rumors of the arming of German prisoners. Repeat to Tokyo for information all future important telegrams relating to situation in Siberia and inform Department when done. POLK File No. 861.00/1344c The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (Spencer) [Telegram] WASHINGTON, March 2, 1918, 8 p. m. Please instruct consuls in your jurisdiction to report actual conditions, facts and occurrences in Siberia and along line of railroad, with particular regard to disturbances, releasing, organizing and arming of prisoners, actions of character hostile to our aims, German or pro-German activities, etc. The Department wants opinions and prognostications but needs specific instances and real facts in order to properly consider developments and formulate policies. POLK File No. 861.00/1193 The Chargé in China (Spencer) to the Secretary of State 1 [Telegram] PEKING, March 3, 1918, noon. Palmer in Irkutsk telegraphs as follows: On account of anarchy regulations all commercial transactions are impossible. War prisoners are armed and organized. Maximalists are showing great discontent at Chinese embargo. They fear intervention by Japan or the Allies but such intervention is desired by almost the entire population and appears to be very urgent. Maximalists have warned consuls and foreigners that the country will make reprisals in case of need. I have transmitted the above to Admiral Knight in Vladivostok and instructed Consul Moser in Harbin to give the Admiral all possible information from every point of view. 'William Morgan Palmer, Vice Consul. SPENCER File No. 861.00/1220 The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State1 [Telegram] Moscow, March 3, 1918, noon. [Received March 4, 8.55 p. m.] 225. The Bolsheviks yesterday 2 signed an ignominious unconditional peace with the Central powers whose last demands embraced great part of Russia, also oil and mineral lands Batum, Kars, and Ardakhan. Bolshevik press and attitude of authorities continue hostile to the Allies and friendly Central powers. Prominent Russians have asked me to advise American Government that any delay in occupying Siberian Railway will result in complete domination by Germany of all Russia and control of this line which is now the only communication with outside world. If this is done the prisoners with aid of Bolsheviks will soon control line and keep same open for military purposes. Joint intervention will be welcomed by the great majority of peaceful Russians who consider such a step as the only escape from anarchy on the one side or the restoration of autocracy under German protection on the other side. File No. 861.00/1196 SUMMERS The Chargé in China (Spencer) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] PEKING, March 3, 1918, 6 p. m. Following received from Consul at Harbin for transmission to you: March 1, 11 p. m. I am informed by high authority of new organization formed here to support Semenov under leadership of Kudachev, Horvat, Rusanov, provisional commissioner of Priamur district, Lavrov, provisional commissioner of Irkutsk. They are enlisting men and yesterday sent four field guns, fifteen machine guns to Semenov. It is proposed to organize army restoration Far East and popular government Siberia under Admiral Kolchak now in Shanghai. Semenov to advance to Irkutsk and there await support of Japanese whose money and forces already promised. Later telegrams from Semenov report Bolsheviks fighting on railway at west stations Manchuria [Manchuria Station?] and all west-bound trains being held up there. Moser. SPENCER File No. 861.00/1193 The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (Spencer) [Telegram] WASHINGTON, March 4, 1918, 7 p. m. Your March 3, noon. How many prisoners have been released? How many are armed? Where did they get arms? What proportions Austrians and Germans? How are they officered? Send as many other facts as obtainable and please continue so to send. POLK File No. 861.00/1229 The Chargé in China (Spencer) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] PEKING, March 5, 1918, 2 p. m. [Received 7.40 p. m.] Consul at Harbin telegraphs in the following sense: Railway Manchouli to Chita destroyed. This is officially confirmed. Ambassador Francis is expected arrive Vladivostok 14th via Amur. It is rumored that Bolsheviks are detaining them. Semenov retreated to Manchouli before superior well-organized Bolshevik advance bringing in dead and wounded. Bolshevik accurate fire indicates German prisoners' assistance at the field guns. Semenov's money and munitions exhausted and he must fail unless given. immediate support. Allied officials Harbin agree Siberian situation is growing worse. Russians hopeless. All proposed plans met with opposition or apathy. Fifty per cent railway workmen Manchuria are now Bolshevik, whereas a month ago obeyed chief engineer. Yesterday workmen refused to move gun trains for Semenov and attempted to destroy them but loyal Cossacks prevented. Widespread German Bolshevik propaganda responsible. Reliable observers report constant speeches favoring Germany. Fifteen thousand copies of the President's speech have been distributed in the Russian language but more direct presentation of Allied cause is essential. Political attitude is due to fear of Japanese and belief Allies will not assist Siberia except for selfish purposes. Statements constantly heard from every class that the Germans are preferable to the Japanese. The idea that the Bolsheviks will oppose the Germans is pure illusion. SPENCER Declaration of the American Government