"marital domicil was in Turkey." Supposing this to be the case, the Department of State had "no hesitation in saying" that, so long as she remained in Turkey, she could not, unless for the purpose of enabling her to return to the United States, obtain the Department's interposition. By marrying a Turkish subject and taking up her residence in Turkey, she became, said the Department, a Turkish subject, and to recover her American nationality " must leave Turkey and take up an American residence." Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mrs. Lografo, Feb. 6, 1886, 158 MS. Dom. The fact that an American-born woman married to a Chinese subject A quotation has been made from a note of Mr. Frelinghuysen to the minister of Sweden and Norway (supra, p. 453). The woman therein referred to was afterwards divorced from her husband, a Swede, by the Swedish courts, on account of her insanity, and was placed by her mother, an American citizen, by whom she was supported, in an asylum in Austria. From this asylum she was in 1888, against the protest of her mother, removed by a person acting as her guardian under Swedish law to an asylum in Sweden. Her mother sought to regain her custody, as her "only rightful and natural guardian;" and to this end resorted to the Swedish courts, and also invoked the good offices of the United States. The Department of State gave the following instructions: "As Madam de Bdivorced from her husband upon his application it is thought that such good offices can properly be employed in her behalf as a person whose original American nationality has reverted to her." - was Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Magee, min. to Sw. & Norway, No. 127, See, however, Pequignot v. Detroit, 16 Fed. Rep. 211. An American woman was married to a Russian subject. Four years after his death, while she was residing in France, the intervention of the United States in her behalf was invoked in respect of proceedings which, it was alleged, were about to be instituted to commit her to an insane asylum. As it did not appear that she had exercised her "possible right" of reversion to her original citizenship, which, if it existed, could be effectively asserted "by returning to and dwelling in the country of her maiden allegiance," it was held that the United States could not officially intervene in her behalf. Mr. Day, Assist. Sec. of State, to Mr. Updegraff, Jan. 27, 1898, 225 MS. By a joint resolution approved May 18, 1898, reciting that Nellie Grant Sartoris, widow, daughter of Gen. U. S. Grant, and a naturalborn citizen of the United States, had married in 1874 a British subject, thereby becoming, under the laws of Great Britain, a naturalized British subject, recognized as such by the United States under the naturalization convention of May 13, 1870, it was declared that Mrs. Sartoris was, "on her own application, unconditionally readmitted to the character and privileges of a citizen of the United States," in accordance with Art. III. of that convention. 30 Stat. 1496. A woman, a citizen of the United States, was married to a Dutch subject, from whom she was subsequently divorced. After the divorce she resumed her domicil in the United States. It was held that she was entitled to a passport as an American citizen. Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Leishman, min. to Switzerland, No. 160, 2. MARRIAGE OF ALIEN WOMEN TO AMERICANS. (1) AMERICAN LAW. $410. "Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen." Rev. Stat., § 1994; act of Feb. 10, 1855, chap. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604; As to the law prior to the act of 1855, see Shanks r. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242; The act applies to a woman married to an alien who subsequently becomes naturalized. (Kelly r. Owen, 7 Wall. 496; Headman v. Rose, 63 Ga. 458; Burton v. Burton, 1 Keyes, 359.) The phrase, "might herself be lawfully naturalized," refers to class or race, and not to the qualifications of character, residence, etc. (Leonard . Grant, 6 Sawyer C. C. 603; Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496. See Burton . Burton, 1 Keyes, 359; Pequignot r. Detroit, 16 Fed. Rep. 211, 215.) Since the act of July 14, 1870, rendering persons of the African race capable of naturalization, women of African blood have been within the operation of the statute. (Broadis r. Broadis, 86 Fed. Rep. 951.) The statute applies to a woman married to a citizen of the United States, irrespective of the time or place of marriage or the residence of the parties (Kelly r. Owen, 7 Wall. 496; United States r. Kellar, 11 Biss. 314; Williams, At.-Gen., 1874, 14 Op. 402); even though the woman lived at a distance from her husband and never came to the United States till after his death. (Kane v. McCarthy, 63 N. C. 299; Headman v. Rose, 63 Ga. 458. See Burton . Burton, 1 Keyes, 359, 362, 366; Pequignot v. Detroit, 16 Fed. Rep. 211, 215.) But it has been held that a native woman who married an alien in the United States, and lived with him there till his death, did not conversely become an alien. (Comitis v. Parkerson, 56 Fed. Rep. 556.) In an earlier case, however, it was held that a woman, an alien by birth, who lived in the United States, and who, after the death of her husband, a citizen of the United States, married a subject of her native country, resumed her original nationality. (Pequignot v. Detroit, 16 Fed. Rep. 211. Contra, Phillips, Solic. General, 1877, 15 Op. 599.) That a divorced woman continues to be a subject of the state of which her husband was a subject, still she, by some act, changes her nationality, seems to be tacitly assumed in Pequignot v. Detroit, 16 Fed. Rep. 211. "Inasmuch as the subject of naturalization is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, there would seem to be little question that such a marriage [one in conformity with the act of June 22, 1860] would be effectual for the purpose of naturalizing an alien female married to a citizen of the United States." Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Bancroft, June 7, 1870, MS. Inst. Prussia, Under the act of February 10, 1855, an alien woman, upon her marriage to an American citizen, acquires the right to be regarded by the authorities of the United States as an American citizen "in every country except that to which she owed allegiance at the time of her marriage." It may be, however, that by the law of such country she is regarded as becoming by her marriage a foreigner. In such case no conflict of law could arise, since the government of her original allegiance would concede her full American citizenship. Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Jewell, min. to Russia, June 9, 1874, H. Ex. Where a woman, a native of Santo Domingo, who had been married to a consul of the United States in that country, but who, after his death, continued to reside there, invoked the interposition of the United States in respect of depredations on her property, which were alleged to have been permitted by the authorities of the island, it was held that, while the United States "does regard the naturalization of a foreigner by reason of her marriage to an American citizen to be valid, yet at the same time something more than a mere marriage solemnization is required to establish good citizenship, such, for instance, as a domicil of some considerable duration in this country; and that, as the complainant was a native of Santo Domingo, was married there, and had lived there since her husband's death, and as her property interests seemed to be "centered in that quarter," and the evils of which she complained appeared to be "of a purely judicial nature," it was not thought that it would be "either efficacious or proper" to interfere in the matter. Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mrs. Marced de la Rodia, June 21, 1879, 128 It was suggested, but not decided, on a passport application, that the same The Government of the United States can not recognize the right of the original Government of an alien-born woman, who was married to a naturalized citizen of the United States, but who has been divorced from him, to intervene in her behalf, so long as she voluntarily continues to make the United States her home. (Mr. Adee, Second Assist. Sec. of State, to Mr. Knagenhjelm, Aug. 21, 1895, MS. Notes to Sw. & Norway, VII. 591.) The American minister at Peking having instructed the American vice-consul at Hankow that Chinese and Japanese women, married to citizens of the United States, form an exception to the rule that the citizenship of the husband determines that of the wife, on the ground that Chinese and Japanese are not capable of naturalization in the United States and that women of those races therefore do not fall within sec. 1994 R. S., his views were approved. Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Conger, min. to China, No. 622, Feb. 5, 1903, For. Rel. 1903, 45, citing Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, and Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373. See Mr. Conger to Mr. Cameron, Dec. 11, 1902, For. Rel. 1903, 44, citing 5 Sawyer, 155; 6 Sawyer, 541; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 716; In re Gee Hop, 71 Fed. Rep. 274. (2) REVERSION OF NATIONALITY. § 411. J., the widow of an American citizen, residing in Nicaragua, claimed exemption, on the ground of her American citizenship, from a forced loan. She was a native of Nicaragua. Held, that while she acquired by her marriage the nationality of her husband by virtue of section 1994, Revised Statutes, yet, being a native of Nicaragua and continuing to reside in the country of her origin, there was room for the contention that she had resumed her original nationality; and that, as she had not since her husband's death manifested any intention of coming to the United States, it was not the duty of the Government to intervene to secure her immunity from obligations imposed upon her by the country of her birth and continued domicil. Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. Baker, min. to Nicaragua, Jan. 24, 1894, For. Rel. 1894, 460. "I have received your letter of October 21st, complaining of a law recently promulgated in Nicaragua, by virtue of which a native Nicaraguan woman, who, having married an alien, continues to reside in Nicaragua after his death, recovers her Nicaraguan nationality. "As the courts of the United States have decided that an Americanborn woman who marries a foreigner and subsequently becomes a widow, still residing here, remains a citizen of the United States, we can not object to Nicaragua declaring by law a similar rule in respect to a native of Nicaragua." 66 Mr. Uhl, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Flint, Dec. 11, 1894, 199 MS. Dom. This evidently refers to the decision in Comitis v. Parkerson, 56 Fed. Rep. 556. By her marriage to a citizen of the United States Mrs. Constantine became vested with his rights as a citizen of the United States. Upon his death she might revert to her original citizenship or retain her American citizenship. She elects to do the latter, and the fact that she is dwelling in Turkey does not militate against her doing so, the Department having repeatedly ruled that the limitations of permitted residence abroad do not apply to that country." It was therefore held that she was entitled to a passport as a citizen of the United States. Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Choate, amb. to England, No. 530, Jan. 14. 1901, MS. Inst. Gr. Br. XXXIII, 534. L., a woman, originally a British subject, went to Canton, in China, and opened a hotel. By the British regulations, British subjects were required, under certain penalties, to take out a license for such purpose. There was no American regulation on the subject. L. claimed to be an American citizen under § 1994, Revised Statutes of the United States, which provides that any woman "who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen." She had lately, however, been divorced from her American husband by the judgment of the United States consular court at Niuchwang. The consul at Canton inclined to the opinion that she had by the divorce lost her American citizenship. The minister at Peking expressed the opinion that the divorce had simply dissolved the |