mittee, because I think it is somewhat difficult to follow and I am sure my explanation is probably not as clear as it might be.

Mr. DENNIS. I thought your explanation was all right and I understood it, but I hadn't heard it before in any detail and I know we have not gotten anything from Mr. Liddy and I was just wondering where we pieced it together.

Mr. DOAR. Well, it is in here and then it is also in the tabs and you can piece it together from phone records and from Mr. Sloan's testimony and from reports of the FBI when they started to get wind of the money.

As soon as they got wind of the money problem, then they told Dean and that was on the night of the 22d, and Dean reported it to Mr. Haldeman on either the night of the 22d or the morning of the 23d. Then the President called and had Mr. Helms and Mr. Walters came

over.

One significant thing about that meeting was that even before the meeting was over between Mr. Helms and Mr. Walters and the President, John Dean had made a phone call to Pat Gray during the meeting and said, "Mr. Walters will be over to see you." So that the plan to have Walters go over to the FBI to talk to Gray was initiated, was conceived even before the meeting that the President had with Mr. Helms and Walters, because otherwise, how could John Dean, who was not in the meeting, make a phone call to Mr. Gray to say that Mr. Walters would be over.

Excuse me, not that the President had with Helms and Walters, but that Mr. Haldeman had with Helms and Walters.

Now, you will remember on the 28th of June with respect to the narrowing of the FBI investigation when the CIA began to be a little reluctant about telling the FBI not to interview people involved in the Ogarrio or Dahlberg checks, Dean placed a call to Mr. Gray and had that investigation still held up.

Now, bear in mind, on the 28th of June, the case was not solved. It was only solved against McCord and the people that were found within the DNC. It was not solved at that time against Hunt and Liddy.

Then on the 28th, Ehrlichman and Dean passed part of the contents of the safe, of Hunt's safe, to Mr. Gray, except and apart from what they gave to the FBI. Now, all of you know, I am sure, that when the FBI receives any documents in the course of an investigation-and this was a special one-the special agents in charge of special investigations such as this really are awfully competent investigators and if they have a free hand they can move. This crime was not that complicated that it would have been possible for the Bureau to have really moved through this, in my judgment, rather quickly.

When they get documents from a witness or when they pick up documents which give them leads, as we all know as lawyers, they make very careful inventories of those documents. And, of course, when they made the inventory of Hunt's safe, they only made the inventory of part of Hunt's safe because Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrlichman did not deliver all the papers, which would have caused the Bureau or given the Bureau additional leads to solve this particular crime.

Now, turning next to the decision, as I say, this all led up to the June 30 conference with Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Haldeman and the President, and Mr. Mitchell talked about this, and it seems, in our judgment,

that there is evidence there that the President has knowledge of what is going on. Implicit in the conversation is a direction that the coverup should proceed.

Again, bear in mind that the President does not know, nor does he appreciate the extent of what has to be done to cover up, because again, Hunt is not identified at that time; Liddy is not identified at that time. The problem at that time was-and the money was not solved at that time. The problem at that time was McCord. The decision was made to contain that coverup until the election, and this was carried out.

Next, we come to the means. The means of containing it was to assign to Dean and Kalmbach responsibilities for particular things to do.

Dean was to throttle, to narrow, to limit, to hamper, to restrict the FBI investigation. Kalmbach was to pay money to the defendants to hire attorneys so that the attorneys could put up a good defense and for support, all for the purpose of, it seems to us it is clear from the evidence, to keep them from talking to the authorities.

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Doar, just one question.

Are you suggesting that the President was present at a meeting where it was discussed that Kalmbach should raise money for this purpose?

Mr. DOAR. No; I am not. It was Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman or the 28th.

Mr. DENNIS. All right.

Mr. FISH. Could you go a little slower, Mr. Doar?

Mr. DOAR. Surely.

Then we have the next thing with respect to the President. It was on the 6th of July when his FBI Director called him and told him, blurted out to him, to the President, that there were people in the White House who were trying to mortally wound him.

The President, after a moment's pause, said, "Just continue to make the same kind of a thorough investigation that you are already making." Well, he had not been making a thorough investigation up to that time, because the CIA and the White House had been restricting him, asking him not to proceed with this and that.

