LX.

Do not laugh at the men who seek respect through their duties and official stations; for we regard no man but for his acquired qualities. All men naturally hate one another. I hold it a fact, that if men knew exactly what one says of the other, there would not be four friends in the world. This appears from the quarrels to which occasional indiscreet reports give rise.

LXI.

Death is more easy to endure without thinking about it, than the thoughts of death without the risk of it.

LXII.

It is wonderful, that a thing so visible as the vanity of this world, should be so little known, and that it should be so uncommon and surprising to hear any one condemn as folly, the search after its honors.

He who does not see the vanity of this world, is vain indeed. For who does not see it, except those young persons who are hurried along in the bustle and din of its amusements, without a thought of the future? But take away those diversions, and you will see them wither with ennui. They then feel their emptiness, without knowing it; for it is a very wretched state, to sink into insupportable sadness, as soon as we cease to be diverted, and are left free to think.

LXIII.

Almost everything is partly true and partly false. But it is not so with essential truth, which is perfectly pure and true. This admixture dishonors and annihilates truth. There is nothing true, if we mean pure essential truth. We may say homicide is bad, because that which is evil and false

is well understood by us. But what can we say is good? Celibacy? I say no; for the world would terminate. Marriage? No; for continency is better. Not to kill? No; for disorders would increase, and the wicked would murder the good. To kill? No; for that destroys nature. We have nothing true or good, but what is only partially so, and mixed with evil and untruth.

LXIV.

Evil is easily discovered, there is an infinite variety; good is almost unique. But some kinds of evil are almost as difficult to discover, as that which we call good; and often particular evil of this class passes for good. It needs even a certain greatness of soul to attain to this, as to that which is good.

LXV.

The ties which link the mutual respect of one to another, are, in general, the bonds of necessity. And there must be different degrees of them, since all men seek to have dominion, and all cannot, though some may attain to it. But the bonds which secure our respect to this or that individual in particular, are the bonds of the imagination.

LXVI.

We are so unfortunate, that we cannot take pleasure in any pursuit, but under the condition of experiencing distress, if it does not succeed, and this may happen with a thousand things, and does happen every hour. He who shall find the secret of enjoying the good, without verging to the opposite evil, has hit the mark for happiness.

CHAPTER X.

VARIOUS THOUGHTS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE.

I.

In proportion as our own mind is enlarged, we discover a greater number of men of originality. Common-place people see no difference between one man and another.

II.

A man may possess sound sense, yet not be able to apply it equally to all subjects; for there are men highly judicious in certain things, who fail in others. The one class are adapted to draw conclusions from a few principles; the other, to draw conclusions in cases which involve a great variety of principles. For instance, the one understands well the phenomena of water, the principles of which are few, but the results of which are so extremely delicate, that none but a peculiarly acute intellect can trace them; and probably, these men would never have been geometers, because geometry involves a great many principles; and the nature of a mind may be such, that it can trace a few principles up to their extreme results, but cannot comprehend those things in which a multitude of principles are combined.

There are therefore two sorts of minds; the one fathoms rapidly and deeply the principles of things, and this is the spirit of accurate discrimination; the other comprehends a great many principles without confusing them, and this is the spirit of mathematics. The one is energy and clearness of mind; the other is expansion of mind. Now, the

one may exist without the other. The mind may be powerful, but narrow, or it may be expanded but feeble.

There is much difference between the geometrical mind, and the acute mind. The principles of the one are clear and palpable, but removed from common use; so that, for want of the habit, it is difficult to bring the attention down to such things; but as far as the attention is given to them, the principles of those things are plainly seen, and it would need a mind altogether in error, to reason falsely on matters, so common place, that it is almost impossible their principles should not be ascertained.

But in the case of the acute mind, the principles with which it is conversant are found in common use, and before the eyes of all men. You have but to turn your head without effort, and they are before you. The only essential point is a right perception; and this is necessary; for the principles are so interwoven and so numerous, that it is almost impossible but that some should escape. Now, the omission of one principle leads to error; hence it needs a very accurate perception to ascertain all the principles, and then a sound judgment not to reason falsely on known principles.

All geometers would be acute men, if they possessed this keenness of perception, for they cannot reason falsely on the principles which they perceive; and men of acute mind would be geometers, if they could turn their attention to the less prominent principles of geometry.

The reason then why some men of acute intellect are not geometers is, that they cannot turn their attention to the principles of geometry; but the reason why geometers have not this acuteness, is, that they do not perceive what is before their eyes, and being accustomed to the plain and

palpable principles of geometry, and never reasoning till they have well ascertained and handled their principles, they are lost in these matters of more acute perception, where the principles cannot be so easily ascertained. They are seen with difficulty; they are felt rather than seen. It is scarcely possible to make them evident to those who do not feel them of themselves. They are so delicate and numerous, that it requires a very keen and ready intellect to feel them; and generally, they cannot be demonstrated in order, as in geometry, because these principles cannot be so obtained, and it were an endless labor to undertake it. The thing must be seen at once, at a glance, and not by a process of reasoning, at least, to a certain degree. And hence it is rare that geometers are acute men, or acute men geometers; because geometers will treat these nicer matters geometrically, and thus make themselves ridiculous; they will begin with definitions, and then go to principles-a mode that will not answer in this sort of reasoning. It is not that the mind does not take this method, but it does so, silently, naturally, without the forms of art; for all men are capable of the expression of it, but this feeling of it is the talent of few.

And the acute mind, on the contrary, accustomed to judge at a glance, is so amazed when a series of propositions is presented which it understands but little, and when to enter into them, it is necessary to go through definitions and dry principles, which it has not been accustomed thus to examine in detail, and from which it turns away in disgust. There are, however, many weaker minds, which are neither acute nor geometrical.

Geometers, therefore, who are exclusively so, possess a sound judgment, provided the matter be properly explain