COMMODORE PAULDING'S ARREST OF WALKER-Speech in the Senate of the United States, January 7, 1858, on the President's Message INCREASE OF THE ARMY-Speech in the Senate of the United States, February 1, 1855, in favor of an increase of the Military Department, to put down Indian hostilities in the West ADMISSION OF MINNESOTA-Speech in the Senate of the United States, February 1, 1858, on the admission of Minnesota as a state ADMISSION OF KANSAS-Speech in the Senate, February 3 and 4, 1858, on the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution MINNESOTA SENATORS-Speech in the Senate of the United States, Feb- ruary 25, 1858, on the proposition to swear in Messrs. Shields and Rice, senators from Minnesota, elected previous to her admission as a state REPRESENTATION OF MINNESOTA-Speech in the Senate, March 29, 1858, on the representation of Minnesota in the Senate and House ALIEN SUFFRAGE-Speeeh in the Senate of the United States, April 7, 1858, on Indian and alien suffrage in connection with the admission of ENGLISH BILL-Speech in the Senate of the United States, April 29, 1858, on what is commonly known as the English Bill, or the report of the Committee of Conference on the disagreeing votes of the two houses on SPEECH delivered at Hazlehurst, Miss., on the 11th of September, 1848 PACIFIC RAILROAD-Speech in the Senate of the United States, January 20, 1859, on the Pacific Railroad . GRANT OF LAND TO THE SEVERAL STATES FOR AGRICULTURAL COLLEGES Speech in the Senate of the United States, -, 1859, on the House Bill making grants of lands to the states for Agricultural ERRATUM-Page 521, 16th line from foot, for 1858, read 1855. SPEECHES AND WRITINGS OF HON. ALBERT G. BROWN. NATIONAL BANK. Report of Hon. Albert G. Brown, in the House of Representatives of Mississippi, made January 24th, 1838, from the committee to whom was referred so much of the Governor's Message as relates to a National Bank. MR. SPEAKER: The committee to whose consideration the foregoing resolution was referred, have given to the subject which it involves, the calm and dispassionate reflection which its vast magnitude and importance requires, and have instructed me to report, as follows: Your committee believe from the manner in which his excellency the governor introduces the subject of a National Bank in his written communication to the two houses of the legislature, that he looks to it as part and parcel of the means of enabling "our citizens to anticipate another crop," and "to retain as a spring to industry a portion of the means now in their possession to operate upon." Such is the plain and palpable inference from the language employed in the message. If these were the only advantages or disadvantages incident to the establishment of such an institution, your committee would not conceive it their duty further to investigate the subject, since "an expression of this body," however early or emphatic, would not, in the course of human probability, effectuate in any particular, the object pointed out. But looking beyond those immediate objects, your committee have thought it their duty to examine the subject more thoroughly. In doing this, they find it divisible into two parts, each of which they propose to examine in its order. First, as to the constitutional right of the general government, to exercise the power of erecting such an institution; Secondly, as to the expediency or propriety of establishing such an institution at this time, and its probable effects upon state banks and other local interests. Your committee see no reason to depart from the long-settled and well-established republican principle, that the government of the United States is one of limited delegated powers, and that it can in no case, with propriety, exercise any other powers, than such as have been expressly delegated, and such others as spring incidentally out of those - substantively given. That within the sphere of its delegated powers, it is bound to revolve; and whenever it shoots beyond this orb, it becomes a trespasser upon the rights of the states, and produces a tendency to consolidation, and absolute anarchy, alarming to state sovereignty, and at once subversive of the best interest of the American people. Viewing the general government, then, as one of limited authority, entitled to exercise only such powers as are above specified, your committee have searched with an anxious solicitude every line in the Constitution, to find some warrant for the erection of a National Bank. It is not pretended by the most zealous friends of this great measure, that the authority for the establishment of a National Bank, is to be found among the enumerated powers. The only legitimate subject of inquiry then is, can it be made incidental to the exercise of any specific grant of power? It is proper, first, perhaps, to define the meaning of incidental powers, as applied to this inquiry. They are such powers alone as are absolutely essential and necessary to carry into effect the substantive enumerated powers; as for instance, the power is expressly and especially given to create post-offices and post-roads; the subject of legitimate inquiry then is, what are the incidental, or implied powers carried along with, and to be exercised by virtue of, the specific grant? The answer is clearly and emphatically, all powers necessary and proper, for carrying into full and complete effect this substantive power. As for instance, the power of appointing postmasters, letting out mail contracts, providing by law for the punishment of mail-robberies, and to do all other acts needful to be done, for the cheap, safe, and speedy transportation of the mail from one place to another. These are incidental powers, which, though not expressly enumerated, are absolutely "necessary for carrying into effect that express authority to create post-offices and post-roads," and without which that clause in the Constitution would ever remain a dead letter. Thus the power to create military schools and academies, though not expressly granted, is fairly incidental to the powers of declaring war, and providing for the common defence. If this be the correct rule for defining incidental powers, the next inquiry very properly is, to the exercise of what specific grant is the power to charter a bank incidental? Here your committee find themselves launched full upon the trackless ocean of visionary political speculation. Whilst one class of politicians find ample authority for the exercise of this power, in that clause of the Constitution which says, that "Congress shall provide for the common defence and general welfare of the people of the United States;" another class contend that it is incidental to the power "to regulate commerce amongst the several states, and with foreign nations,"-and another asserts that the obligatory clause, requiring Congress to see that the revenue is collected in a uniform manner, throughout the United States, carries along with it, by an irresistible rule of construction, the power to charter banks,-whilst another, less disposed to define and particularize, argue that it is necessary to carry into effect the delegated powers generally. It has occurred to your committee as a subject