The President asked for no facts, asked for no details, did not follow up, following that call, with Mr. Gray to see just who it was and what was and how it was that people close to him were throttling the investigation.

Then on the 6th or 7th of July, the President and John Ehrlichman have a discussion about clemency. Now, this again is relevant evidence on the question of Presidential knowledge. Why else would the President discuss clemency unless he had knowledge at that time that Hunt and Liddy, who were White House people, were involved in this? According to Ehrlichman the President made it clear that there could not be any discussions of clemency within the White House.

Then we move to the 29th of August, when the President made a public statement that John Dean had made a careful investigation. Well, the fact of the matter is that John Dean had not made any investigation at all.

Then we turn to the conversation on the 15th of September, where the President discusses with John Dean thoroughly all of the prob

lems, this can of worms, that this break-in had caused. And there was this detailed discussion of what should be done with respect to the Patman hearings.

Then I want to call your attention to pages 15 and 16 of the transcript, the top of 16 of the transcript of the conversation on the 15th of September, where the President says, "I think maybe that's the thing to do; this is, this is big, big play. I am getting into this thing. So that he-he's got to know it comes from the top."

Then a little later down the line, Mr. Haldeman says, "Yeah."
Then the President says, "That's what he's got to know."

And Dean says, "Right."

And then he said, "I can't talk to him myself *** but we can

And then Dean says, "Well, if we let that slide up there, it would

just be a tragedy to let Patman have a field day.”

And the President says, "What is the first move?"

Mr. RAILSBACK. Where are you now?

Mr. DOAR. That is on the top of page 18 of the transcript, again showing Presidential direction of the coverup, direct evidence as set forth in this Presidential conversation.

Now, the third means of coverup were the payments after the election.

After the election occurred, as you can see from the conversation between Mr. Hunt and Mr. Colson, the price of silence went up. The President had won an overwhelming election and Hunt was beginning to put increased pressure for additional money for silence.

You can't read the conversation between Hunt and Colson of November 15 and reach any other conclusion.

Prior to the election, Hunt had already gotten $200,000 and money was getting short and Dean took this tape and went up and played it for Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

Haldeman and Ehrlichman cannot remember that that occurred. He then went to New York and played it for Mitchell. Mitchell acknowledges that it was played for him.

Then you have the use of, the development, or the release by Mr. Haldeman of the $350,000 White House fund to supplement the money that was being paid to the defendants. And you trace through thatMr. COHEN. Mr. Doar, could I interrupt you?

I think you said prior to the election, Hunt got $200,000?

Mr. DOAR. That is about right, yes.

Mr. COHEN. All that money did not go to Hunt himself, did it? Mr. DOAR. No, no, I meant for Hunt and the other defendants. I did not mean to suggest that.

Mr. McCAHILL. Who was the conversation between on the 15th?

Mr. DOAR. The conversation on November 15 was between Colson and Mr. Hunt, on November 15.

I suggest to the members of the committee that that is a conversation that the committee may wish to read in full, as well as a later memo that Mr. Shapiro wrote following a conversation with Hunt on the 16th of March, stating that Hunt was making demands and threats to secure money if he and his associates were going to continue to remain silent.

Then we come to March 21. There there are two problems. I think it is helpful if you accept the problems in analyzing what was dis

41-019-75-pt. 3—35

cussed at that meeting. There is the short-term problem of Huntbuying time for Hunt now to give the President and the other people an opportunity to figure out what to do. Then there is the long-term problem of continued payments to Hunt, the million dollar business, which the President figured would not work, it is not practical, because the fellows will still be in jail and there was no way that the President could provide clemency.

But you have got to distinguish between the immediate problem, the short-term payment so that the President and his men can decide how to handle this with the minimum of risk, minimum amount of loss, and the long-term problem of continuing payment to these people while they remain in jail.

Then you come to page 119 that I want to direct your attention to. if I may, of the transcript. This is in the middle of the page, where we are talking about these payments, and the President says-this is the middle of the page, page 119, talking to Dean-you don't have the transcript? "As far as what has happened up to this time, our cover there is just going to be the Cuban Committee did this for them up through the election."

