No. 9. Extract from the report of the Surgeon General. SURGEON GENERAL'S OFFICE, November 9, 1846. SIR: I have the honor to submit to you a statement of the fiscal transactions of this bureau for the year ending on the 30th of June, and a consolidated report of the sick and wounded of the regular army up to the 30th of September of the present year, together with remarks upon the operations generally of the medical department of the army. * * * * * In relation to the sickness which has prevailed among the volunteer troops, I have not sufficient data upon which to found a report leading to any useful results. The surgeons generally of the volunteer corps have made no regular return or other statement of the sick to this office; and no information on the subject, derived from other sources, is sufficiently accurate or explicit to be adopted as the basis of an official report. All that I can say understandingly on the subject is, that whether stationary or on a march, in camp or in the field, the volunteers have been exceedingly sickly. The Tennessee and Kentucky regiments of cavalry left a great many of their men sick in hospital at Memphis, Tennessee, and again at Little Rock, Arkansas. How many men were left on the road afterwards I do not know; but it is understood that the Kentucky regiment of cavalry continued to be sickly, having, while at Port La Vaca, three hundred on the sick report. The same proportion of sickness, from all accounts, seems to have prevailed among the volunteers located on the Rio Grande, one-half being from time to time, as is understood, on the sick report. From the best information which has been received at this office, it is believed that the extent of sickness among the volunteers on the Rio Grande has been fourfold to that among the soldiers of the regular army, with a corresponding excess of mortality in the ranks of the former. This state of things, it is apprehended, will ever exist with volunteer troops, or undisciplined men employed on distant service and in a foreign clime; more particularly with the volunteer corps gotten up under the impulses of the moment. Old men forget their age-young men think not of their physical disabilities. Impelled by a feeling of patriotism, a thirst after military fame, or the spirit of adventure, many of them recklessly enter the ranks, and undertake to perform the duties of a soldier, the toils, the privations, nor the self-restraint attendant on which, are they in a frame of mind or of body to endure. It is not until they have embarked in the enterprise, have journeyed several hundred miles at a great expense to the government, and much to their own discomfort, that they find out there is something more required to constitute an efficient soldier than patriotism, chivalry, and valor. Then, for the first time, they understand that the labor and exposure, the watching and fasting, the self-denial and selfrestraint they have to undergo, and for which neither nature, nor education, nor habit has fitted them, are beyond passive endurance. In this vexed state of mind they readily take sick, then become melancholy and despondent, with a corresponding aggravation of the disease, so that, should they not sink under the accumulated weight of mental and physical infirmities both, they seldom, after being once stricken down, return to the duties of the field. By the time they have been restored to their feet again, the battle has been fought and the laurels already borne off; and then, though it has not been their good fortune to attain the object of their high aspirations, (a triumphant conflict with the enemy,) they have exhibited, at the sacrifice of their health, their zeal in their country's cause, and are anxious to return home. The correctness of these remarks will, it is believed, be admitted by the volunteers themselves, many of whom enrolled their names with the prospect of wearing a commission, but, having failed in their competition for the station of commissioned officer, are obliged to serve in the ranks as a private soldier. It is proper to state here that one-third and more of all the men who offer to enlist in the regular army are rejected; and it is reasonable to suppose that very many of those who are enrolled for the volunteer service would, if critically examined, be pronounced physically incapacitated for the arduous duties of a soldier. As far as I understand the matter, the government has, under the present state of things, virtually to pay a hundred men, while they realize the services of but fifty. What with the extraordinary expenses attending the concentration of the individuals at a point, their organization into companies and corps, then their outfit and transportation to the theatre of war, together with the expenses of their return home before the expiration of their term of service, on a sick ticket, or on a certificate of discharge, the volunteers have cost the government one hundred per cent. more per man than the men of the regular army. But this is not all; the presence of a numerous body of invalids seriously embarrass the service, for, besides consuming the subsistence and other stores required for the efficient men, they must have an additional number of surgeons and men to take care of them, and a guard to protect them, which necessarily lessens the disposable force, the available force for active operations in the field. From the foregoing statement of facts, it may readily be conceived that measures ought to be taken to prevent the introduction into the volunteer corps, the same as in the regular army, of men who, from disease or original constitutional defectibility, are disqualified to perform the active duties of a soldier. ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR In pursuance of your instructions that I should present you with a brief comparative view of the strength of the army at different periods since the close of our last war with Great Britain, as contrasted with the extent of frontier to be defended by it, and the relative population and resources of the country at the time, I have the honor to submit the following: By the act of March 3, 1815, fixing the peace establishment, the strength of the army was reduced to 10,000, at which it remained fixed down to the further reduction made in 1821, a period when it reached its lowest figure, and from which soon afterward it slowly began to rise. By the addition of a new regiment in 1823, of another in 1836, and by the further increase in 1838, it successively went up from 6,183, its strength in 1822, to 7,497 in 1837, and to 12,539 in 1839. At the close of the Seminole war, in 1842, it was again reduced to 8,613, but four years after was raised to 12,216 by the addition of the regiment of mounted riflemen, and by an increase in the number of privates. Since then, if we leave out of consideration the Mexican war, the only augmentation to it has been that made by the act of June 17, 1850, authorizing the President to increase the number of privates in any company serving on the western frontier, or at remote and distant stations," with that more recently made by the act of March 3, 1855, adding four regiments to the establishment. Thus increased, the organized strength of the army varies now from 12,785 to 18,006, though its actual strength falls short of 16,000. 