Agency.

ADMIRALTY-Continued.

6. It is a sound rule of navigation applicable to the western rivers, re-
cognized by courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction, that an ascend-
ing boat should not cross a channel when a descending boat is so
near that it would be possible for a collision to occur. Ib.

7. A descending boat has a right to the channel of the river, and, while
in her proper place, it is the duty of the ascending boat so to regu-
late her movements as to keep out of the way. Ib.

8. It is a great error, and one which must always incur hazard of a col-
lision, for an ascending boat to attempt to cross the bow or in front
of the descending boat, unless the distance between them is such as
to exclude the possibility of their coming in contact. Ib.

9. An up-stream boat, wishing to cross a channel when a boat is coming
down, must either slacken her speed or stop altogether until the
down boat has passed, and this rule is not affected by the fact that
the signals between the boats give the ascending boat the choice of
sides; for it is a paramount rule of navigation that, if possible, col-
lisions must be avoided, and an error by one boat will not justify
another in running into her unless it is unavoidable. Ib.

10. A boat astern attempting to pass one that is ahead, is held to stricter
vigilance and greater precaution than are required of the latter.
McGrew v. Steamboat Melnotte, 453.

11. The boat ahead is under no obligation to give way or to change her
course to facilitate the passage of the boat which is astern, and the
latter, having a choice of the time and place to pass, incurs all the
risk of the attempt. Ib.

12. This principle applies with great force and stringency when the boat
making the attempt to pass is lightly laden and easily controlled,
and the other is moved with difficulty. Ib.

13. By the well-established rules of navigation on the western rivers, an
ascending boat has the right to indicate a preference as to her course
of navigation, and having done so, the descending boat is bound to
conform to her choice as indicated by her signals, unless there are
circumstances rendering it improper to do so. Western Ins. Co. v.
Steamboat Goody Friends, 459.

14. If there are such circumstances, it is the duty of the descending boat
so to indicate, that the other boat may be navigated accordingly. Ib.
See COLLISION; DAMAGES; PRESUMPTIONS; SALVAGE; FREIGHT;
JURISDICTION; PROCEEDS; CONTRACT; EVIDENCE; LIEN; MA-

TERIAL-MEN.

AGENCY-

1. A letter from a part owner of a steamboat, requesting the person ad-
dressed to advertise the interest of the writer for sale, and in thus ad-

AGENCY-Continued.

Amnesty-Certificate.

vertising to act as his agent, confers no authority to sell, and a sale
under it is a nullity. Thurston v. Steamboat Magnolia, 92.

2. If such part owner, with a knowledge of the terms of the sale, and
with due deliberation, adopts and affirms it, it is obligatory on him
to the extent of his interest, and he can not afterward disaffirm the
ratification. Ib.

3. A power of attorney is not operative till received and accepted by
the agent, and a power to sell for cash does not authorize a sale on
credit. Ib.

1. In Ohio, a failing debtor may prefer creditors by assignment or other-
wise, if done under circumstances which repel the inference of a
fraudulent purpose. Coolidge & Dubarrow v. Curtis, 222.

2. The Supreme Court of Ohio have decided that the act of March 14,
1853, "declaring the effect of assignments to trustees, in contempla-
tion of insolvency, and the statute of 1838, of the same import, do
not affect assignments or transfers made for the sole benefit of the
assignees or transferees; but if made trustees for other parties, the
statute applies, and the property is held for the equal benefit of all
the creditors." Ib.

3. But no trust will be implied merely from the fact that an assignment
or transfer has been made by an insolvent debtor to indemnify a
surety for such debtor, if no more property has been assigned than
was necessary for that purpose, and the facts warrant the presump-
tion that nothing was designed but the bona fide indemnity of the
surety. lb.

4. Although such surety may be liable to respond to the creditors not
provided for, for any surplus after paying the debts for which he
was bound, he is not a trustee within the contemplation of the stat-
ute referred to. Ib.

See DEBT AND DEBTOR; LIEN; PARTIES.

AUTHORITY.

See TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT.

BILL OF EXCHANGE. See INDORSER; INDORSEMENT; PROMISSORY

NOTES.

BOND. See CREDITS; SURETIES; EVIDENCE; TRESPASS; POSTMASTER;

Character-Commercial Intercourse.

CHARACTER-

Proof of the previous good character of the defendant, and that
without compulsion he sought an investigation of the charge is not
only ad missible, but should have weight with the jury if the evidence
implicating him creates a reasonable doubt of his guilt. United
States v. Crow, 51.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE. See LIS PENDENS,

CITATION. See LIS PENDENS,

CITIZEN-

1. The plaintiff, having left Cincinnati in 1856, with the purpose of per-
manently residing in Chicago, and having resided there till 1859, in
the meantime exercising the right of voting in Illinois, was a citizen
of that State in 1858, when this suit was brought, and had a right to
sue in this court, though he afterward returned to Cincinnati. Blair
v. Western Female Seminary, 578.

2. The fact, that his wife and younger children remained at Cincinnati
did not, under the circumstances of this case, prevent the plaintiff
from becoming a citizen of Illinois. Ib.

