REPORT OF ACCIDENTS. The Commission, in order to facilitate the forwarding of reports of accidents as provided for under section 27 of the Act to Regulate Common Carriers in this State, issued a circular order on June 8, 1909, addressed to all carriers, and sent them blank forms of reports to fill out and forward to the office of the Commission. The Colorado & Southern Railway Company and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, up to the time of going to press on this report, have failed to furnish the Commission with their annual reports of accidents, as required. The law under which the Commission is now acting became effective February 15, 1911, but at the time of issuing the aforesaid order it was acting under the old law of 1907, and on account of the question as to the constitutionality of the old law having been raised, the Commission did not deem it wise to seek to enforce the order requiring a report under the old law; nor did it deem it wise to publish the report of some and not of others. Some of the reports of the railroad companies which have been sent in reveal a heavy loss of life and a corresponding heavy list of injured. The Commission feels that to publish the reports of those roads which obeyed the order would be putting a premium on disobedience of the orders of the Commission. The chief benefit of statistics of railway accidents is to point out to those in charge of railway operations and to the people of this State that class of accidents which may be lessened by greater care on the part of railway employes, or greater uniformity in railway equipment and conditions of management. The most prominent fact regarding accidents for the year ending June 30, 1910, is the appalling loss of life and property in collisions. As to whether the present year can be called materially worse or materially better than what it has been in previous years we have no data upon which to base an opinion. That so many people, comprising passengers and employes, should be killed or injured on the railroads in the State of Colorado indicates a condition which should not pass without serious attention. Some of these accidents were due to causes which have never been satisfactorily explained; therefore there is urgent need for a careful consideration of railroad accidents, their causes and results. An interesting discussion on the block signal system and recommendations to the Legislature will be found in a report by the Commission issued December 31, 1909, copies of which can be had on application to the Secretary thereof. During the period embodied in this report the Commission has received notice of and investigated (either by correspondence or direct investigation on the ground at the scene of the accident, depending upon the circumstances) the following number of casualties involving loss of life or personal injury: DOTSERO WRECK. The Dotsero wreck occurred on the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad at Dotsero, Colorado, January 15, 1909. No. 5 westbound passenger had wait order for third No. 66 freight at Dotsero. No. 5 violated said orders and collided with third No. 66 about a quarter of a mile west of Dotsero, killing twenty people and injuring about thirty-five. Five of the injured died within a week of the accident. Below will be found report of investigation made by the Commission: There were two trains involved. First, train No. 5, which was the westbound passenger and express, Engine No. 708, Gus Olsen, Engineer, and A. McCurdy, Conductor, in charge of the train. Fireman, N. D. Wheeler; Flagman, O. Wilson; Brakeman, F. J. Roberts. At Wolcott, a station about twenty-four miles east of Dotsero, Train No. 5 received a train order, No. 37. (All train orders given out being numbered in consecutive order for each day.) This order, after being properly dated and addressed at Wolcott, reads as follows: "No. five Engine No. 708. wait at Dotsero until Nine fifty five. 9/55 P. M. for third No. 66 Engine 1127, and wait at Gypsum untill nine forty 9/40 P. M. for second No. 66 Engine 1110." On the arrival at Gypsum of Train No. 5 they found second No. 66, Engine 1110, on the siding, and passed Gypsum at nine thirty-five (9:35) p. m., consuming about eleven minutes between Gypsum and Dotsero, the distance being seven (7) miles between the two points, and without stopping at Dotsero, or diminishing the speed of the train, passed the entire length of the siding at Dotsero from east to west, passing the west switch at nine fortysix (9:46) p. m., and collided with third No. 66, fourteen hundred and fourteen feet west of the west switch at Dotsero, 9:47 p. m. It is admitted by the train crew that the engineer of No. Five blew the whistle at or near the east whistling post east of Dotsero, which is one of the requirements on all railways. However, the train crew seemed not to be aware they had reached Dotsero until they were crossing the west switch at Dotsero (passing the siding), which switch is 2,735 feet west of the east switch. The west switch is the one that third No. 66 should have taken in order to clear No. Five as per order No. 37. In accordance with the rules of the company, third No. 66 should have their train on the Dotsero siding, clear of the main line, at nine fifty (9:50) p. m., five minutes before the time No. Five was due to leave Dotsero, as per order No. 37. It appears the train known as third No. 66 had ample time to take its place on the side-track and clear the main line in accordance and within the rules of the Company, as they were within 1,414 feet of the west switch at 9:47 p. m. The physical character of the main line, with reference to curvature, so obscured the view of both crews to such an extent that they were unable to prevent collision, once they were in sight of each other. Five hundred and fifty feet west of the west switch at Dotsero the track makes a curve to the left, which, in going west, would be on the Fireman's side of the engine. This curve is known as a nine and a half degree curve and is 626 feet long. The high bank on the inside of the curve obscures the view ahead at about midway of the center stretch. Passing through Dotsero from the east, No. Five was running down a grade of about 26 feet to the mile. The accident occurred at the foot of the grade. The freight train known as Third No. 66 approaching the switch at Dotsero was passing over a level grade. The track at the place of collision is straight only for a distance of about 480 feet. Third No. 66, before coming on this short, straight piece of track, passed around a curve to the left. This curve is an eight degree curve. A view of approaching trains on the main line could only be obtained from the Fireman's side of the engine, still further obscured by high banks and cuts. The Commission was accorded every facility by the Company Officials in order to arrive at the facts. One member of the Commission was present at the examination of all the members of the train crews except three, who were too much injured to appear. The Commission was furnished with copies of all train orders which were issued to cover the movement of these trains, which form of orders are the same as are used by all railways operating west of the Missouri river. The responsibility for this accident rests on the train crew of Train No. 5 of January 15, 1909; Gus Olsen, Engineer, and A. McCurdy, Conductor in charge. "UNCLE SAM" WRECK. The "Uncle Sam" wreck occurred on the D. & R. G. R. R. at Denver, Colorado, June 16, 1909, as a result of a derailment, killing the Engineer and Fireman. Suburban train No. 27, westbound, consisting of engine and two passenger cars, derailed about four hundred feet south of Mississippi street, Denver. The Engineer and Fireman were caught in and under the engine, which turned over. The passenger cars left the rails, but remained in an upright position. Cause of accident unknown. Below will be found the report and investigation made by the Commission: |