TASTE.

THE nature of the present undertaking leads me to begin with some enquiries concerning Taste, as it is this faculty which is always appealed to, in disquisitions concerning the merit of discourse in writing.

There are few subjects on which men talk. more Loosely and indistinctly than on Taste; few which it is more difficult to explain with precision; and none which in this course of Lectures will appear more dry or abstract. What I have to say on the subject shall be in the following order. I shall first explain the Nature of Taste as a power or faculty in the human mind. I shall next consider how far it is an improveable faculty: I shall shew the sources of its improvement, and the characters of taste in its most perfect state. I shall then examine the various fluctuations to which it is liable, and inquire. whether there be any standard to which we can bring the different tastes of men, in order to distinguish the corrupted from the true.

Taste may be defined "The power of receiving pleasure "from the beauties of nature and art." The first question that occurs concerning it is, whether it is to be considered as an internal sense, or as an exertion of reason? Reason is a very general term; but if we understand by it, that power of the mind which in speculative matters discovers truth, and in practical matters judges of the fitness of means to an end, I apprehend the question may be easily answered. For nothing can be more clear, than that Taste is not resolvable into any.such operation of reason. It is not merely through a discovery of the understanding or a deduction of argument, that the mind receives pleasure from a beautiful prospect or a fine poem. Such

objects often strike us intuitively, and make a strong impression, when we are unable to assign the reasons of our being pleased. They sometimes strike in the same manner the philosopher and the peasant; the boy and the man. Hence the faculty by which we relish such beauties, seems more akin to a feeling of sense, and to a process of the understanding; and accordingly from an external sense it has borrowed its name ; that sense by which we receive and distinguish the pleasures of food having, in several languages, given rise to the word Taste, in the metaphorical meaning under which we now consider it. However, as in all subjects which regard the operations of the mind, the inaccurate use of words is to be carefully avoided, it must not be inferred from what I have said, that reason is excluded from the exertions of Taste. Though Taste, beyond doubt, be ultimately founded on a certain natural and instinctive sensibility to beauty, yet reason, as I shall shew hereafter, assists Taste in many of its operations, and serves to enlarge its power.*

Taste, in the sense in which I have explained it, is a faculty common in some degree to all men. Nothing that belongs to human nature is more universal than the relish of beauty of one kind or other of what is orderly, proportioned, grand, harmonious, new, or sprightly. In children, the rudiments of Taste discover themselves very early in a thousand instances; in their fondness for regular bodies, their admiration of pictures and statues, and imitations of all kinds: and their strong attachment to whatever is new or marvellous. The most ignorant peasants are delighted with ballads and tales, and are struck with the beautiful appearances of nature in the earth and heavens. Even in the deserts of America, where human nature shews itself in its most uncultivated state, the savages have their ornaments of dress, their war and their death songs, their " harrangues, and their orators. We must therefore conclude the principles of Taste to be deeply founded in the human mind.

* See Dr. Gerard's Essay on Taste.-D'Alembert's Reflections on the use and abuse of philosophy in matters which relate to Taste.-Reflexions Critiques sur la poesie et sur la peinture, Tom. II. ch. 22-31. Elements of Criticism, chap. 25.-Mr. Hume's Essay on the Standard of Taste.-Introduction to the Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful.

It is no less essential to man to have some discernment of beauty, than it is to possess the attributes of reason and of speech.*

But although none be wholly devoid of this faculty, yet the degrees in which it is possessed are widely different. In some men only the feeble glimmerings of Taste appear; the beauties which they relish are of the coarsest kind; and of these they have but a weak and confused impression; while in others, Taste rises to en acute discernment, and a lively enjoyment of the most refined beauties. In general, we may observe, that in the powers and pleasures of Taste, there is a more remarkable inequality among men than is usually found in point of common sense, reason, and judgment. The constitution of our nature in this, as in all other respects, discovers admirable wisdom. In the distribution of those talents which are necessary for man's well-being, Nature hath made less distinction among her children. But in the distribution of those which belong only to the ornamental part of life, she hath bestowed her favours with more frugality. She hath both sown the seeds more sparingly; and rendered a higher culture requisite for bringing them to perfection.