COLLISION-

1. In a suit for collision, to entitle the libellant to a decree for full dam-
ages for the injury, it must appear not only that the respondents'
boat was in fault, but that the libellants' boat committed no error
which contributed to the collision. Schenck v. Steamboat Fremont, 57.
2. An up-going boat has a right to choose which side of the down boat
she will take, and to signal accordingly, but has no right to insist on
this rule when its observance will render a collision probable. Ib.
3. As a general rule, the proper place of a down boat is in the main
channel. Ib.

4. It is a paramount law of navigation that a collision must be avoided
when it is practicable to avoid it, Western Insurance Co. v. Steam-
boat Goody Friends, 459.

See PRESUMPTIONS; ADMIRALTY; FAULT; PARTIES.

COMMISSIONS. See OFFICER.

COMMISSIONER-

A commissioner for Ohio and Indiana, appointed by the Circuit
Court of the United States in Indiana, to take depositions in a case
pending in said court, has authority to administer an oath under the
laws of the United States. United States v. Coons, 2.

See EXAMINING COURT.

COMMERCIAL INTERCOURSE-

1. By the law of nations where a war exists between two distinct and
independent powers, there must be a suspension of all commercial

Compensation-Contract.

COMMERCIAL INTERCOURSE-Continued.

intercourse between their citizens; but this principle has not been
applied to the States which joined the so-called Southern Confed-
eracy. United States v. Six Boxes of Arms, 446.

COMPENSATION.

OFFICER.

CONFESSIONS-

See SALARY; SALVAGE; MARSHAL; OFFICE AND

Confessions of a prisoner should be cautiously received. United States v.
Coons, 2.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-

1. The seceding ordinances of a portion of the States did not abrogate
the constitution of the United States, or release the citizens of any
State from their obligation of loyalty to the government of the
United States, and a citizen or resident of any State may therefore
be indicted and punished for treasonable acts against that govern-
ment. United States v. Cathcart, 556.

2. The government of the United States is not a compact between the
several States, from which any State may withdraw at pleasure, with
or without cause. Ib.

3. The constitution of the United States was ordained and established,
not by the States in their sovereign capacities, but, as the preamble
emphatically declares, by the people of the United States; and the
government of the Union emanates from the people, and is a gov-
ernment for the people. Ib.

4. The government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is su-
preme within its sphere of action, and laws passed pursuant to the
constitution, form the supreme law of the land. Ib.

1. In the construction of a State law, this court is bound to adopt the
views of the Supreme Court of the State. Stapp v. Steamboat Swal-
low, 189.

2. If the construction of a State statute has been settled by the decision
of the highest court of the State, the courts of the United States uni-
formly adopt such construction. Coolidge v. Dubarrow, 222.

1. A contract, made between the masters of two steamboats, providing
for the exchange of certain barges, and stipulating, among other
things, that the two boats "shall have the use of each other's barge
until such time as they can meet and exchange barges, without injury
or loss to either party," must have a reasonable interpretation.
Slight loss or inconvenience would not justify either in a refusal to

Contraband of War-Copyright.

CONTRACT-Continued.

exchange; but each party is entitled to a reasonable time to make
the necessary arrangements for an exchange. Scott v. Steamboat
Dick Keyes,, 164.

2. Where the intention of the parties is sufficiently apparent from the
terms of a written contract, and there is no ambiguity, either latent
or patent, it is clearly inadmissible to give parol evidence in explana-
tion of the agreement. Ib.

3. Under a contract for the delivery of nine thousand tons of railroad
iron, the contract is not complied with on the shipment of the iron.
Thompson v. C. and Z. Railroad, 152.

4. Where five hundred and ninety tons of iron, shipped under such a
contract, were lost at sea, the risk of the transportation was on the
seller. Ib.

5. In estimating the loss of the purchaser, by reason of the non-delivery
of the iron thus lost, the rule of damage is the difference between
the contract price and the market value at the time and place of the
delivery. Ib.

6. Where it is stipulated in a contract that certain acts are to be done or
omitted, and the contract is of such a nature that the actual dam-
ages of non-fulfillment are susceptible of computation in money, and
a sum is named in the contract as a penalty or forfeiture for a viola-
tion, it is to be viewed as a penalty, and not as liquidated damages,
and in such case the actual damages sustained will constitute the rule
of recovery. White v. Arleth, 319.

7. A contract free from ambiguity in its terms must be viewed as the ex-
ponent of the intention of the parties to it, and can not be varied or
contradicted by extrinsic evidence. McNamara v. Gaylord, 302.

8. Where one party to a contract agrees to do an act at a time specified,
in consideration of which the other party is to do another act at the
same time, neither party can sue for a violation of the agreement,
or insist on its specific performance, without showing an offer to com-
ply with the agreement, or a sufficient excuse for not doing so. Ib.
See STATUTE OF FRAUDS; SALVAGE; SURETIES; DAMAGES.
CONTRABAND OF WAR—

The destination of arms and munitions of war, and the use intended to
be made thereof, at the time of seizure, must furnish a test of their
status as contraband or otherwise. United States v. Six Boxes of
Arms, 446.

CONVEYANCE. See FRAUD.

COPYRIGHT—

1. The chart copyrighted to the complainant's wife, as published on a
single sheet, containing diagrams representing a system of taking
measures for, and cutting ladies' dresses, with instructions for its