months' previous residence and registry as a qualification of voters, but was silent, like the election law of 1857, as regards the pre-payment of any tax; and if such a pre-payment, by force of preceding enactments, applies as a qualification for a voter for the Territorial legislature in October, then it would just as clearly follow, that inasmuch as the convention act was equally silent as to the payment of a tax, the voters for delegates to that convention, besides the three months' residence and registry, must have paid a tax also. But the truth is, whilst the tax remains, the qualification applies no more to the election in October than it does to the election of the delegates to the convention, because it was dropped in both acts, and because we have no right to insert a most important provision that is thus omitted by the legislature, and because it is a settled rule in interpreting statutes, that if the legislature had intended, in either case, in prescribing the qualifications, and all the qualifications of voters, to superadd one that was inserted in a preceding law, they would have repeated the restriction in the subsequent statute. How easy was it for the legislature, in prescribing the qualification of voters under the convention or election law, if they intended, in addition to the qualifications named in these laws, to require the payment of a tax, to have said so, and not left it to others to interpolate words which they had excluded. They have not said so, and that is enough. On this subject I have never entertained any doubt, and never supposed there could be any question. And I might have declined the expression of any opinion on either of these points, but for the certain knowledge of the fact communicated to me from almost every quarter of the Territory, and from all parties, that these conflicting constructions of the law, if not settled, will certainly produce collision at the polls, and, most probably, a disastrous civil war and revolution. I claim no anthority to instruct the judges of election, by virtue of my official power, how they shall decide; but I give my opinion as others have given theirs, and with the same sincerity, in the hope that it may tend somewhat to prevent the disasters with which we are threatened, growing out of these conflicting opinions, and that it may render unnecessary a resort to the military force, subject to my orders, to preserve the peace of the Territory. That military force, which is now already here, or daily arriving, is amply sufficient to preserve the peace of Kansas; but it is my sincere hope that the mere presence of this force, competent as it is to suppress insurrection or rebellion, and maintain the authority of the law, will render any collision unnecessary.

On the 19th of August last I communicated to the President, through the Secretary of State, my views on this subject, together with copies of the several territorial laws, and asked the aid of the President and his cabinet to sustain me, by the moral force of their opinion, in preventing a collision and civil war in this Territory, by stating, if such should be the fact, their concurrence with me in these views. In reply to this communication, in a despatch from the Secretary of State to me, under date of the 2d of September, 1857, after remarking, most justly, as I always contended, that I could issue no authoritative mandate to the judges of election on this subject, or control their decision, he says:

“The Territory of Kansas is in a peculiar condition. By your statement, and possessing, as you do, the best means of information, your views, in the opinion of the President, are entitled to great weight. It is in a state of incipient rebellion, with an organized military force prepared to resist the authority of the United States.

“It may therefore become necessary to use the troops placed at your disposal, not only to aid as a posse comitatus in executing the laws, but also to suppress an insurrection. Surely, under these circumstances, if the expression of an opinion in advance of his action, and, it may be, instead of it, which the President honestly entertains, will have a direct effort in preventing a civil war in Kansas, he cannot be justly censured for attempting, by such an expression of opinion, to avert the calamitous result.

“The danger you anticipate arises, as you observe, from the apprehension of a portion of the citizens of Kansas that they will be excluded from the privilege of voting because they have not paid a territorial tax. Now, the President, as well as every member of his cabinet, concurs in opinion with you, that the payment of such tax is not required as a qualification to vote. He and they entertain not a doubt that the 5th section of the act of February 20, 1857, is complete in itself, and prescribes all the qualifications required of a voter, and among these the payment of a territorial tax is not included. They are also firmly convinced that no person whatever, not possessing these qualifications, notwithstanding they may possess the qualifications prescribed for voters by the organic act of Congress of May 30, 1854, has any just claim to the elective franchise."

It will be observed, then, that in view of the deplorable condition of Kansas for the last three years, and the civil war which has so long raged in this Territory, and the imminent danger of a renewal of that conflict, growing out of conflicting views as to the qualification of voters at the ensuing election, the President and his cabinet

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