against Intervention, March 5, 1918: Further Discussion-Further Reports Concerning Enemy Prisoners-Japanese Offer of Support to Horvat File No. 861.00/1246 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)1 [Telegram] WASHINGTON, March 5, 1918, 4 p. m. At your earliest opportunity you will please read to the Japanese Government the following message but leave no copy unless they request you to do so: The Government of the United States has been giving the most careful and anxious consideration to the conditions now prevailing in Siberia and their possible remedy. It realizes the extreme danger of anarchy to which the Siberian provinces are exposed and the imminent risk also of German invasion and domination. It shares with the governments of the Entente the view that, if intervention is deemed wise, the Government of Japan is in the best situation to undertake it and could accomplish it most efficiently. It has, moreover, the utmost confidence in the Japanese Government and would be entirely willing, so far as its own feelings towards that Government are concerned, to intrust the enterprise to it. But it is bound in frankness to say that the wisdom of intervention seems to it most questionable. If it were undertaken the Government of the United States assumes that the most explicit assurances would be given that it was undertaken by Japan as an ally of Russia, in Russia's interest, and with the sole view of holding it safe against Germany and at the absolute disposal of the final peace conference. Otherwise the Central powers could and would make it appear that Japan was doing in the East exactly what Germany is doing in the West and so seek to counter the condemnation which all the world must pronounce against Germany's invasion of Russia, which she attempts to justify on the pretext of restoring order. And it is the judgment of the Government of the United States, uttered with the utmost respect, that, even with such assurances given, they could in the same way be discredited by those whose interest it was to discredit them; that a hot resentment would be generated in Russia itself, and that the whole action might play into the hands of the enemies of Russia, and particularly of the enemies of the Russian revolution, for which the Government of the United States entertains the greatest sympathy, in spite of all the unhappiness and misfortune which has for the time being sprung out of it. The Government of the United States begs once more to express to the Government of Japan its warmest friendship and confidence and once more begs it to accept 66 1 1 Message to the Japanese Government repeated in telegrams Mar. 5, 8 p. m., to the Ambassadors in Great Britain (No. 6774), France (No. 3260), and Italy (No. 1104), "for your information and guidance," with the further statement: Copies of it were read by me this afternoon to Ambassadors of France, England, and Italy." It was also repeated to the Ambassador in Russia in telegram No. 2108, Mar. 11, 7 p. m., with Mar. 3 given erroneously as the date on which it was dispatched to Tokyo and read to the Ambassadors in Washington. these expressions of judgment as uttered only in the frankness of friendship. POLK File No. 861.00/1285 The Counselor for the Department of State (Polk) to the Secretary of State March 15, 1918. MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The attached memorandum1 was delivered by you to me on March 1, with instructions to show it to the British, French, and Italians. I showed it to the French Ambassador, and Barclay, of the British Embassy, on March 1. They read it and Barclay took a copy. The French Ambassador said that we need not wait to hear any further, but could send the telegram attached 2 at once, as his Government had practically made the request and was only waiting to confirm it in order to hear that we were satisfied. I told him we would wait until we heard from him and the British. On Saturday, March 2, I showed the message to the Italian Ambassador and let him take a copy. He then told me that the Italian Government had made three conditions in their discussion of this matter: (1) That anything done in Siberia should be satisfactory to this Government; (2) Action should be not by Japan alone; (3) Guaranties should be given by Japan that they do not intend to hold territory. The Japanese Chargé came in on the 2d and asked if we had anything to say against their position. I told him we wished to be perfectly frank with him, and I would let him know in a few days. He wanted to know whether we were waiting for further facts, and I told him I would let him know, and took good care not to commit myself as to whether we had made up our mind, or as to our attitude. On Sunday, March 3, I saw the President and discussed the situation. He instructed me to communicate with the Japanese in order to be perfectly frank with them. On March 4, I was called up and told to wait before communicating with the Japanese for further instructions. On March 5, I saw the President and went over the statement as to our position on the Siberian question. Certain changes were made, and I was instructed to send it at once to Tokyo and communicate it here. I saw Barclay, of the British Embassy, in the absence of the Ambassador, and gave him a copy. I also gave Laboulaye, of the French Embassy, a copy, as his Ambassador was away. Barclay read me an 2 1 Not printed. The foregoing telegram to the Ambassador in Japan sent Mar. 5, after some changes had been made in the original form; see third paragraph below. |