66 In a letter to the chairman of the military committee of the House, dated December 29, 1819, Mr. Calhoun, then Secretary of War, speaking of our northwestern frontier, says: "it is on that frontier only that we have much to fear from Indian hostilities." The organized strength of the army was then 10,000; the extent of the north western frontier, reckoning from St. Louis up to the mouth of the St Peter's; thence across to Green Bay; thence to Mackinac and up to the Sault Ste. Marie; and from Mackinac down to the present site of Chicago, was about 1,200 miles; and this, from the sparseness of the settlements along or within the line, was thought to be abundantly protected by some four or five posts. At the present day we have to protect, against savage tribes who are growing every year more hostile, not only the same north western. frontier, now covered with rich settlements, and, of course, far more vulnerable now, and far more difficult to defend against the sudden and always unforeseen attacks of so wily and active a foe, but a frontier extending thence along the whole western line of our eastern settlements, with another on our western coast stretching from north to south from the 49th down nearly as far as the 32d parallel of north latitude; the Territories of New Mexico and Washington, which are on all sides surrounded by Indian enemies who have, in the former especially, repeatedly carried death and desolation into the very heart of their most populous settlements; the greater part of Texas; much of the interior of California and Oregon; and finally, the great emigrant routes to California, Oregon, and New Mexico. The different lines of our military posts, starting from Pembina, where a post would have been established this year had there been troops available for the purpose, down west of Texas to the mouth of the Rio Grande; from San Antonio, in Texas, across the continent to San Diego, in California; from San Diego up to Bellingham bay; from Fort Bliss, Texas, up to Fort Massachusetts; and from the main line of the New Mexican posts across to Fort Defiance, alone, make up a total of over 6,500 miles, which is swelled to over 9,500 by the addition of the three great trails to California, Oregon, and New Mexico, just mentioned; and these distances, it must be remembered, bear a very inconsiderable proportion to the actual extent of frontier exposed. The population of the United States in the year 1815 may, by taking a mean between the census of 1810 and that of 1820, be set down at 8,438,90%; that of the present year probably amounts to at least 26,000,000. While, then, our population has at least been trebled, and the extent of our frontier settlements to be defended against Indians has increased nearly sevenfold; our revenue being nearly four times as great; the value of our imports being at least doubled, and that of our exports having more than quintupled, the organized strength of the army, meantime, is less than twice as great; and its actual strength falls, usually, 2,000 short even of that to which its organization is limited. If we compare the various changes which have been made in the organization of the army with the history of the different wars in which the country has been engaged since the year 1815, we will find that there is no economy in keeping the army reduced to a standard of strength so low that it is unable to meet the demands which are made upon its services. It has been stated in official reports before this, that a regiment of troops stationed at Jefferson barracks would have immediaately suppressed the first outbreak of the Sac and Fox hostilities in 1832; and that a few regiments ordered at once to Florida would have saved the country from the long and bloody Seminole war of 1835-'42. Recurring again to the reduction of 1821, we may be allowed to ask what was really gained by it, when not two years had elapsed before it was found necessary again to increase the army, when we see that it has been steadily augmented ever since; and that, to supply for the insufficiency of regular troops in the intervening period between that year and 1846, not less than 55,324 volunteers had to be mustered into the service of the United States. Looking at the subject in another way, we find that of the 10,000 constituting the strength of the army from 1815 to 1821, nearly threefourths were usefully employed in garrisoning our maritime fortresses, and, by keeping them and their armaments in good preservation and repair, saved large sums to the government, while not a fourteenth part of our present force, nor more than one-sixth of that formerly so employed, can now be spared for that useful duty. We see, too, that whilst schools of cavalry, artillery, and for rifle practice, are impera tively needed to give to our army that thorough training in the several arms of service which is essential to its perfect efficiency in case of our ever being opposed to a civilized foe, it is yet impossible to establish them, for the reason that neither troops nor officers can be spared for the purpose; and thus, while our officers are acquiring admirable lessons of fortitude, endurance, cool presence of mind in danger, and ready resources in the midst of difficulties, and gradually qualifying themselves to dispute the palm of superiority with those of the best light troops of Europe, they are yet, at the same time, slowly unlearning the scientific lessons which the country is at so much pains to inculcate in them at the Military Academy, and from necessity falling somewhat short of what elsewhere constitutes the true standard of the officer of heavy infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Looking upon the subject in yet another light, we will find that the expenses of an army do not always increase in the same ratio with an increase in its numbers; and that where the latter are insufficient, the cost of transporting large bodies of men over vast distances, from one remote department to another, to repress disturbances, which the mere presence of an efficient force would either have prevented from breaking out, or, at least, have stifled in the beginning, enters largely into the account; and thus it is we find that the annual expense per man, including officers, of an average army of 6,000 men, in the years 1809-'10-'11, exceeds that of one of 10,000 men in 1820, from $50 to as much as $80; (See House Document 182, 1st session 16th Congress, report of the adjutant and inspector general.) I have endeavored, in this brief and hasty sketch, strictly to confine myself to the points to which you had directed my attention; but in considering the subject at this day it will not do for us to lose sight of the all-important fact, that the events of the last two or three years are indicative of a spirit of hostility on the part of many powerful tribes who dwell on the great plains which forebodes, at no very distant day, an Indian war of formidable magnitude-one that may, for a long time, check the overland emigration to our Pacific coast, and which can only be averted by vigorous measures, and by an imposing display of our force among them. In conclusion, allow me to draw your attention to the report made by Mr. Calhoun, when Secretary of War, to the House of Representatives, dated December 12, 1820, which will be found in House Document 197, 2d session, 16th Congress. He has discussed the whole. subject upon general principles, and so thoroughly as to leave little to be supplied. I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. JOHN B. FLOYD, S. COOPER, |