worthy of some remark, that of the many parties and factions which advocate the cause of a National Bank, there is not one which does not admit, that if the general government exercise such power, it must find a guarantee for so doing, in the Constitution, since that government can do no act of sovereignty, other than is allowed by the terms of that instrument, and yet no two of them agree as to what clause affords that guarantee. Your committee have also viewed with singular emotions the wonderful influence of this great question over the minds of political partisans. It has brought together and made to harmonize, all the elements of opposition. The lion and the lamb may well be said to have lain down together. The high-toned Nullifier, whose sword leaps quickly from its scabbard to protect his country, and to avenge even a look that threatens her with insult; he whose warm blood coursed quickly through his veins upon the very mention of "protective tariff," and whose choler drove him almost to madness, in resisting an unconstitutional act of the general government, is found greeting in this great conflict, with amazing cordiality, the cold calculating Federalist, who thought it exceedingly impious to rejoice at the success of our arms in war, and who thinks a tariff to protect northern manufactories, perfectly constitutional. Yes, sir, we find that those who believe a tariff constitutional, and those who believe it unconstitutional,-those who believe internal improvement by the general government, constitutional, and those who believe it unconstitutional, and last, though not least, those who believe a bank constitutional, and those who believe it unconstitutional, all uniting, with a few honorable exceptions, in advocating a bank of the United States. Is it for the cause of the bank that all this is done? No! It is for that other purpose of destroying the existing administration, and bringing it into disrepute among the people. It surely never can be said that a party who, but a little while ago, were ready to resist "peaceably if they could, forcibly if they must," an unconstitutional act on the part of the general government, are now, for the mere love of gold, ready to commit what most of them believe, or profess to believe, a still greater infraction upon that Constitution? No! We are unwilling to believe it; the fountain of this outpouring in favor of a National Bank will be found in an anxious longing after power-a power which can only be attained in the downfall of the present administration. Your committee, with an anxious desire to arrive at correct conclusions upon this interesting subject, have made diligent inquiry into the reasons by which different politicians attempt to sustain themselves in deriving power from the Constitution to charter a National Bank. The result of their inquiries they respectfully submit to the consideration of this House. First, As to those claiming under that broad power of providing for the common good, &c., which, like the mantle of charity, is found to cover a multitude of political sins, your committee have heard the opinion advanced by jurists, and sanctioned by politicians, that Congress, so long as it exercises no powers that have been expressly prohibited, and keeps in view the exercise of its delegated functions, is to be the exclusive judge of its own powers. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, in the celebrated case of McCullough against the state of Maryland, lays down the principle in broad terms, That when the law is not prohibited, and is intended to carry into effect any power intrusted to the Government, Congress is to be the exclusive judges of the degree of its necessity. Suppose this to be the settled doctrine upon this subject, and your committee will not be so arrogant as to question its rectitude; the abolition of slavery is not expressly prohibited in the District of Columbia, nor in any of the states where it exists, and among the enumerated powers of the general government, is one authorizing it to provide for the common defence and general welfare. Suppose then that the Abolitionists of the North, whose strength, disguise it as you will, is increasing with frightful rapidity, should, under this rule of construction adopted by jurists, and sanctioned by politicians, insist that in all cases, it was their duty to provide for the "general welfare," in obedience to the power given them, and that to carry into effect this specific grant of power, it was "necessary" to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and the states where it exists. We ask whether it might not be competent for them to do so, or how this case is distinguished from the one immediately under consideration, to wit: the power to charter a National Bank, because it is a measure "necessary" for the "general welfare;" and if the Supreme Court thought it incompetent for them to inquire into the degree of necessity involved in the first case, could they undertake to make the inquiry in the latter? We think not. Again, suppose the nation, in the present enfeebled state of its treasury, be suddenly involved in a conflict with Great Britain, or some other foreign power, Congress is called upon to furnish money to carry on the war; this she refuses to do by levying a direct tax which shall bear equally upon all portions of the United States,-but incorporates a company, and invests them with exclusive power to navigate the Mississippi river for fifty years, in consideration that that company will pay the Government a bonus of twentyfive millions of money. The power to have such action on the part of the general government, is well questioned; it is not however expressly prohibited, and Congress asserts that it is "necessary" in providing for the "common defence and general welfare" to charter said company, and invest them with such powers, for the consideration of the twentyfive million bonus, and the Supreme Court, if appealed to, says, Congress is to be the judge of the necessity, and we will not interfere. We ask if such rules of construction, with such arguments to sustain them, may not, indeed if they are not likely to lead to the most disastrous consequences--consequences portentous of great evil to the rights of the states, and threatening at once the stability of our excellent forms of government? Your committee are of opinion, that this clause of the Constitution, furnishes no warrant for the establishment of a National Bank. The second inquiry is, as to the measure of power conferred by that clause of the Constitution, delegating authority to the general government, to regulate commerce between the states, and how far a "National Bank is necessary and proper" to the perfection of this power. What is meant by regulating commerce between the states and foreign nations, in the sense of the Constitution, is a subject of inquiry, properly engaging the attention of your committee. There is an essential difference, we think, between the means of carrying on commerce, and the regulation of commerce. If, instead of saying that Congress might pass laws regulating commerce among the several states and foreign nations, the Constitution had declared that Congress should have |