This inequality of Taste among men is owing, without doubt, in part, to the different frame of their natures; to nicer organs, and finer internal powers, with which some are endowed beyond others. But, if it be owing in part to nature, it is ow

* On the subject of Taste considered as a power or faculty of the hind, much less is to be found among the ancient, than among the modern rhetorical and critical writers. The following remarkable passage in Cicero serves, however, to shew, that his ideas on this subject agree perfectly with what has been said above. He is speaking of the beauties of style and numbers. "Illud autem "nequis admiretur quonam modo hæc vulgus imperiţɔrum in audiendo, notet; "cum in omni genere, tum in hoc ipso, magna quædam est vis, incredibilisque "naturæ. Omnes enim tacito quodam sensu, sine ullâ arte aut ratione, quæ "sint in artibus de rationibus recta et prava dijudicant: idque cum faciunt "in picturis, et in signis, et in aliis operibus, ad quorum intelligentiam a naturâ "minus habent instrumenti, tum multo ostendunt magis in verborum, numerorum, vocumque judicio ; quod ea sunt in communibus infixa sensibus; neque " earum rerum quenquam funditus natura voluit esse expertem." Cic. de Orat. lib. i. cap. 50. Edit. Gruteri.- -Quintilian seems to include Taste (for which, in the sense which we now give to that word, the ancients appear to have had no distinct name) under which he calls judicium. “Locus de judicio, meá "quidem opinione adco partibus hujus operis omnibus connectus ac mistus est, "ut ne a sententiis quidem aut verbis saltem singulis possit separari, nec magis "arte traditur quam gustus aut odor.--Ut contraria vite mus et communia, ne quid in eloquendo corruptum obscurrumque sit, referatur oportet ad sensu3 qui nɔn docentur." Institut. lib. vi. cap. 3. Edit. Obrechti.

ing to education and culture still more.

The illustration of

this leads to my next remark on this sect, that Taste is a 'most improveable faculty, if there be any such in human nature; a remark which gives great encouragement to such a course of study as we are now proposing to pursue. Of the truth of this assertion we may easily be convinced, by only reflecting on that immense superiority which education and improvement give to civilized, above barbarous nations, in refinement of Taste; and on the superiority which they give in the same nation to those who have studied the liberal arts, above the rude and untaught vulgar. The difference is so great, that there is perhaps no one particular in which these two classes of men are so far removed from each other, as in respect of the powers and the pleasures of Taste and assuredly for this difference no other general cause can be assigned, but culture and education. I shall now proceed to shew what the means are by which Taste becomes so remarkably susceptible of cultivation and progress.

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Reflect first upon that great law of our nature, that exercise is the chief source of improvement in all our faculties. This holds both in our bodily, and in our mental powers. It holds even in our external senses; although these be less the subject of cultivation than any of our other faculties. We see how acute the senses become in persons whose trade or business leads to nice exertions of them. Touch, for instance, becomes infinitely more exquisite in men whose employment requires them to examine the polish of bodies, than it is in others. They who deal in microscopical observations, or are accustomed to engrave on precious stones, acquire surprising accuracy of sight in discerning the minutest objects, and practice in attending to different flavours and tastes of liquors, wonderfully improves the power of distinguishing them, and of tracing their composition. Placing internal Taste therefore on the footing of a simple sense, it cannot be doubted that frequent exercise, and curious attention to its proper objects, must greatly heighten its power. Of this we have one clear proof in that part of Taste, which is called an ear for music. Experience every day shews, that nothing is more improveable. Only the simplest and plainest compositions are relished at first; use and practice extend our pleasure; teach us to relish finer melody, and by de

grees enable us to enter into the intricate and compounded pleasures of harmony. So an eye for the beauties of painting is never all at once acquired. It is gradually formed by being conversant among pictures, and studying the works of the best

masters.

Precisely in the same manner, with respect to the beauty of composition and discourse, attention to the most approved models, study of the best authors, comparisons of lower and higher degrees of the same beauties, operate towards the refinement of Taste. When one is only beginning his acquaintance with works of genius, the sentiment which attends them is obscure. and confused. He cannot point out the several excellencies or blemishes of a performance which he peruses; he is at a loss on what to rest his judgment; all that can be expected is, that he should tell in general whether he be pleased or not. But allow him more experience in works of this kind, and his Taste becomes by degrees more exact and enlightened. He begins to perceive not only the character of the whole, but the beauties and defects of each part; and is able to describe the peculiar qualities which he praises or blames. The mist dissipates which seemed formerly to hang over the object; and he can at length pronounce firmly, and without hesitation, concerning it. Thus in Taste, considered as mere sensibility, exercise opens a great source of improvement.

But although Taste be ultimately founded on sensibility, it must not be considered as instinctive sensibility alone. Reason and good sense, as I before hinted, have so extensive an influence, on all the operations and decisions of Taste, that a thorough good taste may be well considered as a power compounded of natural sensibility to beauty, and of improved understanding. In order to be satisfied of this, let us observe, that the greater part of the productions of genius are no other than imitations. of nature; representations of the characters, actions, or manners of men. The pleasure we receive from such imitations or representations is founded on mere Taste: but to judge whether they be properly executed, belongs to the understanding, which compares the copy with the original.

In reading, for instance, such a poem as the Eneid, a great part of our pleasure arises from the plan or story being well conducted, and all the parts joined together with probability and