Dean says, "Well, yeah, we can put that together. That isn't, of course, quite the way it happened, but, uh,"

Then the President says, "I know, but it is the way it's going to have to happen."

Dean says, "That isn't, of course, quite the way it happened."

And the President says, "I know, but it is the way it is going to have to happen."

And Dean responds, "It's going to have to happen," and laughs.

Now, the next means that was used was clemency, and the question of clemency for the defendants. The question of clemency is really, up to April, a very, very obscure matter. I mean if people talk about clemency, they are not going to talk frequently openly or forthrightly; they are going to talk elliptically. All of us are lawyers. We understand that. They are going to talk in ways that convey the message without using the word. But one puzzle that I think probably many of you are bothered about, and I am bothered about it, too, is the Hermes notebooks. I just want to say something about the Hermes notebooks and the clemency. That is that you remember that Dean did not turn over to the FBI the Hermes notebooks that belonged to Hunt.

Dean's testimony was that he did not realize that they had not been turned over, that they were in the bottom of his safe in a brown folder, and that he did not realize that they were there until some time in January, when he found them and looked at them and shredded them.

You remember that Bittman had made a motion to suppress. Bittman-you saw Bittman here. He is a tough, aggressive litigator. He manned the ramparts for the coverup all through the summer and fall of 1972. He was vigorously filing motions this way and that way in the civil cases, he was defending Hunt, and he filed this very serious motion to suppress evidence

Mr. COHEN. Would you clarify that statement, "manned the ramparts for the coverup?"

Mr. DOAR. Yes; I will. I mean the most effective way to have the coverup continue during the summer of 1972 was if the lawyers were

really tough, contentious litigators all through the summer and delayed the development of the criminal cases and the civil cases that were pending against the CRP. Bittman also testified here that he was used-they were his own words, "I was used." And he was used. He worked up to 2,500 hours during that time in defending Hunt and working with the CRP to defend those cases against disclosure in pretrial discovery and at the same time by aggressive discovery motions before trial.

Mr. COHEN. Isn't that just as consistent with being hard, tough, aggressive representation of your client to delay, file motions, in any criminal case?

Mr. DOAR. I am not saying that it is not. I am not arguing that. I am not suggesting what was Bittman's purpose. I am not talking about Bittman's purpose. My purpose is not to try Bittman here. am saying that the purpose of those that planned the coverup were to use Bittman.

Mr. COHEN. I understand it, but the impression you gave to me was that Bittman was part of this

Mr. DOAR. No; I don't mean that. I don't suggest that. I don't mean to suggest that one way or the other.

But anyway, Bittman files this motion to suppress the evidence and it is pending in the middle of December. From the standpoint of the prosecutors, this is a really difficult problem for them with respect. to Hunt. So the prosecutors get Dean in that office on the 22d of December and they get Kehrli in there and they get Howard in there, and they say, well, what about these Hermes notebooks? And nobody knows anything about them.

Finally, Dean steps out of the room with Petersen, and says to Petersen, I might lie for the President, but I won't lie for Ehrlichman and I want to tell you that part of this material went to the Director of the FBI and part went to the agency. And Petersen says, well, you are going to have to tell the truth if you get on the stand about that. Then Petersen goes off for-it is the last day before the Christmas vacation and he takes a week off and on the 5th of-3d, 4th, and 5th of January

Mr. FLOWERS. Could I ask a question for clarification?

Mr. Doar, when, if you know, did Mr. Bittman file the motion to suppress?

Mr. DOAR. I think it was sometime in October.

Mr. FLOWERS. Sometime in October.

That in and of itself would indicate that he was not in concert in this thing, because that is one of the difficult problems they had to contend with, wasn't it?

Mr. DOAR. I am not suggesting Mr. Bittman was in concert.
Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Chairman.

On that same point, I thought when Mr. Cohen raised the question, there seems to be conflicting evidence. In the newspapers it is reported that Mr. Bittman is an unindicted coconspirator, although he said here he did not know he was. If he is, that would throw him in a different light on manning the ramparts, I think.

Mr. DOAR. My point is he would be on the ramparts whether he knew it or not-whether he was or was not an unindicted coconspirator. He said he was used. I am not suggesting that-I don't know the