ingly, the other party is entitled to read it without further evidence of its execution. As against the party to it, there feems no poffible objection to this rule; for he muft know whether he ever executed fuch an inftrument or not, and the plaintiff not knowing who were the fubfcribing witneffes, cannot come prepared to prove the execution. In one cafe, this rule was extended to third perfons, into whofe hands a deed had been delivered; and it was held that an indenture of apprenticeship having come into the hands of the officers of a parish who were no partics to it, and they producing it under a notice, that no evidence was neceffary to prove the execution; but the propriety of this decifion has been doubted by very high authority. For in a fubfequent cafe where a fimilar point came before the court, Lord Kenyon faid it was too important a queftion to be difcuffed in a feffions cafe, where the opinion of a court of error could not be taken, and that nothing but a folemn judgment of the House of Lords fhould ever perfuade him that this decifion was right. There are fome inftances in which the law permits inftruments to be read in evidence without proof of the execution. In moft cafes it would be abfolutely impoffible, after a great length of time, to prove the execution of a deed, or even the hand writing of the parties. It is neceffary that a period of limitation fhould be fixed, otherwife new questions. would Ch. II. f.4. Notice to produce. Vide 2 T. Rep. 43. Prefump tion of Deeds. Bul. N. P: 255. • Forbes Ad. v. Whale, Guildhall Sitt. after Mich. T. Ch.II.f.4. would daily arife, and therefore Courts of Juftice have laid it down as a rule, that a deed of above thirty years standing, requires no further proof of its execution than the bare production, provided the poffeffion has been according to the provifions of the deed, Bul. N. P. and there is no apparent erafure, or alteration 256. on the face of it; and livery of feifin, though not indorfed on a feoffment, will, after fuch a lapfe of time, be alfo prefumed. In like manner, if a bond of that date be found amongst the papers of an inteftate,' or public company, the fame prefumption arifes in its favour from the place where it was found. (e). But as this rule is founded on prefumption, it does not apply to cafes where there are cirand Co. of cumftances to raise a contrary prefumption,' as if the poffeffion has not been according to Works, the deed, or if the deed appear on the face of v.Cowper, K.B. Sitts. it to be razed or interlined, or a man conveys a reversion, first to one, and then by a fubfe1 Ep.275. quent deed conveys it to another, and the fecond purchafer proves his title; in all thefe cafes it will be incumbent on the party to give the ordinary evidence of the execution of his deed, for the prefumption from the antiquity of the deed is destroyed by the oppofite prefumption; in the one cafe, that fome unfair alteration has been made in the deed; in the other, that the perfon having the pof 1764. 2Governor Chelfea Water after Hil. Tm. 1795. S. C. 3 Chattle v. Pound, 1701, Gilb. Law Ev. 103. (e) In Rex v. Inhabitants of Ryton, 5 T. Rep. 259, it was held, that the production of a parish certificate thirty years old, was fufficient, without evidence of the place where it came from. feffion Recitals of Deeds. feffion was also entitled; for the law will not Ch. II.f.4. raife a prefumption that a man would be guilty of fo manifeft a fraud as to convey the fame eftate to two different people. Ford v. Grey, I Fitzgerald Salk. 286. v. Euftace, Gilb. Law Vide Another inftance in which a deed is according to fome cafes confidered as proved without calling witneffes, is where one deed recites another; in this cafe, the recital it has been faid is fufficient evidence of the recited deed, against the party to that wherein it is recited, or against any one claiming under him; but against a stranger to it, evidence of the actual execution of the firft deed must be given, for the admiffion of another perfon cannot affect him, and if fuch evidence were to be admitted, deeds might eafily be fabricated by falfe recitals. But though in the above cafes it is laid down in general terms, that as against the party to the reciting deed, fuch deed is evidence of that recited in it; vet there are others in which this feems to have been confidered as fecondary evidence, and admiffible only when the firft deed was fhewn to be loft, or fome other reafon given for not producing the regular and beft evidence of it. Such is now the general received opinion of the profeffion, and we find by a cafe which I have had occafion to cite in a Ante 98. former page, that even an admiffion of a deed on oath will not prevent the neceffity of giving regular evidence of its execution. Hardr.120. 2 Lev. 108. see also Ford v. Grey, 6 Ch. II. f. 5. Jones v. Newman, SECTION V. Of Evidence to explain written Inftruments. A DEED, or other inftrument, being produced and proved, is conclufive upon the rights of the parties, and no parol evidence can be received to contradict it: but if an ambiguity arifes, it may be explained by evidence. In this cafe, however, a diftinction has been made between what is called a latent ambiguity and that which is not fo; the la tent ambiguity is that which does not appear on the face of the inftrument, where every thing feems right and clear, but the meaning being rendered uncertain, by the proof of fome fact, the law permits the removal of the doubt by the like evidence. And therefore where a teftatrix devifed her eftate to her coufin, John Cluer, there being both father and fon of that name, parol evidence was admitted that the fon was the percafe, 5 Co. fon meant; for the heir's objection arofe from 1 Black. 60. Cheny's 68 S. P. Roll. Abr. 676. parol evidence, and therefore parol evidence ought to be received to answer it. So if a man having two manors called Dale, levy a fine of the manor of Dale, circumftances may be given in evidence to prove which manor was intended, for this is not to contradict tions. the record, but to fupport it. So prefump- Ch.II. f. 5. tions of law or equity may be repelled by the Ambiguities Prefump fame teftimony, for they only prevail when there is no evidence to rebut them according to the maxim that ftabit prefumptio donec probetur in contrarium, and therefore where A. devised 400l. to his wife, and made her executrix without difpofing of the furplus, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke admitted parol evidence to fhew that the intention of the teftator was, that his wife fhould have it, for there was no ambiguity in the will, nor was it to alter the apparent intention of the testator; for by law fhe was entitled to the furplus as executrix, therefore the evidence was admitted only to rebut the rule of equity, which, in fuch cafes, divides the refidue amongst the next of kin contrary to the general rule of law. But in Brown v. Selwin, Lake, Bul. the teftator having exprefsly devised the refidue to his executors, one of whom owed Temp. Talb. 240. him money on a bond, parol evidence that the teftator meant to extinguish the bond debt was rejected, because that would have been to have altered the apparent intent, and not fimply to have rebutted an equity. In like manner, when a man levies of fine, and no deed is made to declare the ufe, the law prefumes that he did it only to fecure his eftate, and it enures to his own ufe; but parol evidence has been admitted to rebut this fumption, and veft the estate in the conufee, I pre Lake v. N. P. 297. Caf. S. C. Altham v. Earl of Anglesea, 16. Roe v. though Dougl. 25. Popham, |